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ABSTRACT
Full of Grace and Truth: The Sacramental Economy according to Thomas Aquinas
Neo-Thomism misread Aquinas by trying to find in him answers to questions posed 
by  Descartes  and  Kant,  producing  a  theology  that  people  like  Chauvet  rightly 
abandoned.  This thesis, on the other hand, proposes a decidedly pre-modern reading 
of Thomas.  It begins with two basic structures of Thomas' thought  -  a threefold 
notion  of  truth  (so  that  truth  is  ontological  as  well  as  epistemological),  and  an 
understanding of exitus-reditus that shows its links to “archaic” concepts such as the 
hau of  the  Maori.   Then  it  considers  human  life  in  terms  of  merit  and  thus 
“economy,” (exchange of valuables); but this economy is a gift economy, and here 
we consider the gift in the light of Seneca (whom Thomas took as an authority) and 
Mauss, as well as using Allard's insights into how debt, particularly debt to God, 
generates what in Thomas takes the place of the Cartesian subject.  In this light grace 
is seen as the spirit of the gift with which God graces us, giving rise to gratitude.
We then consider  Christ  as  graced and gracing  us,  first  of  all  by our 
configuration to him in the sacraments (using the analogy of clothes), followed by a 
conformation in grace.  We look at this in baptism and penance, but then we take the 
Eucharist as a three-fold sign, and show how it generates in us faith, hope and love. 
The unity of the sacrament as a gift is emphasised, and the cases of its division, such 
as fiction, the votum sacramenti, and circumcision are examined.  As a Jew, Derrida 
gives insight into grace before the coming of Christ and the value of the sacrifice of 
Abraham, and in this way we can see how Thomas circumvents Derrida's critique of 
the gift.  Finally we compare Thomas with Chauvet.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 How do we read Thomas today?
1.1.1 Paradigm change in sacramental theology
“How did  it  come about  that,  when attempting  to  comprehend  theologically  the  
sacramental  relation  with  God  expressed  most  fully  under  the  term 'grace,'  the  
Scholastics  (and  here  we  will  consider  only  Thomas  Aquinas)  singled  out  for  
privileged consideration the category of 'cause'?”1
Thus begins  Louis-Marie  Chauvet's  Symbol  and Sacrament,  the book 
that probably best expresses what might be called the paradigm change in Catholic 
sacramental theology since the Second Vatican Council  -  and the critique of Thomas 
continues throughout the volume.2  And so we must ask: given this paradigm change, 
how are  we  to  continue  to  use  the  Scholastics  (and  here  we will  consider  only 
Thomas Aquinas) in sacramental theology?
The notion of paradigm change originated in the field of the history of 
the natural sciences, and its application to the practice of theology is not without 
complications.  Paradigm change, as Thomas Kuhn understands it, is different from 
normal  science  or,  in  our  case,  normal  theology.   It  occurs  when  the  current 
orthodoxy is no longer working, when the practitioners are increasingly dealing not 
with the discipline's proper external object, but with questions raised from within by 
their own terminology, and when there is a proliferation of explanations, none of 
them truly satisfying.3  The new paradigm shows its superiority by providing better 
1 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian  
Existence, tr. Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995), 7.
2 Originally published as Symbole et sacrement: une relecture sacramentelle de l'existence  
chrétienne (Paris: Cerf, 1987).
3 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1996), 82-83.
1
solutions  to  a  wide range of  problems,  and rendering the  previously problematic 
question superfluous, and the way it achieves this becomes its own model of problem 
solving.4  Once the new paradigm is established, the elements that characterised the 
old paradigm  -  Ptolemaic epicycles, phlogiston, the ether  -  are relegated to the 
status of historical curiosities, and the writings of the old paradigm are irrelevant to 
the practitioners of the new, although scientists have a tendency to create a linear 
history of their discipline, with selected heroes from the times of earlier paradigms, 
to whom are attributed notions they could not have held.5
I want to sugggest that the change in sacramental theology did involve 
an aporia with a proliferation of unsatisfactory attempts at solution, but also to argue 
that, because of the nature of the discipline, theology cannot cut itself off from its 
past nor so easily rewrite its history.  Rather, paradigm change in theology involves a 
new way of reading the documents of the past, and thus we need to find a new way 
of reading Thomas.
1.1.2 The aporia of sacramental causality
If  paradigm  change  renders  the  problems  of  the  previous  paradigm 
superfluous, then it is no surprise that the aporia of the old sacramental theology was 
how sacraments caused grace, precisely the thing Chauvet declares outdated in his 
opening sentence.   Bernard Leeming notes  five sorts  of  theories,  some having a 
number of variants, and further adds to the confusion for, although not wishing to be 
an  innovator,  comments   “It  is  legitimate  in  so  disputable  a  matter,  to  suggest 
modifications to the view of others.”6
4 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 78.
5 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 137-139.
6 Bernard Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, 1960), 287-
2
The basic problem was taken to be how can something bodily,  like a 
sacrament,  cause  something  spiritual  like  grace.7  Thomas  had  appealed  to 
instrumental causality: just as the axe, performing its own action of cutting, forms a 
bed because it is moved by the carpenter, and the form of the bed flows from the 
carpenter's mind through the axe to make the bed, so also baptismal water performs 
its own action of washing the body, but, being moved by God, it also cleanses the 
soul.8 “Perfective physical  causality”  suggested that  this  is  through some passing 
ontological enhancement of the water;9 it is difficult to reconcile this with Thomas' 
clear  statement  that  baptism  is  achieved  through  the  water's  proper  action. 
“Occasional causality” began with sacraments as signs and talked of the washing as a 
sign  of  God's  command  to  give  grace;10 but  Thomas  quite  clearly  denied  this 
approach.11  “Moral causality” found something of value or merit in the sacrament 
that moved God to bestow grace, for instance, that baptismal character gives a right 
to  grace;12 this  would  contradict  grace's  absolute  gratuity.   “Dispositive  physical 
causality” held that the natural effects of the sacrament disposed to grace,  as the 
natural effects of the parents' acts dispose the conceptus to the infusion of a soul from 
God; 13 “dispositive intentional causality” holds that “sacraments express the divine 
intention to sanctify, and by expressing it produce the sanctity expressed.”14  Against 
both  these  views  we  can  note  that,  although  Thomas  had  held  some  sort  of 
290.
7 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 284.
8 Summa Theologiae III.62.1 cor, ad 2.  In the notes to follow, the abbreviation ST will be used.
9 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 288-289.  Leeming suggests Cajetan took this approach.
10 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 287
11 ST III.62.1 cor.
12 Leeming would also include Odo Casel's Mysteriengegenwart in this category , Sacramental  
Theology, 287-288.  More explicit examples of character as a right to grace are John M Donahue, 
“Sacramental Character: the State of the Question.” The Thomist 31.4 (October 1967): 464, and 
Toshiyuki Miyakawa, “The Ecclesial Meaning of the “Res et Sacramentum,” The Thomist 31.4 
(October 1967): 440.
13 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 289.
14 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 289-290.
3
dispositive causality in the Scriptum, he rejected it in the Summa.15  Besides, many of 
these solutions were seen as excessively mechanical or juridical, out of place in a 
religion of personal love; many theologians sought a “personalist” approach.16  In all 
the confusion, one was tempted to say that baptism is a mystery, a miracle even;17 but 
Thomas  insists  that  the  justification  of  the  sinner,  although  a  greater  work  than 
creating the world, is not miraculous.18
The situation was ripe for a totally new approach.
1.1.2 Alternative approaches
The writings of Edward Schillebeeckx are one example among many of 
the change that was happening.  In 1952 he published the first volume of a planned 
two volume work on the sacraments, taking Thomas as an authority but also closely 
studying the patristic sources, so as to interpret Thomas in the light of the tradition 
that he himself received.19  The first volume dealt with sacramental character.  The 
second volume, however, which was to explain how sacraments confer grace, never 
appeared.  Instead in 1958 there was a much smaller work, which, while often citing 
Thomas as an authority, from its very title proclaimed that it was taking a different 
and more “personalist” approach, that of encounter.20  This seemed to resonate: for a 
15 Hyacinthe-François Dondaine, “À propos d'Avicenne et de saint Thomas: de la causalité 
dispositive à la causalité instrumentale,” Revue Thomiste 51 (1951): 441-453.
16 Colman O'Neill, Sacramental Realism: a General Theory of the Sacraments (Dominican 
Publications: Dublin, 1983), 16-17.
17 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 352.
18 ST I-II.113.10 cor.
19 Edward Schillebeeckx OP, De sacramentele Heilseconomie: theologische bezinning op S. Thomas'  
sacramentenleer in het licht van de traditie en van de hedendaagse sacraments problematiek 
(Antwerp: H. Nelissen, 1952).  I have used the French translation, L'économie sacramentelle du  
salut: Réflexion théologique sur la doctrine sacramentaire de saint Thomas, à la lumière de la 
tradition et de la problématique sacramentelle contemporaine, tr. Yvon van der Have, OSB 
(Fribourg: Academic Press, 2004).
20 Edward Schillebeeckx, Christus, Sacrament van de Godsonmoeting (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1958, 
revised edtion in 1959); English translation: Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, tr. 
Paul Barrett OP, assisted by Mark Schoof OP and Laurence Bright OP (New York: Sheed & Ward, 
4
few examples, the theme is noticeable in the work of Herbert Vorgrimler;21 Regis 
Duffy sees it as important in the works of contemporary “Rahnerian” theologians;22 
in its more friendly form of “meeting” it even appears in book titles.23  However, as a 
first attempt it had its weaknesses.24
Alongside  this  there  was  the  increasing  emphasis  on  the  Church  in 
sacramental theology.  Henri de Lubac established that in the Fathers the term corpus 
Christi mysticum referred to the Eucharist, and the corpus Christi verum referred to 
the  Church,  but  by  the  12th century  the  referents  were  swapped.25  Previously, 
therefore, the focus of the Eucharistic celebration had been the building up of the 
ecclesial body of Christ, now it had become the relationship between the individual 
believer  and God.  There was a  loss of sense of community and the role  of the 
community in the sacraments, theologians complained, and they tried to reclaim it. 
Among those following these trends, the idea was established that Christ was the 
fundamental sacrament, and that he gave us the Church as the sacrament, in which 
we have the seven sacraments.26  Sacraments were increasingly looked at in terms of 
their relation to the Church, and as establishing status in the Church.27  Thus the view 
1963).
21 Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, tr. Linda M Maloney (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 
1994), 73, 80.
22 He refers to Theodor Schneider, Zeichen der Nähe Gottes: Grundriss des Sakramententheologie  
(Mainz: Grünewald, 1987) and Lothar Lies,  Sakramententheologie Eine personale Sicht (Graz: 
Styria, 1990).  David N Power, Regis A Duffy and Kevin W Irwin, “Sacramental Theology: A 
Review of the Literature,” Theological Studies 55.4 (1994): 665-666.
23 Colman O'Neill, Meeting Christ in the Sacraments, rev. Romanus Cessario OP (New York: Alba 
House, 1991).
24 Alexandre Ganoczy comments that Schillebeeckx' “encounter theories” applied the “personalistic” 
approach too quickly and did not take into account all the complexities of communication, 
particularly a full theory of symbols.  An Introduction to Catholic Sacramental Theology, tr. 
William Thomas and Anthony M Sherman (New York: Paulist, 1984), 148-149, 156-164.  A 
summary can be found at Power, Duffy and Irwin, “Sacramental Theology,” 671-672.
25 Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: the Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages: a Historical  
Survey, 2nd ed., tr. Gemma Simmonds, (London: SCM Press, 2006).
26 As one example, this was held before the council by Leeming, Sacramental Theology 351.
27 Miyakawa names as proponents of this view: Matthias Scheeben, Émile Mersch, Otto Semmelroth, 
Karl Rahner, Bernard Leeming, P Smulders, Edward Schillebeeckx, J Fuchs, PF Palmer, C 
McAuliffe, J Lhoir and R Masi.  “The Ecclesial Meaning,” 387n 14.
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was  becoming  more  widespread  that,  with  the  sacrament  of  penance,  the  res  et  
sacramentum was  not  something  related  solely  to  the  individual  (like  Thomas' 
paenitentia interior), but reconciliation with the Church.28
Although  such  theologians  met  with  some  resistance,  their  views 
gradually gained currency, and they considered certain statements of Vatican II  - 
especially   “the  Church is  in  the  nature  of  a  sacrament”   -   as  supporting  their 
position.29  Karl  Rahner  takes  the statement that  in  the sacrament of  penance an 
additional reconciliation of the sinner takes place with the Church herself as a virtual 
vindication of his position on the res et sacramentum of penance.30  In this period of 
change and flux, what had been one of the crucial questions of sacramental theology 
before the council was now considered irrelevant.  Thus Bernard Häring, who treats 
Thomas as a respected authority, nonetheless declares that we can no longer consider 
sacraments according to the category of cause.31
1.1.3 The establishment of a new paradigm
Chauvet's  Symbol and Sacrament,  published a little over twenty years 
28 For a history, see Gilles Emery, “Reconciliation with the Church and Interior Penance: The 
Contribution of Thomas Aquinas to the Question on the Res et Sacramentum of Penance,” tr. 
Robert E Williams, in Trinity, Church and the Human Person (Naples FA: Sapientia Press, 2007), 
174-182. 
29 Lumen Gentium 1.  Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole gives one account of the effect of these 
statements.  “Questions actuelles sur la sacramentalité,” Revue Thomiste 99 (1999), 484-485.
30 Lumen Gentium 11, as discussed by Karl Rahner, “Penance as an Additional Act of Reconciliation 
with the Church,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 10 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
1973), 125-149.  There is a tendency after a council for theologians to see recognition of part of 
their position as establishing their whole position as accepted.  Robert Daley points out that 
Bellarmine and his colleagues saw themselves as justified in developing theories of Eucharistic 
sacrifice that far exceeded what Trent had defined, and then  -  quite unwittingly  -  shows that 
contemporary theologians of Eucharistic sacrifice are doing the same thing in a different direction 
after Vatican II. “Robert Bellarmine and Post-Tridentine Eucharistic Theology,” Theological  
Studies 61.2 (June 2000): 239-260.
31 Bernard Häring, The Sacraments in a Secular Age: A Vision in Depth on Sacramentality and its  
Impact on Moral Life (Slough: St Paul, 1976), 97.
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after the council, may be taken to represent the moment when the movement had 
come  of  age.   Chauvet's  approach  builds  upon  the  emphasis  on  the  Church  we 
mentioned above: sacraments are about giving people a place within the worshipping 
community.   Relying  upon  contemporary  theories  of  social  status,  symbolic 
exchange  and  subjectivity,  he  shows  how sacraments  mediate  new relationships, 
moving us from servile fear of God to filial love, and making us brothers and sisters 
of each other  -  with a corresponding new set of rights and obligations.  Grace is not 
an independent thing, but lies within the new status with its freedom and demands. 
He avoids the Scylla of an ex opere operato approach in which people rely upon the 
grace they gain in the sacraments and neglect love of neighbour, and the Charybdis 
of a social activism whereby the sacraments merely testify to what the community 
has achieved; he also provides insight into numerous pastoral problems, particularly 
those arising from a period of liturgical, ecclesial and social flux.
Much of what Chauvet says is not original with him, nor would everyone 
looking for an alternative to the standard pre-conciliar theology agree with him.32  He 
is  overly  reliant  on  Heidegger,  and  some  find  his  explanation  of  the  Eucharist 
inadequate.33  A number of Thomists have taken issue with him on his interpretation 
of Thomas.34  Nonetheless, the synthesis he entitled “a sacramental reinterpretation of 
32 See, for instance, Yves Labbé, “Réceptions théologiques de la postmodernité: à propos de deux 
livres récents de G. Lafont et L.-M. Chauvet,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 
72 (1988): 397-426.
33 Laurence Paul Hemming, “After Heidegger: Transubstantiation,” Heythrop Journal 41.2 (April 
2000): 170-186.
34 Liam G. Walsh OP, “The Divine and the Human in St. Thomas's Theology of the Sacraments,” in 
Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris: Image et message de saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récents  
études historiques, herméneutiques, et doctrinales: homage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP 
à l'occasion de son 65e anniversaire, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira OP (Fribourg: Éditions 
Universitaires, 1993), 321-352; Thierry-Dominique Humbert OP, “Note sur la cause efficiente et 
l'onto-théologie,” Revue Thomiste 105 (2005): 5-24; Bernhard Blankenhorn OP, “The Instrumental 
Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet,” Nova et Vetera, English 
Edition, 4.2 (2006): 255–94.  The Dominicans of Toulouse held a colloquium on Chauvet on 15 
October 2011; the papers will be published in a forthcoming issue of Revue Thomiste.
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Christian  existence”  showed  that  the  new  theoretical  approach  entailed  by  the 
rejection of sacramental causality produced a theology that more easily dealt with 
many other difficulties within the older orthodoxy, as one would expect from a new 
paradigm.  Both his followers  and his opponents  witness that he is  the writer  in 
sacramental theology who must be taken into account.35
1.2 How to read Thomas
1.2.1 The need to read Thomas
But theology is not one of the natural sciences; rather, it depends upon a 
revelation that took place in history and that is mediated to us through the successive 
generations of the Church.  As Chauvet himself makes clear, we understand what the 
sacraments are by understanding the place they had in the life of the Church (and in 
the Church's own reflection on that life) over the centuries;36 thus, as an integral part 
of his method, he accepts the Scholastics as authoritative bearers of that tradition.37 
Nonethless, our thought patterns have been formed by the natural sciences.  As Liam 
Walsh observes, the sustained attack would lead a reader to think that to adopt this 
sacramental theology one must abandon Thomas  -  and that this is a theological 
move worth making.38
1.2.2 Neo-Thomism as a flawed reading of Thomas
35 As Nathan Lefler points out, there are also Thomists who continue to operate as if nothing had 
happened.  “Sign, Cause and Person in St. Thomas's Sacramental Theology: Further 
Considerations,” Nova et Vetera (English Edition) 4 .2 (2006): 399-400.  But when such people 
refer to substantial attacks on Thomas' sacramental theology, it is Chauvet they mention  -  even if 
only to dismiss him in a footnote.  For example, Anselm Kyongsuk Min, Paths to the Triune God:  
An Encounter Between Aquinas and Recent Theologians (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 2005) 96n 83.
36 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 185-186, 204-212, 377-382.
37 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 379-380, 383-387, 
38 Walsh, “The Divine and the Human ,” 326n 15.
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If  each  generation  of  theologians  is  re-reading  and  re-writing  their 
predecessors, an aporia may arise when changes in the wider world may impede the 
“translation” of the older texts.  This is clearly the case of much of the interpretation 
of  Thomas  since  the  Enlightenment,  but  more  particularly  since  the  “Thomistic 
revival” initiated by Leo XIII's encyclical  Aeterni Patris.  Thomas was seen as an 
antidote  against  modern  philosophy.   Scholars  such  as  Mark  Jordan  argue  that 
although Thomas never calls any Christian a “philosophus,” many Thomists tried to 
find  in  Thomas  “a  Thomistic  philosophy,  and  especially  a  Thomistic  ethics, 
independent of revelation,” and that they attempted “to resist, coopt, or outdo modern 
epistemologies.”39  In  particular,  in  order  to  gain  credibility  among  their 
philosophical  contemporaries,  they claimed  that  this  autonomous  philosophy was 
based on the thought of a recognised non-Christian philosopher, Aristotle.  But, as we 
shall see, not only does Thomas seem to regard the Stoics as better ethicists than 
Aristotle,  but  his  whole  ethical  system renders  any action  worthless  unless  it  is 
motivated by infused charity,  and the final incentives for action are gifts  that  go 
beyond  the  rational.   Jordan  points  out  that  Thomas  even  rejects  Aristotle's 
philosophical definition of virtue, preferring a theological one from Augustine, and 
that in doing so he is “judging human life otherwise than Aristotle did.  Thomas has 
changed philosophical  water  into  theological  wine.”40  Similarly,  argues  Jordan, 
Thomas takes the category of cause and applies it to situations never envisaged by 
Aristotle (specifically the sacraments), thereby reversing “the analogy of 'cause' as he 
39 Mark Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after his readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 87.  Cf 
Fergus Kerr OP, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 17-21.  The 
young Joseph Ratzinger's distaste for the Thomism he was fed in the seminary is well-known. 
Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 2-7.
40 Mark Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 163.
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did with 'virtue.'”41  In this light, it is hardly surprising that the ship of neo-Thomism 
should have run aground on the shoals of sacramental causality.
1.2.3 Reclaiming what all want to explain away
Theology must continue to read the Scholastics, and therefore it needs a 
new paradigm with which to do so.  And the key to a new paradigm is to ask what 
was most difficult in the old reading  -  not what the theologians had the greatest 
difficulty explaining, which is normally just a symptom of the problem, but what 
they most readily explained away.  And the answer is Anselm's theory of satisfaction 
and, more generally, the whole notion of payment as it occurs in mediaeval theology: 
as  Gisbert  Greshake  remarks,  there  is  probably  no  other  theological  theory  so 
passionately  disputed.42  And  when  Thomas  presents  his  version  of  it,  even  his 
supporters find it difficult to cope.  When Thomas appeals to the satisfactory death of 
Christ as the source of the efficacy of the sacraments, Ghislain Lafont laments that 
we  could  have  expected  “more  and  better.”43  Romanus  Cessario  maintains  of 
satisfaction that this “basic perspective may appear alien at first;” but after devoting a 
whole book to Thomas' treatment, he concludes “if the term 'satisfaction' cannot be 
restored to current usage, then certainly the substance of St Thomas's understanding 
of  satisfaction  can  and  should  be.”44  Nonetheless,  given  that,  for  Cessario,  the 
substance here  is  love,  we are  left  asking why Thomas introduced the  notion of 
satisfaction in the first place.  As long as we are trying to explain away something 
41 Mark Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 168.
42 Gisbert Greshake, “Erlösung und Freiheit: Zur neuinterpretation der Erlösunglehre Anselms von 
Canterbury,” Theologische Quartalschrift 153 (1973): 323.
43 Ghislain Lafont OSB, Structures et méthode dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin 
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 452.
44 Romanus Cessario, The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to  
Aquinas (Petersham MA: St Bede's, 1990), xvi, 204.
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that  Thomas  found so  central,  we remain  aliens  to  his  theological  thinking,  and 
therefore should not be surprised that, somewhere down the line, what he says on 
another topic, such as sacramental causality, seems hopelessly obscure.
1.2.4 A pre-modern reading of Thomas
If the problem with neo-Thomism was that it tried to force the mediaeval 
Thomas into a Cartesian or Kantian mould, then we need a pre-modern reading of 
Thomas.  And so I shall, for instance, interpret “spirit” keeping in mind the way he 
uses it to explain the evil eye and human reproduction, follow him in understanding 
the gift in the light of Seneca, develop his ideas of subject according to the categories 
of Roman law, and consider the role “honour” played within mediaeval feudalism. 
Further, to understand these concepts more deeply, I shall go back to their roots in 
tribal and “archaic” societies, relying upon anthropologists such as Marcel Mauss 
and Julian Pitt-Rivers.  Above all, I shall give an “economic” reading of Thomas, one 
in which notions such as payment, price, debt, earning (merit) and satisfaction are 
central.
When  we  do  this,  we  discover  that  Thomas'  theological  project  is 
surprisingly similar to Chauvet's.  Both have a notion of a subject constructed by 
symbolic exchange, both have a similar understanding of the gift and therefore of 
grace.  Constructive dialogue between the two becomes much easier.  In fact, instead 
of  Chauvet  finding  fault  with  Thomas,  Thomas  will  be  able  to  show  up  the 
shortcomings of Chauvet arguing from within Chauvet's own presuppositions.  In 
order to have a dialogue, we need to understand the positions of both.  A condensed 
version of Chauvet's approach will take up the remainder of this chapter.  And then, 
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since we are giving a re-reading of Thomas, and since he, and not Chauvet is the 
subject of this thesis, we can devote seven and a half chapters to the Angelic Doctor, 
trying  to  do  it  from within  his  own  terms  and  not  Chauvet's,  although  making 
references to similarities or contrasts where apposite.
1.2.5 The plan of this thesis
To understand Thomas, I shall begin chapter two with the pair “grace and 
truth” as Thomas explains them in his commentary upon John, and then (allowing for 
some slippage between the words “grace” and “spirit”) show the fundamental role 
that these terms have in Thomas' theology: in how he reads the Bible, and in the 
macro-structure and micro-structure of the  Summa.  With some help from Philipp 
Rosemann, the coming forth and return of creatures in Prima Pars will be shown not 
to be “productionist” but very pre-modern, more like Jacques Derrida's  production 
donatrice, and radically concerned with honour and glory.
Chapter three will take the issue of merit, which frames  Prima Secundae, 
exploring how merit implies an economy, looking at the relation between a carnal 
and a spiritual economy, and between the economy of reward and that of punishment.
Chapter four will focus on the tract on justice in Secunda Secundae.  With a 
little help from Maxime Allard, it will start with debt, religion and subjectivity, and 
then  move  on  to  gratitude  and  the  gift,  exploring  Thomas'  clear  dependence  on 
Seneca, with some valuable assistance from Marcel Mauss.
Then, noting that Thomas' first term for gratitude is gratia, chapter five will 
return to Prima Secundae to look at the three-fold reality Thomas also calls  gratia. 
Here we shall see how the changes in Thomas'  position on grace all  converge to 
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make it more like the hau or the spirit of the gift as we find it in Mauss.  This will be 
amply supported from the scriptural commentaries.
We shall begin to look at Tertia Pars in chapter six, starting with the grace 
of Christ, and then his merit and his “subjectivity.”  Going through the mysteries of 
his  life,  we  shall  prepare  ourselves  to  see  how we are  “clothed”  with  Christ  in 
baptism, sharing his “subjectivity” in the one persona mystica.  The other sacrament 
closely studied here is penance.
Baptism only works through its ordination towards the Eucharist, which will 
be the topic of chapter seven.  Exploring its past, present and future signification 
along the lines of the three-fold liberation that truth brings, we shall see how the 
symbolism of the Eucharist works to take us from a carnal to a spiritual economy.
In  chapter  eight  we  shall  bring  all  this  to  bear  on  the  very  condensed 
explanation of the causation of grace by the sacraments, in the Summa Theologiae, 
and also look at those situations (“revival,” the votum sacramenti, and circumcision) 
where  the  reception  of  the  gift  object  is  separated  from the  bestowal  of  grace. 
Jacques  Derrida,  as  a  Jew,  shall  help  us  understand  what  Thomas  says  about 
circumcision, which will also give us a chance to evaluate his extremely influential 
critique of the gift.  And then, in conclusion, we can compare Thomas and Chauvet, 
and see what is the benefit to Thomas' theology in talking about sacramental grace in 
terms of cause.
But first let us look at Chauvet.
1.3 The sacramental theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet
Symbol  and  sacrament  can  be  considered  as  a  polemical  work,  striving 
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against the reification of grace.  Therefore he begins by constructing a space wherein 
to speak of grace, and in that place he looks at the sacraments.
1.3.1 Grace as a non-object
Chapters one and two, therefore, centre around a hinge, which is Chauvet's 
comparison  of  grace  with  manna.   In  an  evocative  allegorical  reading,  Chauvet 
presents us with grace as the non-object, with no quiddity, whose very name (What is 
that?) is a question.  It is subject neither to measuring nor storage nor valuation, and 
melts under the gaze of the sun. (44-45)45
It  is  because  of  this  view  of  grace  that  Chauvet  rejects  Thomas' 
understanding of sacraments  as causes of grace,  for  he holds that  causality is  so 
linked with the ontotheology endemic in western thought that, despite all the cautions 
and qualifications of the scholastics, it will (almost?) inevitably result in thinking of 
grace as a  thing.  (7-9)  Chauvet notes that,  in  an advance on his position in the 
Scriptum, in the  Summa Thomas defines sacraments in terms, not of cause, but of 
sign, but then notes that in the next question cause returns  -  “et avec quelle force!”46 
In the  second chapter,  therefore,  Chauvet  looks to  Heidegger  and his  critique of 
metaphysics for an alternative point of departure.  Of course, Heidegger does not talk 
of God, but of Being (or Being), Being that reveals itself to Dasein through language, 
and reveals itself in its withdrawal and its absence. (74)  Here Chauvet sees a certain 
homology  with  grace,  for  “this  movement  of  donation  can  only  be  welcomed 
graciously in an attitude of “letting-enter-into-presence,” where the accent fall not on 
the presence itself  but  on the letting as “letting the coming-into-presence.”  “(61) 
45 For the remainder of this chapter, numbers in brackets will refer to pages in the English edition of 
Chauvet's Symbol and Sacrament.
46 Chauvet, Symbole et sacrement, 18 (Symbol and Sacrament, 12)
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This stepping outside of metaphysics cannot be totally achieved, and so the project is  
an always unfinished one, and thus a way that makes itself, a “be-wëgender Weg.” 
(54)  Chauvet also finds an interesting parallel in the unfinished subject of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis.  Here the subject is not ontologically given, but always in need of 
construction. (77-82)
1.3.2 Grace as gratuity in exchange
Chauvet has now expressed his search in terms of becoming a subject, and 
for both linguistic and psychoanalytic reasons he sees this as being achieved through 
language or symbolic exchange, and this is the focus of chapters three and four.
Following Marcel Mauss and his  Essay on the Gift, Chauvet distinguishes 
between commercial  exchange and  symbolic  exchange.   In  the  former  the  items 
exchanged have a use value, and the exchange attempts to equate the value of the 
objects exchanged; it is the objects exchanged in themselves that matter.  (100-107) 
In  symbolic  exchange  what  is  exchanged  (or  generated  by  the  exchange)  is  the 
identity as subjects of the parties to the exchange and alliances between them.  The 
object of exchange is of secondary value in itself.   In archaic societies there is a 
constant movement of objects in exchange; each object is given as a “gift,” but a 
return-gift is obligatory. (101-103)
In our modern consumer society the gift in a certain way survives as that 
which resists the “imperialism of value.”  (103) But we are continually trying to 
establish our identity through the purchase of commodities, attempting to buy not the 
thing, but the idea attached to the thing.  (104-105)
It  is  in  such  a  world  that  Chauvet  wants  us  to  understand  grace,  and 
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particularly sacramental grace.  Like the manna, it has no value and is not a thing.  It 
is marked by a certain excess or super-abundance.  It is both gracious and gratuitous, 
but the gratuity does not deny the possibility of the return gift; indeed, to do so would 
be to suffocate the recipient, to make the recipient into an object. (108-109)  
We said above that every gift obligates; there is no reception of anything  as a gift 
which does not require some return-gift as a sign of gratitude, at the very least a 
“thank you” or some facial expression.  Which is to say that by the very structure of 
the exchange, the gratuitousness of the gift carries the obligation of the return-gift of  
a  response.   Therefore,  theologically,  grace  requires  not  only  this  initial 
gratuitousness on which everything else depends but also the  graciousness of the  
whole  circuit,  and  especially  of  the  return-gift.   This  graciousness  qualifies  the 
return-gift  as beyond-price, without calculation  -  in short, as a response of love.  
Even  the  return-gift  of  our  human  response  thus  belongs  to  the  theologically  
Christian concept of “grace.” (108-109)
Hence infant baptism is not the best example of grace. (109)
Grace must be treated as something outside the boundaries of value, according to the 
symbolic mode of communication, and in the first place communication of the word.  
Rather than being represented as an object-value that one would “refine” through 
analogy, the “treasure” is really not separable from the symbolic labor by which the 
subject itself bears fruit by becoming a believer.  (109)
Having  come  to  this  conclusion  by  considering  gifts,  Chauvet  now 
approaches it by considering symbols, and we can observe a certain parallel.  Just as 
there is commercial exchange and gift exchange, so also there is communication by 
signs and by symbols. (111) Both signs and symbols, of course, only work as part of 
a larger system: to accept the sign/symbol is to accept the order that gives it meaning. 
(115)  Signs convey information, and speech at this level is locutionary and can be 
true or false; symbols convey recognition and social status, and speech at this level is 
illocutionary, and can be valid or invalid, depending on the social standing of the 
speaker.47 (132-135)   The  symbol  is  not  an  ornament  added  to  the  sign,  or  a 
degenerate form of the sign  -  which would make it less “real.” (123) Rather, as 
47   There is also a third level, the perlocutionary, which, through symbols, generates an external, 
non-symbolic effect: Chauvet gives some examples of healing rites from the anthropological 
literature. (135-139)
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symbolic exchange is what constitutes the “I”, it touches us at our deepest level.  The 
sign and the symbol are two poles of language, and all communication relies to a 
certain extent upon both.  But this also means that all “reality” is also at the same 
time symbolic.  This leads Chauvet to claim that “Water never comes so close to its  
“truth” as when it functions as both sepulcher of death and bath of rebirth.” (123)
Chauvet  uses  the  idea  of  “intra-linguistic efficacy”  to  begin  to  explain 
sacramental grace, because coming forth as a subject, in filial or fraternal alliance, is 
precisely the sort of effect that symbolic exchange achieves.  But divine grace cannot 
be reduced to a mere anthropological reality.  It is “an  extra-linguistic reality, but 
[. . .] comprehensible only on the (intra-linguistic) model of the filial and brotherly 
and sisterly alliance established  outside of us (extra nos),  in Christ.   Once again, 
despite grammar, 'grace' is not a thing, but a symbolic work or 'perlaboration.'” (140)
Relying  upon  Derrida's  position  that  metaphysics  regards  writing  as  the 
mere reduplication of the spoken word, which is more immediate, more “present” 
(144), Chauvet reminds us that the symbol, like the body, resists attempts to sweep 
away mediation and contingency.  These are not remedies or concessions (154), signs 
waiting to be decoded.  Rather, it is fundamental that “the most 'spiritual' happens  
through the most 'corporeal'.” (146)  Similarly, the body cannot be eliminated; as 
Nietzsche says:  Leib  bin  ich,  ganz  und gar,  und nichts  ausserdem.  “Body am I, 
entirely and completely, and nothing besides.”(149)   Because of this, grace takes 
place through sacraments, and Christian faith is sacramental in its constitution, and 
not by derivation. (155)
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1.3.3 Sacraments thought within symbolic exchange
In the second section of his book, Chauvet then places sacraments in the 
symbolic network of the faith of the Church.  Becoming a believer, like becoming a 
subject, is an always unfinished task. (178)  One way of looking at it is to consider 
faith (which takes place in the Church) as based around three interconnected poles: 
scripture, sacraments and ethics (172).  Faith, as Chauvet explains with reference to 
the  Emmaus  story,  means  accepting  that  our  relationship  with  Jesus  is  always 
mediated by a symbol, which makes him present in his absence, and this absence 
must be assented to.  To seek the fulness of presence in the symbol is to seek a body 
that can only be dead: it is a necrotic temptation. (161-171)
Scripture is explained in terms of this symbolic exchange.  Constitutionally, 
it  is  formed in the liturgical  assembly,  canonized by the Church whose symbolic 
structure mediates our assent in faith.  The text gives information, as it must, but it 
never stops there: it is not an idol, but an icon.  (216-220)  “The letter [. . .] can be 
the  mediation  of  the  revelation  of  God  only  to  the  extent  that,  as  Beauchamp 
emphasized, it forms figures. [. . .] only by splitting itself in two.” (218) Meaning is 
never  mastered,  because  the  subject,  constituted  by  language,  is  always  split   - 
otherness is the place where meaning arises. (205-206)
In Chapter Seven Chauvet considers the relationship between sacraments 
and ethics.  Jewish ritual was about remembering a foundational past event so that a 
new future becomes possible.  (233-234) Hence the prophets criticize the cult when it 
is  divorced from the  ethical.  (238-239) Christianity is  eschatological,  not  simply 
awaiting a coming that will annul all intervening history, but seeing all history as the 
possibility of this coming. (240)  It is Jesus who makes the eschatological difference; 
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he himself is the thanksgiving. (250)  In the New Testament, liturgical terms apply 
either to Jewish liturgy, Jesus himself, or Christian everyday life, but not to Christian 
worship.  (254)   The  move  is  from  sacralisation  (removing  something  from  the 
profane) to sanctification of the profane. (262)
Similarly, in Chapter Eight Chauvet views the exchange of gifts that takes 
place  in  the  Eucharist  as  ultimately  about  the  worshippers  receiving  the  gift  of 
themselves,  in  order  that  they  can  worthily  praise  God   -   in  other  words,  the 
establishment of the Church.  This is built around the notion of each gift needing to 
be received and evoking a counter-gift, and notes that, within the Eucharistic prayer, 
the moment when we offer the sacrament to God, our dispossession, is actually the 
moment of our reception of the gift as gift and therefore as obliging the return gift. 
This “cultic offering is  only the  symbolic representation of a return-gift yet to be  
'veri-fied' elsewhere” (in ethical behaviour). (276, my underlining).  “Because grace 
is outside the order of value, it is in rendering to God God's own grace, Jesus Christ 
given in the sacrament, that the Church receives it,” for “the appropriation of this no-
object that is 'grace' can only occur under the mode of disappropriation.”  And once 
again,  this  is  work,  the  “labor  of  an  unceasing  'pass-over'  from the  oldness  that 
threatens  it  to  the  newness  it  proclaims  accomplished  in  Christ.”  (287)   As  an 
example  of  this  newness,  Chauvet  shows  that  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  is  “a  quite 
singular sacrifice” (302).  It is not “non-sacrifice”, as Girard would have it; the term 
“sacrifice”  must  be  retained,  for  Christ's  sacrifice  turns  sacrifice  around  and  is 
perhaps an anti-sacrifice. (307)  God does not need the sacrifice, as Irenaeus says, but 
asks us to sacrifice to teach us how to be grateful. (311-312)
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1.3.4 The symbolizing act of Christian identity
1.3.4.1 How liturgy works
Given that grace is to be found in the sacramental rites that give the believer 
a  new status  within the Church,  in  Chapter  Nine Chauvet  explores  the nature of 
ritual, and particularly of liturgy.  Given the context of the liturgical reforms after 
Vatican II, he tries to explain the dual temptations to a rigidity about liturgy that fears 
the loss of its heterotopy which creates a place where God can be found, (330-335) 
and  an  urge  to  master  and  imprint  ourselves  on  the  liturgy,  so  that  there  is  no 
dispossession, and hence no place where God can come, no reception of the gift. 
(337-339)  As  only  symbolic,  ritual  reveals  the  founder's  absence,  as  symbolic it 
connects with the founder and reveals a total  dependence on the founder, for the 
liturgy is not our own creation  -  to celebrate what Jesus gave us in this way is,  
before all words, to acknowledge him as Lord, in an apostolic Church. (341-342)
“'The first efficacy of rite' is to 'cause people to believe in the rite itself.'”48 
Care must be taken to prevent the liturgy performing merely social functions; it must 
always  be  in  service  of  the  Gospel.   The  ritual  marks  Christian  identity  and 
difference  on  the  body  of  each  participant,  but  this  must  not  be  the  cut  which 
excludes according to the “metaphysical” scheme (competition, distance-separation, 
opposition),  but  a  placing  into  communication,  the  linguistic  “you-I” connection. 
(351-2)
The marking of Christian identity works with created things, which, because 
they are produced by God's word, are symbolic; they are neither the products of an 
artisan or emanations on a biological model, but gifts, and must be treated as gifts: 
48 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 349, citing FA Isambert, “Réforme liturgique et analyses 
sociologiques,” Le Maison Dieu 128 (1976): 84.
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not profaned or exploited, but recognised by a counter-gift.  (358) Further, unlike the 
closed identity conferred by the initiation rites found in the classics of ethnography, 
Christian identity has a certain openness to it. (363)  This initiation into the same 
culture comes about in a different way in each of us due to the unique history of our  
desire.  (365)   The  desire  for  the  rite,  which  is  often  the  manifestation  of  an 
unconscious desire (which Chauvet sees as connected with a sense of guilt), must be 
redirected to avoid the liturgy performing a merely sociological function. (367)  Yet 
Chauvet also sees that this desire, which “lives only to be the 'desire of the desire of 
the Other,'” is of its very essence unable to be satisfied, part of a journey to death that 
starts  with  our  origin  (presumably  as  subjects)  in  language.   Metaphysics,  says 
Chauvet, is an attempt to manage this contradiction by a route other than traditional 
religions, that is, through the way of reasons.  (368)
Liturgy stages the body  as such; makes it manifest as a desiring body in 
connection with the cosmos, society and the ancestors.  (369)  But it also stages the 
body with respect to the “Sacred:” not that the “sacred” (substantive) exists before 
the rituals, but that the rituals make certain things “sacred” (adjective), because the 
symbols  can  point  to  a  greater  depth.  (369-370)   The  body,  marked  by  its 
contradictory other,  is  presented  to  the sacred,  the Other,  in  an allocutory mode, 
making petition for the object of its desire, and thus being taught that its true desire is 
for the Other itself. (370-371)
In the very concreteness of the sacraments, the scandal of their irreducible 
materiality, Chauvet sees that God is frustrating our attempts to project onto him all 
the onto-theological perfections, by withdrawing into human bodiliness: sacramental 
rites are the most eminent representation of this pro-cession of the divine God within 
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God's recession at the heart of what is most human. (373)
1.3.4.2 Sacraments as instituted
As  well  as  being  irreducibly  material,  sacraments  are  also  irreducibly 
instituted and contingent.  Chapter 10 explores this from the point of view of the 
symbol.  For just as language must precede its use, so also must a symbol and hence 
a sacrament.  The Church indeed has power over the sacraments, but there is a limit 
to this: “save their substance.” (377-380)  But this power would be pointless unless 
the sacraments had already been instituted, and in particular (and here Chauvet is in 
sincere agreement with Thomas, Bonaventure and their colleagues) unless they had 
been instituted by Christ as God they would not be able to confer grace. (379-380) 
The very acts by which the Church expresses her dependence on God are given by 
God, and are thus grace, but they also dispossess the Church of any power she might 
imagine she has over God, they are a “harsh” law, creating a barrier separating us 
from the origin which must always be for us an “empty place.” (382)  Chauvet then 
explores this instituted quality as it applies to the Eucharist, considering bread not 
from the point of view of substance but of symbol (which is appropriate, as Thomas 
considers sacraments to be in genere signi).  (390)
First  Chauvet  considers  transubstantiation,  which  is  merely  one  way  of 
talking of the change, and notes that it makes the accidents of the bread a sign, not a 
veil, and that it avoids any physicalism or gross representation, and that in framing 
the theory the scholastics were acknowledging the authority of traditional practices 
that led them to break with certain aspects of the Aristotelian categories they were 
using, a sacrificium intellectus. (384-387)
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Nonetheless, Chauvet sees the scholastic expressions as “dangerous” in that 
they separate the Eucharistic presence from its destination, the Church, and the head 
from the body: they lead us to forget that the esse is an ad-esse. (388-389)  He shows 
how this ad-esse is intrinsic to the structure of the Eucharistic celebration, the words 
of the prayers and even the formula of institution, the gestures, and, as he explains at 
length, even the material elements of bread and wine. (390-392)  When we consider 
reality as intrinsically symbolic (even if the symbolism is culturally determined) then 
bread  and  wine  will  always  be  seen  as  related  to,  as  gathering  together,  what 
Heidegger terms the Fourfold (Geviert): earth, sky, gods and mortals. (392-396)  This 
is the real being of bread and wine: they never exist without this symbolic dimension, 
and the more they do this (e.g. by being used ritually), the more truly they are bread 
and wine, where “are” is used symbolically, not metaphysically. (397-398, cf 400). 
Nonetheless, the Church's recognition in the Eucharistic bread of God's self-gift to us 
in  Christ  is  not  a  merely  anthropological  reality:  it  requires  faith,  a  sacrificium 
intellectus.   However,  the  “rupture”  this  entails  “is  in  harmony  with  the  entire 
symbolic approach” which has gaps through which the truth can shine, whereas the 
metaphysical  approach  aims  to  close  the  gaps.    Moreover,  our  response  to  the 
Eucharist is to continue on the path of seeking the connections between the Fourfold 
(Geviert) that the bread already symbolizes.  (398-399)  Hence we no longer say that 
what once was bread is no longer bread, but rather that it is now essential bread, the 
true bread of John 6.  (400)
In  responding  to  the  objection  that  this  approach  risks  a  “subjectivist 
reduction” of the reality the Church affirms in the Eucharist, Chauvet returns to the 
thrust of this whole chapter.  For in the symbolic approach the real is that which 
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“resists every attempt at understanding by the subject,” and is thus recognised as the 
“presence-of-the-absence.”  As Derrida notes, we do not become subject except by 
being subject  to  the rules of the symbolic order,  which therefore resist  us.   This 
resistance is true of all the sacraments, and also of the reading of Scripture, except 
that we more easily erase “the mediation of the letter in favor of the 'Word'.” (400-
401)  This, of course, leaves the Eucharist as prey to temptations to idolatry,  but 
nonetheless  in  its  exteriority,  anteriority  and  permanence  it  proclaims  the 
irreducibility of God.  It is icon, not idol. (402-403)  For in the symbolic approach, 
“presence”  and  “absence”  “form  one  ambivalent  reality.”  In  the  Eucharist  (as 
elsewhere) Christ  is  present not  as a “thing,” but as “the gift  of his  life” and as 
“coming-into-presence.”  Without acknowledging this, one compromises the role of 
the Spirit  in transubstantiation and also its  eschatological aspect.   God is  always 
present as “inscribed” but not “circumscribed:” the response to God's presence is a 
journey or exile, even after taking possession of the land, and Christ is present in the 
breaking of the bread, even in its very rupture. (405-408)
1.3.4.3 Sacraments as instituting
Having dealt with the sacraments as instituted, now in Chapter Eleven he 
considers how, precisely as instituted, they are the means of instituting the identity of 
the Church.  Identity is not something added to essence.  The essence of the Church 
is its communion with the Father through Christ in the Spirit, and the sacraments 
institute the Church because they effect this relationship, and they do so as gift and 
grace. (409)
Chauvet is seeking to avoid two ways that are opposed (and therefore in the 
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same genus), one in which sacraments produce grace in human beings
God → Sacraments → Human Beings
← ←  
that leads to the objectivist impasse, and the other, in which sacraments express or 
translate the grace produced directly by God (or human activity considered from a 
semi-Pelagian point of view)
God → Human Beings → Sacraments
← ←
that leads to a subjectivist impasse.  Vatican II, he notes, put forward (but did not 
explain) a different model:
God
   
Sacraments   Human Beings
 
which  Chauvet  now  wants  to  explain.49  The  clockwise  arrows  represent  the 
sacraments  as  revealers;  the  anti-clockwise  arrows  represent  the  sacraments  as 
operators.  But, because sacraments operate in the symbolic order, their operation is 
inseparable from revelation.  On the other hand, this revelatory operation cannot be 
reduced to a mere translation into external signs of the interior working of grace, 
“since the revelation they make of it is inseparable from a symbolic labor, new each 
time, within the believing subject.” (431)  Thus, in the sacrament of penance, grace 
comes  at  the  moment  of  true  repentance,  which  normally takes  place  before  the 
sacrament; but the act of repentance is an integral part of the sacrament, which then 
reveals the Christian nature of the grace that has been received.  And part of what it  
reveals  is  that  “the  act  of  conversion  cannot  'take'  except  in  the  Church  and  is 
49 The diagram is from the French original (425); the English translation (415) has swapped some of 
the arrows.
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always-already structured by the ecclesial and sacramental dimension,” something 
Chauvet has prepared us for by previously describing in detail the ecclesial context 
of and involvement in the sacrament of penance.  (Although, of course, a host of 
factors could intervene so that true repentance was not followed by a request for the 
sacraments.)  This would seem illogical from a rationalist perspective, “where faith 
life and sacramental rites are set in competition,” with the efficacious performance of 
one rendering the other  superfluous.  (436)  If  we are to  take sacraments  as they 
present themselves to us, if we are to take their “language game” seriously and not 
compromise it by trying to translate it into something it is not, then it is clear that  
sacraments are illocutionary, that they actually bring about some effect.  This effect 
“is  not of the physical,  moral,  or metaphysical  but of the symbolic  order.”  But, 
because we are approaching this  from the symbolic  point  of  view,  this  symbolic 
effect (say, of communion with Christ in his death and resurrection) is “most 'real.'” 
(437-438)
On this  basis,  Chauvet  can  explain  sacramental  grace.   We can start  by 
considering a sacrament, say, baptism, at the anthropological level.  The illocutionary 
act of the presider, who embodies the social capital of the group and acts in its name, 
brings about a change of status in those baptized, which is recognised as real by the 
members of the group, and which creates a new set of relations (sons and daughters 
of God and so brothers and sisters of each other) and a new set of rights and duties. 
(438-439)  What is happening theologically cannot be reduced to this, but “must still 
be  understood  within  this  perspective.”  Baptism takes  place  before  the  “absent-
present Other” who is Christ, and when we are put into a new relation with him, we 
are put into a new relation to the others in the Church, and with God, no longer being 
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slaves but sons and daughters, thanks to the Spirit of the Son. (439-440)  This new 
status is eschatological, and it has to unfold itself in ethical practice which involves 
the labour  of  receiving our new selves.   Baptismal grace is  thus the “permanent 
symbolic work of conversion by which,  through the Spirit,  we become believing 
subjects.”  (440) “A sacrament is an 'event of grace' not because it is a field in which 
a treasure is buried, but because it ploughs the field that  we ourselves are and thus 
renders it fruitful.” (442)  “Grace concerns this painful working through the field of 
our desire.” (440)  And yet grace also changes our desire, which “is turned around 
into filial gratitude toward the Father,” no longer thinking of him as a rival, because 
no longer considering his gifts as things, as with the Samaritan woman, for whom 
Jesus  substitutes  “'symbolic'  water  one  can  talk  about  but  not  manipulate”  for 
“empirical water.”  In the end, the woman's desire is for Jesus himself. (441)  The 
intra-linguistic efficacy by which we are proclaimed a son or daughter of God (and 
brother or sister) requires faith so that it can be “accompanied by an extra-linguistic 
efficacy concerning the gift and reception of grace itself.” (443-444).
1.3.5 Connections with Christology and the theology of the Trinity.
Finally,  in  chapters  twelve  and  thirteen,  Chauvet  shows  the  parallels 
between theology of the Trinity and Christology on the one hand, and theology of 
sacraments  and  grace  on  the  other.   He  begins,  as  is  usual,  by  indicating  the 
deficiencies of the approach of the scholastics in general and Thomas in particular. 
In considering the incarnation in metaphysical categories, rather than finding therein 
the great refutation of ontotheology and of the dualism of nature and grace, they 
merely affirmed the perfections  of  the onto-theological  God who is  miraculously 
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present in Jesus Christ.  The result was an over-emphasis on Christ at the expense of 
the Holy Spirit (456-464), which also resulted in a heavily institutional approach to 
the  sacraments.  (468-474)  Moreover,  (in  parallel  with  what  Chauvet  says  of  the 
Eucharist) Christ was considered in his esse rather than his ad-esse, with two major 
consequences. (488-489) The humanity of Christ and by extension the sacraments 
were seen as instruments, and ultimately merely occasions whereby a God whose 
Trinitarian nature had been forgotten acted in a productionist way; and the historical 
context of Jesus and the mysteries of his life became irrelevant to the workings of the 
sacraments. (454-456)
Chauvet, like Thomas, talks of the sacramental grace as continuation of the 
incarnation, but he seeks to expound this from the perspective of symbolism.  The 
great  revelation  of  God  in  Christ  takes  place  in  the  crucifixion,  where  God  is 
“crossed out”,  so  that  it  can  only be  understood within  a  meontology.   But  this 
revelation cannot remain at the level of an intellectual exercise, a mere “stroke of the 
pen.” (533)  To consider the crucifixion symbolically is to consider it as imprinted on 
us,  embodied in  us  in  the redirection of  our  desires  manifested  in  the  liturgy of 
ethical practice: the passage from discourse to the body that always needs to be done. 
(535)  So the sacraments belong to the in-between time, remembering the death of 
Jesus as the great ethical example while not reducing it to mere example, and looking 
forward to a future that is not inevitable (a mere teleology) but truly eschatological, 
given to us because Christ died for us.  (546-547)
On all accounts, it is an impressive theological vision.50  But it is also a 
polemic  against  Thomas.   He  is  accused,  sometimes  directly,  sometimes  by 
50 In a review that does not spare criticism, Y. Labbé says of the work, “One has the impression of 
having read not a book, but a multitude.”  “Réceptions théologiques,” 402.
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implication  only,  of  complicity  with  ontotheology,  a  productionist  approach  to 
causality  and  an  almost  inevitable  reification  of  grace,  belittling  symbolism,  not 
understanding the construction of the subject, ignoring the need to make a response 
in grace, and having an excessive focus on the metaphysical presence of Christ in the 
incarnation and in the Eucharist, without sufficient attention to the mysteries of his 
life, the  ad-esse of Eucharistic presence and its symbolic character, and the role of 
the Holy Spirit.  This is why we need to take a long, hard look at Thomas.
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CHAPTER TWO
GRACE, TRUTH AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
If we are to understand an article in the Summa Theologiae on Thomas' 
own terms, we need to understand the basic principles that structure the  Summa at 
both the macro and micro level.1  As most commentators on the Summa are aware  - 
to their own frustration  -  these principles are merely hinted at in the Summa itself. 
However, in some of his other works we do find detailed analysis of categories that 
can be applied to the task at hand.  In this chapter I shall  first consider the way 
Thomas elaborates a threefold approach to truth in his commentary on John, and then 
show that this threefold approach is reflected not only in his understanding of Holy 
Scripture (and, by analogy, the sacraments) but also in the overall structure of the 
Summa itself.   The  earlier  contender,  exitus-reditus,  however,  still  needs  to  be 
considered  as  providing  the  reason  that  any  created  thing  finds  its  place  in  the 
Summa.  Here Philipp Rosemann's insights into the circularity of being, drawn from 
sources such as the Compendium Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, will be 
useful, leading to a discussion of the pre-philosophical ideas that lie behind Thomas' 
understanding  of  “spirit”  and  the  related  term “grace.”  Thus  the  analysis  of  the 
structure of the Summa will be framed by the Johannine pairs “spirit and truth” and 
“grace and truth.”
1 In this thesis, “Summa” shall refer to Thomas' Summa Theologiae unless otherwise stated.
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2.1 The threefold nature of truth
2.1.1 Establishing the threefold nature of truth
2.1.1.1 The three meanings of truth outside the Lectura super Ioannem
Although this examination of the threefold meaning of truth for Thomas 
relies mainly upon his Lectura super Ioannem, we can start with his basic definition, 
found there and in numerous other places: truth is adaequatio (or commensuratio) rei  
ad intellectum. 2  From this definition Thomas holds that truth properly speaking can 
exist only in a mind, but improperly speaking it can exist in things.3  Truth is pre-
eminently found in God, because God’s knowledge of himself is the divine essence, 
and thus is in no way different from what is known, and the understanding of things 
in the divine mind is the cause of their conformity to that understanding; for the 
second sense of  truth,  however,  the  dependence runs  the  other  way:  truth  in  the 
human mind is determined by the mind's conformity to the thing.4  “Truth” in things 
can be considered with respect to either the divine or the human intellect.   With 
respect to the divine intellect, a thing is true insofar as it has the being intended for it 
by  God,  which  is  always  the  case,  and  so  this  sense  of  truth  rarely  becomes 
significant.  With regard to human intellects, a thing is true insofar as it tends to 
produce a true estimation of itself in a human mind.  Thus there are three important 
2 Lectura super Ioannem 14.2 (M1869, i.e. paragraph 1869 in the Marietti edition) and 18.6 
(M2365);  also Scriptum 1.19.5.1 cor, 1.19.5.2 ad 2; De Veritate 1.1 cor, 1.4 sed contra 7, 1.8 cor; 
Super De Trinitate 3.5.3 obj 1; Super Romanos 3.1 (M255); there are other variations, such as 
adaequatio intellectus ad rem (Scriptum 3.33.1.3.3 cor) and adaequatio rei et intellectus (Summa 
Theologiae I.16.2 obj 2)  At this last use of the definition, and at De Veritate 1.1 cor, Thomas gives 
the De Definitionibus of Isaac (Israeli) as its source.  In fact, the definition comes from Avicenna, 
and was used without attribution by William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales 
and others.  Philip also used another definition from Isaac, but attributed it to Augustine, a mistake 
Albert noted.  It seems that Thomas, aware of this, attributed the wrong definition to Isaac.  See 
Alexander Altmann and Samuel Miklos Stern, Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the  
Early Tenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58-59
3 Summa Theologiae I.16.1 cor.  (Henceforth referred to as ST)
4  ST I.16.5 cor, 16.6 cor.
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ways one can speak of truth: in the divine mind, in the human mind, and in things. 
This characterization of truth is also found in the Lectura super Ioannem, presented 
slightly differently, at the same places as the definition.  Long before that, however, 
as early as chapter 1, Thomas has given two other three-fold ways of considering 
truth.
2.1.1.2 Grace and truth
First, commenting on the “true light”, Thomas holds that scripture sees 
truth as the opposite of three different things: falsehood, figures, and participation. 
Christ was the true light because, before his coming, there were three lights in the 
world which failed to be true: the philosophy of the pagans, which was false; the 
teaching of the law, which was in figures; and the knowledge possessed “in a more 
special manner through grace” by angels and holy people, which was participatory.5
Secondly, when dealing with the text “full of grace and truth”, Thomas 
looks at the three ways Christ had the fulness of grace, and links them with three 
ways in which Christ had the fulness of truth.6  As Bonino points out, the first two 
connections are easy to see.7  The first is that through the grace of union Christ is 
truth itself.  In second place, through his habitual grace, Christ's soul is perfected, 
and so he knows all truth.
The third way poses difficulties.  The first difficulty is that it is divided 
into two.  On the one hand there is the capital grace of Christ, both producing virtue 
in people's minds by infusion of grace and meriting superabundant grace enough for 
5 Super Ioannem 1.5 (M125), Cf Serge-Thomas Bonino, “La théologie de la vérité dans la Lectura 
super Ioannem de saint Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 104 (2004):143.
6 “Possunt autem haec verba exponi de Christo tripliciter.”  1.8 (M188)
7 Bonino comments on this text, but holds that there is no link between the capital grace of Christ 
and the fulfilment of the figures and promises of the Old Testament.  “La théologie de la vérité ,” 
153-155.
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infinite worlds (if they existed), which is coupled with a truth that fulfils the figures 
and  promises  of  the  Law.   On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  graciousness  that 
accompanied his teaching and life, coupled with a truthfulness about his teaching, 
which  was  open,  without  using  riddles  or  figures,  or  deceptively  pandering  to 
people's vices by not teaching the whole truth.  But, pace Bonino, I would argue that 
in this seemingly disparate assembly of sorts of grace and truth there is a unity which 
logically complements the first two pairs.
We can start with the connections to the three things truth can be opposed 
to.  By the grace of union Christ, while being human, is truly God, and not divine “by 
participation,” which is the term Thomas uses in explaining texts like “you are gods.” 
Habitual grace ensures that the contents of Christ's human mind are true and not 
erroneous.  And Christ teaches the truth as opposed to proposing figures.  But not 
only do we have to deal with the objection that Christ was notorious for speaking in 
parables, but we also need to make the connection between plain language and the 
capital grace of Christ.
As far as parables go, we should recall that for Thomas the literal sense 
of a figure of speech is what the speaker intends: the literal meaning of “My God is a 
rock” is “I can rely utterly on God.”  A mystical sense (allegorical, tropological or 
anagogical) is a sense in excess of the literal sense: the story of the manna literally 
recalls  how the  people  of  Israel  were  fed  in  the  wilderness,  but  allegorically  or 
figuratively  it  refers  to  the  Eucharist.   In  this  sense  Christ's  teaching,  even  his 
parables, was to be taken literally.
As far  as  the  connection  between plain  language and capital  grace  is 
concerned, we need to remember that here we are concerned with “truth” as it is 
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found in things, in other words, how Christ helps people to have a true estimation of 
things.   The question is not whether the ideas and virtues in the human mind of 
Christ are true as opposed to erroneous, but whether these ideas and virtues can be 
communicated to others, communication being something done through the body.8 
And because Thomas is showing that Christ is full of grace and truth, it is a question 
of the extent of that communication.
Thomas notes  in  Tertia  Pars that  Christ  is  the head of  the Church in 
virtue of his humanity, and even his corporality, so in looking at Christ's capital grace 
it is not out of place to consider him as a “thing.”9  Here Thomas is talking about the 
scope of that headship: extensively it reaches not just to the Jews, not even to all 
people in the world, but even to infinite worlds if they existed, and intensively it  
leads them to perfection, which the Law could not do.  To this is paired the weakness 
of the Law as a means of communicating truth: the Law spoke in figures, which the 
bulk of the people did not understand, and made promises that those without the gift 
of prophecy could not see as fulfilled (and so true)10  -  in Christ as a thing the fulness 
arrives, the promises are seen to be fulfilled and the meaning of the figures becomes 
clear.  Further, Christ is not a passive thing, but an active one, and so  -  considering 
extension  -  his life and teaching (or perhaps we could say his teaching by word and 
example) are full of grace, and so attract all people (which Thomas supports with Ps 
44:3 and Luke 21:38) and also  -  considering intension  -  they deliver all the truth, 
not impeded by figures or by a restriction of content.
8 “It is an attribute of [human nature] that it is led through bodily and sensible things into spiritual 
and intelligible things.” ST III.61.1 cor.  All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
9  ST III.8.2.
10  ST II-II.2.7 cor.
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2.1.1.3 Truth and freedom; truth and the figures of the Law
In  order  to  verify  and  deepen  this,  we  can  jump  ahead  to  Thomas' 
comments on John 8:32 “the truth will set you free.”11  Here we are given three sorts 
of freedom through three sorts of truth: freedom from error by the truth of doctrine; 
freedom from servitude by the truth of grace; and freedom from corruption by the 
truth of eternity.  The error-doctrine pairing obviously goes with truth in the human 
mind; corruption-eternity can be linked to the truth which is God.  This leaves the 
truth of things to be linked to the pair slavery and grace.  This linking is corroborated 
in that, when talking about slavery and grace, Thomas quotes Roman 8:2, “But the 
law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus will  set me free from the law of sin and 
death.”  When talking earlier of the capital grace of Christ, Thomas compared it to 
the  weakness  of  the  law,  and quotes  Roman  8:3,  “What  was  impossible  for  the 
Law...”
What link is there between figure and slavery?  Thomas holds that the 
law needed to meet people with the desires they had; and so, for instance, as they 
were  addicted  to  sacrifices  and  could  have  relapsed  into  idolatry,  it  gave  them 
sacrifices, which were figures of the sacrifice to come.  As the bulk of the people (for 
whom the Law was principally intended) did not understand these figures, they acted 
simply out of obedience, and out of fear of the temporal punishments threatened to 
those who sacrificed to idols.  They were slaves.12
As slaves, only their outward behaviour was changed by the Law: the 
Law did not make them good.  And indeed Thomas argues that the Law was meant to 
evacuate itself, to show its own weakness.  Thomas repeats the argument in almost 
11  Super Ioannem 8.4 (M1198-1199)
12  ST I-II.96.2 cor, ad 2; I-II.97.3 ad 2; I-II.102.3 cor, I-II.107.1 ad 2.
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identical terms when discussing both the timing of the giving of the Old and New 
Law, and the time of the incarnation.13  In both cases Thomas argues that, because sin 
happens through pride, after sin humanity is left on its own, first of all to experience 
the weakness of natural reason, and then, after the revealed law comes to the aid of 
reason, to realise that humanity cannot fulfil the law by itself, and so needs grace. 
The Law is experienced as promise, as promise that in itself it cannot deliver.
The Law becomes true when it stops using figures and directs us to the 
truth.  To fill in the gaps in Thomas' argument, then it no longer panders to people's 
vices, because it is not asking them to obey the law for material ends, but only out of  
love  of  God,  who is  the sole reward  promised.   The Law no longer  promises  a 
justification it cannot deliver (for no animal sacrifice could adequately win God's 
favour  or  grace),  but  the  merit  of  Christ's  passion  actually  does  justify  us;  the 
promise is not related in figures, but is fulfilled.
Admittedly, Thomas' division between the Old and the New Law is more 
subtle than what has just been said, for he holds that grace was available under the 
Old Law.  This shall be discussed later.
Returning to the three ways of considering truth, it may be objected that 
these categories are shifting around.  For instance,  when linking grace and truth, 
Thomas  opposes  Christ's  teaching  to  the  figures  of  the  Law;  when  talking  of 
liberation, the truth of doctrine is opposed to error.  However, if we keep in mind that 
the categories fundamentally divide up truth according to where it resides, then we 
can see that the categories remain clear and distinct: it is the activity of teaching 
which straddles them.  For teaching starts with truth in one mind, and ends with truth 
13 Thus ST I-II.98.6 is “Whether the Old Law was fittingly given in the time of Moses” and  ST I-
II.106.3 is “Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world”; and 
ST III.1.5 is “Whether it was fitting for God to be incarnated from the beginning of the world.”
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in another mind, and in this way doctrina, as the body of things to be taught, falls 
into  the  truth-in-the-mind  category and  is  opposed  to  error.   But  the  activity  of 
teaching involves  communication  and thus  things  that  make ideas  present  in  the 
mind,  either  directly  or  as  figures.  Thus  here  the  truth-in-things  category  is 
appropriate.
Further, the truth of God is practical as well as theoretical,14 and so truth 
in the mind is found in both practical and speculative reason, and truth in things 
produces not only the right ideas in the minds, but also the virtues.
2.1.2 The threefold characterization of truth and the threefold spiritual sense 
of scripture
If  this  three-fold  characterization  of  truth  is  of  major  significance  to 
Thomas’ thought, we would expect to find it in his other works, particularly in the 
Summa Theologiae.  And indeed it is found there, and at key places: it lies behind the 
three mystical senses of scripture, the threefold way that sacraments signify, and the 
tripartite structure of the Summa itself.
2.1.2.1 Thomas' explanation of the three spiritual senses
In the very first question of  Prima Pars,  when outlining the nature of 
sacred doctrine, Thomas introduces and explains the four senses of scripture, known 
to the scholastics from Gregory the Great.15  There is the literal sense and the three 
spiritual  or  mystical  senses:  the  allegorical,  the  tropological  and  the  anagogical. 
Thomas distinguishes them clearly.  The literal sense is what the author intended, 
14  ST I.1.4 cor.
15  ST I.1.10.
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using words to designate things, and it is found in scripture in the same way as in  
secular literature.  If the author was using a figure of speech, such as metaphor or 
allegory, then the intention behind the metaphor or allegory is the literal sense.  Thus 
when scripture talks about the arm of God, the literal sense is what the author intends 
the word “arm” to symbolize, namely, God’s operative power, and in this way, even 
though God does not have a physical arm, the text taken “literally,” because it is not 
referring to a physical limb, is not false.16
But, Thomas reminds us, God has power not only over words, but also 
over  things.   (We  could  at  this  point  recall  that  rather  neglected  sense  of  truth 
according to which all things are true because they reflect the divine mind which 
wills them to be as they are.)  Thus the things Scripture refers to, as coming from 
God, have a sense intended by God, the spiritual or mystical sense: as Gregory says 
of the letter of scripture, dum narrat gestum, prodit mysterium.17  This extra sense is 
threefold: the figures contained in the Old Law are figures of the New (allegorical); 
the New Law itself is a figure of future glory (anagogical), and what is said of Christ 
the head signifies what we the members should do (tropological or moral).18  And 
just  as  the  allegorical  sense  as  a  spiritual  sense  is  different  from  an  allegory 
deliberately intended by an author, so also when the Bible directly gives a command 
or talks of heaven, this is still the literal sense rather than a spiritual one.19  These 
three spiritual senses correspond to the three ways in which the truth sets us free: 
from the figures of the Old Law and their corresponding slavery; from error by the 
truth of teaching; and from corruption by the truth of eternity.
16 ST I.1.10 ad 3.
17 “While it tells the deed, it proclaims the mystery.” Gregory, Moralia, 20.1, cited at ST I.1.10 sed 
contra.
18 ST I.1.10 cor.
19 Quodlibet 7.6.2 ad 2, ad 5.
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2.1.2.1 The necessity of the spiritual senses
It is claimed that Thomas was the only 13th century theologian to pose 
directly the question of the relation of the spiritual senses to the literal sense, and the 
strength of his response lies in the way it ties the senses to the mystery of Christ, in  
terms of salvation history and the mystery of the Church as Christ’s body.20  But this 
“rational critique” of the spiritual sense, in a certain way “revolutionary,” has been 
credited, not only with clarifying the four senses of scripture, but also with making 
the spiritual senses seem redundant.21  For Thomas insisted that only the literal sense 
could be used in argument; and yet, this did not rob Sacred Scripture of anything, for 
nothing necessary to the faith is contained under a spiritual sense that is not found 
elsewhere in scripture stated literally.  Given that there was a growing unease with 
mystical interpretations in the High Middle Ages, there seemed little point, claims 
Ceslaus Spicq, for an exegete to trouble himself with the spiritual senses of a text 
when all  the riches could be found in other passages under the literal  sense,  and 
could be read and commented on in all security.22
Thomas, of course, did not mean to make the spiritual senses redundant, 
and he uses them abundantly in his scriptural commentaries, but given his position 
that they had no value in theological argument, he does not make use of them in his 
strictly  theological  works  (apart  from allegory),  and  so  it  is  hard  from reading 
Thomas to see their value.  However, a number of threads of his theology can be 
woven together to develop a case for them, and I shall illustrate how this might be 
done by considering the tropological sense.
20 M.-D. Mailhiot OP, “La pensée de saint Thomas sur le sens spirituel,” Revue Thomiste 1959 (59): 
615n 2, 640-641.
21 Ceslaus Spicq, Esquisse d’une histoire de l’exégèse latine au moyen âge (Paris: Vrin, 1944), 288.
22 ST I.1.10 ad 2.
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First, we can recall that a direct command, even in the New Testament, is 
an example of a literal rather than a spiritual reading.  But as Thomas also holds, if a 
command simply remains a command outside of us, telling us what to do without 
enabling us to do it, then, even if it is a text of the New Law, it is the letter that kills,  
rather than the Spirit that gives life.23  The New Law must cause something in us, 
rather than simply informing us of what is to be done.  It is in this light that we 
should  interpret  Marie-Dominique  Mailhiot’s  remark  that  the  tropological 
interpretation is related to the causality of the acta et passa Christi, a causality that 
Mailhiot  regards  as  exemplary,  but  which  Thomas  normally  refers  to  as 
instrumental.24
Secondly, we can consider the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and in particular 
the gift of understanding.  This gift goes beyond what is on the surface and gives us a 
deeper penetration of what we believe through faith.25  Through faith we believe that 
which is proposed to us to be believed, whether it be the central mysteries of faith 
which exceed our power of reason, or the other things that are somehow ordered to 
them, “such as all things that are contained in divine Scripture.”26  This deeper sense 
of the scriptures, enabled by the power of the Holy Spirit, is not merely speculative, 
looking at eternal and necessary truths as they are in themselves.  But rather, it sees 
these truths also “as they are somehow rules of human acts, for a cognitive power is 
all the more noble insofar as it extends to more things.”27  A fuller discussion of this 
23 ST I-II.106.2 cor.
24 Mailhiot OP, “La pensée ,” 647; ST III.48.6 cor.
25   ST II-II.8.1 cor.
26   ST II-II.8.2 cor.
27   ST II-II.8.2 cor.  Gilles Emery recalls Thomas teaching that the “statements and commands found 
in Sacred Scripture can be interpreted and understood from what the saints have done” through the 
inspiration of the same Spirit who inspired the text (Super Ioannem 18.4 (M2321), but he does not 
explicitly connect this to the spiritual senses.  “Trinity as Truth: the Son as Truth and the Spirit of 
Truth in St. Thomas Aquinas” tr.  Sr Mary Thomas Noble OP, in Trinity, Church and the Human 
Person: Thomistic Essays (Naples, Florida: Ave Maria University Press, 2007), 111.
40
process would show how the other gifts are involved.
So, what the gift of understanding accomplishes is the movement from 
the “is” to the “ought,” a movement that much Enlightenment philosophy has argued 
cannot take place through human reason.28  And it comes because the Word that faith 
accepts and that understanding penetrates is the Verbum spirans Amorem.29  This is 
the move from unformed faith (faith that does not operate in love, the faith without 
works that is dead) to faith informed by love, the faith that saves.  But in this process 
the imperative does not come from without, from the letter, but from within, from the 
Spirit, and so we have the movement from the external Old Law to the New Law, 
which is only secondarily in writing, but primarily is written on the human heart.30
Thus the spiritual sense is, at least in this case, something interior to each 
one who believes in love.  The believer already knows what to do, for he or she 
believes the commands that are given literally in other parts of the New Testament, 
but the spiritual sense enables the believer to carry out the command in love.  Hence 
Thomas can assert that the gifts of the Holy Spirit (and thus presumably the spiritual 
senses) are necessary  for salvation,  but that what is necessary  for faith is always 
expressed literally somewhere in Scripture, and the need for the spiritual sense to 
have some basis in a literal sense is a necessary corrective for interpreting spirits, 
which are impulses that go beyond human reason.31  But, to return to our original 
28 Alasdair MacIntyre traces this back to Hume, and argues that it arises once a sense of purpose or 
goal in nature is lost.  After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981), 56-59. 
We shall see soon how the “spirit” that inspires the spiritual senses is dynamic and purposeful.
29   ST I.43.5 ad 2.  Gilles Emery also uses the idea of the Verbum spirans Amorem to explain how 
the Spirit teaches the truth without being a different principle from the Son or adding anything to 
what he teaches.  He does not, however, explicitly connect this to the seven gifts of the Spirit. 
“Trinity as Truth: the Son as Truth and the Spirit of Truth in St. Thomas Aquinas” tr.  Sr Mary 
Thomas Noble OP, in Trinity, Church and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays, (Naples, Florida: 
Ave Maria University Press, 2007), 103-110.
30   ST I-II.106.1, 107.1 ad 2.  This richer view of how Scripture works challenges Chauvet's claim 
that Thomas has a merely instrumental approach to language.  Symbol and Sacrament, 33-34.
31   ST I-II.68.2 and ST I.10.1 ad 1; Quodlibet 7.6.1 ad 3, cf. ST I-II.68.1 cor.
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claim, it can be seen (at least in one case) that the truth imparted by the three-fold 
spiritual sense is not simply a truth that informs, but a truth that sets us free.32
2.1.3 The threefold signification of the sacraments
In his  discussion of the spiritual sense according to Thomas, Mailhiot 
compares the structure of scriptural language to the structure of the sacraments, using 
the following diagram.33
Biblical language Sacraments
voces   (signa) sacramentum tantum
│      │
res . . . . signa res et sacramentum
│ │
res res tantum
In both cases there is a sign that refers to and causes (is the sacramentum [tantum] 
of) a  thing  (res), and  yet  this  thing  (res) is  also  the  sign  and  cause  (is  res  et  
sacramentum) of a further reality, which is not a sign (res tantum).  The analysis of 
the sacrament into these three parts had arisen in the 12th century as a way of making 
sense of Augustine’s insistence that, even when the recipient posed an obstacle and 
thus did not receive grace, something lasting was conferred in the baptism and so the 
sacrament need not, and should not, be repeated when the person came to true faith 
and charity, an insistence extended, mutatis mutandis, to the other sacraments.34
There  are  grounds  not  mentioned  by  Mailhiot  for  taking  this  further. 
32 Ulrich Horst notes that Thomas is moving in this direction in his discussion of the gift of 
understanding (ST II-II.8.2), but does not pursue it, preferring to answer the question of the 
compatibility of faith and understanding.  See Die Gaben des Heiligen Geistes nach Thomas von  
Aquin (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 113-114.  John Farrell OP notes how the gift of 
understanding gives one “an insight into the direct order of Providence,” (the “eternal law of the 
Holy Spirit” which Thomas does not explain further, cf. ST I-II.69.1 obj 2) “impossible for human 
reasoning and insight alone.”  “St Thomas Aquinas' Treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in the 
Summa Theologiae” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1984), 243-244.
33 Mailhiot, “La pensée,” 631.
34 Ibid.
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Thomas  recalls  Augustine's  statement  that  sacraments  can  be  treated  as  “visible 
words.”  Moreover, he makes a parallel between God's choice of material elements in 
the sacraments and of the ways spiritual things are spoken of in Scripture through 
similitudes chosen by the judgment of the Holy Spirit.  He could here be referring to 
both the literal and the mystical senses of scripture.35
Even  better,  just  as  the  spiritual  sense  is  threefold,  so  also  is  the 
signification of the sacrament.  For at the beginning of the tract on sacraments, as 
soon as he has established that sacraments are signs, and signs “of a sacred reality 
insofar as it is sanctifying human beings,” Thomas then uses Aristotelian causality to 
establish the different realities of which a sacrament can and should be a sign.36 For 
in signifying our salvation
there  are  three things to  be considered,  namely:  the cause itself  of  our 
sanctification,  which  is  the  passion  of  Christ;  and  the  form  of  our 
sanctification,  which consists  in grace and virtues;  and the ultimate end 
(finis)  of  our  sanctification,  which  is  eternal  life.   And  all  these  are 
signified through the sacraments.  Whence a sacrament is: a rememorative 
sign of that which came before, namely of the passion of Christ; and a 
demonstrative sign of that which is brought about in us through the passion 
of Christ, namely grace; and a prognostic—that is, announcing beforehand
—sign of future glory.37
The formal and final causality of our sanctification clearly correspond to 
truth in the human mind (as opposed to error and vice) and to the truth which is God, 
which  we  shall  finally  see  and  thereby  receive  eternal  life  and  liberation  from 
corruption.  But there is no easy connection between the passion and truth in things 
(as opposed to the figure) which leads to freedom from slavery.  A full answer to this 
will unfold as this thesis develops, for this threefold characterization of truth is being 
used as a heuristic device to help us understand the sacraments, and when, having 
35 ST III.60.6 obj 1, III.60.5 ad 1.
36   ST III.60.2 cor.
37   ST III.60.3 cor.
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used it, we see how the passion is effective in the sacraments, we shall understand 
the  connection.   As  a  foreshadowing  of  the  answer,  however,  we  can  note  that 
Thomas holds that any action of Christ would have had sufficient merit to achieve 
our salvation, but that the action whose merit was actually deputed to that end was 
the  passion,  for  as  well  as  meriting  it  removed other  obstacles  as  well.38  Chief 
among these obstacles was our attachment to material things, for, having turned away 
from God in the sin of Adam, human beings were collapsi ad corpora, which is why 
God became incarnate, using these very same bodily things to save us.39  What the 
passion does,  we shall  see,  is  to reveal that all  bodily things used in worship or 
received as rewards from God are to be first understood as signs of spiritual realities, 
and so it releases us from slavery to the Old Law, which does not in itself go beyond 
the figure and the material reward or punishment.
Thomas does not here mention the material cause of the sanctification of 
a  human being,  which is,  of course,  the human being who, by the power of  the 
passion is filled with grace and virtue so as to be able to merit eternal life.  For the 
material cause is passive, and the sacrament does not need to signify the material 
cause but to act upon it.
One  further  comment  on  the  parallel  should  be  made.   The  realities 
scripture  refers  to  are  generally  visible  realities  and  thus  easily  act  as  signs 
themselves, but character, as a “mark” on the soul, is not immediately perceived by 
the senses,  and thus cannot be a sign in the strict  sense of the word.   Character 
functions  as  a  sign  only because  it  is  produced by the  visible,  audible,  sensible 
sacramental  ritual.40  Therefore  it  is  the  character-as-produced-by-the-outward-rite 
38 Quodlibet 2.1.2.
39   ST III.1.3 ad 1.
40  ST III.63.1 ad 2.
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which  is  the  sign  signifying  and  producing  grace.41  The  linkage  between  the 
sacramentum tantum and  res  et  sacramentum is  given  by God alone,  just  as  in 
scripture God is  responsible not only for the  voces but also for the  res that they 
denote;  however, as the res et sacramentum is not visible in itself, faith is needed to 
perceive the truth of this link.  This is that fourth and often overlooked sense of truth, 
the infallible matching between things as they are and things as God knows and wills 
them to be.  And indeed, when we have probed the workings of sacraments and seen 
the role that the material element plays for us who are collapsi ad corpora, we shall 
get a clearer understanding of the link between the literal  and spiritual senses of 
scripture, to see why the spiritual sense is necessary, not as a piece of information 
(for the information is contained literally elsewhere) but as a transformation of the 
literal sense, and also to see how this necessary spiritual sense can be considered as 
having a basis in the sacramentality of Christian life.
2.1.4 The structure of the Summa Theologiae
We do not merely see this threefold understanding of truth at work in 
Thomas’ treatment of Scripture and sacraments.  I want to suggest that it also sheds 
light on Thomas' most puzzled-over threefold division, the structure of the  Summa 
Theologiae.  This will be of direct benefit to this thesis, because, for instance, it will 
help us to understand why Thomas does not discuss sacraments when he deals with 
grace or the virtue of religion.
2.1.4.1 Why the exitus-reditus schema fails to convince
Contemporary discussion of the structure of the  Summa began with an 
41 Cf Schillebeeckx, L'économie, 425.
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article in 1939 by Marie-Dominique Chenu.  His basic argument was that, in order to 
present  sacred  history as  an  Aristotelian  scientia,  Thomas  made  us  of  the  neo-
Platonic idea of  exitus and  reditus.42  He bases his claim for this structure on the 
prologue to I.2, the prologue to II (where he claims that the vocabulary “exemplar” 
and “image” are a clear indication that he is employing a Neoplatonic thematic) and 
from the Scriptum Super Sententiis: “Unde in prima parte determinat de rebus divinis 
secundum exitum a principio; in secunda secundum reditum in finem.”43  Thus Prima 
Pars deals with God, and the procession of creatures from God (exitus) and Secunda 
Pars deals with the return of the rational creature to God (reditus); Tertia Pars deals 
with Christ who is the way.44  As Chenu himself notes, this leaves Tertia Pars outside 
the  structure,  and  ends  up  dealing  with  grace,  charity  and  contemplation  before 
Christ; however, he suggests that this helps show that God was not compelled to send 
his Son into the world.45
But Chenu's claim that exitus-reditus is actually the structuring principle 
of the Summa does not withstand criticism.46  For instance, Michel Corbin notes that 
divine governance, which deals with the return of creatures to God, and which was 
traditionally considered part of moral (and where it is found in Contra Gentiles), is 
moved to  Prima Pars in the  Summa Theologiae.47  True, the reason for anything 
42 M.-D. Chenu OP, “Le plan de la Somme théologique de S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste 45.1 (Jan-Mar 
1939): 97.
43  ST III prologus and ST III.56.1 ad 2 and ad 3; Scriptum 1.2.1 prologus; cited at Chenu, “Le plan,” 
98.
44  Cf ST I.2 prologus.
45 Chenu, “Le plan,” 101-105.
46  Many writers have put forward arguments for or against: for a summary, see Brian V. Johnstone, 
“The Debate on the Structure of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas: from Chenu (1939) 
to Metz (1998),” in Aquinas as Authority: A collection of studies presented at the second confer-
ence of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, December 14 – 16, 2000, ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris 
and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 187-200.  Various individual theologians will be men-
tioned later at an appropriate point in the development of the argument of this thesis.
47  Michel Corbin, Le chemin de la théologie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974),  798-
799.
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creaturely thing being discussed in the  Summa is that it has its source and goal in 
God (cf ST I.1.7 cor), but to take this as structuring principle for the entire work is to 
mistake material objects for formal objects.48  It is significant that to find the pair 
exitus and reditus  Chenu has to go to the Scriptum, Thomas' earliest work and one 
where the order was dictated by the text on which he was commenting.
Exitus and reditus still have a part to play in the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
but they have become part of a larger whole which operates on two principles.  The 
first  division is  between what  we can know by reason (Books 1-3),  and what  is 
beyond reason but is believed on authority and which can be shown not to contradict 
reason (Book 4).  Then there is a second division: the divine nature; created natures 
as proceeding from God; the return of created natures to God.49 
The  faith/reason  distinction  is  to  be  expected  from  the  very  aim  of 
Contra Gentiles, and it gives rise to a parallel structure.  Book 1 and the first part of 
Book 4 are about natural theology and the confession of the Trinity respectively; 
Book 2 and the second part of Book 4 are about physics (in the Aristotelian sense) 
and the incarnation (and those things consequent upon it); Book 3 and the last part 
are  about  morality  (which  includes  divine  governance)  and  our  ultimate  end 
(resurrection).   Although  the  exitus-reditus scheme  is  subordinated  to  reason-
revelation;  it  is  followed here  more  rigorously than  in  the  Sentences (where,  for 
instance, grace and sin is considered in the second book, which should still be about 
exitus).  However, Thomas is making a clear link between this scheme and those 
branches of philosophy that somehow concern God: metaphysics, physics and ethics 
(not mathematics), which makes sense given the aim of the book.  We may note, 
48 Wilhelm Metz, Die Architektonik der Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin: Zur Gesamtsicht  
des thomasischen Gedankens (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998), 201.
49 Corbin, Le chemin, 792-793.
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however,  that  whereas  pagan  metaphysics  considered  all  separated  substances, 
Thomas distinguishes between the Creator and creatures, and angels are discussed 
under “physics” in Book 2.
Further insight into the three-fold division of knowledge is gained from 
the commentary on John, a work more or less contemporary with the Summa, where 
Thomas uses it twice.  He alters a remark of Theophylact concerning Pilate's notice 
on the cross to link the Jews with (revealed) theology, the Greeks with “natural and 
philosophical philosophy”, and the Latins with moral science.50  More significantly, 
in  his  proœmium  he  links  these  three  sciences  with  three  aspects  of  the 
contemplation of God.  Unremarkably, he says that natural science has the fulness (or 
breadth) of contemplation because it considers things that proceed from God; and 
among the natural  sciences  metaphysics  has  the  height  of  contemplation.   Moral 
science, he says, has the perfection of contemplation, because it is about the ultimate 
end, which would relate to the definition of morality used in Contra Gentiles.51
However,  a  few lines  earlier  Thomas  has  called  John's  contemplation 
perfect  because  the  one  contemplating  is  drawn  up  to  the  level  of  what  is 
contemplated.  Perfect contemplation is unitive and sanctifying.  Thomas notes twice 
that this sanctification is achieved through the “sacraments of the humanity,” which 
he claims are referred to when the Isaian text under discussion says, “and the things 
that were under him filled the temple.”52  The sacraments (of the New Law) therefore 
hold an ambivalent position: they could come under morality, but because they “fill 
the  temple,”  they  are  the  presence  of  his  power,  and  could  fall  under  natural 
knowledge, just as in Contra Gentiles sacraments are considered as consequences of 
50 Super Ioannem 19.4 (M2422); cf Catena in Ioannem 19.6 for the original quote.
51  Super Ioannem proœmium, M9.
52  Super Ioannem proœmium, M8.
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the incarnation, and are paralleled with natural philosophy.53
When  considering  divisions  of  human  knowledge,  therefore,  Thomas 
does not abandon the metaphysics (natural theology) – physics – morality (final end) 
approach, wherein sacraments, as means to the end, would fall under morality.  But 
Thomas mentions this division in the proœmium only to point out that John is the 
true contemplative and his Gospel has “totum simul” what these sciences contain 
“divisim.”   Divine  knowledge is  one;  there  is  no division  in  the  divine  intellect 
between  speculative  and  practical:  and  revealed  knowledge  shares  in  this  unity. 
Therefore this division is not necessarily the best for dealing with what is known 
through faith, and it seems that in the  Summa Thomas has chosen a different one, 
based upon the extent to which the Word of God has been revealed to us and in us.
Three differences between  Contra Gentiles and the  Summa Theologiae 
are evidence of this change.  That the Trinity is in the first section shows that the 
whole work is  about  sacra doctrina,  what has been revealed.   The placement of 
divine governance in Prima Pars shows that exitus-reditus is no longer the principle. 
This gives rise to the third difference, that morality must be considered as something 
different than merely the return to God, and so in the Summa it is about the human 
being as the image of God.54
2.1.4.2 An earlier approach: naturalis, moralis, sacramentalis
My own interpretation of the structure of the Summa appeals to an earlier 
classification, and indeed the earliest we have.  Near the start of the 14 th century Fra 
Tolomeo of Lucca, who had been a pupil and travelling companion of Thomas, used 
53 However, they are also alluded to under morality in Book 3, where the role of material things in 
worship and sanctification is mentioned.
54 Corbin, Le plan ,796-799.
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the adjectives  naturalis,  moralis and sacramentalis to label the three parts.55  More 
explicitly,  the  Summa deals  with:  natures  (divine  first,  then  created);  moral 
philosophy (general first, then specific vices and virtues); and sacraments and the 
incarnation  of  the  Word.   This  neatly  coincides  with  Thomas'  threefold 
characterization of truth, for Thomas is speaking as a “doctor veritatis catholicae.”56 
There is the truth in God (that is, in the divine mind), which is the same as the truth 
in things when we consider the relation between the nature of things and the ideas in 
the divine mind.  Then there is truth in the human mind, which is an adequation of 
the  human  mind  to  the  divine  reality  (theological  virtues)  and  created  reality 
(cardinal virtues).  Finally, there is truth in things, insofar as they lead us to the truth. 
This is Christ considered not as Word in itself, but as something that presents itself to 
us, thus Christ in his humanity and the extensions of that in the sacraments.  As it is 
theology, at all stages there is a procession from God and return: uncaused in the case 
of the divine nature and efficiently caused in the case of created natures; formally 
caused in the case of morals (I shall explain this later); and instrumentally caused in 
the case of Christ's humanity and the sacraments.  And throughout God is operating 
as the end of the return and thus final cause for creatures.
Furthermore, at all stages the Word of God is always present, and indeed 
all things are understood through the Word.  In considering both divine nature and 
angelic natures, we see that in all cases understanding takes place through the Word. 
This is not the incarnate Word, for reasons we shall soon see.
Secunda Pars describes itself as dealing with the image, as opposed to 
55 Tholomaeus de Luca, Historia ecclesiastica nova, in Thomae Aquinatis vitae fontes praecipuae, 
ed. Angelico Ferrua OP (Alba: Ed. Domenicane, 1968), 22.39 (§175 ).  Fra Tolomeo describes his 
relationship to Thomas, ibid., 23.8,10 (§176, 178).
56 ST I proœmium
50
the exemplar treated in Prima Pars.  In particular, the human being is a divine image 
insofar as  per se potestativus, as  principium of his or her own actions.  We have 
already seen the rôle played here by law, as well as the gift of wisdom.  And Image is 
a personal term for the Word; Law and Wisdom are not personal, but are normally 
appropriated to the Word.57  As we have seen, the Law comes to its perfection in 
Christ.  The human soul of Christ was full of all virtues  -  because it already enjoyed 
the beatific vision  -  and it is these virtues that are described in this part.  In Secunda 
Secundae one sed contra in every six appeals to Christ's authority, and if there is less 
appeal to him in the other parts of the articles, it is because Thomas is trying to show 
that this teaching is rational.  Furthermore, for faith to be salvific it must be faith in 
the Trinity and incarnation, and hope and love arise from this faith.58  As Thomas 
stated at the beginning of the  Summa, the content of the faith is what is known by 
God and by the blessed.59  It is this knowledge that we share through informed faith 
that is in a sense the formal cause of our virtues.
Christ is not left to  Tertia Pars as something of an afterthought; rather, 
once we have seen how his New Law of grace formally makes us good in Secunda 
Pars,  we  can  see  how  through  his  humanity  as  it  presents  itself  to  us  (in  its 
corporality), Christ is the instrumental cause of our graced living.
2.1.4.3 An increasingly human presence of the Word
Rudi te Velde sees the plan of the Summa as: God-and-his-works; man-
and-his-works;  Christ-and-his-works,  and  notes  an  increasing  level  of 
57 ST I.35; I-II.93.4 ad 2; I.39.8 cor.
58 ST II-II.2.5, 7 and 8.
59 ST I.1.2 cor.
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concretisation.60  The notion of increasing concretisation is helpful.  The plan of the 
Summa is professedly paedogogical: this work, unlike others, will have an order that 
makes it suitable for beginners.61  Thomas holds that the teacher knows something 
more profoundly than the pupil (as does the higher angel with respect to the lower 
angel), because in his grasp of that reality he realises more of its consequences and 
effects.62  This approach to teaching is appropriate for  sacra doctrina, where both 
pupil and master know the subject matter through faith, and thus without complete 
comprehension.  The teacher, therefore, must break down (distinguere) the unified 
concept to present it at a level the student can understand, at a level which is more 
connatural to the student.  For the human being considering divine truth, this will be 
at a more human level, and even a more corporeal level, for after sin we are collapsi  
ad corpora.63  So Thomas starts with God, the shared object of our faith that we wish 
to understand through sacra doctrina.  We can make many statements about God, but 
although the students can assent to these statements, they have very little grasp of 
their content  -  as Karen Kilby comments about Thomas' Trinitarian doctrine.64  Yet 
Thomas says that without this Trinitarian doctrine, we cannot understand creation 
(which takes place through the Word) or our salvation.  But the correlative is also 
true.  The procession of creatures from God is closer to us than the procession of the 
Word from the Father,  and is  more understandable  quoad nos:  having dealt  with 
creation, and then the various ways that creatures share in the governance of creation 
-  specifically how angels and then humans know and express that knowledge, and 
60 Rude A te Velde, Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006), 18.
61 ST I proœmium
62 ST I.106.1 cor.
63  Cf ST III.1.3 ad 1
64 Karen Kilby, “Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding,” International Journal of  
Systematic Theology 7.4 (2005): 414-427.
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also how humans generate children  -  we have grasped more deeply the procession 
of the Word in which all these motions somehow participate.65  It is not a movement 
upward from creation to the Creator  -  Thomas insists that such attempts to prove the 
Trinity merely provoke well-deserved mockery66  -  but something that deepens the 
grasp  of  what  is  already  believed.   The  movement  then  to  morality  and 
sacramentality is not a movement to the more concrete as such, but a movement to 
what is more easily grasped by the (fallen) human being.67
Neither is Thomas arguing more geometrico: for instance, it is argued that 
the  New  Law  justifies  before  justification  is  explained,  and  when  that  moment 
arrives, justification is attributed to faith before faith has been discussed.68  Argument 
more geometrico would require a much deeper level of understanding of the first 
principles; we understand point and line, but we only know God's existence, not what 
God is.
2.1.4.4 Resolving some anomalies in the structure of the Summa
It is from this point of view that we can reconcile what would seem to be 
two anomalies within the natural-moral-sacramental plan.
First of all, Thomas would seem to deal with angelic morality (and even 
divine “morality”, as we might term theodicy) outside the moral part.  But Secunda 
65  Cf SCG 2.2.
66 ST I.32.1 cor.
67 And in this way the vetula (old woman) (cf In Symbolum Apostolorum 1), by living a virtuous life 
in grace and receiving the sacraments, knows the Trinitarian processions in the deepest way we 
can know in this human life; the theologian is able to articulate the connections.  Cf Bruce D 
Marshall, “Quod scit una vetula: Aquinas on the Nature of Theology,” in The Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005), 1-35, and Kilby, “The Limits of Understanding,” 426-427.  Theology in 
showing the connections may help show the logical coherence of what is believed and to refute 
heresy and attacks from unbelievers (ST I.1.8), and in these and similar ways may assist the life of 
faith and love, but it cannot replace it and is always at its service.
68   I-II.106.2 comes before I-II.113.4, which comes before II-II.1-16.
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Pars is a separate part not because it concerns choices made in freedom, but because 
it concerns the Word as Law and Wisdom present in a special way in the human 
being.  The eternal decrees of God are beyond us, and the statements of theodicy are 
as comprehensible to us as the statements of Trinitarian theology.   Similarly,  the 
morality of angels, who know no deliberation, and who cannot grow in merit, for 
whom the concept of “way” simply does not apply, is totally different from ours. 
Even  if  we  were  to  talk  about  it,  it  would  not  substantially  advance  our 
understanding.  And so Thomas' treatment of what angels do is helpful to us insofar 
as we understand angelic nature, not insofar as we see the Eternal Law present in the 
angelic minds.
Similarly, although Thomas carefully relegates all questions regarding the 
sacraments of the New Law to Tertia Pars, he considers the sacraments of the Old 
Law in Prima Secundae. But Thomas insists that the sacraments of the Old Law were 
not instrumental causes of grace.  As we shall see, any grace that came through the 
sacraments of the Old Law came through the faith and obedience of the one who 
received them.69  They are for Thomas sacramenta legalia as a part of the Old Law 
under the general discussion of law.  There is no extra presence of the Word in such a 
sacrament than in any other aspect of the Old Law.  But the sacraments of the New 
Law are extension of the incarnation of the Word, as we shall see.
Finally, we might note that this explanation of the structure of the Summa 
also covers the parts that were not written.  Just as he did in Contra Gentiles, in the 
Summa Thomas labels  his  eschatological  section as  being  about  the  resurrection. 
Now the resurrection operates by a sort  of instrumental causality,  and also as an 
exemplary cause: as an exemplar not for God, but for us  -  in other words, the 
69 ST III.62.6.
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incarnate Word in his rising effectively communicates the truth of the risen life to the 
just.70
2.2 Exitus-reditus, spirit and grace
Having established the macro-structure of the Summa, we can now consider 
exitus-reditus as the reason why anything is discussed there.  We can start with God, 
both in the unity of the essence and the distinction of the persons, and then look at 
the divine missions, the vestiges or images of the Trinity in creation,  the various 
ways that creation gives glory to God, and the participation of creatures in divine 
governance,  including  human  reproduction.   This  will  expose  us  to  some  more 
“archaic” aspects  of  Thomas'  thought,  especially the meanings he attaches  to  the 
word spiritus, so that we can show some links to anthropological notions of spirit and 
grace.
2.2.1 The circular movement in God and in creation
The Summa describes itself as handing on “the knowledge of God, and not 
only as he is in himself, but also as he is the principium of things and their finis.”71 
All this is covered (at a certain level only) in Prima Pars, which treats of God, and 
then of creatures, and we shall follow that order of discussion, but then look at what 
Thomas places at the hinge, the divine missions.
2.2.1.1 Processions in God
70  ST III prologus and ST III.56.1 ad 2 and ad 3.
71 ST I.2 prologus
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Instead of saying that he wants to talk about creatures as they come from 
God and return to  God, at  two key points Thomas sums up the contents of  that 
second section as the “procession” of creatures.72  This term obviously links back to 
his  theology  of  the  Trinity,  for  it  is  through  establishing  the  reasonableness  of 
processions  in  God  that  Thomas  can  move  on  to  real  relations  and  then  the 
“distinction of persons,” his term for the subject matter of this section.73  But it is also 
implicit that this procession in creatures must have God as its beginning and end, and 
thus  be somehow a circular  movement.   We have been prepared for this:  before 
Thomas shows that knowledge is one of the operations that leads to procession in 
God, he shows that knowledge is a return to self which is in fact what it is to subsist.  
“For a thing to return to its own essence (redire ad essentiam suam) means nothing 
other than for it to subsist in itself,” and thus the highest degree of self-subsistence is 
associated with the most perfect form of return.74  As Thomas O'Meara points out, the 
fact that the tract on the unity of the divine essence concludes with a question about 
beatitude  is  not  “a  medieval  curiosity,  but  it  is  in  fact  a  summary  of  Aquinas' 
philosophical theology of God and a bridge to properly revealed and supernatural 
theology.”75 
We get a more developed and more explicitly “circular” presentation of this 
notion of subsistence as return in  De Potentia, where Thomas is arguing that there 
are only three persons because there are only two processions, associated with the 
72 ST I.2 prologus, I.44 prologus.
73 ST I.2 prologus, I.44 prologus.  The prologue to I.27 gives the subject matter as the “Trinity of 
persons in divinis”, but then goes on to order the material on the basis of what enables the persons 
to be distinguished.
74  ST I.14.2 ad 1. cf Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne agens agit sibi simile: A 'Repetition' of Scholastic  
Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 254.
75 Thomas F O'Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure in the Summa theologiae of Thomas 
Aquinas,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 55 (1988): 136.
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two operations of knowledge and love.76  In the case of God, in both these operations 
the procession remains entirely within God: the operation is God (in God, to be is to 
know is to will), the object is God, and the word or love that proceeds is God.  But 
there is also a circularity that arises from both operations taken together, as in human 
beings, but differently.  In human beings, knowledge is caused by exterior things, and 
then the knowledge inspires desire that is directed back to those things, and so the 
“circle is closed”, but outside the human being.  God's knowledge, far from being 
caused by things, causes them, and God's love is not directed to things, but directs 
things to him.  Indeed, God's knowledge and love of things is merely an aspect of 
God's knowledge and love of self.  Thus with the procession of the Holy Spirit, the 
divine love directed to God, “circulus conclusus est,” and there are no more divine 
persons.
We can  develop  this  notion  of  circularity  in  two  ways.   The  first  is  to 
consider it  in terms of knowledge and love, and in  De Potentia Thomas goes on 
immediately to develop this in terms of the vestiges of God and two levels of the 
image of God.  The second is in terms of generation.  Both of these are found in 
Prima Pars.
2.2.1.2 Vestiges and images of God
Thomas expects to find a vestige of the Trinity even in irrational creatures, 
because every effect resembles its cause.  And so a thing in its subsistence resembles 
the Father, in its form it resembles the Word, and it its being somehow ordered to 
God it resembles God's love of self.  In rational creatures there is found an image 
through the operations of knowledge and love, the image of creation.  And when the 
76 De Potentia 9.9 cor.
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object  of  that  knowledge  and  love  is  God,  the  image  is  at  a  higher  degree  (of 
recreation), of which 2 Cor 3:18 says: “for we with unveiled face contemplating the 
glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image.”77
In  Prima Pars the vestige is more clearly distinguished from the image.78 
The image itself can now enjoy three grades: creation, recreation (through grace) and 
likeness (through glory).  This helps explain why Thomas pays so much attention to 
angelic and human knowledge and willing, the “image of creation.” What is more 
important is that he concludes the tract on the Trinity by discussing the means by 
which the “image of recreation” is achieved, the missions of the divine persons.  This 
is  Thomas'  first  description  of  grace,  from  a  Trinitarian  and  cosmological 
perspective, so it is important that we consider it closely.
2.2.1.3 Divine missions
Two things are necessary to consider a divine person as sent.  That person 
must first of all proceed from another divine person, and secondly he must begin to 
exist  in  a  new mode  at  the  terminus  of  the  sending;79 if  that  new mode  can  be 
described as the other “having” the divine person, that is, being freely able to use 
(uti) or enjoy (frui) that person, then we can also talk of the person being given.80
2.2.1.3.1 Visible and invisible missions
Thomas  distinguishes  between  visible  and  invisible  missions.   A visible 
77 De Potentia 9.9 cor.
78 ST I.45.7, I.93.2, I.93.6 cor.
79 ST I.43.1 cor.
80 ST I.43.3 cor.
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mission does not involve the use of a pre-existing creature, but is the presence of a 
divine  person  to  a  creature  that  was  created  specifically  for  the  purpose  of 
manifesting that divine person.  The Son was visibly sent in Jesus; the Holy Spirit in 
the dove at the baptism, the cloud at the transfiguration, and the wind and the fire at 
Pentecost.  The visible missions are a concession to our human weakness.81
Invisible missions,  on the other hand, are part  of God's original plan for 
rational creatures.  Indeed, it is only to rational creatures, whose powers of intellect 
and will make them to be in the image of God, that there can be a deeper mode of 
presence by which God is present as the known in the knower and the beloved in the 
lover, a way by which the rational operation reaches right through to God.82  The 
presence that raises the intellect is a mission of the Word; that which moves the will 
is  a  mission  of  the  Spirit  who is  Love.   Any other  divine  activity in  a  creature 
(rational  or  otherwise)  is  simply  the  common  way in  which  God  is  in  creation 
through essence, power and presence.  Thomas is clear that although graces  gratis  
datae, such as knowledge and faith, may enrich our intellect, they are not considered 
to be an invisible mission of the Son, for in them the Son is known through some 
effects in us, but he does not dwell in us or can be we be said to have him.83  Invisible 
missions are occasions where sanctifying grace is bestowed upon a person, either 
initially or to augment grace already given; further, the term is normally applied to a 
significant  movement  of  grace,  such  as  preparation  for  martyrdom  or  for 
renunciation of worldly goods.84
81 ST I.43.3 and I.43.7 cor.
82 ST I.43.3 cor and ST I.38.1 cor.
83  ST I.43.3 obj 3 and ad 3.
84 ST I.43.6 cor, ad 2 and ad 3.
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2.2.13.2 The inseparability of the missions
More light is shed by the arguments that there cannot be an invisible mission 
of the Son without an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit.   First  of all,  the two 
persons are inseparable, and always work together in works ad extra.85  Further, the 
Son is not just any word, but the Verbum spirans Amorem.  If the Son is really in us, 
if he is not merely known but  percipitur (which implies some sort of experiential 
knowledge), then the inevitable result is to break forth into love.86   Furthermore, the 
sending of a divine Person implies a perfecting of those who receive, raising them up 
to be assimilated to the person who is sent.  But the raising of the intellect, which 
should be attributed to the mission of the Son, is experienced as gift, and therefore is 
also to be attributed to the Holy Spirit, who as Love is the one who makes the gift  
object a gift.87  Not surprisingly,  therefore,  throughout the question on the divine 
missions there is an emphasis that these missions must bestow gratia gratum faciens 
and that grace is not bestowed without them.88
Thus this circular motion that is so deeply part of existence is part of what it is to be 
human, and is perfected by the circular motion within God which, on the other hand, 
goes out of itself as an expression of its circularity.
2.2.2 Effects give glory to their causes
Although  the  similarity  involved  in  this  circular  motion  was  always 
85  So also the Father dwells in us with the Son and the Holy Spirit, but as the Father is unoriginate, 
he is not spoken of as sent.  ST I.43.5 cor.
86  ST I.43.5 ad 2.  Gilles Emery points out that this can be considered from another perspective: the 
one who knows the Son so as to be in some way conformed to him is loved by the Father with the 
Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Son (objective genitive) proceeding from the Father.  “Trinity as 
Truth,” 96.
87  ST I.43.5 ad 1, cf ST I.38.2 cor and ad 1.  Thomas talks of the indwelling of the Trinity, and it 
would seem that the Father is present as the giver, the Son as the gift object, and the Holy Spirit as 
the spirit of the gift.
88  ST I.43.3, 43.4 obj 2, 43.5 obj 2, cor, ad 2; 43.6.
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present in the discussion (especially through the notion of image), it is now time to 
look at it directly, particularly through the scholastic maxim “omne agens agit sibi 
simile” (the result of every action is something similar to the agent), and we shall do 
so by considering procession as generation, and the return as giving honour.89
2.2.2.1 Omne agens agit sibi simile
A  good  introduction  is  in  the  more  compact  investigations  of  the 
Compendium  Theologiae and  Contra  Gentiles,  where,  as  Philipp  W.  Rosemann 
points out, Thomas explores procession starting from inanimate objects and working 
up to the angels, in order to show the vestiges in creation of the processions in the 
Trinity.90  Not surprisingly, it is the Trinitarian processions that meet Thomas' idea of 
a perfect procession, which is one:
• that proceeds as distinct without ever being separated; 
• that is an entirely internal process that takes nothing from outside;
• and in which that which proceeds is the same as the principle from 
which it proceeds.
Thus he considers processes of generation (fire generates fire, and plants 
and animals generate something different but of the same species) and finds them 
lacking  on  all  three  counts.   When  he  gets  to  sensitive  animals,  that  which  is 
generated in the imagination and stored in the memory at least remains within, but it 
starts from without.  He then moves up to the procession produced by the intellect in 
89 Cited in Prima Pars alone at I.3.3 obj 2, I.19.2 cor, I.19.4 cor, I.44.2 obj 3, I.110.2 cor, I.115.1 cor.
90 Rosemann, Omne agens, 263 et seqq., citing Compendium 1.52 and Summa Contra Gentiles 4.11. 
Unfortunately, in some places he does not make it clear which text he is following.  The various 
degrees of this circular motion are also discussed, with reference to Contra Gentiles only, in Rudi 
A te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E J Brill, 1995) 274-277, 
and Simon Oliver, “Motion according to Aquinas and Newton,” Modern Theology 17.2 (2001): 
172-173.
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humans,  angels and God, cases we have already seen.   And yet  Thomas has not 
abandoned his original vestiges: he is wanting to show that this procession according 
to the intellect in God can also be called generation, and that the Word is also the 
“Son” of the Father.  For Thomas, procession has aspects both of fecundity and of 
being known.
The reason that  the  procession  “out”,  so  to  speak,  is  a  generation  or 
reproduction, is that any action resembles the agent: omne agens agit sibi simile.  In 
this sense, everything acts for its own sake: “The agent is said to be the finis of the 
effect, insofar as the effect tends to a likeness of the agent; whence the form of the 
one generating is the finis of the act of generating.”91
The corollary of this is that every effect makes its cause known.  Indeed, 
from our human perspective, we cannot come to know essences directly, but only 
gradually  and  with  great  difficulty  through  their  effects,  as  Rosemann  notes.92 
Effects are signs of causes.  Of course, there is a level of effect that bears only the 
most  minimal resemblance to its  cause.   Smoke is  an effect  caused by fire;  it  is 
recognised as a sign of fire, but, to use modern terms, only as an indexical sign. 
Thomas would say that smoke is a sign of fire insofar as, being an effect, it indicates 
that there is some sort of cause.93  
The bed produced by the carpenter resembles the carpenter, or at least it 
resembles the art in the carpenter's mind (hence, seeing a bed, we could identify its 
maker as being, say, a traditional Chinese artisan, Chippendale, or a member of the 
Bauhaus movement).94
91  “Agens dicitur esse finis effectus inquantum effectus tendit in similitudinem agentis: unde forma 
generantis est finis generationis.”  SCG 3.19.2, cf. Compendium 1.101.
92 Rosemann, Omne Agens, 311-312, with reference to In Symbolum Apostolorum prologus.
93 Rosemann, Omne Agens, 187, with reference to ST I.45.7 cor.
94 ST III.62.1 cor.
62
2.2.2.2 Every effect honours its cause
Thus every effect makes its  cause known, and makes it  known as its 
cause, its principle, its superior.  Recalling that for Thomas honor is “nothing other 
than a certain protestation of the excellence of someone's goodness,”95 we could say 
that the circularity that is the basic microstructure of the universe means that every 
effect shows honor to its cause.  Moreover, when honor is put into words it is praise, 
and when this leads to striking knowledge of someone's excellence, then this is glory. 
Ambrose' definition of glory  -  “clara cum laude notitia”  -   is repeated a number of 
times by Thomas.96  Of course, the knowledge of God (or of God's goodness) is glory 
antonomastically (“I will not yield my glory to another” Is 42:8), and this glory is 
held most excellently by the Son, who is the “splendour of his glory.”97  Although 
Thomas normally talks of God's goodness as the ultimate end of all things, he does 
sometimes talk of God creating for the sake of God's glory.98  Glory in the  Prima 
Pars is particularly obvious when we consider the “return to God” of the angels, the 
most subsistent of all creatures, for they are always “talking” to God in praise and 
admiration, but only occasionally “talk” to each other.99  The songs of the angels are 
not to be considered as a more advanced form of the return to God found in lower 
creatures, for Thomas' universe works from the top down rather than from the bottom 
up.   The perfect  return  found in  the  angels  is  precisely what  makes  them more 
subsistent, more really being, and it is in the lower creatures that an impoverished 
95  ST II-II.103.2 cor; cf ST II-II.103.1 cor.
96 The Index Thomisticus lists 13 places.  In the Summa it is found at I-II.2.3 obj 2 and cor, II-
II.103.1 ad 3 and, noting its relation to a definition by Cicero, II-II.132.1 obj 3. 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age
97  Super Hebraeos cap. 1, lect. 2 M26.
98 Divine goodness at ST I.19.2 cor, ad 2, 3; I.19.3 cor, I.19.5 cor, I.44.4 cor, ad 1, I.47.2 cor; divine 
glory at I.65.2 cor.
99 ST I.107.3 ad 2.
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form of return is found.100
2.2.2.3 Giving honour to God by sharing in the divine governance
But honour is given not only when a creature returns directly to the first 
cause, but also when that creature itself acts as a cause.  For when a higher cause 
operates  through  a  lower  cause,  it  is  the  higher  cause  that  is  operating  more 
powerfully, that is more present in the effect, than the secondary cause.101  Thomas 
not only notes that God governs creation through secondary causes, but devotes most 
of his treatment of governance to the operation of those secondary causes.102  Thomas 
devotes less attention to angelic praise of God than to the locutions by which higher 
angels illuminate lower ones.103
Angels can also act upon material creation, imparting to them motion (in 
the broad sense) that has God's goodness as its final end.  This could be causing the 
celestial bodies to move with the motion proper to them, moving terrestial bodies, or, 
for  a  rational  creature,  an  act  of  illumination.   Indeed,  if  we  consider  the  two 
questions about the power of angels over material things in general (Q 110) and over 
human beings  (Q 111),  it  seems that  the former  is  the preparation  for  the latter. 
Because human knowledge, unlike angelic knowledge, starts in the senses, it would 
seem that, as non-corporeal creatures angels cannot illuminate people: but, having 
shown the possibilities and the limits of angelic power over bodies, Thomas can then 
show how angels can illuminate us, and can affect our imagination and even our 
100 This point was made by Michael Hanby at a deparmental seminar at Nottingham University, 15th 
August 2011.
101 Super Librum de Causis Expositio 1.
102 ST I.103.6.  Q 104-105 are about direct governance by God, q 106-119 about governance through 
secondary causes.
103 ST I.107.1-3.  Their locutions also include asking for illumination either from God or from a 
higher angel, but the very act of asking is an acknowledgement of the superiority of the one 
addressed, and so is an act of giving honour. ST I.107.3 cor, cf. II-II.83.3 cor.
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sensitive powers (for it is through these that we know), but cannot directly control 
our will.104  And it is the illumination of people, that part of governance that leads 
people to their God-given end, that is the true focus of angelic power of corporeal 
creation; after all, the movement of the celestial spheres is for the sake of our journey 
to God, and will stop when that journey comes to an end at the final judgement.105  In 
all this, the honour is due to God  -  indeed, we often do not even know that an 
illumination has come to us through the ministry of angels.106
The last topic in Prima Pars (questions115-119) is the way that corporeal 
creation shares in God's governance.  There is one case of illumination here, for one 
human being can teach another  -  but only by providing exterior help to an intellect 
of the same rank;107 and thus an angel, whose mind is of higher rank and who does 
not learn through the senses, cannot be taught by a human being.  108 But the main 
focus of this section is generation, which for corporeal creatures means replicating 
the substantial form in different matter.  As we have seen, generation is a long way 
from the perfect processions of the Trinity, but it is still connected to it, for we talk of 
the generation of the Son by the Father.109
2.2.2.4 Human reproduction
As in the discussions referred to above that showed the vestiges of the 
Trinity in creation, Thomas noted the power of an elemental form to impress itself on 
104 Illumination ST I.111.1, imagination I.111.3, senses I.111.4, will I.111.2.  Of course, these 
extensive  but limited powers can also be used against us by angels in rebellion against God.  ST 
I.114.
105 Scriptum 4.48.2.2, SCG 4.97.2-3, De Potentia 5.5, Quodlibet 7.5.1, Compendium 1.171, Super 
Ioannem 6.5 (M940); the incomplete Summa, of course, has no tract on the general resurrection.
106 ST I.111.1 ad 3.
107 ST I.117.1 cor.
108 ST I.117.2 cor.
109 ST I.27.2.
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other matter, and, if powerful enough, to do so at a distance, as fire can generate fire. 
Souls, being superior to elemental forms, do this in two ways: without a medium 
(like  fire)  through  the  process  of  nutrition,  and  with  a  medium (or  instrument), 
through reproduction.110  This medium is taken from food by the nutritive power and 
then the generative power uses it as an instrument.  Thomas takes some care to argue 
that the matter which becomes semen was never properly part of the human body, 
and in particular he rejects the idea that semen contains a tiny piece of each different 
part of the body, as though it contained some homunculus.  In lower animals a bit cut 
off may develop into the complete animal, but not in higher ones.111  Thomas is not 
interested in such cases, but in cases where the form exceeds or goes out of the body 
it is in, not in its being but in its action  -  and this is one of his objections to the 
atomism of Democritus.112
Because the semen is an instrument, this virtus is more in the nature of a 
movement of the generating soul, it flows through the semen in the same way that 
the form of the bed in the mind of the carpenter flows through the saw or axe.113 
Thomas here talks of a spiritus present in semen, with the word meant in a corporeal 
sense;114 he also talks of a  seminalis ratio.  And he also notes that in this  spiritus 
there is  a  certain  heat  from the  power of  the celestial  bodies.   When the semen 
reaches the properly disposed material within the mother, this force transmutes that 
matter, which already has a dormant vegetative soul, so that is brought to the act of a 
sensitive soul.  Then the semen dissolves, the  spiritus dissipates, and the sensitive 
soul, through its nutritive power, builds up the rest of the body.115
110  ST I.118.1 cor.
111  ST I.119.2 cor.
112 ST I.115.1 ad 5, cf cor.
113  ST I.118.1 ad 3.
114 The spiritus makes it foamy and thus white. ST I.118.1 ad 3.
115  ST I.118.1 ad 4.
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As a subsistent form the human soul must come into being in its own 
right, and as a spiritual reality it cannot be generated by a merely corporeal reality, 
and thus Thomas insists that God creates each human soul.116  This creates a problem, 
for it seems to deny that human beings actually generate human beings, making sibi  
simile.   Thomas  replies  that  just  as  the  virtus in  the seed disposes  the  matter  to 
receive the soul, but the soul gives the form, so the whole of the corporeal nature acts 
as God’s instrument and disposes the matter so that it is ready for God to give the 
form, with the implication that he can still appeal to his earlier statement that it does 
not  matter  if  one  says  something  is  brought  about  by  the  instrument  or  by  the 
principal  agent.117  This  is  a  less  developed  way  of  talking  about  instrumental 
causality than we shall  find in his discussions of the humanity of Christ  and the 
sacraments.
2.2.2.4 The possibility of communication
Two things deserve comment at this point.  One is that Thomas takes it as 
evidence of superiority that a form in matter can inform additional matter not merely 
by direct contact, but through a medium.  The inferior way of acting is allied to the 
nutritive  power,  eating  and  digesting  the  other;  the  superior  way  of  acting  is 
communication, and is allied to the spread of ideas, such as the form of the bed in the 
mind of the carpenter.  The second is the rôle of  spiritus, and that deserves a new 
subsection
116  ST I.118.2 cor.
117  ST I.118.2 ad 3; cf ST I.118.1 cor.
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2.2.3 “Archaic” themes in Thomas' thought
As we move to the second point we should consider that scholars like to 
show how the thought of Thomas takes the insights of the great philosophers and 
develops them further.  Thus in examining the circular nature of causality in Thomas, 
Rosemann also shows its Neoplatonic origins, and indeed its antecedents in Plato and 
Aristotle.  But further, he shows how this circularity is modelled on very material 
things: For Plato both procreation and the exercise of reason serve as paradigms of 
the cyclical nature of being, and Aristotle, starting with biological examples, argued 
that all cause-effect relationships involve such a seed-like δυνάμει ὄν, an embedded 
material potential to transmit form from cause to effect, and yet at the same time 
these processes imitate the divine.118  Now, Thomas retains these early elements in 
his own work, and through them we can establish parallels between Thomas' thought 
and the thought of pre-philosophical cultures, which will prove very useful later in 
talking of grace and gift.
2.2.3.1 The Christian context: spiritus
I shall start with the  spiritus involved in human procreation.  Thomas 
talks of similar spirits in the immediately preceding question, where, discussing the 
“evil  eye,”  he  notes  that  the  spirits  of  the  body  can  be  affected  by  strong 
imaginations, and that this particularly happens around the eye, and that these spirits 
can then spread a certain distance through the surrounding air.119  Thus menstruating 
women  who  look  at  new and  pure  mirrors  can  give  them an  impurity  (so  says 
Aristotle),  and  when  the  soul  is  vehemently  aroused  to  malice  (“as  happens 
118 Rosemann, Omne Agens, Plato and Aristotle 33-62, Neoplatonists 63-101, with summaries at 61-
62 and 101.
119  ST I.117.3 ad 2; cf Super Galatos 3.1 (M117)
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especially in old women”), this can make the person's gaze “venomous and noxious”, 
particularly  for  little  children  who  are  sensitive  to  these  sorts  of  impressions. 
Thomas makes it clear that he is not committed to this explanation; his main aim is to 
avoid the human soul acting upon any body other than its own.  We should not get 
sidetracked,  therefore,  by  the  limitations  of  the  natural  science  of  the  thirteenth 
century, but we can note that for Thomas spiritus denotes subtlety, being hidden or 
invisible, and an impulse to movement  -  hence, he says, the word spiritus is also 
applied to the wind.120  
Thus, in Prima Pars, as well as Neoplatonic exitus-reditus, we find other 
themes: there is going out in the sense of “excess,” fecundity or reproduction, honour 
and glory, and spirit, which is impulse but might also be wind.   Thomas O'Meara 
tries identify this structuring principle with the concept of “grace,” which he glosses 
as a “vital force.”121 If we too readily interpret this as grace in the narrow technical 
sense of sanctifying grace, we shall have lost that wider reference that occasioned the 
development of a concept  of “grace” which could then be taken up by Christian 
writers.122  Indeed, under the title of “grace” (closely associated with “honour”) this 
wider concept was the particular study of Julian Pitt-Rivers and his colleagues in the 
context of Mediterranean cultures, recognising that it has its own unique concept in 
each culture: the  baraka of the inhabitants of the Moroccan Rif, the  indarra of the 
120 Super Ioannem cap. 14, lect. 4 (M1916).  Cf Emery, “Trinity as Truth,” 110.
121 O'Meara, “Grace,” 149.  He does not go beyond “vital force” to explore the aspects we have 
mentioned.
122 And O'Meara does too readily move in that direction.  Romanus Cessario OP is right to point out 
that we should not see grace (sc. sanctifying grace) everywhere.  As if to oppose this emphasis on 
grace, Cessario then gives his own version of the structure to the Summa, “not as a singular 
circular movement (thus, Chenu) but rather in terms of concentric circles, each manifesting its own 
degree of necessity.”  “Is Aquinas' Summa only about grace?” in Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris:  
Image et message de saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récents études historiques,  
herméneutiques, et doctrinales: homage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP à l'occasion de son  
65e anniversaire, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto De Oliveira OP (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires 
Fribourg Suisse, 1993), 198, 206 emphasis added.
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Basques, the  gracia of the Andalusians, and so on.123  Trying to summarise it, he 
speaks of  a  particular  type  of  exitus and then  of  a  reditus that  acknowledges  its 
source:
The only general rule that can be cited is that grace is always something extra, over and  
above “what counts,” what is obligatory or predictable; it belongs on the register of the  
extraordinary (hence its association with the sacred).   Nevertheless, when a favor has 
been done the return of grace is always expected.124
But the other factors we mentioned are present in the individual cases. 
Indarra is  closely  connected  with  reproduction  and  vitality,  with  the  honour  or 
prestige that enables the householder to maintain a harmonious house, and yet it can 
also mean a gust of wind.125  Baraka is both outside of calculation and reciprocal 
services (and thus in excess), and is associated with fertility, as well as a power to 
perform miracles and prodigies.126
2.2.3.2 The animist context: hau
But even what we see in these societies is the product of a dialogue with 
Christianity (or some related monotheism) and particularly its own concept of grace: 
indarra, for instance, enables Mary to conceive the Son of God.127  And at one point 
Pitt-Rivers,  whose  major  work  was  done  in  Andalusia,  explicitly  takes  the 
theological meaning of grace first and then sees the others as extensions.128  But this 
123 J G Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, eds., Honor and Grace in Anthropology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
124 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript: the place of grace in anthropology,” in Honor and Grace in  
Anthropology, ed. J G Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 217.
125 Sandra Ott, “Indarra: some reflections on a Basque concept,” in Honor and Grace in 
Anthropology, ed. J G Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 193-194.
126 Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript,” 231; Raymond Jamous, “From the death of men to the peace of God: 
violence and peace-making in the Rif,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, ed. J G Peristiany 
and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 178-179.
127 Ott, “Indarra,” 193.
128 Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript,”235.  Pitt-Rivers appeals to Émile Benveniste for this originally religious 
meaning of gratia, and while it is true that Benveniste says this, all he argues is that the word was 
originally associated with giving that expected no return, which includes the gifts of the gods and 
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cannot explain why the word “grace” would be applied to God in the first place, for 
words applied to God, even if they more truly describe him, are taken first from 
descriptions of human affairs.129  Pitt-Rivers suggests that the Polynesian pair  hau 
and mana are concepts of the same order as grace and honour, but are the product of 
a polytheistic culture.130  Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter Four, independently of 
the work of Pitt-Rivers there has been a dispute about hau because of the use Marcel 
Mauss makes of it when discussing the gift, so we shall look at it more closely.
Tamati Ranapiri, the leading Maori informant of Elsdon Best, begins his 
description of hau as a concept in human affairs by saying that it “is not the wind that 
blows,” so we are already with something that, like spiritus, can also be applied to a 
gust of air.131  Mauss talks of hau as spirit, and although this is disputed by Marshall 
Sahlins, all that the latter manages to prove is that hau is not the same as wairua, a 
concept that would seem to correspond to Thomas'  anima.132  The  wairua is more 
powerful than anima, as it can leave the body in a dream and act elsewhere, but still 
this is an  excessus (in the sense of going or travelling out) in being rather than an 
excessus in acting.  The excess in action belongs to  hau, which Best at one point 
defines in terms of excess in the sense of superfluity or extending beyond; and yet is 
also  has  the  meanings  of  fertility  and  of  prestige.133  And  like  the  spiritus that 
thanks to them; and that the word could then also be applied in more strictly economic contexts. 
Indo-European Language and Society, 159-162.
129 ST I.13.6 cor.
130 Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript,” 237; cf Julian Pitt-Rivers, Mana (London: The London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1974).
131 Elsdon Best, “Maori Forest Lore . . . Part III” in Transactions of the New Zealand Institute 42 
(1909) , 431, 439  cited by Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic  
Societies, tr. Ian Cunnison (New York: W W Norton, 1967), 8-9.  Mauss connects  hau with the 
Latin spiritus as having the same two meanings, 86n 26..  Marshall Sahlins gives another 
translation of this passage.  Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974), 151-152.
132 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, (London: Tavistock, 1974), 165-168
133 Elsdon Best, “Spiritual Concepts of the Maori,” Journal of the Polynesian Society 9 (1900): 193, 
cited by Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 82.
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produces the evil eye, it can also be used for evil purposes.134  
An observation made by  Étienne Gilson can help us understand what 
Thomas is doing with this collection of phenomena which we can link under the term 
hau.   Gilson notes that Plato's idea of the Good was not a god, for the ideas were 
intended as a superior form of explanation to the animistic Greek gods: the result of 
this  push was that  when Aristotle  re-instated a  god at  the summit  of being,  “the 
Greeks had gained an indisputably rational theology, but they had lost their religion.” 
These impersonal forces did not care about our lives, nor did they inspire devotion.135 
It would take Christianity to deepen metaphysics so that religion could re-emerge in 
a  purified form.   Gilson also notes  that  where divinity is  modelled on ideas,  on 
essences,  we  end  up  with  an  essentialist  metaphysics,  causality  is  reduced  to  a 
principle of sufficient reason, and God thus becomes both causa sui and the ground 
of all else that is.136  This, of course, is one aspect of the ontotheological God rejected 
by Heidegger  and,  following  him,  Chauvet:  “Before  this  Causa sui humans  can 
neither fall to their knees in fear, nor play instruments, sing or dance.”137  There is a 
widespread agreement that there was another element in Greek thought, evident in 
the  pre-Socratics,  that  counter-balanced  this  tendency.   In  a  work  that  we  shall 
consider  in  detail  at  the  end  of  this  thesis,  Jacques  Derrida  contrasts  the 
post-“cartésien” world in which nature is an “order of necessities,” with an earlier 
view  in  which  nature  is  the  “grand,  generous  and  genial  bestower  to  whom all 
returns” and so that the “others” of nature (art, law, society, freedom, etc.) return to 
her, where phuein still lies behind nature as a giving that gives birth and gives form, 
134  Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 162-165.
135 Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 1-37; quote on 
34.
136 Étienne Gilson, L'être et l'essence, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1962), 177-183.
137 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 62, citing Martin Heidegger, Identité, Q. 1, 306.
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and fortune and necessity do not oppose each other.138  This, of course, is the world in 
which it made sense to talk of hau.
Now my contention is that it is precisely this element of archaic thought 
(archaic “religious” thought, if we can tolerate such an anachronism) which Thomas 
has not merely incorporated into his theology, but has made a vital feature of the 
mystery of God and the rationale for the inclusion in the Summa of any created thing. 
This is not the “productionist” causality that Chauvet complains about, nor can we 
say that for Thomas “spiritual” means merely the opposite of “sensible” in the way 
that “intelligible” might.139
2.2.4 Full of grace and truth, we have seen his glory
Our argument has not been exhaustive or rigorous.  What we have done 
is to set the stage for a close examination of one aspect of hau  -  its relation to the 
gift  -  and the use that Thomas makes of it.  “Gift,” of course, is another name for 
the  Holy  Spirit,  but  gift  is  neither  a  purely  natural  phenomenon  (like  human 
reproduction)  nor even a merely intellectual  one (like producing concepts),  but  a 
moral one, and so that examination will need to take place in the context of the whole 
purpose of the  Secunda Pars.   We have done this by linking the structure of the 
Summa to grace and truth  -  whose fulness in the Son gives glory to God  - and to  
spirit  and  truth,  the  conditions  for  true  worship.   This  is  not  surprising,  for  the 
Summa is about “Catholic truth” and “what pertains to the Christian religion,” and 
religion, as we shall see, is the virtue by which we give due honour to God.140  This 
138 Jacques Derrida, Given Time I: Counterfeit Money, tr. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1992) 127-128.
139 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 21-26; 462
140 ST I. prologus; II-II.81.1 cor, ad 1, ad 4.
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approach  to  Thomas  may  not  be  the  standard  one,  but  it  will  provide  us  with 
foundations for understanding what he says about the sacraments.
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CHAPTER THREE
MORALITY EXPLAINED AS ECONOMICS
3.1 The existence of an “economy” in the thought of Thomas
“All  religions,  in  essence,  direct  and  distribute  time,  attention  and 
devotion.   Religions  are  patterns  of  life  through  which  it  is  claimed  that  life  is 
enriched.  If there is an opposition between God and money, then fundamentally it 
comes down to this:  wealth contains its  own principles according to which time, 
attention and devotion are allocated.”1  Thomas would not disagree with Goodchild's 
description of religion.2  And while Goodchild spends his time showing that the use 
of money implies things we would more often associated with religion (credit, which 
is the equivalent of faith3), what I want to show in this chapter is that certain terms 
we  tend  to  think  of  as  more  naturally  related  to  money  (earning,  price,  debt, 
redemption) actually have their true home in the world of religion, indeed, that the 
religious life forms an economy, although one that operates on principles that do not 
simply compete with a monetary economy, but subvert and subordinate it.   Indeed, it 
has been observed that when the possibility of merit was removed from the Christian 
religion, the energy of the devout became directed to material profit.4
“Economy,”  as  opposed  to  “theology”  has  been  used  since  the  New 
Testament to denote the arrangement by which the Trinitarian God saves us, but, as 
the Vulgate testifies,  here  οἰκονομία can simply be replaced by the slightly more 
1 Philip Goodchild, The Theology of Money (London: SCM Press, 2007), 6.
2 See his discussion of religion, ST II-II.81-91, especially 83.14 (time), 83.13 (attention) and 82 
(devotion).
3 Philip Goodchild, The Theology of Money (London: SCM Press, 2007), 10-11 et passim.
4 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 73-74 and R H Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: J Murray, 
1936), 105-111, 142.  The exact process of this transfer is far from simple; more insight will be 
offered at 4.3.3.
75
abstract  dispensatio.5  The  emphasis  is  on  the  arrangement  by which  God gives 
spiritual goods to us, rather than the exchanges that lead to our spiritual enrichment, 
in line with Aristotle's understanding of  οἰκονομία as household management, and, 
according to the Index Thomisticus, this last sense is the only one in which Thomas 
uses the word oeconomia.  My contention, however,  is that for Thomas the believer 
is involved in exchanges of valuables with God, and that there is a structure that 
mediates those exchanges, an economy in the modern sense of the word, and that this 
economy underlies  his  whole account  of morality,  as an examination of  Secunda 
Pars will show.
3.1.2 Economy and the structure of Prima Secundae
3.1.2.1 The need for merit
According to our understanding of the structure of the Summa, Secunda 
Pars should deal with the truth in the human mind, acknowledging our origin in God 
and bringing about our return.  
In his prologue, Thomas uses two ideas to describe it.  First, there is the 
human being as the image of God because endowed with intellect and the power of 
choice, and so the principle of his or her own actions.  Then he notes, having dealt in  
Prima Pars with the exemplar and the things that proceed from him by his power and 
will, he will now do the same with the image.  His concern, then, is with the acts that 
proceed; but acts, as Thomas often tells us, obtain their species from their ends, so 
Thomas begins by considering the ultimate end of human life, which is the beatitude 
5 1 Cor 9:17; Eph 1:10, 3:2, 9; Col 1:25; at 1 Tim 1:4 it is translated by aedificatio.  By contrast, 
when refering to the stewardship of the unjust steward (οἰκονόμοϛ /vilicus), we get vilicatio and 
vilicare (Lk 16:1-4)
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that is God.6  Thus, as was the case in Prima Pars, “proceed” seems also to include 
return.  Further, as is obvious from the contents and is made clear in the prologue to 
Secunda Secundae, although he is dealing with acts (the means by which we achieve 
or deviate from that end), he is concerned with the source of those acts, the virtues,  
gifts, vices, etc., in the human mind.  And when he considers those sources, he finds 
some that are external  -  law and grace  -  so we see that what ends in God also came 
from him.  And even the role of the Spirit is repeated: the New Law is the grace of 
the Holy Spirit, and even the infused virtues are perfected by the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit.
Thomas carefully concludes that our beatitude will consist in seeing the 
essence of God.7  But, unlike God, whose being and beatitude are the same thing, for 
rational creatures this operation is beyond our natural powers.8  Thomas does not 
then conclude that beatitude comes as a sheer undeserved gift (for it is only at the 
end of  Prima Pars  that he considers grace), but rather that if beatitude is to be the 
end of human actions, our actions must in some meaningful sense be ordered towards 
it and able to achieve it, and therefore it must be earned, as Thomas has argued in 
Prima Pars when speaking of angels.9  It is possible for someone to enjoy beatitude 
straight  away with  its  existence,  but  as  beatitude  is  natural  for  God alone,  it  is 
appropriate that God alone enjoys beatitude immediately. Creatures enjoy beatitude 
through  either  one  operation  (angels)  or  many  (humans),  and  among  humans, 
therefore,  although they share the one nature,  the depth of their  beatitude varies. 
6 ST I-II.1 prologus
7  ST I-II.2-3, culminating in I-II.3.8.
8   ST I-II.5.5 cor.
9 ST I.62.4 cor. As John Milbank points out, before the Late Middle Ages, theologians had not yet 
“set divine and human activity over against each other” and “grace and merit were not [. . .] in 
competition with each other.”  “The Transcendality of the Gift,” in The Future of Love: Essays in  
Political Theology (London: SCM, 2009), 361.
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There is one case, however, of a human enjoying beatitude from the first moment of 
existence  -  Christ, who is simultaneously God  -  and through the merit of Christ the 
baptized who die as infants enjoy beatitude through an operation that is not really 
their own.  So, according to the  ordo of divine wisdom, creatures come to enjoy 
beatitude in a variety of ways, and the many actions by which (adult) humans do so 
are  called  merits  (merita).10  Bernard  Catão  sums  it  up  by  saying  that  it  is  a 
fundamental anthropological principle that human actions attain their end by merit.11
3.1.2.2 What can and cannot be the basis of merit
Having established this principle, Thomas goes on to investigate the sort 
of human actions that will help us or hinder us on the way to beatitude.  First he deals 
with actions in themselves  -  speaking only generally in  Prima Secundae  -  then 
with their principles.  The actions in themselves need to be divided into voluntary 
and involuntary,  and  having  made this  division  he  considers  voluntary (properly 
human) acts, and the passions (which we also share with animals).  In considering 
the principles of human action, he first considers the interior principles.  He passes 
over the powers of the soul that were dealt with in Prima Pars, and looks at habits  - 
in general, and then as virtues and vices.  Then he looks at the external principles, 
law  and  grace.   Both  with  the  virtues  and  with  law  he  starts  by  considering 
something purely natural (but nonetheless God-given), and then looks at how God 
can raise it to a higher level.  As interior principles there are natural virtues, then 
there are the theological virtues and the other infused virtues, and finally the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit, the chief of which is wisdom  -  the beatitudes and the fruits of the 
10 ST I-II.5.7
11 Bernard Catão, Salut et rédemption chez s. Thomas d'Aquin: l'acte sauveur du Christ (Paris: 
Aubier, 1964), 12.
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Holy Spirit are included here not as additional principles of human action, but as 
consequences of the gifts that help us to understand them more fully.12  Although, 
precisely because they go beyond reason, their workings are not subjected to a long 
rational analysis, these gifts represent a high point in Thomas' moral theology, and it 
is significant that Thomas prefers to consider them according to their biblical name, 
“spirits,” with its connotations of impulse.13  Similarly, with the law we have natural 
law (given by God but as arising out of the God-given natural principles) and the 
human law which is a particular application of it.  Then there is divine law, revealed 
in addition to nature, which itself has the divisions of the Old Law and the New Law, 
the second being the equivalent of the grace of the Holy Spirit  implanted in our 
hearts.14
Once  this  has  been  firmly  established,  in  the  last  question  of  Prima 
Secundae Thomas deals with merit.  For it is through the infused virtues and the gifts 
which truly elevate the operation above the purely human level and make it also the 
working of the Holy Spirit that an action can be simultaneously both truly imputable 
to a human person, and also not merely congruously but also condignly worthy of 
beatitude  -  but only “by the presupposition of the divine ordinatio.”15  Not only can 
we merit beatitude, but once we are in grace we can merit more grace.  And when 
Thomas has done this, he is satisfied with what he has said about morals in general, 
and will move on to discuss the specific virtues, vices, gifts, precepts and states of 
life in Secunda Secundae.
12 ST I-II.69.1
13 ST I-II.68.1 cor, II-II.45.1 cor, ad 2, 45.4 ad 2.  Among those who highlight this role of the gifts is 
Yves Congar, “Le Saint-Esprit dans la théologie de l'agir moral,”  in Thomas d'Aquin: sa vision de  
théologie et de l'Eglise (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 11-12.
14 ST I-II.106.1 cor.
15 ST I-II.114.1 cor.
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3.1.2.3 Economy as ordo or structure
Not  only  is  Prima  Secundae structured  around  the  question  of  the 
meriting of beatitude by human beings,  but it  also considers this  in terms of the 
divine ordo or ordinatio.16  This order comes from God but also somehow exists in 
things, for Thomas argues that human operation is a prerequisite to beatitude, not 
because of God's weakness, but “so that the ordo in things should be upheld.”17  This 
ordo is like language: not innate to the human being, but given from the outside, and 
necessary  for  the  proper  operation  of  the  human  being.   Today  we  would  use 
“structure” to refer to such a reality.
The closest parallel in Thomas is probably the second of the two senses 
he gives to natura, especially in his discussions on original sin, which is a sin, not of 
the person, but of the natura.18   In its first sense, nature is whatever arises from the 
principles of a thing; because of this, what is natural in this sense cannot be lost  
without the thing being changed into another thing.  “The nature remains intact” is a 
line from Dionysius that Thomas cites repeatedly.19  As human nature in this sense 
remains intact after original sin, this is not the locus of original sin and its immediate 
effects.  The second sense of nature includes those things that are given to a nature 
from another source so that what is fitting to that nature can be achieved.  It is at this 
level that original sin affects human nature.  The effect of original sin in us is the loss 
of the original gift to the nature that enabled it to achieve what it should achieve, a 
gift Thomas refers to by the traditional name original justice.  What is more, nature 
16 For a good discussion of Thomas on ordo, and how his approach differs from that of the Scotist 
notion of acceptatio, see Joseph P Wawrykow, God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit' in the  
Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 180-189. 
17 ST I-II.5.7 ad 1.
18 SCG 4.52.11, cf ST I-II.81.2 cor.
19 According to the  Index Thomisticus at least 17 times, in Scriptum super Sententiis, Summa 
Theologiae, De Veritate, De Malo, Quodlibet 5, and Super Ioannem.
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in both senses is propagated.  The power of Adam to hand on human nature in the 
first sense (body and, with God's help, soul) remains intact after sin; the power to 
hand on nature in the second sense (as possessing original justice) is impaired.
A further term Thomas uses in this regard is “status,” which allows him 
to talk of the various historical states of humanity in a way that lacks the dangerous 
ambiguity of “historical natures.”20
Finally,  a  structure  can  be  considered  from the  point  of  view  of  the 
people who come under it,  and this more concrete approach better suits Thomas’ 
mentality.   For  him,  when  the  word  is  used  metaphorically,  a  “body”  is  “one 
multitude ordered for one purpose [in unum] according to distinct acts or offices.”21 
Thus all such uses of “body” for Thomas are ways of talking about structures.  In 
particular, as we shall see later, membership of the “body” of Christ is integrally 
connected with sharing his merit,  and thus the “body” of Christ  can be taken as 
referring to an economy.22
Thus, although Thomas does not use the term oeconomia in the sense we 
use “economy,” he does have terms which point to something we would recognise as 
a structure, and which enable those exchanges between people and God by which 
they merit beatitude.
3.2 Justice and the economy
3.2.1 Strict justice and the virtues allied to it
Because an economy entails a system of exchanges, implicit in it there is 
a justice.  Thomas himself begins his discussion of merit by considering such things 
20    ST I.94.2 cor.
21   ST III.8.4 cor.
22   ST III.19.4 cor.
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as merces (wages) and pretium (price, but also value and prize), and even the pretium 
iustum.23  But  he  also  notes  here  that  justice,  in  its  strictest  sense,  only applies 
between equals; between others there is only justice  secundum quid, and between 
God and humans there is maxima inaequalitas.  This distinction in fact will order his 
discussion of justice in Secunda Secundae, as we shall see in greater depth later when 
we look at gratitude.
What Thomas is clear about is that in the justice of this economy, God 
becomes a debtor not to us, but to himself, “inquantum debitum est ut sua ordinatio 
impletur.”24  Our actions do nothing to God so that we have some claim on God, but 
rather they increase God's glory, which is the goal of all God's works.  Indeed, our 
action would not have “rationem meriti except by the presupposition of the divine 
ordinatio.”  The very economy itself is God's gift to us.25
3.2.2 Condign merit
Given that an act proceeding from a human will is in value far below the 
infinite good of beatitude, but God, having promised to do so, can reward it with 
eternal life according to some sort of proportion, it would seem that we could merit 
only  congruously.26  This  would  solve  the  aporia  arising  from  the  maxima 
inaequalitas, but Thomas does not see it as corresponding to the data of revelation. 
Moreover,  as we shall  see,  declaring the merit  to be merely congruous is merely 
shifting  the  whole  of  the  problem  of  sharing  in  the  divine  nature  to  some 
23 ST I-II.114.1 cor.
24 ST I-II.114.1 ad 1, ad 2, ad 3.
25 Cf “One receives gift as the gift of an always preceding gift-exchange.”  John Milbank, “Can a gift 
be given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” Modern Theology 11.1 (January 
1995): 150.
26 Thomas has earlier argued that the same beatific vision will be enjoyed by all, but in differing 
degrees of intensity, according to our merits.  ST I-II.5.2 sed contra and cor.
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eschatological  time:  breaking it  up into two problems of an imperfect  sharing in 
grace now that  is  rewarded with a  perfect  sharing in glory in the future actually 
corresponds better to our composite nature.  For Thomas sees that any act of our free 
will that is considered meritorious by God is so because it is the act of the Holy Spirit 
at work in us, and also the act of one who, in the Holy Spirit, has been made a sharer  
in the divine nature.27  A divine act is condignly deserving of eternal life. (Réginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange would make a distinction here between the merit of the Son, who 
is a divine Person, which is condign in strict justice, and our merit,  condign in a 
looser sense, on account of the divine ordination to accept it.28  Thus not only is there 
the gift of the economy, as a structure, that is a gift to the whole human race, but  
there is also an individual gift which enables individuals to take part in the economy, 
the gift of the grace of the Holy Spirit.
But to insist on condign rather than merely congruous merit is to imply 
that the price is not arbitrary, but true and just.  Here it is worth recalling that for 
Thomas, the just price is determined according to the nature of the thing.  Neither of 
the two exceptions granted by Thomas (covering the legitimate costs of the seller, or 
the spontaneous overpayment of a highly motivated buyer) applies here.29  In other 
cases, paying more is paying for what is not there; it is untrue, and this, just as much 
as his objection to greed, is Thomas' reason against speculation.30  Human buying 
and selling is instituted for mutual utility, and so it is the nature of a thing as it enters  
into human use, and not absolutely, that determines the price  -  Thomas refers to 
27 There is, of course, a significant difference in the way in which we share in the divine nature by 
grace and by glory, as we shall see shortly.
28 Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange OP, Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia 
IIae q. 109-114, tr. the Dominican Nuns, Corpus Christi Monastery (St Louis: Herder, 1952), 366-
369.
29 ST II-II.77.1 cor.
30 ST II-II.77.4 cor, ad 1.
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Augustine's remark that sometimes a horse is sold for more than a slave.31  When 
Thomas  takes  the  term  “just  price”  and  uses  it  outside  the  context  of  material 
commerce,  the  criterion  is  obviously  no  longer  usefulness  to  humans,  nor 
“usefulness” to God, since although God may want that something is on account of 
another thing, God himself never wants something on account of something else.32 
Rather, since God is the buyer and can set the price, it will be based upon the true 
nature of what is offered (even if it is not recognised as such by the “seller”33).  So, 
although “just price” as a term may have originated in the field of commerce, it finds 
a truer application in the way that God deals with us: the language is analogous.34
To  appreciate  the  economy  we  need  to  see  how  it  is  that  we  have 
something so precious in the eyes of God.
3.2.3 How charity merits
Thomas receives the tradition that acts of charity merit increase in charity 
now, and in the life to come the beatific vision at an intensity dependent upon the 
level of our charity in this life.  What I want to do is to show that:
• the act of charity has a certain perfection in itself;
• there  is  a  certain naturalness  about  an act  of  charity leading to  an 
31 ST II-II.77.2 ad 3.
32   ST I.19.5 cor.
33 ST II-II.77.1 ad 1; Cf Thomas' comments on the parable of the sheep and the goats, Super 
Matthaeum, 25.3 (M2098).
34 Thus when Catão remarks that we can keep the term justice to describe these relations, even 
though it is not justice “properly speaking” but “analogously,” we should recognise that anything 
analogously ascribed to God finds its higher truth there, and that “properly speaking” refers to the 
human origins of the word.  Salut et rédemption, 58.  Wawrykow, interpreting this “analogical” 
predication as a dilution of justice, and presumably trying to defend condign rather than merely 
congrous merit, reacts againt Catão, insisting on a “juridical” understanding of merit, while at the 
same time trying to avoid any “objectivization” of the relationship between God and the human 
person, or laws which are purely extrinsic to human life. Wawrykow, God's Grace, 29-31.  We 
shall see in the next chapter that Thomas subverts his notion of strict justice in his treatment of the 
virtue of religion.
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increase in charity;
• the act of charity is truly ours, yet is also a gift from God;
• the act of charity is offered to God;
• the act of charity is offered with a view to an increase in charity and a 
consequent increase in beatitude;
• we are aware of the value of our act of charity;
• in  all  this,  God's  hand  is  never  forced,  but  it  happens  by  God's 
arrangement;
• each increase of charity happens, not automatically, but as a special 
act of God towards the person concerned.
This will help us to see that Thomas' claim of condign merit is grounded 
in the rest of his theology, and that it ensures that we have a genuine economy, a true 
exchange of valuables within a structure that enables that exchange and makes clear 
the value of what is exchanged.
3.2.3.1 The interplay between knowledge and love
For Thomas, there are two operations that have God both as subject and 
object: knowledge and love, the operations he uses to explain the circular processions 
of the Trinity.  We can perform these operations, therefore, as both directed to God 
and  in  virtue  of  a  divine  power  working within  us.35  These  are  the  operations, 
therefore, which can be the basis of condign merit and reward in an economy that 
operates between God and us.
We start, as Thomas does, with the reward, beatific vision, which is the 
35  ST I-II.62.1 cor, ad 3, 62.3 cor.
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knowledge of the divine essence.36  As the thing known is inside the knower, we shall 
in a certain sense have or possess God, although this does not entail comprehension. 
Moreover, while each of the blessed sees the totality of the divine essence, for it is 
utterly simple and has no parts, the capacity for seeing it can vary, depending on 
one's merit.37  The vision is beatific, in other words, the enjoyment is consequent 
upon the gift.38  We desire God, for God is the highest good, and we desire God for 
God's  own sake.   In  the  act  of  possessing  the  object  of  our  desire  through  the 
operation of knowing, we enjoy it (frui).
If  the  reward is  knowledge,  then this  leaves  love  as  the operation by 
which we merit the reward.  For condign merit, there must be a perfection of love to 
merit this greatest of rewards.  Yet for Thomas love must be based on knowledge. 
Thomas deals with this aporia as follows.
For Thomas, love is  a passion:  of its  very nature as having an object 
which is its end, it is caused by its object.  This is manifestly true for love in the 
sensitive appetite, but it is also true, using “passion” in a more extended sense, for 
love in the intellectual appetite, the will.39  Love is somehow elicited by the object of 
love;  love  breaks  forth  (prorumpit)  if  three  conditions  are  present:  goodness, 
knowledge and likeness.40  Moreover, the knowledge and the likeness do not have to 
be perfect.  The knowledge can simply be that this good thing exists;41 the likeness 
can be the likeness of something in potency to something in act.42  However, once the 
36  ST I-II.3.8 cor.
37  ST I.12.4, 6,7, ST I-II.5.2 sed contra and cor.
38  ST I-II.4.1-2.
39 ST I-II.26.2 cor.
40 ST I-II.27.1, 2 and 3.  27.4 shows that other passions only cause love if there is already a prior 
love.
41 ST I-II.27.2 cor, ad 1 and ad 2.
42 ST I-II.27.3 cor.  The similarity of the loved object to the subject, being some sort of proportion 
existing between the two, will make it good simply to behold the object of love, and so the beloved 
object will also be beautiful.  ST I-II.27.1 cor and ad 3; cf 27.2 cor, where, citing Aristotle Ethics 
IX, Thomas holds that not only is corporeal vision the basis of love of the senses, but the 
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object of love is known and there is some basis of similarity, the love itself can be 
perfect, not necessarily in the sense that it is loved as much as it is worthy of love,  
but at least in that the thing is loved to the extent that it is apprehended in itself.43 
Therefore a perfect love can be based on an imperfect knowledge and likeness.
However, it is not just any love of God which merits beatitude, but only 
charity.44  Charity, Thomas says, is fundamentally a love of God which is friendship 
(as opposed to love of concupiscence).45  In its two inferior forms, friendship is based 
on the  pleasure  or  advantage  one hopes  to  gain  from the  friend,  but  honourable 
friendship is based on something shared in common.  Charity is friendship with God 
based upon the sharing of beatitude, and is distinguished from a purely natural love 
of God, where the basis is merely that God is our beginning and our end  -  we are 
created by God for his greater glory  -  without any reference to sharing in God's 
beatitude.46  We should note that love of friendship extends also to those who belong 
to one's friend: in charity we can love all those who also will share in beatitude, first 
of all, our own selves, then our neighbour, then our own body.47
Thomas holds that, in a way, charity, even in this life, is perfect.48  In 
terms of the beloved, charity cannot be perfect in that God is loved as much as he is  
worthy of love, because no creature can love the infinite goodness of God infinitely. 
In terms of the lover, however, charity can be perfect when the lover loves as much 
as she can.  This is attained both in terms of act and in terms of habitus.  Only in our 
contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the basis of spiritual love.
43 ST I-II.27.2 ad 2.
44   ST I-II.114.2, 4.
45   ST II-II.23.1 cor.
46   ST I-II.109.3 cor and ad 1.
47  ST II-II.25, especially 25.12.
48   ST II-II.24.8 cor.
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homeland will we be able in actu to always turn our heart directly and immediately 
to God.  Here on pilgrimage it is possible to devote our whole attention to God and 
divine things to the exclusion of everything else except when the necessities of life 
intervene, and at least some can do this.  But charity of its nature means that there is  
a habitus of placing our whole heart in God, at least to the extent that we do nothing 
contrary to divine love.  This habitus is held by all those who have charity.  This 
habitus is not simply and absolutely perfect, but perfect secundum quid.   As it is a 
habitus, it is not destroyed by single actions contrary to it (venial sins).49  Also, as a 
habitus, it can grow (become more intense); indeed, in this life charity is the way, 
“the  more  excellent  way”,  because it  can increase  and charity itself  leads  to  the 
increase of charity  -  so much so that in this way “to stand still is to go backwards.”50
Thus we have the first point: with charity, we have something worthy to 
offer God in exchange for the reward.
3.2.3.2 The effects of love and the appropriateness of this exchange
When we consider the effects of love, we can see the appropriateness of 
this exchange.  Thomas lists six effects: the ones relevant for our purposes are union, 
mutual indwelling (inhaesio), and ecstasy, to be considered only in terms of love as 
friendship.
Thomas notes  a union of love at  three levels.  There is  the union that 
causes love (substantial union in the case of self-love, union of likeness for love of 
others).  There is the union that essentially is love, that is a certain fitting together 
(coaptatio)  of affection,  which is like substantial  union, for the lover regards the 
49   ST II-II.24.10 cor,
50   ST II-II.4 cor (citing 1 Cor 13); II-II.24.6 and obj 3.
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beloved as he would himself.  There is also the union which is the effect of love, the 
real union which love seeks: the desire is that the two would be one,  but as this 
cannot be achieved without destroying one of them, at least they live together, talk 
together, etc.51
Mutual  indwelling  can  take  place  at  two  levels,  apprehension  and 
appetite.  At the level of apprehension the beloved is in the lover in that the lover's 
mind always dwells on the beloved, and the lover is in the beloved in that the lover 
strives  for an interior  knowledge of the beloved in every detail.   At the level of 
affection the beloved is in the lover by inspiring the desires and emotions (rejoicing 
in their good, wanting things for them) from deep within (the viscera caritatis); and 
the lover is in the beloved as the lover regards his friend's things as his own (seeing 
the world with the friend's eyes, one might say).52
Similarly,  there  is  an  ecstasy  of  the  appetite,  wanting  good for  one's 
friend rather than for oneself, and an ecstasy of the apprehensive faculty.  This latter 
takes one outside one's proper knowledge, either in madness or by being lifted to a 
higher way of knowing to understand things beyond sense and reason.  Love merely 
disposes one for this intellectual ecstasy, by making one meditate on the beloved.53
We can see that the effects of love move in the direction of deepening 
knowledge.  The coaptatio of affection provides a new level of similarity that could 
act as a base for further knowledge, and in the case of charity, where there is a co-
operation with the Holy Spirit and a certain connaturality with God, we have the 
basis  for  the  gift  of  wisdom  in  via and  the  beatific  vision  in  patria;  the  mutual 
indwelling  creates  a  desire  for  this  intimate  new  knowledge;  and  the  continual 
51 ST I-II.28.1 ad 2.
52 ST I-II.28.2 cor.
53 ST I-II.28.3 cor.
89
meditation on the beloved disposes the lover to be open to this new way of knowing. 
And this is what Thomas argues.54
3.2.3.3 How charity enables a real offering to God
If we are to offer something in love, it must first of all be ours.  Love is in 
the will, and therefore it is something that is truly voluntary and truly ours.  And yet 
also this love is the working of God.  It is not possible by our own natural powers, 
but only because God gives us the knowledge (in faith) and gives us the beatitude 
which we have in hope,55 and gives us the Holy Spirit because of likeness of the Son 
present in us in faith and hope.56
If we are to talk of exchange, there also must be a real handing over on 
our part.   Now, while Thomas often simply talks of a good action (or a hardship 
endured) and then discusses its merit, at least occasionally in this regard he mentions 
a real handing over of something that is somehow directed towards God.
The clearest  statement  that  this  renunciation  must  be  directed  to  God 
comes in one of the  quaestiones.   In discussing whether the death of Christ  was 
necessary, or whether some lesser action would have sufficed, Thomas makes clear 
that any action of Christ was of infinite value, but that these actions were not directed 
to the saving of humanity in the way that Christ's passion was, so that the merit could 
be combined with the example and symbolic significance. “Two things are required 
for buying: the quantity of the price, and the deputation of that price towards buying 
54 The gifts of the Holy Spirit are “higher perfections [than the virtues] according to which 
[someone] is disposed to being divinely moved.” ST I-II.68.1 cor.  Wisdom is the gift that 
corresponds to the union arising out of charity, which unites us to God. ST II-II.45.2 cor.
55 Thomas does not explain in detail the proleptic way that hope works in this process, but it is 
clearly there in his works and his sacramental theology does not make sense without it.
56 This gift of the Holy Spirit will be explained in greater detail in the discussion of baptism.
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something.”57  However, this deputation of our acts of charity to eternal beatitude can 
be presumed.  After all, beatitude is implicitly the ultimate goal of all our actions,  
although we often mistake that end and with our free will we choose badly the means 
to that final end;58 “but the movement of the human mind to the enjoyment of the 
divine good is the proper act of charity, through which the acts of all the other virtues 
are ordered to this end.”59 
Showing that some sort of handing over takes place is a little harder.  We 
can begin  with  the  article  about  Christ  meriting  exaltation  through his  passion.60 
Thomas reminds us again that merit implies a sort of equality of justice.  Then, just 
as the one who, through an unjust will, attributes to himself more than he is owed is 
justly deprived even of what he rightly has (as in the demand for four-fold restitution 
at Ex 22:1), so also the one who through a just will removes what he is entitled to 
earns that something more be given him in addition,  quasi the wages of a just will 
(cf. Lk 14:11, “he who humbles himself will be exalted”).
To give away “with a just will what one ought to have” has a paradoxical 
ring, particularly when we consider that Thomas takes as the definition of justice that 
it is “the enduring and constant will granting each his or her own right (jus)”, and the 
act  of  justice is  “nothing other  than to  render  to  each person what  is  his  or  her 
own.”61  
Indeed, for justice in its strict sense, which governs interactions between 
equals, it might well be a contradiction in terms.  But between God and us, where 
there is  maxima inaequalitas,  interactions are not governed by justice in its strict 
57 Quodlibet II.1.2 cor.
58 ST I-II.5.8 cor and ad 2; I-II.8.2 cor.
59 ST I-II.114.4 cor.
60 ST III.49.6 cor.
61 ST II-II.58.1 tit; II-II.58.11 cor.
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sense, but by religion.62  According to this virtue whatever is given by a human to 
God is owed, and so religion is like justice,  but it  does not match the fulness of 
justice in that whatever we give cannot be equal to what we owe God.63  From this it 
flows that whatever we give to God that is rightfully ours to give, we give with a just  
will  -  and one could only give to God with an unjust will if one gave what actually 
belonged to someone else.64  The main interior act of religion is devotio, a  “certain 
will of promptly handing over oneself to what pertains to the service (famulatus) of 
God”, and, given that the human being is per se potestativus, our selves truly belong 
to us.65  The first of the exterior acts is adoration, by which one disposes one's own 
body in the veneration of God.66  But when we get to the second external act of 
religion, sacrifice, we find that giving to one's neighbour can also be giving to God, 
and thus meritorious.
3.2.3.4 Sacrifice
For our purposes, two things need to be clarified with regard to sacrifice: 
whether it is genuinely a case of giving something that is rightfully ours to God, and 
how far the category of sacrifice extends.
If we hold that the purpose of sacrifice is to placate God or to achieve the 
grace of forgiveness, then sacrifice would only be offered by sinners, and seem to 
62 ST II-II.57.1 cor and ad 3; 58.2 cor; 80.unicus cor.
63 ST II-II.80 unicus cor.
64
Cf ST II-II.86.3 cor, 88.8.  According to Thomas' understanding, private property is a way of 
entrusting the uti (use) but not the frui of wordly goods to some who then have a duty to use them 
for the good of all, as a part of which a thing could belong to one person and not to another.  There 
is no place here for something belonging to a human being and not at the same time to God.  See 
Marcus Lefébure OP, “Private Property according to St Thomas and Recent Papal Encyclicals,” in 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 38, Injustice (2a2ae. 63-79), ed. Marcus Lefébure OP 
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975), 275-289.
65 ST II-II.82.1 cor, cf. I-II. prologue.
66 ST II-II.84 tit.
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have very little to do with merit (apart from Christ's sacrifice); for, in the  Summa, 
Thomas is adamant that only those in a state of grace can merit.67  Put another way, 
the sinner owes infinite satisfaction to God and thus owns nothing to give up with a 
just  will.68  Thomas,  however,  recognises  three  motives  for  offering  sacrifice.69 
Sacrifice can be offered to wipe away sin (the OT sin offerings), to preserve people 
in a state of grace,  that is,  peace and salvation (peace offerings), and so that the 
human spirit might be perfectly united with God, which will reach its full effect in 
glory (holocausts).  The last two categories are offered by people already in a state of 
grace, that is, by people who have something in their own right which they can offer 
to God and expect to merit thereby.  Moreover, in his explanation of why offering 
sacrifice  is  required  by  natural  law,  he  makes  no  mention  of  sin,  but  bases  his 
argument solely on the common human perception of our own weakness and the 
need to be helped by something superior, which all call “god”.70  Although it is not 
mentioned in scripture, he is sure that even Adam offered sacrifice.71
As to what the term “sacrifice” covers, Thomas has both a broad and 
narrow definition.  Broadly, sacrifice is “a certain special act having praise because it 
is done in reverence of God,” and so any act of any other virtue, praiseworthy in 
67 ST I-II.114.5, 7.  Under the influence of Augustine, Thomas developed his understanding of this 
point, as is well described by Wawrykow, God's Grace, 37-38, 53, 266-276.  Compare, for 
instance the interpretation of “facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam” at Scriptum 
1.48.1.3, cor,  ad 1;  2.4.1.3 sed contra 3, 2.28.1 3 ad 5, 2.28.1.4 cor, 2.28.2.2 cor, 2.29.1.3.ad 3, 
3.25.2.1.1 ad 2, 4.20.1  sol. 1; 4.20.1.1.1  cor and ST I-II.109.6 obj 2 and ad 2 (references given by 
Wawrykow, 84-85n 47).
68 Cf ST III.1.2 ad 2.
69 ST III.22.2.  Thomas also distinguishes between a mere sacrifice, a partial offering, and the total 
offering of a holocaust, using it as a type for understanding the difference between, say, one act of 
almsgiving and the lifelong vow of poverty.  ST II-II.186.3 ad 6.
70 ST II-II.85.1 cor.  Note how here he appeals to God as known by natural reason alone, as he also 
did for the same reason at II-II.81.1 sed contra.  See Maxime Allard OP, Que rendrai-je au 
Seigneur?  Aborder la religion par l'éthique, Paris: Cerf, 2004), 300.
71 ST II-II.85.1 ad 2.  He does not clarify whether he would have done so if he had not sinned, but as 
the thesis develops we shall see that it is likely that Thomas imagined even an unfallen Adam 
would have carried out some sort of sacrifice.
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itself (say, almsgiving or mortification of the body), when done for the reverence of 
God is a sacrifice.  But some acts are not praiseworthy in themselves except in that 
they are done in reverence for God, and these “are properly called sacrifices, and 
belong to the virtue of religion.”72  Thomas shows how this agrees with Augustine's 
assertion, “True sacrifice is every good work which is done so that we inhere in God 
in holy fellowship,” for the very desire to inhere in God belongs to reverence for 
God.73  He goes on to give examples of the sorts of goods we can offer to God in 
sacrifice: the good of our souls,  the good of our body,  and external goods: thus, 
“mediately, when we share our goods with our neighbours for the sake of God,” it is 
a sacrifice.74  The same arguments occur in the Super De Trinitate.75
Therefore, through a consideration of the virtue of religion and the nature 
of sacrifice, we see that for Thomas any act done in charity is an offering to God with 
a view to obtaining eternal beatitude.
3.2.3.5 We know the value of what we offer to God
We can further appreciate that this is an economy when we consider that 
Thomas  distinguishes  charity  from  love  by  saying  that  “charity  adds  a  certain 
perfection over and above love, in that what is loved is reckoned to be magni pretii 
(of great price/value).”76  In charity God is loved and sought; but also, in charity we 
love  our  own selves  because  of  our  connection  to  God,  namely,  because  of  our 
72 ST II-II.85.3 cor.
73 ST II-II.85.3 ad 1, citing Augustine De Civitate Dei 10.6.  He cited the same quote at Scriptum 
3.9.1.1.2 obj 1, and responded that “sacrifice” was being used metaphorically.  He uses it again at 
ST III.48.3 cor, to argue that Christ's death was a sacrifice.
74 ST II-II.85.3 ad 2.
75 Super De Trinitate 2.3.2 cor.4.  This argument is perhaps clearer for our purposes than the one in 
the Summa.
76 ST I-II.26.3 cor.
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sharing  in  the  divine  nature  (incipiently  by  grace,  to  be  completed  in  glory).77 
Therefore, in our acts of sacrifice to God, we both hope to obtain something of great 
value (the vision of God) and we give up something of value (ourselves, loved in 
charity).
Thomas  hesitates  to  apply  “charity”  to  love  of  self,  as  charity  is 
friendship, and a friend is an other; but he then says that love of oneself is in a certain 
sense greater than friendship, indeed, is its form and root, because we cannot love 
neighbours as we love ourselves unless we love ourselves.  This parallels the case 
with knowledge: we do not have knowledge of the first principles, but something 
greater,  namely,  understanding.   However,  this  love  of  self  can be  called charity 
because it is founded in the charity with which we love God.78
3.2.3.6 God's hand is not forced
As we have noted, Thomas insists that it is God who has willed that we 
should be able to come to share the divine life in this way; any sense of debitum is 
only insofar as what God wants to happen ought to happen: if God is a “debtor” to 
anyone, it is not to us, but to God's own will and thus God's own self.  This divine 
ordo is a structure of justice,  a replacement for the gift  of original justice which 
Adam lost.  But  it  is  a  structure  that  mediates  agency rather  than  obliterating  it.  
Increase in  grace  and glory is  an appropriate  reward  for  charity,  but  it  does  not 
happen automatically.  When it comes to rational (as opposed to irrational) creatures, 
God deals with them at the appropriate level, which is personal.  God may make a 
general act of the will with regard to irrational creatures, but takes individual care 
77 ST II-II.26.3 cor, 26.4 cor.
78 ST II-II.26.4 cor.
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with rational ones: they have merited by an act of the will, and are rewarded by an 
act of God's will.79  This is related to a distinction Thomas makes when discussing 
providence: a builder makes a specific decision how many rooms there will be in the 
house, but decides the number of bricks simply as the number needed for a house of 
those dimensions.80  This fits in with Thomas' insistence that charity is a species of 
friendship, and that revelation of secrets is a sign of friendship  -  and as we have 
seen, knowledge of God is increased through intimate co-working with God, and this 
increase in knowledge is the basis for an increase in charity.81
3.2.3.6 Trinitarian aspects
This economy is based upon the operations of knowledge and love, for 
love comes from knowledge.  We saw this already, in that an invisible mission of the 
Son is accompanied by an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit, for the Word is not 
any word, but the  Verbum spirans Amorem.   The charity by which we merit is a 
sharing in the Holy Spirit, given by grace.  Sometimes Thomas seems to resile from 
these Trinitarian aspects.  Christ's sonship comes from the Father alone, whereas ours 
is the work of the whole Trinity, with different aspects of it appropriated to different 
persons.  But the point Thomas is making here is that our sonship is but a likeness, a 
participation in the sonship of the Son.  Even as a mere likeness it is radically and 
ineradicably Trinitarian.82
79Summa Contra Gentiles 3.140.4.
80 ST I.23.7 cor.
81 Super Ioannem prologus (M11), 14.4 (M1916), 15.3 (M2016)
82 ST III.23.2.  An interesting light is shed on this when Thomas considers the possibility of an other 
Person becoming incarnate to save us through filiation, ST III.3.5 ad 2.
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3.3 Alternative bases to morality: punishment and temporal goods
This economy is basically about spiritual goods (charity) being rewarded 
with  even  greater  spiritual  and  eternal  goods  (glory).   But  there  can  be  other 
motivations to act: fear of punishment, temporal goods, and obedience to the law. 
We must see how these fit into the economy, if at all. 
3.3.1 Punishment
As well as rewards, punishment, according to its quality and quantity, can 
be deserved.  We need to see if it forms an economy, and its relation to the economy 
of reward.83
3.3.3.1 Punishment and ordo
For Thomas God implants an order within nature so that nature achieves 
its own goals -  which God has determined for it  -  due to processes internal to 
nature itself:  secondary causes are real causes.84  Thomas begins his treatment of 
punishment by noting that this order tends to preserve things, and thus if one thing 
attacks another, it is likely to suffer some harm from it or be weakened by it.85  This 
tendency occurs in human beings as well.  He then applies this principle to ordo: an 
ordo will  defend  itself  against  an  attack  upon  it,  acting  more  vehemently  and 
subduing (deprimere) that which rose against it.86
83 Garrigou-Lagrange notes that “in the abstract” the merit that brings eternal life and the demerit that 
deserves punishment are opposed, but apart from repeating Thomas' remark that merit comes from 
an integral cause and punishment from a defective cause, does not in that work follow the 
connection between the two.  Grace, 366, 371.
84 ST I.103.6, I.105.5 cor.
85   ST I-II.87.1 cor.
86 Stephanie Gregoire, as the title of her article suggests, tries to analyse Thomas' position on 
punishment in terms foreign to him by asking whether he is a retributivist (“backward-looking”) or 
a utilitarian (“forward-looking”) and misses the dynamic nature of an ordo.  Because an ordo is 
teleological, to restore it is to look to the future.  “Punishment: Aquinas and the Classical Debate,” 
Angelicum 86 (2009): 375-398.
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However, the nature of an ordo is such that by its own intrinsic processes 
it carries out the intentions that belong to its foundation (principium, or, if this is 
personal, its princeps).  Hence Thomas says that “whatever rises up (insurgit) against 
some  order  will  be  put  down  (deprimatur)  by  that  order  or  (vel)  by  the  ruler 
(princeps) of that order.”87  As is indicated by Thomas’ use of vel rather than aut, the 
action of the ordo and the action of the princeps are not two acts, but one.
Sin is  a disordered act,  and so it  acts  against an order,  and there is a 
connection  between  order  and  glory.   The  existence  of  an  order  is  an  external 
manifestation of the founder of that order, a going out of self, in that the known is 
somehow present in the knower.  Hence Thomas prefaces his remarks about order by 
saying that when all things “are contained under an order, they are in some way one 
in  order  to  the  source  (principium)  of  that  order.”   The  purpose  of  punishment, 
therefore, is not simply to change the behaviour of the offender (which it might not 
do), but to strengthen the presence of the order (or the glory of the princeps ordinis) 
in all those who belong to that order, so that they either repent themselves or are 
strengthened in their resolve to persevere in the good.88
  The sinner acts against not one order, but three: the interior order of 
one’s own reason, the external order of the one who governs, and the divine order. 
Notice that human order is not abstract, but has its foundation in a concrete, personal 
governor  (gubernans),  temporal  or  spiritual,  civil  or  domestic  (politice  vel  
oeconomice).89  And so punishment is threefold: firstly, the remorse of conscience, 
brought  on  by  the  person  himself,  next  human  punishment,  and  then  divine 
87 ST I-II.87.1 cor.
88  ST I-II.87.2 ad 1; 87.3 ad 2.
89  ST I-II.87.1 cor.  Here we have one example of Thomas’ restricted understanding of oeconomia.
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punishment.90  Divine punishment will be the focus here.
Since sin is a disordered act of the will, punishment consists in something 
that is against the will of the one punished.  But this disorder of the will has two 
aspects  -  a turning from God, and a turning to finite, created goods  -  each of which 
is brought into order in a different way.91
3.3.3.2 Punishment as loss
We can consider turning away from God as merely the negative side of 
the  economy of  merit  and  reward.   If  the  beatific  vision  is  given  to  those  who 
condignly merit it, then those who do not merit it, miss out on it, which is against 
their deepest will and so is a punishment.  Indeed, as frustrating our deepest will it is 
the greatest  punishment,  and Thomas several times cites John Chrysostom to this 
effect.92  Similarly, in this life mortal sin of its nature results in the withdrawal of 
grace.93  The  potentially  or  actually  infinite  duration  of  this  punishment  arises 
because of the potentially or actually infinite duration of the turning away.94  Turning 
away from God, although a finite act, has a certain infinite quantity, as it is turning 
away from an infinite good, and the punishment is the loss of an infinite good.95
3.3.3.3 Punishment as inflicted
When sin is considered as turning towards finite goods, a different sort of 
punishment arises.  In terms of the definitive punishment after death, there is the 
poena sensus, literally punishment of the senses, but Thomas holds that, particularly 
90  ST I-II.87.1 cor.
91  ST I-II.87.4 cor.
92 ST I-II.88.4 cor; De Malo 5.1 obj 3.
93  ST I-II.85.5 cor, I-II.87.2 cor.
94  ST I-II.87.3 cor.
95  ST I-II.87.4 cor.
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before the general resurrection, the term “senses” is to be taken metaphorically, as 
indicating  that  the  punishment  is  not  the  spiritual  punishment  of  the  loss  of  the 
beatific vision.  This punishment involves the separated soul being tied to an inferior 
material substance (fire), which causes the pain of indignity; or the soul and risen 
body suffering through a fire that cannot corrupt, only bring pain.96  It is a suffering 
through the very thing which the person has wrongly chosen.  Further, although the 
spiritual punishment is the same for all (as the same good is lost), the poena sensus 
can vary in intensity from one person to another, according to the intensity of their 
attachment to finite goods:97 unbaptized infants, who have not voluntarily attached 
themselves  to  anything  at  all,  experience  no  poena  sensus,  as  will  be  explained 
below.  This allows there to be some proportion or justice in punishments (as there is 
some proportion in the reward).  It also helps the punishment to be a deterrent in the 
minds of those who think nothing of the spiritual life and therefore are not disturbed 
by the prospect of the loss of the beatific vision.98
For  Thomas  holds  that  punishment  is  first  and  foremost  about  the 
preserving of order, and only accidentally about pain.  This is seen most clearly in his 
treatment of limbo.  Unbaptized babies in limbo enjoy natural happiness, but not the 
beatific vision; Thomas insists, however, that since they have only ever lived at the 
natural level and have never had any inkling of anything beyond, although they are 
aware that they are made for happiness, they are totally unaware of the happiness of 
glory they are missing, and it is no source of anguish to them.99  We can see the 
babies in limbo as deprived, and so as punished for their share in the guilt of Adam, 
96  SCG 4.90.
97  ST I-II.87.4-5.
98  SCG 3.145, specifically directed against Algazeli.
99 De Malo 5.3, cor, ad 1.  For a good treatment of this question, see Serge-Thomas Bonino, “La 
théorie des limbes et le mystère du surnaturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 101.1-
2 (2001): 131-166.
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but they do not. Objectively they are punished, but subjectively they are unaware of 
it.100  This distinction can be extended: we can see sinners who descend deeper and 
deeper into vice as moving further and further away from God, suffering greatly for 
their  sins,  but  they may not  see this  and,  at  the  time,  may actually  be  enjoying 
themselves.101  For obvious pastoral reasons, Thomas does not explicitly state the 
logical conclusion: there may well be souls in hell who, because of their minimal 
awareness of God before death, barely notice the loss of the beatific vision, and for 
whom the poena sensus is an annoyance rather than a torment, and who consequently 
have a minimal “worm of conscience.”  Such people may even be happier in hell 
than they were on earth: after all, God delights not in punishment but in justice;102 
and the punishment can serve no medicinal purpose,  so there is no sense in God 
taking pains to inflict it. It is possible to reconcile hell and God's mercy.
3.3.3.4 Does God inflict punishment?
But this raises the question whether God actually inflicts any punishment, 
or whether, in accord with a possible reading of our original quote, it is simply the 
God-given order that re-asserts itself.  The system would work perfectly without any 
100 Lawrence Feingold uses Thomas' explanation of limbo to argue for the actual existence of natura 
pura. The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and his Interpreters 
(Naples FA: Ave Maria University Press, 2010), 213-214, 247-250, 350-353, 367-369. Aaron 
Riches responds to this, “To Rest in the Infinite Altitude of the Divine Substance: A Lubacian 
response to the provocation of Lawrence Feingold and the resurgent attack on the legacy of 
Surnaturel (1946) – Part One,”, Synesis 1 (2013). He relies in part on Bonino's argument that at De 
Malo 5.3 ad 1 Thomas makes it clear that there is only one beatitude: what differs is the intensity 
with which it is enjoyed: “La théorie des limbes,” 158.  Even Garrigou-Lagrange would disagree 
that limbo represents a real case of natura pura, for he holds that in classical Thomism “fallen man 
cannot be directly averted from his final supernatural end without at the same time being at least 
indirectly averted from God, his final natural end and the author of life,” and hence that infants in 
limbo do not have “absolute, perfect natural happiness” but only “ a certain natural beatitude.” 
Grace, 504-505.
101  For only in some cases does the descent into vice cause the repentance of the sinner, but it is 
always a warning to others: ST I-II.2 ad 1.
102  SCG 3.144.10.
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“intervention” on God's part.  Even the poena sensus could be ascribed to a tragically 
but invincibly misguided will fixing the sinner to material things, even though this 
keeps it from God, its highest desire, and so it could be voluntary (so not imposed by 
God) and “against the will” (and so punishment) at the same time.  Such a position is 
consistent with Thomas, but he does not state it.103  For, as it was with reward, so it is 
with punishment: human beings are not irrational objects; their merits and sins are 
voluntary and personal, and God responds to them in an appropriate way.104  Thomas 
seems to distinguish between the loss of grace that comes automatically (effective) 
through  mortal  sin,  and  the  withdrawal  of  grace  from  the  sinner  by  God  as 
punishment (meritorie);105 and yet at the same time declares that this is not due to a 
defect  in  God's  grace,  but  to  our  decision  to  turn  away.106  God's  reward  or 
punishment  flows  straight  from the  divine  will,  and yet  is  not  arbitrary,  because 
entirely in  keeping with the divine order  of  justice.   This is  why in the passage 
originally quoted from the Summa, that the “order or the ruler of the order” repress 
the disorder, should be interpreted not as two separate agents, but as both acting in 
total harmony, each in its own way.
What we have, then, is a single economy which provides a structure in 
which God can graciously interact with rational creatures and allow them meaningful 
action  by  which  they  can  merit  their  share  of  the  gift  of  the  beatific  vision. 
Punishment is the negative side of this economy.  Under both aspects, the structure 
never takes over as a brute structure, but is always there to support the interpersonal 
103 Given that the idea that we remain in hell and its torments by our own will may be 
incomprehensible to some sinners and so pastorally unhelpful, this is not surprising.  He gets close 
to it, however, citing as authoritative Bernard's dictum “only one's own will burns (sola propria  
voluntas ardet).” De Malo, 5.2 sed contra 1.
104  SCG 3.140.4
105  ST II-II.24.10 cor
106 Super Ioannem cap.12, lect. 7 (M1698); De Malo 3.1 ad 8.
102
exchange.
3.3.4 Material rewards
This economy is principally a spiritual economy: it is ordered upon the 
beatific vision (or the loss of it).  And yet the poena sensus reminds us that it has a 
material aspect.  This is not restricted to punishment.  The acts of charity that merit  
reward are carried out in the body, and so it is not unjust but rather congruent that the 
body should share in the reward.  The soul will be vivified and glorified, and the 
glory of the soul redounds to the body.107
As for temporal goods in this life, Thomas argues that the imperfection of 
the  Old  Law  is  that  it  works  by  threatening  external  punishments  and  offering 
temporal  rewards,  so that  people's  motivation for  obeying the law is  not love of 
virtue; consequently the Old Law does not make people truly virtuous, and thus fails 
as a law.108  It is not surprising, therefore, that when he considers the issue in the last 
article on merit, the  sed contra cites Ecclesiastes to remind us that temporal goods 
and ills happen equally to the just and the unjust.109  And yet, while Thomas may be 
meaning  to  imply  the  vanity  of  temporal  goods  as  such,  he  does  not  want  the 
indifference with which they fall upon the just and the unjust to imply that God is 
indifferent to us, a doctrine that Thomas strongly opposes.110  This sed contra is one 
of the very few in the Summa to which Thomas gives a response.  Thomas sees the 
107 ST III.19.3 ad 3; 
108 ST I-II.107.1 ad 2.  He argues similarly that if baptism conferred impassibility in this present life, 
people would approach it for the wrong reasons, ST III.69.3 cor.
109 ST I-II114.10 sed contra.  This article has occasioned very little interest from 20th century 
commentators.  Garrigou-Lagrange devotes thirty-six pages to the question on merit, but a mere 
nine lines on the last page to this article. Grace, 363-398.  Nor do we find a mention in Cornelius 
Ernst OP, “Merit” in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 30 The Gospel of Grace: Ia 2ae 
106-114 , ed. Cornelius Ernst OP (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1972).  There is not even any 
discussion of it in Wawrkyow, God's Grace.
110 Super Iob, prol.
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justice of God working through temporal goods in three ways.
Since  the  ultimate  reward  is  eternal  life,  anything  that  is  given  in 
response to our just  actions which helps  us towards eternal  life  may properly be 
considered as merited.  This applies principally to an increase in grace or charity, as 
we have already seen, but sometimes material things may help, and these also are 
merited in the strict sense.  However, there is a problem here, as this category could 
just as easily include “bad” material things as well as “good” ones.
Secondly,  temporal goods considered solely in themselves can also be 
merited, but only secundum quid.  When they come about through our own efforts, 
which, of course, are only possible by God and which only prosper under God, these 
goods  “are  in  a  sense  pay”  (habent  rationem  mercedis)  according  to  God's 
dispensation,  even  if  they  are  carried  out  by people  who  do  not  have  the  right 
intention.111  This would seem to cover two scriptural examples raised as objections, 
where people's actions assisted God's plan for the Chosen People, even though their 
will was partially (the lying midwives) or wholly defective.  Thomas' insistence that 
this is a derived sense reminds us that although the language of merit comes from the 
human world, its real sense is with regard to the spiritual and eternal good.
Thirdly, where Scripture talks of temporal goods as the reward itself, this 
use is ultimately figurative.  That these material things were promised to the still 
carnal chosen people of the time as a reward for following the Law is literally true, 
but the overall purpose of this was as a figure of the spiritual rewards to come, “and 
not only their tongue, but even their life was prophetic.”112  This may also cover, for 
example, the reward to the lying midwives.113
111 ST I-II.114.10 cor.
112 ST I-II.114.10 ad 1, citing Augustine Contra Faustinum, cap. 2.
113 ST I-II.114.10 ad 2.
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These different usages of “merit” cover bad things happening to good 
people and  vice versa.  Thomas points out that what is punishment to one may be 
medicine to another.  Or, as the last theological statement of Prima Secundae says: 
“All things happen just as much to the good as to the bad, at  least  so far as the 
substance  of  temporal  goods  and ills  is  concerned.   But  not  as  regards  the  end, 
because the good are led through these things to beatitude, and the bad are not.”114 
The good, because they know that their  beatitude is  spiritual,  know that material 
goods are not their final end and that material evils are not a sign of punishment, and 
so they can deal in the light of God's love with all these things, which thus become 
helps to spiritual progress.  The bad, who focus on the goods of this world as their 
end, see things differently, and will often wrongly think that they are being blessed or 
punished, leading to even more irrational behaviour  -  but sometimes a temporal evil 
will motivate them to repent of a moral evil, or a temporal good will encourage them 
in moral good, leading to some sort of conversion and repentance.
One could object here that it is completely random whether a bad person 
interprets (guesses?) rightly or wrongly the significance of a particular temporal good 
or evil.  But just as God's justice works personally with an order that would seem to 
automatically punish and reward, and so God's acts of reward and punishment are 
seen to be totally voluntary and also totally just; so also God's mercy works with an 
order that seems intrinsically random, so that God's merciful act that reveals the true 
working of the economy is seen to be in no way irrational and yet totally gratuitous.
There is, then, one economy that, while primarily spiritual, also includes 
material goods, and while primarily about reward, also includes punishment.  But 
this economy, as it does not flow automatically from the principles of our nature, 
114 ST I-II.114.10 ad 3.
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needs to be received.  Apart from its reception, human beings will live in some other 
sort of economy (otherwise their actions would be meaningless even to themselves), 
which will by default be based around created goods or false gods.  For Thomas, God 
meets the people where they are, and uses law to subvert the carnal from within (to 
“evacuate” itself) and to lead to a spiritual economy.  And this is why we must turn to 
the category of law, which Thomas in  Prima Secundae does not see as opposed to 
grace, but rather finding its perfection in grace.
3.4 Economy and Law
Prima Secundae concludes with the two external helps to virtue: law and 
grace.  Law is an analogous term.  The primary referent for law is God, and while 
law, as it is not a personal term, cannot be attributed to any of the divine persons, it  
closely  associated  with  Wisdom,  which  is  appropriated  by  the  Son.115  Humans 
participate  in  law  through  reason  (natural  law)  and  revelation  (divine  law);  the 
primary reason for the two modalities, as always in Thomas, is that we have an end 
beyond  our  natural  means,  although  a  secondary  reason  is  the  weakening  and 
darkening of our rational powers due to sin.116  There is also human law, consisting of 
particular attempts to apply the natural law to given communities.
3.4.1 Law as a structure
Thomas' treatment of law is probably the clearest example of an attempt 
by him to understand a structure.  Law has both a universal existence in the mind of 
the legislator (divine or human) as well as an existence in each of the subjects of the 
115 ST I-II.93.1 cor.
116 ST I-II.91.4 cor.
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law who is regulated by it.117  An irrational object can only be subject to law (or, 
more correctly, a likeness of law) directly from God, for the “law” exists in it as its  
natural  inclination  to  achieve  the  common  good  as  God's  providence  directs;  a 
rational agent, having providence over himself or herself, participates in the eternal 
law by an impress of God's light on the mind, by which he or she discerns good from 
evil. 118  In a similar way divine law or human law can be impressed upon the rational 
mind through promulgation.119  The virtuous person will obey the law because of an 
already existing inclination to virtue (although in the case of positive law, human or 
divine, this may simply be the virtue of obedience); those who have the foundations 
of virtue will obey simply by force of reason, this will either help form acquired 
virtues in them, or dispose them to infused virtues.  And the fearful will obey to 
avoid punishment, which might cause virtue in them in the same way.  Some, of 
course, will disobey.  But for all people law will exist in their minds as a summons to 
obey,  and the  first  virtue  it  will  generate  (if  obeyed)  is  obedience  to  the  higher 
authority that imposed the law. 120  But the ultimate factor that makes the law work in 
inducing change in people is fear of punishment.121  In response to the objection that 
people can be incited to good by rewards as well as by punishment, Thomas replies 
that  anybody  can  offer  a  reward,  but  only  someone  holding  legal  authority  can 
punish.122
117 ST I-II.91.2 cor.
118  ST I-II.91.2 cor and ad 3.
119  ST I-II.90.4 cor and ad 1.
120 Of course, if the higher authority imposes a bad law, obedience will generate a habitus directed to 
a bad end, a good secundum quid, such as being a good thief.  ST I-II.92.1 cor, ad 1, ad 2.
121 ST I-II.92.2 cor.
122  ST I-II.92.2 ad 3.
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3.4.2 Is the New Law more or less a law than the Old Law?
Under such a description of law, is the New Law more or less a law than 
the Old Law or a human code?  In terms of the end of the law, to make the subjects 
good, it is obviously a better law, but does it better achieve the end of law by actually 
being something different from a law?
Although the Old Law and the New Law are geared towards the same 
end (beatitude), they are for different groups of people who are characterised by a 
different closeness to that end.123  More specifically, the difference of the New Law is 
characterised by what is most powerful (potissimum) in it, namely the grace of the 
Holy Spirit which pours charity into the hearts of believers.124  In the question on the 
New Law in itself,  Thomas repeatedly says that the New Law is not written, but 
rather implanted on the heart, and that primarily it is the grace of the Holy Spirit, and 
only secondarily is it something written that tells us what to believe or do.125  But as 
Thomas repeatedly distinguishes law and grace, we should not rush to identify them 
here.  It is in the following question, on the relation between the New Law and the 
Old Law, that the way in which the New Law can be called grace becomes clear. 
The Old Law was made for those who were on the early stages of the journey to 
beatitude, the imperfect who were not yet in charity as they had not yet obtained 
spiritual  grace.126  Thus  it  was  characterised  by  using  fear  of  punishment  and 
temporal rewards as motives, things external to the acts it commanded, and it could 
not aim directly at the state of mind, but only the external actions, and these external 
actions of themselves could not dispose to grace; the New Law is designed for those 
123  ST I-II.107.1 cor.
124  ST I-II.106.1 cor.
125  ST I-II.106.1 cor, 106.2 cor, ad 1, I-II.107.1 ad 3, 
126 ST I-II.107.1 cor.  The phrase “spiritual grace” allows Thomas to talk of Israel as enjoying God's 
favour without necessarily having the gift of the Holy Spirit.
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who have charity through the grace of the Holy Spirit, either to bring them to it, or to 
guide them in conserving it and growing in it.127  As we have seen,  of its nature 
charity places all its hope in God's promise of eternal beatitude, and so it does not 
need  motivation  from temporal  rewards,  or  punishments  that  are  external  to  the 
precepts of charity.  If there is fear, it is not the servile fear that dreads temporal 
punishment,  but  the  filial  fear  that  dreads  the  loss  of  the  grace  of  God  or  the 
forfeiting of eternal glory. 128 Like the Old Law, it has rituals, but these are capable of 
conferring the grace of the Holy Spirit and increasing charity.129  Thus while the New 
Law has the same features as the Old Law, its difference is that these features come 
from and lead to charity given by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and so it can be said  
that  the  New  Law  is  essentially  grace  rather  than  works,  essentially  something 
implanted rather than something written.  Indeed, without the Holy Spirit, the letter 
even of the New Law will bring death.130  Of course, Thomas admits that under the 
Old Law there were those who had charity, and under the New Law there are those 
who lack it, but it is more a question of the status of the group to whom the law is 
primarily directed.131
If punishment is a distinctive feature of law, then the New Law, where the 
punishment is the greatest possible, surpasses the Old.  And yet the New Law does 
not work by fear of punishment, but by hope of reward.  Its mode is one of freedom 
rather than violence.  It does not regulate a carnal economy by restricting irrational 
desires, but it inspires good desires by mediating a spiritual economy.  And that is 
where  Thomas  finds  the  superiority  of  the  New Law,  in  that  instead  of  merely 
127  ST I-II.107.1 ad 2.
128  ST II-II.19.2 cor.
129  ST I-II.108.1 cor, 108.2 obj 2 and ad 2.
130  ST I-II.106.2 cor.
131  ST I-II.107.1 ad 2 and ad 3.
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inducing people to carry out good acts, it makes them good formally by inducing 
virtues, particularly charity.132
The other difference is the status of the parties.  Law that worked on 
punishment required the subordination of the subject to the legislator, and indeed this 
is  chiefly what  the  law brought  about.   An economy does  not  require  the  same 
subordination, and actually requires some sort of equality between the two parties.  If 
the  object  of  the  law  is  simply  to  produce  good  behaviour,  then  law  based  on 
punishment  will  suffice.   If  the object  is  the communication of  the goodness  by 
which the lawgiver is good (in this case, divinisation), then a law based on intrinsic 
reward, an economy, is more desirable.
3.4.3 Moving from the Old Law to the New: satisfaction
Thomas  sets  up  a  distinction  between  punishment  and  merit. 
Punishment, as we have seen, is always experienced as against the will of the one 
who is punished, but for an act to be meritorious, it must be truly voluntary.  One sort 
of  act,  however,  falls  somehow  into  both  categories:  satisfaction.   An  act  of 
satisfaction is taken on voluntarily; this enables it to be meritorious.  However, it is 
of the nature of an act of satisfaction that it is something that the person concerned 
would rather not do, and in that sense it is against the will  secundum quid.133  The 
strange workings of satisfaction will be explained gradually in greater detail as the 
thesis progresses, we shall just note here that Christ's passion can be understood both 
132 For this and similar reasons Mark Jordan warns against trying to understand Thomas on law by 
simply taking ST I-II.90-108 as a self-sufficient “treatise”, without realising, at the very least, that 
they are integrally connected with the questions that follow on grace.  See Rewritten Theology, 
139.  Similarly, Servais Pinckaers laments the modern separation that puts the treatise on law in 
moral theology and the one on grace in dogmatic.  The Sources of Christian Ethics, tr Sr Mary 
Thomas Noble (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 232.171.
133 ST I-II.87.6 cor.
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as punishment and as merit, and therefore it enables the person who believes in its 
satisfactory power to move from the Old Law, characterised by punishment, to the 
New Law, characterised by charity, the basis of merit.134  But what we need to do 
next is to look at the grace that is central to the New Law, and we shall do so by way 
of an examination of the gift.
134 This unstable nature of satisfaction has been noted by others, e.g. “there really is a sense in which 
the legal language of justification by faith “self-destructs”: the point of the doctrine is to move us 
out of the legal domain into the world of family relationships, and it is just this point that so often 
gets lost in theological controversy over satisfaction, substitution, and imputation.”  Brian Albert 
Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1993), 60
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE GIFT
In the previous chapter we showed that Thomas clearly sees the Christian 
life as an economy, for beatitude  -  the quest for which gives meaning to all human 
activity  -  is something that we earn.   And while it was clearly appropriate that 
beatitude be given as the reward for love, it was still not entirely clear how the merit 
could be condign, that God in a real sense would owe us beatitude, even granted that 
this is only because of the order set up by God, so that God is primarily a “debtor” to  
himself.
This chapter will start by examining what “debt” means for Thomas, as it 
is a far from univocal term.  With the help of Maxime Allard, we shall also see that 
different sorts of debts entail different sorts of subjects, and that in some cases debt is 
one of the constituents of the subject.  We shall then consider the debt of gratitude 
which arises from the gift,  to show that gift exchange provides a suitable way of 
understanding the economy of merit.  Explicitly Thomas relies heavily on Seneca for 
his explanation of gift-exchange, but there are strong similarities with Marcel Mauss. 
An examination of these similarities helps to understand the connections between 
gifts and symbols, gift-exchange and violence, and gifts and social status and honour: 
Thomas also sheds light on the hau or “spirit of the gift” in Mauss.  Finally, we can 
use these insights to come to a better understanding of satisfaction.
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4.1 Debt
4.1.1 Legal and moral debt
Thomas  explores  the  various  meanings  of  debt  when,  after  having 
considered justice in its strict (narrow) sense  -  the justice of transactions regulated 
by law, where what is rendered to the other is equal to what is owed (debitum)   -  he 
considers the “potential parts of justice” or the “virtues annexed to justice.”1  These 
virtues all have some notion of rendering to the other, but they depart from strict 
justice either because of an inability to render what is equal, or from a weaker sense 
of debitum or debt.  Some debts simply cannot be repaid: first of all our debt to God 
(to which the virtue of religion responds), then to our parents or country (piety), and 
after that, to our superiors (observance).  In other cases what is rendered can be equal 
to what is owed, but the debt is a moral debt rather than a legal one.2  Sometimes the 
moral debt has the notion of necessity  -  one cannot preserve one's honestas morum 
without paying the debt  -  as in the case of gratitude and vindication.  In other cases, 
the payment of the debt is necessary as contributing to greater honestas, as with the 
virtues of liberality and affability.
4.1.2 Moral debt
Maxime Allard has produced a study of Thomas' treatment of the virtue 
of religion which pays close attention to this “scene of the debt.”  He notes that it  
presents the legal debt of a commercial exchange as being “a particular case of a 
1 ST II-II.80 art. unicus.
2 It is not entirely clear whether Thomas sees the debts of religion, piety and observance as being 
legal debts.  In Scriptum 3.33.3.4.1 cor, religion and piety are said to involve a legal debt.  This is 
not explicitly stated in the Summa; rather, legal debt is said to properly apply to “the justice which 
is the principal virtue” (ST II-II.80 unicus cor).  But, of course, religion and piety are covered by 
the first four precepts of the Decalogue (ST II-II.122.1-5) and maybe Thomas means that in that 
sense they incur a “legal” debt.  Further, Thomas gives a different distinction between moral and 
legal debt at ST I-II.99.5 cor.
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larger economy” which “does not treat merely of the exchange of objects,  but of 
individuals implicated in the exchanges,” even to the point where one “exchanges 
oneself, renders oneself towards the other” but “without one party or the other being 
reduced to the state of an object of merchandise.”3
Of the virtues annexed to justice, Allard is concerned chiefly with virtues 
mentioned earlier in the list, where the notion of debt is stronger.  Seven things can 
be noted.
 This  is  not  a  contractual  debt,  freely  entered  into  by  pre-existing 
parties;  thus,  here  the  debt  involves  the  very  person;  such  a  debt  cannot  be 
transferred, not does it cease to exist if the other party fails to meet the conditions.4
 In fact, particularly with religion and piety, the one liable to the debt 
does not exist prior to the debt: the very fact of coming into being is the source of the 
debt.5
 The  debt  is  somehow  “imposed”:  not  by  command,  force,  moral 
(ontological) constraint, nor even by liturgical habituation, but in a way intrinsic to 
the positioning of the ethical instance.6
 Particularly in the case of the debt of religion, the debt is of all that 
one is, and there is no way that it can be paid.  However, debt is not to be equated 
with guilt.  Allard notes that Thomas in no way mentions guilt, sin or a need for  
expiation as the source of the debt of religion, and Allard disapproves of the way that 
some people have argued from an unpayable debt to God to some sense of guilt in 
the presence of God even before one has had the chance to commit a sin.7
3 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 247.
4 Allard, Que rendrai-je,  259-260.
5 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 260
6 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 97-98.
7 Allard, Que rendrai-je,  280-281, cites N Sarthou-Lajus, L'Éthique de la dette (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1997), 28, 71; we find something similar in Jan Patočka, “Is 
114
 Particularly  for  religion,  but  to  a  reduced  extent  for  piety  and 
observance, the debt remains throughout time, not coming to an end.8
 This  sort  of  debt  is  positive  and  can  be  gladly  assumed  or 
acknowledged, and Allard cites Benveniste to suggest that this, rather than an owing 
due to a contractual borrowing, was the original meaning of debeo (= de + habeo).9
 The debt is an impulse to action.10
4.1.3 Debt and the subject
Allard  is  not  the  first  to  realise  that,  although  “St  Thomas  takes  the 
human experience of justice as his point of departure, he transcends it in his concept 
of the virtue of religion.”11  The special significance of Allard's analysis is the way he 
relates it to subjectivity.
In  line  with  many  contemporary  scholars,  Allard  raises  various 
arguments  -  epistemic, metaphysical (and phenomenological) and ethical  -   that 
unsettle the Cartesian notion of the subject.  We have already seen some of these 
when considering Chauvet.12  In particular, he starts by looking  at the tradition of 
Roman law, wherein “The persona is the crossroads of adventitious elements through 
which there is the intersection of a name, a family, a city, a history.  The individual is 
Technological Civilisation Decadent, and Why?” in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, 
tr. Erazim Kohák (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 107.  Even Chauvet slips it in as a way of 
explaining original sin, although he carefully arranges for the connection to be put into the mouth 
of a third party.  See Symbol and Sacrament, 366-367.
8 Allard, 262.
9 Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, 148-149.
10 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 281-282.
11 Häring, Sacraments, 160.
12 Not all scholars of Thomas would agree.  Emmanuel Perrier makes no reference to Allard, but he 
considers Chauvet's arguments for the social construction of the subject to be at odds with the 
teaching of Thomas.  “Louis-Marie Chauvet, saint Thomas d'Aquin et le pain de vie,” (paper given 
at a workshop on Chauvet, Dominican Convent, Toulouse, 15th October 2011, and to be published 
in Revue Thomiste), pp. 5-14.
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not defined as an isolated being (un être séparé).”13  The relation tends to go from the 
act  to  the  agent.   If  the  Roman  subject,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  modern 
(Cartesian) world, seems passive, this is simply a problem of the perspective.14
Allard is very wary of coming up with a substitute notion for the subject 
with which to approach the tract on religion.  Rather, he proposes a heuristic device, 
the “instance éthique advenant en posture subjective.”  As if in order to prevent the 
reader  from too readily forming a mental  picture of  what  this  might  refer  to,  he 
explains how each term in the phrase has been chosen with multiple resonances in 
mind.  The one word instance, for instance, carries the following connotations.
1. A  positioning,  a  posturing,  a  holding  of  place  among  many 
possibilities  -  “ethical” adds to this the idea of responsibility, of answering to others.
2. A process,  a  trial  in  order  to  readjust  the “sharing” entailed in the 
shared relations and beliefs so that it is fair, to achieve a stable set of relations to 
others  -  “ethical” adds the view with respect to beatitude, and also the concept of 
the author.
3. “Une valence thymique énoncée.”  (The word thymique recalls Plato's 
tripartite division of the human being into body, soul and θυμός, and probably is 
linked with what we referred to in Chapter Two as spirit.  A few pages later Allard 
emphasizes that the role Thomas gives to the gifts of the Holy Spirit takes his moral 
theology beyond  a  mere  obedience  to  rules  or  the  imitation  of  a  model.15  The 
addition of énoncée would seem to add that this impulse is not sub-rational.)  Allard 
connects this idea of instance as impulse with the idea of desires towards others.
13 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 52.
14 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 53, with reference to Y.-P. Thomas, “Acte, Agent, Societé: Sur l'homme 
coupable dans la pensée juridique romaine,” dans: Archives de philosophie du droit, 22 (1977), 63-
83.
15 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 87.
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Moreover, the  “instance  éthique advenant en posture subjective” allows 
distancing from philosophies of “conscience de soi” and of the “moi;” it  is more 
psychoanalytic, and it allows the tying together of a reflected desire of an  agir; a 
passibility extending between sadness and joy; and a constellation of syncopes.  This 
ties in with the second sense to allow for a process without a mastering.
Without going into all the details, this approach allows more scope for 
certain features of Thomas' theology, and particularly the virtue of religion.
First of all, the ethical must be seen, as Thomas sees it, in terms of the 
quest  for  beatitude.   As  beatitude  is  something  unknown to  us  and  beyond  our 
powers, we cannot act as Cartesian subjects and consider it as an object; moreover, 
Thomas is clear that the internal sources of our ethical action are both deliberate acts 
of the will and the movements of the appetites, the emotions, that must be controlled 
by the will.  This is where the need for the “thymic” impulse comes in.  Indeed, the 
very ability of the instance to  act  ethically (towards  beatitude)  is  something that 
grows in it, and which it approaches (hence advenant).  Its very subjectivity is in the 
process of becoming, and yet this becoming is not something that develops from 
within like a plant from a seed (an image Allard rejects), but which comes from 
without.16  In order to receive it one must adopt a posture (a word which reminds us 
of the bodily nature of the human being, as is made clear in Thomas' treatment of 
adoration), and to be subject to it (hence subjective).  This subjectivity is not to be 
confused with the posture assujettie, which is not a centre of dispositif actoriel but is 
trying to imitate some exterior project, and so cuts off its growth.  Nor is it to be 
confused with the posture in-subjectivable, which desires to test the destinateur, and 
16 Hence Thomas also talks of the exterior principles of our ethical action, law and grace, mediated to 
us by the institutions of the state and the Church.  Allard, Que rendrai-je, 74-75.
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so is blinded and disoriented.   Both of these  postures are actually  impostures,  as 
Allard will make clear when he examines the question on idolatry.
Consequently,  there  is  a  marked difference  between the  legal  debt  of 
strict justice and the moral or honorable debt associated with these virtues.  The debt 
of strict justice is about things owed between two parties that are distinct from each 
other, whose relations are mediated by a third party (the law), and where the other 
relations between the parties are not taken into consideration, so that the parties to 
the contract could be changed.  I can subcontract someone to do a job, but I cannot 
subcontract someone to pray or to love my mother.  We could say that, for those 
virtues where the debt is real (at the very least religion, piety and observance) the 
very debt that impels the “ethical instance” to act is what constitutes him or her as an 
ethical instance, and it is in that action of giving that he or she receives (more fully) 
subjectivity.   And this  goes back to the idea that  the  persona is  a  crossroads,  or 
perhaps, we could say, a node on a network of relations.  The debt that both brings 
into being and binds is also a bond in the sense of relationship, and we know for 
Thomas  that,  in  the  pre-eminent  case,  persons  are  distinguished  by  relations  of 
origin.
Religion, piety and observance all entail debts that can never adequately 
be returned; it is not from considering them that we shall discover the way in which 
God becomes a “debtor” to us.  It is only when we get to gratitude that is becomes 
possible to repay the debt.  And yet gratitude is the larger category of which the other 
three are special cases, as Thomas makes clear by asking in the second article, which 
deals with gratitude to God (and also gratitude to parents).17  And so, leaving Allard 
17 II-II.106.2.  Thus I. Mennessier, while acknowledging the powerful logic of Thomas' ordering of 
the potential parts of justice, says that we can also go the other way,  to understand analogously 
our obligations towards that transcendent other who is God, and, we could add, God's 
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to examine religion, it is to gratitude that we now turn.
4.2 Gratitude and gratia
4.2.1 The multiple character of gratia
We can start with the title of question 106 of  Secunda Secundae: “De 
gratia sive gratitudine.”  When discussing the theological concept of grace in Prima 
Secundae,  Thomas  has  already explained  the  meaning  of  gratia as  it  applies  in 
human affairs.18  It can refer to the choice of one person to love another (dilectio) that 
makes the second person gratus to the first;19 a gift given gratis; and the recompense 
for a benefit given gratis, as in the term gratias agere.  Furthermore, the gift-giving 
proceeds  (procedit)  from  the  love,  and  the  thanks  proceeds  (procedit)  from  the 
benefit.  Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange holds that Thomas is pointing to an analogous 
use of the word gratia, but to Thomas' three meanings in the human realm, he seems 
to add a fourth and more primary one, the quality that makes us pleasing (e.g. “the 
grace of countenance”).20  We can avoid adding this extra meaning if we follow the 
approach provided by Godbout.  Basing himself on the works of Benveniste, he notes 
that many words that relate in some way to exchange originally had an ambiguity, 
whereas “economic” or “market” usage has specified and narrowed the meaning; a 
word that applied to both giving and taking (and the very ambiguity of the original 
*do to denote both “give” and “take” is an example that Godbout does not cite at this 
point) is restricted to the side of either giving or taking.21  The examples given by 
“obligations” towards us.  “Renseignments techniques,” Appendix II in Thomas Aquinas, Somme 
Theologique: La Religion: 2a-2æ, Questions 80-87, tome premier, tr. I. Mennessier OP, Éditions de 
la Revue des jeunes (Paris: Desclée, 1932), 189-190.
18 ST I-II.110.1 cor.
19 Thomas specifically links dilectio with choice at  ST I-II.26.3 cor.
20 Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 112-3, 114-115.
21 Jacques Godbout (in collaboration with Alain Caillé) L'esprit du don, new edition (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2000), 241-249, citing Émile Benveniste, Vocabulaire des insitutions indo-
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Godbout  are  reconnaissance,  recevoir and  hôte (these  two  in  connection  with 
hospitality),  avoir confiance,  je lui dois beaucoup,  prêter,  prix and especially the 
Latin  gratia which, as Benveniste points out, can apply to the party who receives 
with favour, or to the party who is received with favour.22  If we follow this line, 
Thomas is looking at a reality whose proper dynamic is to have three phases, which, 
as we shall see, is in keeping with what he says about gratitude.
4.2.2 Thomas' debt to Seneca
We  can  understand  Thomas'  treatment  of  gratitude  better  when  we 
consider his sources.  Of the 50 citations of authorities in the ten articles of the two 
questions on gratitude and ingratitude, 24 are from Seneca's  De Beneficiis, eleven 
from Aristotle, one from Cicero, nine from scripture, four from the fathers, and one 
from the lives of the saints.23  Analysing more closely the way these authorities are 
used makes even clearer the reliance upon Seneca.  Cicero, the great taxonomist of 
morals,  is  cited in  the  first  sed contra,  concerning whether  gratitude  is  indeed a 
special virtue, and of the remaining nine, four have citations from scripture, three 
from Seneca, one from Aristotle, and one sed contra argues from reason alone.24  On 
the other hand, at least five of the citations of Aristotle, two of the patristic quotes, 
and one of the scripture passages,  are about more general moral or metaphysical 
européennes, 2 vols., (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969).  The reference to *do can be found at 
Émile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, tr. Elizabeth Palmer (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1973), 66-70.
22 Benveniste, Indo-European Language, 159-162.
23 Let us recall that Thomas claimed that the Romans, not the Greeks or Jews, excelled in ethics.  On 
the basis of remarks in Jerome's De Viris Illustribus 12, Seneca himself was commonly believed to 
have corresponded with St Paul, and a set of spurious letters circulated widely in the Middle Ages. 
In an article that tends to downplay the influence of Seneca (completely omitting any reference to 
Thomas' use of him), M. Spanneut points out that there are over 300 surviving copies of this 
alleged correspondence from the period 1200-1500.  “Seneca, Lucius Annaeus,” New Catholic  
Encyclopedia, s.v. “Seneca.”
24 ST II-II 106.1 from Cicero, 106.2, 3; 107.1, 4 from scripture, 106.4 and 5 and 107.3 from Seneca, 
and 106.6 from Aristotle.
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principles,  whereas  all  the  Seneca  quotes  are  specifically  about  gratitude  or 
ingratitude.  Moreover, these citations from Seneca present the main outline of his 
teaching, and even when he is cited in an objection (106.4 obj 3; 107.1 obj 1, 2 and 
3;  107.2  obj  3;  107.3  obj  3)  his  position  is  never  denied  or  minimised,  merely 
clarified, always in keeping with the general tenor of his thought, and sometimes 
even by reference to other places in his own writings (107.1 ad 2, 107.3 ad 3).  Thus 
it  is  clear  that  for  Thomas  gratitude  is  a  Christian  virtue,  and at  the  same time 
(although, as we shall see, he makes some modifications to Seneca's position) he 
fundamentally endorses Seneca's pre-Christian notion of gratitude.  This rootedness 
in the pagan world will help us to bring Thomas' notion of the gift into dialogue with 
the findings of anthropology.25
This  already  gives  us  an  insight  into  the  threefold  nature  of  gratia. 
Seneca begins De Beneficiis by considering the traditional image of the three Graces 
holding hands in  a  ring,  and tells  us  that  one represents  giving  the  gift,  another 
accepting  the  gift,  and  the  third  returning  the  gift.26  If  giving  is  listed  first, 
nonetheless  what  is  envisaged  is  an  unending  cycle  that  loses  its  beauty  if 
25 Thomas' debt to Seneca has not been analyzed closely, and where it is mentioned, it is often 
downplayed.  There is a brief treatment in Ceslao Pera OP, Le fonti del pensiero di Tommasso  
d'Aquino nella Somma Theologica, con Presentazione di P. M. -D. Chenu O.P. e aggiornamento  
bibliografico di P. C. Vansteenkiste, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1979), 74-75, which mentions one 
article on the topic, Martin Blais, “La colère selon Sénèque et selon saint Thomas,” Laval  
Théologique et Philosophique 20.2 (1964), 247-290.  Pera notes that although Thomas has severe 
criticisms of Stoicism's religious thought and moral theory (regarding the good or evil of the 
passions), Thomas treated him as an “authoritative moralist”, freely citing him with regard to a 
number of the virtues (including gratitude); but in this Christian synthesis Stoicism “loses its latent 
pride and inhuman harshness.”  This, of course, overlooks the fact that Thomas himself recognised 
that  the difference between him and the Stoics as regards the passion was one of terminology: 
Nicholas M Healy, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian of the Christian Life (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
159, referring to ST II-II.123.10 cor.  As another example, Leon Elders SVD merely notes that 
Thomas  consults Seneca in dealing with gratitude, anger and clemency. “La méthode suivie par 
saint Thomas d'Aquin dans la composition de la Somme de théologie, III,” Nova et Vetera (French) 
66 (1991): 180.  We might suspect that this downplaying is a defence of the supposed pure 
Aristotelianism of Thomas, but even Mark Jordan, who attacks such an approach, minimises 
Thomas' debt to Seneca, saying that it is mainly about how to control emotions.  Rewritten  
Theology, 103.
26 Seneca De Beneficiis, 1.3.2-5.
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interrupted.  Thomas, looking at the use of the word gratia, has replaced accepting 
the gift with the gift itself, but, as we shall see, keeps the idea of the unending cycle. 
And in the question the word gratia and its cognates slip back and forth among the 
three foci: the giver, the recipient, and the one making the return gift.
Thomas begins his discussion of gratitude by distinguishing it from other 
virtues on account of the different notion of debt at stake.  He distinguishes not only 
the source of the debt  -  and in particular that it is owed for a “particular and private 
benefit”  rather  than  the  common  benefit  conferred  by  those  of  rank,  and  thus 
implicitly different from the debt of religion, piety and observance  -  but also the 
nature of the debt: it is not a legal debt, but a debt of honour that one pays of one's 
own accord (sponte).27
4.2.3 The gift object and the spirit of the gift
Fundamental to both the beneficium and to the gratitude it should inspire 
is  that  what  matters  is  not  the  effectus or  donum  (the  material  benefit)  but  the 
affectus, animus or voluntas of the benefactor.28  Thus although, absolutely speaking, 
God gives the greater gift to the one who remains innocent, there is greater  gratia, 
because the gift is  magis gratis, when he gives pardon to the penitent.29  This also 
helps distinguish the debt of gratitude from the debt of religion, because in the latter 
the gift is that of created existence, a gift that is of its nature the same for all.30  What 
27 ST II-II.106.1 cor and ad 2.
28 ST II-II.106.5 cor.
29 ST II-II.106.2 cor.
30 Allard would hold that we thank parents for the gift of life through piety, and, by elimination, in 
religion we thank God for the gift of human nature.  Que rendrai-je 275.  I find the easier 
explanation for the distinction in Thomas' insistence that only God can create; creatures operate as 
secondary causes, which should be honoured (with the honour ultimately going back to God). 
Secondary causes do not assist God in creating, but in governing or steering the universe, and this 
is why one's country is owed piety as well as one's parents.
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is at stake in gratia is God's choice to give to individuals, where the quantity of the 
gift need not be the same.  We also note that gratis here has overtones of unexpected, 
in keeping with the insistence that the choice is made sponte.
The same distinction between  affectus and  effectus is used in the third 
article, where it is applied to the compensation.  Thus even someone without means 
who does what he or she can is not ingratus.31  Similarly, slaves who do more than 
their duty can confer a benefit on their masters, when it crosses over into affectum 
amici; and their deeds here are  gratiae habendae.32  This enables Thomas to insist 
that all people are obliged to gratitude, which he bases on  Dionysius' dictum that 
every effect naturally comes back (convertit) to its cause:  The benefactor as such is 
the cause of the beneficiary, and like a father, he operates as a principle or source 
(habet rationem principii).33  What exactly the benefactor causes in the beneficiary 
will be discussed below.
The distinction between affectus and donum (or effectus) also applies to 
the time of recompensatio.  Because the benefit consisted of both, the affectus should 
be returned immediately  - as Seneca says, to receive kindly is to repay the benefit. 
But a suitable countergift  should wait  for the opportune time (and then be given 
without delay).34  To pay too soon is to show oneself unwilling to be a debtor, and 
thus  ingratus.   This  is  different  from legal  debt,  which  must  be  paid  before  the 
appointed time, which is often at the very moment of the transaction.  Here, however, 
as Thomas insists, it is a moral debt which depends ex honestate debentis.35  Later we 
shall explore these notions of honour and willing debt with the help of anthropology.
31 ST II-II.106.3 ad 5.  Note here that the adverb grate describes both receiving of the benefit and the 
way the benefits come to us.
32 ST II-II.106.3 ad 4.
33 ST II-II.106.3 cor.
34 ST II-II.106.4 cor and ad 3.
35 ST II-II.106.4 cor and ad 1.
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Much the same contrast occurs in the next article, where Thomas finally 
clarifies that in a legal debt (e.g. arising from a loan) or one arising from amicitia  
utilis, the repayment depends upon the quantity of what has been given, even if in the 
latter case it can be termed a beneficium.  But in the case of amicitia honesti or of 
gratia one considers the choice (electio) or affectus of the giver, especially as gratia 
considers the benefit insofar as it is made gratis.36
4.2.4 Welcoming debt
Finally, the need to repay both the  effectus and the  affectus leads to an 
aporia.   The  benefit  is  commendable  because  it  was  given  gratis and  honestas 
generates an obligation to give back  gratis.  Merely to return a gift of equal size 
would be to acknowledge only the effectus, so one should try to give back something 
greater.37  But this would lead to an unbounded spiral of repayment, which would not 
observe the mean of virtue or the nature of the good.  But the debt of gratitude arises 
from charity, “quae quanto plus solvitur, tanto magis debetur.”  It is not inappropriate 
for charity to increase without bound.38  Perhaps Thomas' wish to place gratitude at 
the  service  of  charity  is  the  reason  he  does  not  take  up  the  illustration  Seneca 
borrows from Chrysippus to describe this spiral of gift-exchange.39  Giving benefits 
is like throwing a ball to an inexperienced player.  At first it is done gently, so that he 
can easily catch and return, but as his skill improves, “we shall be bolder in throwing 
the ball, for no matter how it comes, his ready and quick hand will promptly drive 
36 ST II-II.106.5 cor.
37 ST II-II.106.6 cor.
38 ST II-II.106 obj 2, 3 and ad 2.  This outmanœuvring of Aristotle is noted by Vivian Boland, “An 
Education in Gratitude,” Religious Life Review 51, no. 275 (July/August 2012): 221-222.  This is 
part of the larger pattern of the theological subversion of the Aristotelian idea of virtue described 
by Mark Jordan: see 1.1.3.
39 Seneca De Beneficiis 2.17.3-5.
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it.”40  This image depicts the “rally” of benefits as potentially unlimited, and also  - 
in a non-competitive way  -  as ludic, and thus outside the rational without being 
irrational.41
This connection with charity is taken up in the question on ingratitude.  It 
would seem reasonable (and even scriptural) to want to avoid debt, but the “debt of 
gratitude is derived from the debt of love, from which no-one should (debet) want to 
be absolved.  Whence, that someone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise 
from a defect of love towards the one who gave the benefit,” and so ingratitude is a 
sin.42
Describing  the  degrees  of  ingratitude  gives  Thomas  the  occasion  to 
consider the duties of gratitude: to acknowledge the benefit received; to give praise 
and thanks; and to repay (as and when appropriate).43
In the article on whether ingratitude is a mortal sin, the words gratus and 
gratitudo become  virtually  synonymous  with  “(being  in)  a  state  of  grace.” 
Ingratitudo as a mortal sin becomes the absence of grace.  Ingratitudo as a venial sin 
does not have the full sense (perfecta ratio) of ingratitude: it does not take away the 
habit of charity, but excludes some of its acts: it is not contrary to it, but outside it.44
Finally, in line with the Lucan text “the Most High is kind to the ingratos 
40 Seneca De Beneficiis, vol. 3 of Moral Essays, ed. and tr. John W Basore, Loeb Classical Library 
(London: William Heinemann, 1935), 2.17.4.
41 Josef Pieper notices a ludic strand connected with the gift in Thomas, who, he says, considers 
rational activity as work, and intellectual activity (contemplation) as the reception of a gift.  “The 
highest form of knowledge comes to man like a gift  -  the sudden illumination, a stroke of genius, 
true contemplation; it comes effortlessly and without trouble.  On one occasion St. Thomas speaks 
of contemplation and play in the same breath: 'because of the leisure that goes with contemplation' 
the divine wisdom itself, Holy Scripture says, is 'always at play, playing throughout the whole 
world,' (Proverbs viii, 30f).”  Leisure the Basis of Culture, tr. Alexander Dru (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1952), 35-36, 40, citing Scriptum 1.2.1.5 expositio textus.  The text continues to point out 
that, like play, divine contemplation has no end but itself.
42 ST II-II.107.1 ad 3.
43 ST II-II.107.2 cor.
44 ST II-II.107.3 ad 1 and ad 2.
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and the wicked,” Thomas argues that it  is the duty of the benefactor “de ingrato 
gratum faciat” by giving a further beneficium.45  The similarity to the technical term 
“gratia gratum faciens” is highly suggestive.
Thomas bases almost all the points he makes upon Seneca.  But the point 
where he  differs  leaves  us  with  an important  question:  what  does  the benefactor 
cause in the beneficiary?  It is quite clearly not that thing which Thomas elsewhere 
refers to as the effectus of the beneficium, because, as for Seneca, gratitude responds 
to the affectus much more than the effectus.  Seneca gives a very clear example: if a 
doctor saves someone's life by a routine procedure and without showing any special 
concern for the patient, then the standard payment for the doctor's skilled labour will 
suffice.46 
To answer this question it helps to know what to look for; Allard has 
already given us some clues, but the study of the gift made by Marcel Mauss  -  and 
developed by the likes of Alan Caillé and Jacques Godbout  -  will be very valuable.
4.3 Maussian gift-exchange
A few pages into  The Gift Marcel Mauss introduces,  like Seneca,  the 
triple obligation to give, to receive, and to give in return.47  Seneca and, therefore, 
Thomas are working with a notion of gratitude that has strong affinities with that 
found in  Mauss'  “archaic”  societies,  but  the  changed social  context  entails  some 
differences too.
45 ST II-II.107.4 sed contra and corpus.
46  Seneca, De Beneficiis 6.16.1-5.
47 Mauss, The Gift, 10-11.  For his failure to refer to Seneca, see Alain Caillé, Anthropologie du don:  
le tiers paradigme (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), 88n 7.
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4.3.1 The basics of Mauss' theory
Mauss  notes  that  in  archaic  societies  there  is  a  form  of  exchange 
characterised by the gift.  This often co-exists with what we could call commercial 
exchange, either by barter or through money, but is quite distinct from it.48
For  Mauss  gift  is  not  characterised  by  what  we  would  call  “pure 
gratuity:” One of the major points of The Gift is that very often there is an obligation 
to give, to receive or (especially) to repay the gift.49  But he is adamant that gift-
exchange is not cleverly  -  or clumsily  -  disguised commerce.50  In commercial 
exchanges  the  decision  depends  entirely  on  the  two  contracting  parties,  and  the 
objects exchanged are inert objects.  In gift-exchange the objects exchanged act upon 
the  parties,  establishing  or  strengthening  the  bonds  between  them.  Also  unlike 
commercial exchange, the giver never completely relinquishes the gift.51  Along with 
the object given there is some spirit (mana or hau) which leads the giving to return to 
the  original  giver,  often  through a  third  party.52  There  is  also  normally a  delay 
between the gift and the countergift.53
The obligation to repay the gift at least as well as it was given is very 
strong.  Failure to do so will lead to loss of face or social status, to social death. 54 
This obligation can become the engine of agonistic gift-exchange, where the purpose 
is to place the other party in a state of debt that they cannot repay.  The paradigmatic 
48  For instance, he notes that the Trobriand Islanders distinguish between the kula trade and “the 
straightforward exchange of useful goods known as the gimwali.”  It is not the objects as such that 
distinguish the two, but the manner of the giving and receiving: “It is said of the individual who 
does not behave in his kula with the proper magnanimity that he is conducting it ‘as a gimwali’.” 
Mauss, The Gift, 20.
49  There is a section entitled, “The Three Obligations: Giving, Receiving, Repaying,” Mauss, The 
Gift, 37-41.
50 Mauss, The Gift, 74-75.
51 Mauss, The Gift, 22, 62, 65.
52  Mauss, The Gift, 8-10.
53  Mauss, The Gift, 34.  A quick return is remarkable, ibid., 28.
54  Mauss, The Gift, 38-41, and p. 101, n. 119.
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case of this is the potlatch of the tribes of the Canadian Pacific coast, which can 
involve the destruction of large amounts of valuables in an attempt to outdo one's 
rivals.55
Mauss refers to “societies of total prestation” in which gift-exchange is 
not confined to a few areas of life, but where just about anything anybody has is 
actually a gift to them from someone else, a society in which each person is in debt 
to a wide range of other people, continually obliged to return countergifts, so that 
these have become the structuring principle of this society.56  Light is shed on this 
process  by  the  observation  of  Alain  Caillé  that  gifts  ought  to  be  considered  as 
symbols, and equally symbols ought to be envisaged as gifts.57
4.3.2 Gifts and symbols
Caillé holds that Mauss went beyond Émile Durkheim with his social 
facts and the idea that society cannot exist without symbols.  For Mauss did not hold 
that  symbols  represent  the pre-existing structures  of  society,  as  though the social 
structures  and  their  representations  were  two  distinct  levels  of  reality  (with  the 
former tacitly assumed to be more real), but rather that “social facts are intrinsically 
symbolic.”58  This parallels Mauss' innovation of the  total social fact: nothing in a 
society, even something purely natural, exists without being in relation to all the rest 
of the society, and that relation is mediated by symbols.59  Without symbols we can 
neither share nor communicate (communier et communiquer), and the two are just 
55  Mauss, The Gift, 33-37
56  Mauss, The Gift, 6-8, 45.
57 Caillé, Anthropologie du don, 184.
58  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 193 citing Camille Tarot, “De fait total de Durkheim au fait total 
social de Mauss: un changement de paradigme?”, La Revue du MAUSS semestrielle no 8 (1996), 2e 
semestre, p. 71.  My translation.
59 Caillé, Anthropologie du don, 193-194.
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about the same.60  The symbols that connect the objects within society to people are 
arbitrary,  but they are universally accepted (in that society) and so have a certain 
objectivity.  “Durkheim and we believe that we have proved that there is no symbol 
except if there is communion, and that the fact of communion creates a link which 
can give the illusion of the real, but which is already of the real.”61  Caillé interprets 
this to mean that there is no symbol except of something that is given and shared, and 
approvingly cites Camille Tarot:  “The Maussian symbol of the symbol is not the 
word or the phoneme; it  is  the gift.   And the Maussian gift  can certainly not be 
reduced to the  pure  and sterilised  exchange,  disincarnated  and transcendental,  of 
Lévi-Straussian structuralism.”62  The gift here is envisaged as primitive money, like 
the types used for bridewealth or  wergeld, which were not universal currency, but 
each  type  was  suitable  only  for  certain  specific  transactions,  transactions  which 
occupied “a semantic space marked out by the opposition between life and death, 
between alliance and conflict.”63  Our modern abstracted and universalised currency 
and the transactions it  enables ultimately find their  basis  in these more primitive 
exchanges; there has arisen a world of autoreferential signs (that refer to each other) 
rather  than  heteroreferential  symbols  (that  refer  to  things).64  Caillé  distinguishes 
between  gifts  that  create  or  renew  an  alliance,  the  gifts  of  institution  (dons 
d'institution) and gifts that are exchanged within an existing alliance (dons institués), 
the former being more  fully symbols  than the latter.65  Symbols  always  have an 
60 Caillé, Anthropologie du don, 193.
61  Marcel Mauss, “Catégories collectives et catégories pures” in Œuvres vol. II (Paris: Minuit, 
1969), 151.
62   Caille, Anthropologie du don, 196, citing Camille Tarot, «De fait total de Durkheim au fait total 
social de Mauss: un changement de paradigme?», La Revue du MAUSS semestrielle no 8 (1996), 2e 
semestre, p. 86.  My translation.
63  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 197; Helen Codere, “Money-Exchange Systems and a Theory of 
Money,” Man (New series) 3.4 (December 1968): 565.
64  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 197-199.
65  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 200.  I shall often use the French alliance, which can also mean a 
covenant.
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arbitrariness,  because they are based on alliances made by the human will,  made 
through a gift which is gift precisely because it did not need to be given, and on this 
basis rests all friendship, subjectivity and culture.  “The symbol is to the sign as the 
link  is  to  the  good  [exchanged]  (le  lien  au  bien),  the  alliance  to  separation, 
subjectivity  to  objectivity  and  arbitrariness  overcome  (l'arbitraire  surmonté)  to 
necessity.”66  There is a constant pressure to find freedom by detaching the symbols 
from the specific interpersonal relations on which they rest, which can be linked to 
the quest for modernity;67 and even though Caillé thinks that religious symbols have 
in a certain way always been set free, still, he holds, these are deployed in a space 
that  is  woven  through  and  through  with  symbolic  relations  between  people.68 
Symbols, referring to something that is given, have a sense in a way that signs do 
not: signs are capable only of being subject to calculation and manipulation.  Lévi-
Straussian and Lacanian analysis of symbols, in trying to reduce their operations to 
calculated exchange, is in danger of reducing symbols to signs and losing all sense.69
This  analysis  of symbols,  however,  should not  be read as a  reductive 
sociologism: the meanings we construct and then reconstruct within the space the 
symbols  provide  (communally  or  privately)  is  not  a  pure  construct  (except  that 
psychopathologies verge in that direction), for the symbols are based on relations 
between concrete persons, mediated by concrete things.70  Similarly,  although the 
symbolic  world  sets  the  stage  and  gives  us  roles  to  play,  this  is  not  symbolic 
interactionism  or  Parsonian  functionalism.   The  roles  are  not  so  rigidly 
predetermined, but rather there is some “play” in the “play”, precisely because the 
66  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 201.  My translation.
67  Robert A Nisbet, The Quest for Community: a study in the ethics of order and freedom (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 104 et seqq.
68  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 202.
69  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 209-210.
70  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 210-213.
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giving of the initial gift is always a gamble and hence a game.71
These links and alliances build up society, which Mauss defines as, “a 
group of people permanent enough and large enough to gather a sufficiently large 
number  of  sub-groups and living  generations   -   ordinarily  -   on a  determined 
territory, . . . around a (generally) independent and always determined constitution.” 
Caillé notes the echoes of Aristotle, and we could also say Aquinas.72  Elsewhere 
Mauss insists that only the invisible links established by gifts can allow a society 
based on caritas, rather than on fear, which can only make weak links: this is also a 
characteristic Thomistic theme.73
4.3.3 Gifts and Warre
“We marry the people we fight,” as the Enga tribesmen would say to 
Mervyn Meggitt.74  Bearing  in  mind that  an Enga marriage  is  a  very significant 
occasion of gift exchange (the bride herself, pigs, and these days even some western 
consumer goods), this classic quote from the annals of anthropology should warn us 
against  romanticising  “archaic”  societies  based  on  gift-exchange.   Violence  was 
exchanged as well, and is repeatedly present in the background in Mauss' Essai.75
71  Caille, Anthropologie du don, 213-215.  This is an attempt to translate the “play” on words in the 
French: “le monde symbolique est un monde où l'on joue les rôles  -  all the world is a stage, 
assurément  -  mais il ajoutera que on ne peut les jouer que pour autant qu'on joue à les jouer.”
72  Mauss, Fragment d'une sociologie descriptive, in Œuvres, vol. III, p.307, cited by Caillé, 
Anthropologie du don, 217.  My translation.  Thomas cites Aristotle’s Politics I to the effect that 
only the civitas, which is composed of households, each composed of many people, is a perfect 
community, whose regulations are truly law. ST I-II.90.3 ad 3.
73  Caillé, Anthropologie du don, 217-218, citing “Appréciation sociologique du bolchevisme,” 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale 31 (1924), 107.
74 Mervyn J Meggitt, “Male-Female Relationships in the Highlands of Australian New Guinea” 
American Anthropologist New Series 66.4 (1963): 218.  The Enga, the largest of the Highland 
tribes of Papua New Guinea, still have something of a reputation marrying (polygamously) and  - 
despite the brief respite under the kiap during which Meggitt made his observations  -  for tribal 
fights.  See Douglas Young, Our Land is Green and Black: Conflict Resolution in Enga, Point 
Series no. 28 (Goroka: Melanesian Institute, 2004)).
75 Mauss is focussed on the gift, not on warfare, and one can gain a one-sided impression from his 
book. But the allusions to violence are there  -  see Mauss, The Gift, 3, 11, 31, 35, nn. 118 and 122 
(on pp. 101 and 102), 38 nn, 143 and 144 (on p. 105), 61, 77  -  and they become very explicit  in 
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If  gifts  and  violence  seem opposed  to  us,  we  should  remember  that 
opposites belong to the same genus.76  In this case it is the genus of things given 
gratis,  and  both  the  Latin  gratis and  the  Greek  δωρεάν  it  translates  can  mean 
“meaningless”  or  “pointless,”  and  today we  still  talk  of  gratuitous  violence  and 
gratuitous insults.77  A group or an individual can maintain or increase its honour by 
responding to the gratuitous (gift or violence) in its gratuity, although the relative 
priority of violence and gifts, and of gifts among themselves (e.g. women rather than 
non-human gifts) varies from society to society.78
Thus  we  can  see  the  limitations  of  Marshall  Sahlins'  comparison  of 
Mauss with Thomas Hobbes.  Both Mauss and Hobbes, argues Sahlins, are interested 
in the alternative which humanity devises against “Warre.”  Sahlins uses the archaic 
spelling favoured by Hobbes to remind us that what is meant is not an event but a 
form of social organization, one where the way that groups carried on dealings with 
each other  was  through  violence.79  That  the  overcoming of  Warre  was  a  major 
concern of Hobbes is well-known, as is his solution, the development of a state with 
a monopoly on violence; Sahlins also provides quotes from The Gift to show that this 
was the concern of Mauss, for instance, that he defines “total prestation” as those 
exchanges,  “undertaken in  seemingly voluntary guise .  .  .  but  in  essence strictly 
the concluding four pages, 79-81.
Milbank also holds that, in relation to Christian agape, “'local' gift-economy societies . . . 
should be regarded as possessing a merely 'advent' character,” and “The inherent violence of such 
a system reveals itself in the painful markings of tribal identity upon human bodies, and the 
ungovernable war between one symbolic system and another.”  “Can a Gift be Given?” 144, 145. 
But neither here nor in his later as yet unpublished essays on the gift does he directly link violence 
and gift-exchange.
76 E g., ST I.79.12 obj 2, ST I.100.1 cor, ST I-II.88.3 ad 1, II-II.4.3 arg 1, 
77   See Galatians 2:21 in the Greek and in the Vulgate.  Thomas, in commenting on this text, equates 
gratis with sine causa, frustra, superflue, in vacuum, (Ad Galatas, cap. 2, lect. 6 M112) and, at 
another place, as sine utilitate, (Ad Philippienses, cap. 3, lect., 3 M140)
78 Jamous, “From the death of men,” , 168, 171.
79 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, (London: Tavistock, 1974), 171-173.
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obligatory, on pain of public or private warfare.”80  In other words, gift exchange is 
the archaic attempt to achieve what the modern world attempts to achieve through 
the state.  There is some truth to this, in that we moderns constantly turn to the state,  
or a superstate,  to deal with violence,  whereas, in Enga Province it  is sometimes 
claimed that tribal fighting would ease if they could properly re-instate the tee.81  But 
the continued existence of violence in both the modern state (or between modern 
states) and in tribal society shows that the total elimination of violence was never the 
goal.82  It is the maintenance and enhancement of honour that matters, and in this 
game,  as  is  supremely  manifested  by  the  potlatch,  gift-exchange  is  simply  war 
carried on by other means.83  Like the gift, violence in such a society is a symbolic 
activity, normally about relative honour with regard to one's opponent, about settling 
scores so as to remain on top.84   Violence must be somehow restrained, not only to 
avoid one's own side being totally wiped out, but also to avoid the elimination of the 
enemy, the one in whose face one has honour.85
80 The Gift, 1966, p. 151, cited by Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 174.  (In the 1967 edition this is 
on p. 3)
81 The tee is a highly complex ritual of interwoven gift exchange between clans.  Its claimed power 
to solve tribal fights is reported byYoung, Our Land , 34-37, 141-142, 255.
82 William T Cavanaugh notes that Augustine had commented that the state looks for enemies to fight 
without in order to achieve unity and suppression of discord within.  (City of God 5.12 and 1.30) 
The modern state often manufactures an enemy within in order to justify its existence.  Torture 
and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 9-10; 32-33.
83 Cf Young, Our Land, 142.  
84   In tok pisin the term “tribal fight” has become “trabel pait”, a fight about a trabel (trouble) or 
grievance, reflecting the way the participants themselves perceive what is going on.  Young, Our 
Land, 47.  Moreover, the tally of the number killed on each side is the main measure of who is 
winning, although the relative status of those killed also matters.   Young, Our Land, 159.
85 Jamous, “From the death,” 171-173.  One is reminded of Hegel's example of the bondsman and the 
master.  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), para. 190-196, pp. 115-119.
Thus most social norms have no place for unlimited accumulation of power or wealth.  However, the 
unceasing striving after merit before the infinite God does make sense in the Christian tradition. 
This may be the key as to why, as Weber observes, when the Refomation detached this impulse 
(originally monastic, but increasingly secular as well) from merit by good works before God, the 
result was a culture of unremitting material work and productivity.  Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 
73-74.
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4.3.4 What Mauss brings to light in Thomas
The lengthy discussion of Maussian gift-exchange was necessary for two 
reasons.  First of all, it helps to place what Thomas has to say on gratitude and the 
gift in the wider academic discussion of the topic.  Secondly, as pre-moderns Thomas 
and  his  intended  readership  understood  the  gift  more  in  Maussian  terms  than 
contemporary westerners do.  Thomas could presume things from his 13th century 
readers that cannot be presumed from 21st century ones, and a study of Mauss can 
help to identify some of those presumptions.  I shall look at two aspects of Maussian 
thought  relevant  to  our  study,  the  relationships  between  gifts  and  symbols  and 
between gifts and violence,  before taking up the question of what the benefactor 
causes in the  beneficiary, which will give the opportunity to consider the link Mauss 
sees between gifts, relationships and social status.
4.3.4.1 The need to interpret gifts
This  parallel  between  gifts  and  symbols  recalls  the  parallel  we  saw 
earlier between words and sacraments, and it gives insight into literal and spiritual 
interpretations. 
We can begin  by noting  that  symbols  and gifts  both  work  through a 
certain arbitrariness: what makes a gift a gift (especially a don d’institution) is that it 
does not have to be given; and symbols have of their nature a certain arbitrariness to 
function, as Thomas notes.86  The arbitrariness of the symbol is not quite as total as 
that of the linguistic sign, as Ferdinand de Saussure notes, and so Thomas is right to 
consider  the  convenientia of  (sacramental)  symbols.87  As  symbols,  gifts  require 
86 III.60.5 ad 1
87 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, tr. Wade Buskin (London: Peter Owen, 
1960), 67-70; ST III.66.3, 5; 72.2, 4; 74.1, 3-6; 78.2-3.
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interpretation, and the interpretation is both given and open.  Thomas holds that we 
need to interpret the gift to see the spirit of the gift behind it, and it is in accordance 
with this interpretation that we either treat the object as merely an object, and repay 
equally, or treat it as a gift and repay in excess  -  in other words, the interpretation 
lets  the gift  open into an unending cycle,  and each additional gift  has something 
arbitrary, gratuitous or ludic about it.88  There is a literal sense, and if we stay with 
the literal sense we are stuck at the level of commercial exchange, where a specific 
return is demanded by strict justice.  But if we can perceive the spiritual sense, the 
return takes on an element of play or of grace.  Nature is determined to one thing,  
says Thomas, but  gratia opens on to the infinite.89
4.3.4.2 History and the splitting of gratia and vindicta
The existence of a strong state is probably the major difference between 
the society that fostered the thought of Seneca (directly) and Thomas (perhaps partly 
by legacy).  Thomas is aware of the difference between his thought-world and that of 
archaic societies, and he refers to various aspects of the difference when reflecting 
upon the historical development of social structures and its theological significance.
Immediately after the fall there was no need of law, as the knowledge of 
the natural law through reason had not yet been darkened by the “custom of sin,” and 
the social organization was still basically domestic.  Written law comes on the scene 
with the formation of the larger social unit,  the  populus,  and implicit  in it  is the 
recognition that some external help is needed both for the good to be instructed and 
helped to attain what they aim for, and for the wicked to be restrained and “tamed.” 
88 ST II-II.106.5 ad 3.
89 According to the Index Thomisticus, “Natura determinatur ad unum” or its equivalent is found at 
least 30 times in Thomas' works, e.g. ST I.41.6 cor.
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God revealed a law to the chosen people, whose ceremonial precepts in a special way 
prepared for the coming Messiah, but whose moral precepts not only showed the way 
but also pointed out the weakness of human reason obscured by sin.90  But as the 
moral precepts were in keeping with the natural law, they could be discovered by 
other  peoples  as  well,  although  not  with  the  same  clarity  as  among  the  Jews.91 
Thomas  notes  that  among  the  pagans  the  pre-eminent  development  of  law  was 
achieved by the Romans, although this was waiting “to be taken captive and rendered 
obedient to Christ.”92
Essential to a law is that it restricts the right to violence, and especially 
the right to kill and hence to wage war, to the state.93  Both Seneca and Thomas are 
working in a strong state, and one in which there is at least a degree of specialisation 
in that not all engage in military activity, in a way that differs even from Aristotle.94 
This results in a marked asymmetry with regard to the two virtues associated with 
repaying our peers  -  gratia (to respond to the good one receives) and vindicta (to 
respond to evil).95  The strong state has separated the virtue of commutative justice 
according to which a magistrate must arbitrate, and the virtue of vindicta according 
to which a private person responds to evil, thus allowing gratia (where the division 
between legal and moral debt lies along different lines) to eclipse vindicta.96
And this is the point where Thomas can take gratia “captive and render it 
90 ST I-II.98.6.
91 ST I-II.94.5 ad 1, I-II.95.1-2, I-II.98.5 cor.
92 Super Ioannem 19.4 (M2422), citing 2 Cor 10:5.
93 ST I-II.92.2 ad 3, II-II.40.1 cor, ad 1, II-II.64.3 cor, ad 3, 64.5 cor, ad 2, 65.1 cor, 2 cor, ad 3.
94 Thus Aristotle makes the courage in war of the citizen (not of the mercenary) the first virtue 
(Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116b 5-24).  Thomas treats the cardinal virtues of prudence and justice 
before fortitude, and retains Aristotle's focus on war only by an extraordinary extension of the 
meaning of the word. ST II-II.123.5 cor.  We might recall Jordan's remarks about Thomas' 
subversion of Aristotelian ethics at 1.1.3.
95  ST II-II.80 unicus cor; II-II.106 and 108.
96  ST III.108.2 ad 1.  For Seneca, it is folly to try to make gratitude legally enforceable. De 
Beneficiis 3.6-17.
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obedient to Christ.”97  Thomas' faith leads him to a marked asymmetry between evil 
and good: evil is not something positive, but the privation of the good, and we should 
pay more attention to good than to evil.98  For Thomas, neither a truly charitable act 
nor an evil act is circumscribed by reason, but differently in each case: the evil act is 
not reasonable by way of defect; the charitable act, insofar as it is prompted by the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit,  is not reasonable by way of superabundance.99  Thus the 
spiral of gratitude should escalate indefinitely, but the cycle of evil should be brought 
to an end, and punishment should be adapted or even omitted if it will bring greater 
evil.100  The purpose of punishment is, after all, to bring what is defective back into a 
reasonable and even a charitable order.
Although  the  difference  between  gratia and  vindicta has  been 
established, we need to remember their common roots, for this commonality enables 
the switch from a cycle of punishment and fear  to a  cycle of gratitude and love 
through the process of satisfaction, as we shall see below.  A fuller understanding of 
satisfaction  will  arise  when  we  have  investigated  the  connection  between  gifts, 
honour and glory, which will come as we try to understand the spirit of the gift.
1.1 What the benefactor causes in the beneficiary
We are now in a position to answer the question of what the benefactor 
causes in the beneficiary.  The answer is complex, and I want to consider it under 
three aspects: debt, gratuity and status.
97 It was conveniens that Christ, who came to be ruler of the world and bring peace, came at a time 
when the world was at peace and under one ruler.  ST III.35.8 ad 1.
98  ST II-II.106.3 ad 2.
99  For the gifts are a disposition to be moved by something higher than reason, ST I-II.69.1 cor.  One 
example Thomas gives of this is that the gift of piety may lead a ruler to spare from execution a 
criminal who has repented and had all his sins atoned for in baptism.  ST III.69.2 ad 3.
100  ST II-II.108.1 ad 5.
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4.4.1 Debt
We started looking at gratitude within the “scene of the debt,” and so at 
one level it is obvious that the benefactor causes debt.  The task is to see why this 
should be a positive thing,  for,  as Jacques Godbout  observes,  “Modern liberty is 
essentially the absence of debt.”101  Here Allard's observations on debt and identity 
are useful, and we shall take them up below.  Debt, of course, implies an imperative, 
and we have seen earlier that imperatives can be seen as oppressive when they seem 
to be imposed from without: even the letter of the New Law can kill.  And so we 
need some parallel to the gift of understanding.  Gifts are symbols, and they need to 
be read in a way that the imperative is the yearning to become what you are called to 
be, what the gift gives you the hope and desire to be.
4.4.2 Gratuity
The second thing I have called gratuity, which, of course, seems to the 
modern to be the opposite of debt.  One thing I have constantly been referring to has 
been the element of excess, of the unnecessary, the arbitrary, the non-rational, the 
gratuitous that is associated with gratia and its cognates.    Gratuity is something that 
is detected with the intellect, not with the senses; it is present in us as the known in 
the knower.  When what is offered grate is received grate, the recipient is becoming 
somehow non-rational and excessive in the very act of reception.  By the same token, 
101 Jacques T Godbout, Le Don, la Dette et l'Identité.  Homo donator vs homo œconomicus, 
(Montréal: Éd. de la Découvert-Éd. du Boréal, 2000), 47, cited by Allard, Que rendrai-je, 241.  As 
an example, despite her professedly postmodern approach, Robyn Horner cannot see anything 
positive in debt.  In response to John Milbank's suggestions in “Can a Gift be Given?” in 
Rethinking Metaphysics, ed. L Gregory Jones and Stephen E Fowl (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 119-
161, she complains: “But I still cannot believe in a God who obliges my belief, and similarly, a 
God who constantly places me in debt seems not particularly loving.” Rethinking God as Gift:  
Marion, Derrida and the Limits of Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 
17.
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to receive ingrate is to receive in a way that either completely ignores the gratuitous 
quality of the gift, or tries immediately to annul it, to bring it back to the old order, 
for instance, by seeking to repay the debt immediately.
The  difference  between  the  gratuity  of  evil  and the  gratuity  of  good 
makes for the difference between vindication and gratitude.  Vindication is the virtue, 
Thomas tells us, that completes the natural inclination (found even in animals) to get 
rid of harmful things, bringing the situation into line with right reason, “preserving 
due measure according to all the circumstances.”102  Evil is non-rational by way of 
defect, and it would be possible to allow oneself to be conquered by evil, that is, to  
slip into the pattern of gratuity in that negative sense.  This would be to respond 
simply by wishing evil on the evil-doer in return, seeking justification from his or her 
prior  action:  such  a  response,  warns  Thomas,  cannot  be  virtuous.103  The  only 
virtuous response to evil is one motivated by charity, that seeks somehow to fill the 
lack, and to make the disorder part of a greater order, either by just punishment from 
a legitimate authority, or even better by bringing the sinners to repentance, where 
their penance will satisfy for the disorders they have caused.104
On the other hand, any action motivated by love somehow exceeds the 
rational order, and to accept it as it is, in its excess, is somehow to know its excess.  
This would seem to be connected with Thomas' insistence that the gift of wisdom is a 
knowing beyond rational knowledge (even beyond rational reflection on the revealed 
articles of faith), which is knowledge by connaturality for the one who loves with 
charity, and is present in all who have gratia gratum faciens.105  And yet this excess, 
102 ST II-II.108.2 cor, ad 3.
103 ST II-II.108.1 cor.
104 ST II-II.108.1 cor and ad 1.
105 ST II-II.45.2 cor, 45.4 ad 1 and ad 2, 45.5 cor.
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which exceeds the rational order, is not experienced as disorder, but it establishes a 
new order, for it is the prerogative of the wise person to put things in order.106
Like the known in the knower, the benefactor is present in the beneficiary 
as  the  cause  of  the  beneficiary's  gratia.   The  change  that  takes  place  in  the 
beneficiary, insofar as it can be known to the beneficiary or to others, manifests and 
honours the goodness of the benefactor: to receive  grate is already to give thanks. 
And any further actions that the beneficiary does, presuming they are done in that 
gratia,  continue  to  honour  the  benefactor.   One  cannot  argue  according  to  strict 
justice that this will necessarily also involve a grateful repaying of the benefactor, 
acknowledging both the gift and, by a certain excess, the spirit of the gift  -  for the 
return transcends the order of rational necessity: the debt is moral, not legal  -  but we 
can observe that it does happen.
4.4.3 Social bonds
This  brings  us  to  the  third  thing  caused  in  the  beneficiary  by  the 
benefactor:  the  bond  or  alliance   -   we  have  already  seen  Caillé talk  of  dons 
d'institution that set up alliances.  Admittedly, we have to look elsewhere in Thomas 
for specific references to the social bonds created by gifts;107 nonetheless, this would 
seem to be what he is referring to when he refers positively to such debt.108  But 
perhaps also it is covered by the term honestas: the practice of gratitude (and its more 
specific  forms:  observance,  piety and religion)  is  necessary to  maintain  honestas 
morum.
106 E.g., ST II-II.45.6 cor, with reference to the beginning of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
107 Thomas mentions the bonds between families created by marriages, and the civic bonds created by 
public feasts. De Regno 1.4, Sententia libri Politicorum, 2.14.9, ST II-II.63.2 ad 2.
108 Thomas gives charity as the reason why this debt should not be avoided, but charity, of course, is 
the bond that holds the building together (ST II-II.4.7 ad 4, cf Col 3:14), the “unitive force” that 
causes peace (ST II-II.29.3 ad 3).
140
Because the debt is moral, not legal, the reward and sanction is not some 
material  good  or  some  legal  punishment,  but  honour  or  the  loss  of  honour. 
Observing the moral debt of gratitude (or, a fortiori, of observance, piety or religion) 
is necessary for honestas morum.  Thus the third thing the benefactor causes in the 
beneficiary is the introduction into a circle where people are showing each other 
honour, recognising not merely each other's existence, but each other's excellence. 
And while Thomas has a hierarchical view of excellence, it is not, at least within the 
human sphere, a totalising view.  It is possible for an inferior to excel secundum quid 
over someone who is superior simpliciter.  And even if one excels and another excels 
even more,  the superior still  can and should show honour to the inferior for that 
excellence  with  respect  to  certain  others,  or  even  secundum  se:  on  the  basis  of 
Philippians  2:3,  Thomas  holds  that  we  can  always  find  something  superior  and 
worthy of honour in the other.109
Although this willingness to honour others is motivated by charity and 
serves charity,  for Thomas is discussing a Christian virtue, this honour is distinct 
from charity.  Nor is it a recognition of their moral goodness.110  Nor should it lead to 
discrimination in  matters  of  distributive justice or  in  judicial  matters.111  What  is 
being honoured is the place that the person rightly holds in the network of social 
relations.112  We see reflected here the concept of the person mentioned earlier by 
Allard,  “the  crossroads  of  adventitious  elements  through  which  there  is  the 
intersection of a name, a family, a city, a history.”113  The debts created by generation 
and child-rearing, by governance, or by gifts are the links that make up this network, 
109  ST II-II.103.1 cor, ad 3.
110 With regard to leaders and benefactors, see ST II-II.103.2 ad 2, 106.3 ad 5 respectively.
111  ST II-II.63.
112 ST II-II.63.3 cor.
113 Allard, Que rendrai-je, 52.
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and precisely the element of gratuity and excess in these links enables them to be 
symbolic  and  meaningful.   It  is  through  these  relations  that  one  has  “face”  or 
“respect,” that one is “a name and not a number.”
That  Thomas  owes so much to  Seneca  reminds us  that  this  Christian 
virtue has its pagan parallels, and that the idealised social order Thomas hints at has 
counterparts that are not motivated by charity.  Pitt-Rivers reminds us of the complex 
ways by which honour is established  -  “Honour is at the same time a sentiment, a 
guide to action, a quality demonstrated in action and finally the public recognition of 
that quality”  -  and that the ways of obtaining honour, and thus the content of the 
concept, vary across and within societies.114  What is more, he argues the analogy 
between honour on the one hand and power and authority on the other. 
For power is what is credited to people, force is what they demonstrate. 
Hence  power,  though  it  may  be  initiated  by  a  demonstration  of  force, 
always searches, in order to secure itself, to become legitimate, in which 
case it merges into authority.  Authority can dispense with force so long as 
it is not challenged. [. . .]  Authority is like honour in that it is a matter of  
credit and has recourse to force only when it is questioned.115
Which  brings  us  back  to  the  point  made  earlier,  that  gift-giving  and 
violence (or the threat of violence) are closely parallel and often intertwined ways by 
which social relations are established, maintained and modified.  And we are now in 
a position to assess the nature of the  hau that Mauss claims is associated with the 
gift, and also to look with much more insight at the process of satisfaction.
1.1.1 The modality of the cause: the spirit of the gift
Numerous objections have been raised against the way Mauss speaks of 
hau.  Claude Lévi-Strauss, who sees gift-exchange as no different in essence from 
114  Julian Pitt-Rivers, Mana: An Inaugural Lecture (London: The London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1974), 8.
115 Pitt-Rivers, Mana, 16-17.
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commerce,  claims  that  Mauss  has  adopted  the  indigenous  explanation  without 
analysing what was behind it: just as buying and selling are one reality, so are giving 
and receiving,  and  hau refers to no reality but plays  the rôle  of the grammatical 
copula.116  Marshall Sahlins, an economist, puts the hau narrative that Mauss uses in 
a  wider  context,  and then proves  that  hau is  not  the  soul;  after  which,  although 
realising  the  incongruity of  the  expression,  he  reduces  hau to  commercial  yield, 
seeing no inner necessity but only the threat of sanction in its motivating power.117 
Maurice Godelier corrects some of Sahlins' misinterpretations and connects  hau to 
the fact that the gift never ceases to be the property of the giver; he finds fault with 
the way that Mauss seems to speak of the hau of the gift as well as of the giver.118
There is some consensus on Godelier's basic point. In the pre-modern 
world, unlike objects sold or bartered, gifts do not (or at least do not necessarily) 
cease to belong to the giver, a position Thomas also holds.119  Thus Mauss can say 
that “one gives away what is in reality a part of one's nature and one's substance, 
while to receive something is to receive a part of someone's spiritual essence.”120 
The “spiritual essence” is not a ghost or the presence of the soul travelling outside 
the body (Sahlins is right, but Mauss never claimed this), but it is, first of all, that 
quality of excess and arbitrariness that makes the object in question a gift.  Even if 
the gift is not motivated by charity, this excess places the gift in a different order 
from market exchange, contra Lévi-Strauss.  The order is a social construct, but for 
116 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Introduction” in Marcel Mauss, Œuvres, ed. Viktor Karády, vol. III (Paris: 
Éditions de Minuit, 1973), xxxix-xl
117 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 149-168.
118 Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, tr. Nora Scott (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 48, 52-
55.
119  ST I.38.1 cor, where a gift is something the recipient can uti et frui.  Nonetheless the gift remains 
“of” the giver through its origin.  Before being given, the gift “is of the giver alone” (est tantum 
dantis); afterwards, “it is [also] of the one to whom it is given.”  ST I.38.2 ad 3.
120 The Gift, 10.
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those who operate within the understanding that recognises that construct, the gift 
really belongs in that order, as Mauss notes.121  The gift can only be assimilated by 
the recipient if the recipient begins or continues to act within the logic of that order. 
Moreover, to give the gift is an act of recognition, and recognition is of its essence 
mutual.  If the gift is given and received grate (as gratus would be understood in that 
society),  then the impulse to somehow return the gift  (in a culturally appropriate 
way)  will  also  be  present.   Moreover,  the  excess  is  the  action  of  a  particular 
individual or moral person and it always retains that personal quality: the recipient is 
moved to generosity in a way that somehow bears the stamp of the giver.  Even if the 
gift-object is handed on to a third party, the impulse to make an act of return to the 
original giver at the appropriate time remains.122  And, as we have said, the bond 
created also confers some social standing.  It is not surprising that the Maori think of 
this impulse in terms of a word that can also mean excess, fertility and prestige (but 
not economic return).
As long as  the  object  remains,  it  bears  witness  to  the original  act  of 
generosity.123  In this light, Mauss declares that the gift is not inert, but it continues to 
exercise its power; indeed he notes that the gift-object may be personified, and later 
he gives some examples from the tribes of the Pacific coast of North America .124  The 
personification is an aid to understanding, and it may help us to enter the minds of 
the  actors  in  that  society,  but  the  phenomena can  still  be  accounted  for  without 
making the gift-object into a person in the modern western sense.  It is still the hau of 
the giver in the gift, although we can see how one can talk of the object as the hau, or 
121  See remarks on the “illusion of the real” at 4.3.2.
122  Tamati Ranapiri takes this for granted in his celebrated explanation of hau.  Mauss, The Gift, 8-9.
123  In fact, Seneca counsels giving a permanent object that will be seen by recipient to increase one's 
likelihood of receiving a countergift.  “Ipsa res evanescentem memoriam excitet.”  Seneca De 
Beneficiis 1.12.1.
124  The Gift, 10, 43-44.
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the return gift.  After all, are not the favour of the giver, the gift object, and the return 
of thanks all termed gratia?
In  these  anthropological  examples,  the  exchange  takes  place  in  a 
background of fear.  Each actor is trying to establish his own honour for the sake of 
personal safety, and each is wary lest his own status should slip: as Pitt-Rivers points 
out, it is honourable to submit to one higher in honour, but not to one who is lower.125 
It is not surprising, then, that a failure to listen to the hau and to show honour to the 
giver,  which risk reducing his status, might be met  with sanctions of violence or 
sorcery, and that fear of these sanctions may be a motive for returning the gift.  As 
Thomas  makes  clear  in  a  parallel  case,  the  violent  sanctions  are  for  that  small 
minority who will not listen to reason and who threaten the whole social order  - 
although in time some of them, following the law from fear, may come to appreciate 
its wisdom: good people obey the law because it is reasonable, not through fear of 
punishment;126 similarly,  honourable  people  return  gifts  because  that  is  the 
honourable thing to do.
4.5 Satisfaction revisited
This brings us to the topic of satisfaction.  Gisbert Greshake argues that 
Germanic  feudal  society  supplies  the  social  background  necessary  to  understand 
Anselm's theory of satisfaction.  In such a society, as honor implied social standing, 
to damage someone's honour, to cause offence, was to weaken their social status; and 
the more crucial that  person's  status was to the whole interconnected network of 
status that held society together, the more that the offence damaged not merely a 
125 Pitt-Rivers, Mana, 17.
126  ST I-II.90.1 cor.
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private good but the common good: the higher the person's rank, the more serious the 
offence.127
The  offence,  which  upset  the  order,  could  be  counteracted  by  a 
punishment,  which  did  not  simply  balance  the  material  wrong  done,  but  re-
established the honour that was lost and so the social order.  And, as we have seen, 
punishment, particularly in a society without a central state  -  in which perhaps the 
Melanesian  term  “payback”  seems  to  me  more  appropriate   -   can  lead  to  an 
escalation  of  violence.   Thus  it  is  easy  to  see  the  attraction  of  satisfaction  or 
compensation,  in  which  the  offending  side  voluntarily  makes  a  gift  which  re-
establishes the honour of the wronged party.  And indeed, the wronged party may 
initiate a demand for compensation first, rather than immediately seeking payback.128
Gisbert Greshake rightly points out that this is the social background to 
Anselm's teaching on satisfaction.129  More so than any king, it is God whose honour 
is  the  source  of  peace  and  stability.    God  seeks  to  have  his  honour  restored, 
therefore, not for his own sake (as Anselm insists) but for ours.130  And as we should 
be prepared to let the whole universe go to ruin rather than sin, God's honour is so 
127 Gisbert Greshake, “Erlösung und Freiheit: Zur neuinterpretation der Erlösunglehre Anselms von 
Canterbury,” Theologische Quartalschrift 153 (1973): 331.
128 Greshake, “Erlösung,” 332-333.  Jean-Pierre Torrell OP sees a similar background in Roman law. 
However, he focuses on the will to restore friendship so that the question of the loss of honour  - 
with all its attendant dangers  -  is totally eclipsed.  Le Christ en ses mystères: la vie et l'æuvre de  
Jésus selon saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Desclée, 1999), 2:400.  This approach could be balanced 
by the description of satisfaction in a much more violent society, where there is a real tension 
between the fear of losing honour and the fear of the continuation or escalation of violence.  See, 
for instance,  Jamous, “From the death,” 181
129  But not everyone agrees, partly because, as Guy Mansini points out, most people who look to 
Germanic society as Anselm's inspiration for satisfaction seem to do so in order to reject the notion 
as alien to Christianity.  Thus Mansini then goes on to argue, not only that the notion belongs to 
the Church, but that it “can be located quite specifically in Benedictine monastic theory and 
practice.” “St. Anselm, Satisfactio, and the 'Rule' of St. Benedict,” Revue Bénédictine 97 (1987): 
102n 9, 103.  However, all he can prove is that satisfaction is found even there.  Our argument is 
that satisfaction is a fairly standard feature of any society in which honour and gift-exchange are 
prominent: it is only where these languish, as in the modern west, that satisfaction becomes a 
scandal.  Besides, whatever its origin for Anselm, Thomas clearly has secular satisfaction in mind 
as is clear from the examples he uses, e.g. De Rationibus Fidei 7, Summa Contra Gentiles 4.55.25.
130 Greshake, “Erlösung,” 333-334.
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great that an offence against God is of infinite magnitude.131
In particular, Greshake claims for the king to forgive an offence without 
satisfaction being made is a dereliction of duty, for it weakens the fabric of society. 
Anselm, he claims, is right therefore to hold that it is not possible for God to forgive 
sin without satisfaction.  That Thomas is prepared to countenance that possibility, 
says Greshake, is evidence that the feudal structure had already weakened so that the 
king could be considered as a private person.132
It is more reasonable to say that here Thomas thinks, once again, that 
Anselm has proved too much.133  God is a prisoner of no system and is “debtor” only 
to himself.  There are always other possibilities open to God, and so God could have 
forgiven our offence without satisfaction.134  The initiative is on the side of God who 
genuinely seeks reconciliation, and the means chosen is one fit for the need.  In the 
merely human sphere, the possibility of true satisfaction depends on the system of 
honour, so that the desire for peace and maintenance of honour can be in conflict; 
particularly where the restoration of honour can only be congruous and not condign 
(for what is commensurate with a human life?), satisfaction will always be ultimately 
unsatisfying.135   But we shall explore this more after we have dealt with sanctifying 
grace and salvation.
131 Greshake, “Erlösung,” 336.
132 Greshake, “Erlösung,” 335.
133 Just as Thomas argues against the validity of the “ontological argument” (ST I.2.1 ad 2) and any 
proof of the Trinity from reason (ST I.32.1 cor).
134 ST III.46.2 ad 3.
135 Jamous, “From the death,” 182-183.  Interestingly, in this case an attempt is made to ground the 
value of the 'ar (the sheep killed in the place of the offender) in the ram that Abraham offers in 
place of his son.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GRACE
For Thomas the goal of human life is beatitude and, until we reach it, the 
only  thing  that  gives  purpose  to  our  actions,  and  thus  makes  them truly  human 
actions (truly actions of an image of God), is that they might contribute to earning 
beatitude.  Not only does Thomas begin Prima Secundae with five questions on the 
quest for beatitude, but he ends it with the question on merit.  Thus this theme of 
merit, and therefore of exchange, frames the work:1 all human action is to be seen as 
part of an exchange with God.  Therefore, when grace enters the discussion in the 
last  tract  of  Prima Secundae,  it  is  not  to  replace  human endeavour  or  to  render 
exchange  obsolete,  but  rather  to  transform  these  things  so  that  they  can  earn 
beatitude.  Thomas made it clear from the beginning that beatitude had to be earned 
as it was not the result of our own natural operations; as he works through the types 
of human actions (acts of the will and acts of the irrational appetites (passions)), the 
interior principles of human actions (virtues, and by defect, vices and sin) and the 
exterior principles (law) he is constantly showing this inadequacy:2 acquired virtues 
need to be perfected by the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit; in fallen 
humanity the natural law needs to be supplemented by divine law, but the Old Law 
serves  to  show the  inadequacy of  any law unless  it  also  bestows  grace.   Grace 
therefore  comes  as  the  fulfilment  of  all  the  other  (positive)  principles  of  human 
action, not as their replacement.3
1 Cf Ghislain Lafont OSB, Structures et méthode dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas 
d'Aquin (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 257.
2 Lafont also points out that sin, law and grace indicate a biblical and historical development, 
especially given the way that Thomas goes from orginal sin and natural law, through the Old Law, 
to the New Law of grace: Structures, 261.
3 Cf note earlier about taking the qq. 90-108 as a self-sufficient “treatise on law.” (Note 132 in 
3.4.3).  Thus Joseph Wawrykow considers tenable Cornelius Ernst's view that the tract on grace 
begins with the discussion of the New Law in q.106, although Wawrykow himself starts at q.109. 
“Grace” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, 
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In composing Prima Secundae, therefore, Thomas is immediately faced 
with two problems that confronted Mauss as well: how to show that the exchange 
that leads to beatitude is irreducible to commercial exchange; and how to talk of 
grace/hau as  something  that  comes  from  the  Giver/giver  bearing  something  of 
himself, so that we perform actions that return to and honour him, without being 
accused of mystification.  There is a third problem which Thomas alludes to here but 
which will emerge fully in  Tertia Pars: how can grace be borne and caused by a 
created nature, such as the humanity of Christ, and a fortiori a sacrament?
Thomas deals with these issues according to the scholastic categories and 
approaches available to him.  As grace is a sharing in the divine nature, he cannot 
begin with a definition of grace, and so, as he does with God at the beginning of the 
Summa, he deals with the effects of which grace is a cause in place of a definition;4 
thus this question (109) synthesizes all the earlier discussion about those things we 
need to do to reach beatitude but which lie beyond our power.5  The second question 
considers the essence of grace: as grace is a sharing in the divine nature, this is not 
directly  a  question  about  the  essence  of  divinity,  but  about  the  way our  soul  is 
transformed  when  it  participates  in  the  divine  nature.6  The  third  question, 
considering  the  divisions  of  grace,  pinpoints  from  among  all  the  traditional 
theological uses of “grace” which one is primary (gratia gratum faciens) and how the 
others are related, as well as then distinguishing habitual and actual, operating and 
co-operating grace.  Grace as a sharing in the divine nature is once again prominent 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 192.  Cf Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, vol. 30 The Gospel of Grace Ia IIae q. 106-114 , ed. Cornelius Ernst, (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1972)
4 ST I.1.7 ad 1 and I.2.2 ad 2; I-II.112.5 cor, pace Lafont, who claims that the standard scholastic 
analysis begins only with q. 110.  Structures, 255.
5 Lafont, Structures, 254.
6 This is more clearly argued at Scriptum 2.26.1.1 cor.
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in  the fourth  question on the  cause of  grace,  insisting  that  only God can be the 
principal cause, although instrumental causes can be used: this leads to a strongly 
Augustinian doctrine of predestination and the primacy of grace, and our inability to 
know for certain that we have it.  And in the fifth and sixth questions we have the 
effects of operating and co-operating grace: justification and merit respectively, and 
thus the tract culminates in showing how grace enables the exchanges that lead to 
beatitude.  I want to consider the tract on grace by asking how Thomas' position has 
developed since the Scriptum, and in particular how these developments help him to 
deal with the three problems mentioned above.
5.1 Developments in the doctrine on grace
5.1.1 Predestination and grace as gift
In 1944 Henri Bouillard first argued the case that there had been a major 
shift in Thomas' approach to justification.7  In the  Scriptum he accepts the general 
validity of the adage facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam (God does not 
deny grace to the one who does what is in his ability).8  However, through a careful 
reading of Augustine, particularly De Dono Perseverentiae and De Praedestinatione 
Sanctorum, he came to the conviction that to merit first grace would be contrary to 
the  very meaning of  grace as  a  free  gift,  and also to  grace  as  something totally 
beyond our  nature   -   and  a fortiori someone who is  not  in  grace  cannot  merit 
beatitude.9  One cannot even say that faith comes from us and merits grace, for the 
beginning of true faith is from God, and faith does not merit justication: rather, it is 
7 Henri Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Aubier, 1944), 102-114.
8 Scriptum 2.42.1.5 ad 7, 3.25.2.1.1.ad 2, 4.17.1.2, 4.20.1.1.1 cor.
9 ST I-II.114.5 cor, 114.2.
150
an integral part of the process of justification and one is not justified without it.10 
Nor can one “merit” first grace after the event by making good use of it.11  Further, it 
is by divine ordination alone that those in grace are able to merit, and even then they 
will fail to achieve beatitude unless God also grants the utterly unmeritable grace of 
perseverance.12  This is entirely in accord with Thomas' position that there is nothing 
in us that can go any way to explaining why God chooses one person rather than 
another: it lies entirely in the inscrutable will and good pleasure of God.13  There is 
no point looking for a reason in us: thus we can say that grace is gratuitous both as 
gift  and  as  lacking  reason.   This  starkly  Augustinian  approach  to  grace  and 
predestination  puts  Thomas  closer  to  Calvin  than  to  the  sympathies  of  some 
Thomists,  but it  is  part  and parcel of Thomas'  insistence that grace is  a gift  and 
indeed the utterly transcendent gift of a sharing in the divine nature.14
Stark this teaching may seem, but it serves to remove grace entirely from 
the domain of commercial exchange.  Commercial exchange takes place within the 
bounds of strict justice, mediated by a law, a dictate of right reason, before whom 
both parties are equal, and has nothing in common with the gift of grace.  As one 
illustration of this,  even when one in grace does merit  an increase of grace,  that 
increase is not owed to him immediately as in commerce, but, as in gift exchange, is 
given when God sees fit.15  More to the point, even the act of gaining by the recipient 
is  radically different:  true,  grace causes  in  the  soul  is  a  habitual  quality through 
10 ST I-II.114.5 ad 1.
11 ST I-II.114.5 ad 3.
12 ST I-II.114.1, 114.9.
13 ST I.23.5 cor., ad 3; cf Super Ioannem 6.5 (M938).
14 “On the beginning of justification there is no disagreement between us and the sounder 
Schoolmen.” John Calvin, cited in Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 97.  On the other hand, François 
Daguet finds Thomas' teaching on predestination disturbing, and argues that it goes against other 
currents in his theology, and that Thomas reluctantly accepted it out of deference to the authority 
of Augustine.  Théologie du dessein divin chez Thomas d'Aquin: Finis omnium Ecclesia (Paris: 
Vrin, 2003),  324-342, esp. 334, 340-341.
15 ST I-II.114.8 ad 3.
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which the possessor can uti and frui the Holy Spirit when she likes (thus satisfying 
another  of  Thomas'  definitions  of  the  gift),  but   -   in  contrast  to  commercial 
exchange, where the thing transferred is alienated from the original owner  -  grace 
entails a participation in the divine nature which never ceases to belong to God.16 
There is a difference here far more radical than anything Mauss could have talked 
about.   In most of the later points I shall  be looking at grace as “spirit,” but the 
achievement of this development in Thomas' position is to make this spirit the spirit 
of the gift.
5.1.2 The threefold meaning of gratia
5.1.2.1 From two meanings to three
This  focus  on  the  gratuity  of  grace  is  necessary  given  the  constant 
background presence of  exchange.   But  grace comes to  perfect  exchange,  not  to 
replace  it,  and  a second advance found in  the  Summa is  that  the gift  is  seen  as 
intrinsically in relation to exchange through Thomas' recapturing of the fulness of the 
original meaning of gratia.  We have already discussed at length gratia as favour, gift 
object and return of thanks, but it should be pointed out that this is an innovation for 
Thomas.  In his earlier works he only gives theological significance to two meanings 
of gratia and gratus: freely given and favour or acceptance.17  The threefold nature of 
grace is mentioned only once in the tract on grace, but without it the tract would stop 
at the question on justification, and our return acts of gratitude, although of great 
importance,  would be seen as  external  to  grace,  and thus unconnnected with the 
16 ST I.38.1 cor, ad 1; I-II.110.2 cor.  Unlike Mauss, Thomas states that ownership passes with the 
transfer of a material gift object, but, given their common understanding of the debt of gratitude, 
this probably arises from the difference between Thomas' concept of ownership and what it means 
for Mauss to say something belongs to someone.  Thomas is adamant that a spiritual good is not 
lost in the giving.  Contra Impugnantes 2.3 ad 19.
17 De Veritate 27.1 cor.
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bestowal of beatitude (as would seem to be the case for Calvin).18
But  there  is  a  further  corollary  to  this  development.   When  in  the 
Scriptum Thomas explains grace with reference to only two meanings of gratus, he 
does not base himself on the connection between the two, but for the one reality of 
the gift of grace he provides a separate argument for each of the meanings.19  In the 
Summa Thomas considers the meanings as related (so that the favour gives rise to the 
gift object, and the gift object to the thanks), but asks if there is something in the soul 
that corresponds to each of the three meanings; taking it as obvious that this is the 
case for the second and third meanings, he focuses on the first.20  This question, I 
contend,  can only be understood if  we anticipate what  Thomas will  say later  de 
gratia sive gratitudine, where he distinguishes clearly between the spirit of the gift 
(affectus or animus) and the gift object (effectus), giving clear priority to the former 
-   and  we  have  already  argued  that  it  is  through  the  spirit  of  the  gift  that  the 
benefactor causes something in the beneficiary.  Moreover, because Thomas is asking 
whether anything is posited in the soul, he is clearly talking here about grace and not 
about predestination, which posits nothing in the soul but is solely in the mind of 
God, and thus one can be in mortal sin but still be favoured (predestined) by God. 21 
Without that reference to what follows in Secunda Secundae the threefold meaning 
of gratia will be pointless.22  Nonetheless, the need for such a connection is clearly 
18 Calvin insisted that, at least with the “sounder Schoolmen” the dispute was not about justification, 
but about merit.  Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 98.
19 Scriptum 2.26.1.1.cor.  The same two meanings are mentioned at De Veritate 27.1 cor, but now he 
sees that favour implies the gift but not vice versa; thus it is possible to have gratia gratis data 
without gratia gratum faciens.
20 ST I-II.110.1 cor.
21 ST I.23.2, De Veritate 27.1 cor.  However, he does acknowledge that, loosely speaking, sometimes 
predestination is referred to as a grace.  ST I-II.110.1 cor.
22 One who does note the connection in the works of Thomas is Vivian Boland, “An Education in 
Gratitude,” Religious Life Review Vol. 51, No. 275 (July/August 2012): 221-222.
Garrigou-Lagrange, who deserves credit for actually paying close attention to this 
threefold meaning, fails to refer to the difference between the gift and the spirit of the gift and is 
thus wrong on two points: he identifies the first meaning (favour) with predestination, and the 
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seen by commentators: as Ghislain Lafont observes with regard to the overall treatise 
on grace, by connecting grace both with something that comes from God that makes 
us like God, and with the principle that results in acts of gratitude by which we return 
to God, Thomas has a view of grace that covers both of the divine aspects of human 
action that are considered in Prima Secundae: God as the exemplar, and God as the 
final goal.23
Thomas is careful here to point out that, unlike human love, divine love 
makes the loved one good, so that the divine favour makes us pleasing (gratus) to 
God.24  There has been a slight shift in the emphasis here: in earlier works, it was on 
grace as something created.25  However, by the time of the Summa Thomas held that 
any benefactor causes something in the beneficiary; the difference is that human love 
“does not totally cause the goodness of a thing, but presupposes it in part or in toto,” 
but God's love is utterly gratuitous, taking us into a new economy where we can 
perform meritorious acts26.  It is God who is the efficient cause of that change, and 
the grace in our souls (whatever it is) is the formal cause.27  Thus it may be possible 
to receive the gift object ungraciously and ungratefully (as we shall see in the case of  
fiction); and it is also possible, by anticipation, be filled with gratia in anticipation of 
second (the gift object) with the habitual quality in the soul.   Grace, 3-4, 114.
Thomas de Vio Cajetan does not note the linking of favour, object and gratitude when 
considering this article in his Commentaria, (published as a running commentary in the Leonine 
Edition of the Summa Theologiae).  Not is it found in the following 20th century annotated editions 
of the tract on grace: Thomas Aquinas, Somme Théologique: La Grace 1a-2ae Questions 109-114, 
Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, tr. R. Mulard OP (Paris: Desclée, 1929); Somme Théologique: La 
Grace 1a-2ae Questions 109-114, Éditions du Cerf, tr. Ch. V. Hêris OP (Paris: Desclée, 1961); 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 30 The Gospel of Grace Ia IIae q. 106-114 ed. 
Cornelius Ernst (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1972), nor in some more recent discussions of 
Thomas on grace, such as Wawrykow,“Grace,” or Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
23 Lafont, Structures, 259-260.
24 ST I-II.110.1 cor, ad 1.
25 Scriptum 2.26.1.1 cor, De Veritate 27.1 cor.  The ad 1 in the Scriptum article hints at the possibility 
of acceptance causing something in the favoured one, but this hint is absent in the corresponding 
ad 2 of the De Veritate article.
26 ST I-II.110.1 cor, cf II-II.106.3 cor.
27 ST I-II.110.1 ad 2, 110.2 ad 1.
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a gift  object  yet  to  be received;28 but  it  is  not  possible  to  possess  gratia and be 
ingratus.
5.1.2.2 Corroboration from the biblical commentaries
Many  passages  in  the  scripture  commentaries  imply  that  to  become 
gratus means to become grateful as well as acceptable.29
For instance, in his commentary on Galatians 2:21 Thomas says.
Therefore  he  says,  because  I  have  received  so  much  from God, 
because he handed himself over, and I live in the faith of the Son of 
God, “I do not throw away gratiam Dei,” that is, I do not repudiate 
it, nor do I present myself as ingratum.  (1 Cor 15:10 “Gratia Dei in 
me was not empty,” etc.)  Whence another reading has “Non sum 
ingratus  gratiae  Dei.” (Heb 12:15:  “Being careful  lest  anyone be 
lacking  to  the  gratia  Dei,”),  that  is,  declaring  himself  unworthy 
through ingratitude.30
Thomas  holds  that  to  give  thanks  is  to  acknowledge  the  favour, 
recognoscere gratiam sibi factam.31  However, given that we can only know like by 
like, and given that its essence is ineffable, it is the very grace that we are given that 
enables us to perceive it.  Thus Thomas gives the mystical explanation of “Come and 
see.”  “[F]or the dwelling (habitatio) of God, either of grace or of glory, cannot be 
known except through experience, for it cannot be explained in words.  (Rev 2:17 
“on a stone a new name,” etc.)”32  Logically,  therefore, there can be no gratitude 
without grace, and in line with this, when commenting on the thanksgiving at the 
beginning of 1 Corinthians,  Thomas notes that thanksgiving to God is  done “per 
gratiam Dei.”33  We get the whole argument presented in a different form later in the 
28 Raymond Hain, The Virtue of Gratitude according to St. Thomas Aquinas, (PhD diss., Pontificium 
Institutum Angelicum, 1953), 186, with reference to ST II-II.88.5 ad 2.
29 I am grateful for a conversation with Richard Conrad OP in which he gave me the idea that gratum 
faciens could also mean “making grateful.”
30 Super Galatas cap. 2, lect. 6 (M111).
31 Super Philippenses, cap. 1, lect. 1 (M9).
32 Super Ioannem cap. 1, lect. 15 (M292)
33  Super 1 Corinthios, cap. 1 lect. 1 (M12-15)
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same commentary: noting that Paul does not want his addressees to be ignorant of 
spiritual things, which Thomas takes to be spirituales gratias (both gratis datae and 
gratum facientes), he cites Seneca that ignorance of benefits is ingratitude, and then 
immediately points out that God acts to prevent this ingratitude: “As it says above, 
2:12, We have received spiritum which is from God, so that we may know the things  
that have been given to us by God.”34  This double connection, that not only should 
gratia (favour) be acknowledged by gratia (thanks), but also that it is through the 
very  favour  granted  that  we  are  enabled  to  make  the  return  can  be  seen  in  his 
comments on the thanksgiving at the beginning of Romans.  After remarking on the 
naturalness and necessity of gratitude (citing Ecclesiastes about rivers, as he did in 
the dedication to the Catena), he notes “Thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) should flow 
back to God in the same ordo as graces (gratiae) from God come down to us, that is, 
through Jesus Christ.”35
Looking at  it  another  way,  the “spirit”  of the gift  cannot  be received 
except insofar as it produces something similar to what sent it.  The spiritum filii that 
regenerates us as children of God acts like human seed, as Thomas says explicitly 
elsewhere.36  Thus the spirit of the gift has the hau-like qualities of seeking return, of 
honouring its source, and of fertility.  But we now need to consider its ontological 
status.
34 Super I Corinthios, cap. 12, lect. 1 (M710).
35   Super Romanos, cap. 1, lect. 5 (M75-M76).
36 Super Galatas cap. 4, lect. 3 (M214).  He uses the same comparison at Super Titum prologus (M1), 
but there, following the parable of the sower, the seed is the “word of God”  -  not the person of the 
Son, but, as another biblical quote makes clear, the Gospel.
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5.1.3 Is grace the sort of thing that can be effected by an instrument?
5.1.3.1 Is grace created?
In the Scriptum Thomas specifically talks of grace as something created 
(aliquid creatum).37  It might be said that he simply means that it is something in the 
created order, but given that he also holds that when it is corrupted (when a soul 
loses grace) it reverts to nothing, it seems that he means created in the strict sense of 
the term.38  This is despite maintaining that grace is an accident.39  But it does not 
take long for Thomas to argue that grace, as an accident, has the mode of being of an 
accident: strictly speaking, accidents are not created or annihilated, but rather they 
are co-created with the substance in which they inhere.40  In the Summa we get the 
mature argument: unlike in the Scriptum and De Veritate, he realises that the question 
is not whether grace is something created, but whether it posits something in the 
soul.41  Then he argues that as a quality grace is not a substance but an accident; thus 
it is not generated or corrupted in itself, but it is said to come to be or cease to be 
insofar as the substance begins or ceases to be in act according to this accident.  If at 
times it is spoken of as being created, this is using the term loosely, to denote that it 
brings about a new way of being, and that this is “ex nihilo,”  that is, not on the basis 
of merit.42
What is at stake here is not only what grace is, but who or what can cause 
it.  Throughout his writings, Thomas is adamant, against Avicenna, Al-Ghazali and 
even the Master of the  Sentences, that only God can create, and that the power to 
37 Scriptum 2.26.1.1.
38 Scriptum 2.26.1.2 ad 5.
39 Scriptum 2.26.1.2.
40 De Veritate 27.1 ad 8, 27.3 ad 9, although at 27.1 ad 1, ad 6, he talks of grace as created.
41 Scriptum 2.26.1.1, De Veritate 27.1, ST I-II.110.1.
42 ST I-II.110.2 ad 3.
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create cannot be communicated to any creature, even instrumentally.43  On the other 
hand, he wants to affirm with the tradition that sacraments cause and contain grace.44 
Now, when he began as a theologian he faced the obstacle not only of the created 
status  of grace,  but  also of the nobility of grace and of the Avicennan model  of 
instrumental causality.   The obstacle of the created status of grace was overcome 
quickly, as we have seen, but the others took more time.
5.1.3.2 Instrumental causality
As Hyacinth Dondaine has  shown,  Thomas'  original  understanding of 
instrumental causes came from Avicenna.  According to this model, the instrument 
prepares  or  disposes  the  matter  so  that  it  is  ready to  receive  the  form from the 
principal cause; the paradigm is human reproduction, where the semen disposes the 
matter and God creates the soul.  As the human soul is a substantial form, its coming 
into being is creation and only God can achieve it.  Not surprisingly, in this model 
there is no  communicatio between the principal and the instrumental cause.45  But 
there was also an understanding of instrumental causes that came from Aristotle via 
Averroes,  where  the  principal  cause  is  an  unmoved mover,  and the  instrumental 
cause  is  the  moved  mover.   Here  the  instrumental  cause  is  subordinated  to  the 
principal  one;  there  is  one  causality,  and  one  movement  that  flows  through  the 
instrumental  cause,  so  that  it  is  present  therein  in  an  incomplete  way.46  Moved 
43 Scriptum 2.1.1.3 cor, De Veritate 5.9 cor, De Potentia 3.4 cor, Summa Contra Gentiles 2.21, ST 
I.45.5 cor.  There is a good analysis of the development of Thomas' position on the 
communicability of the power to create, to bestow grace, and to work miracles in M. Benoît 
Lavaud OP, “Saint Thomas et la causalité physique instrumentale de la sainte humanité et des 
sacrements à propos d'un livre récent,” Revue Thomiste 32 (1927), 292-316.  In what follows I 
consider the texts he studies, but also pay attention to the issues of causality and nobility.
44 Thus as early as Scriptum 4.1.1.4.1 cor he opposes the explanation that sacraments are causes sine 
quibus non as “not being sufficient to save the sayings of the saints” who held that sacraments in 
some way cause grace.
45 Dondaine, “À propos,” 441-443.
46 Dondaine, “À propos,” 448.
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movers  and incomplete forms are already mentioned when Thomas is  explaining 
sacramental causality in the  Scriptum, but it takes time for Thomas to completely 
relinquish the idea that the instrumental cause is only dispositive.47  He gets very 
close to  it  in  De Veritate when discussing  the  headship  of  Christ  (which  he  has 
according to his humanity), but is careful to include a qualifier: Christ achieves our 
salvation “quasi ex propria virtute.”48
5.1.3.3 The nobility of grace
One of the reasons for this reluctance was the nobility of grace.  Thomas 
was familiar with the saying of Augustine that it is a greater work to justify the sinner 
than to create the world.49  Moreover, grace was a participation in the divine nature 
and so nobler than the human soul.50  The creation of the world presupposes no 
matter, either ex qua or in qua the forms are produced; the creation of a human soul 
is ex nihilo but it presupposes matter in qua, because in the normal course of events 
there is an embryo there waiting to be informed.  Thus there can be no instrumental 
cause for the creation of the world, and any instrumental cause for the creation of a 
human soul can be merely dispositive.51  Initially, Thomas would not admit that an 
instrumental cause could have an effective role in the nobler role of producing grace 
in the soul.  Thus all the sacrament could do was to prepare the soul (by producing 
character or some ornatus animae) for God to pour in the grace.52
47 Scriptum 4.1.1.4.1 cor, 4.1.1.4.2 cor, 4.1.1.4.1 cor, 4.1.1.4.4 cor, ad 1.
48 De Veritate 29.4, 29.5 cor, ad 3.  Jean-Pierre Torrell does not give the same weight to the quasi as I 
do: Saint Thomas Aquinas vol. 1 The Person and his Work, tr. Robert Royal (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 66n 53.
49 Used against the communicability of the conferral of grace at Scriptum 4.5.1.2 sed contra 2, De 
Veritate 27.3 sed contra 4; At De Potentia 3.4 obj 8 it is used to argue a fortiori that God can share 
the power of creating: the response insists that any sacramental instrumentality is merely 
dispositive.
50 De Veritate 27.3 cor gives three variations on this theme.  
51 De Potentia 3.4 ad 7.
52 Scriptum 4.1.1.4.1 cor, De Veritate 27.4 ad 3, De Potentia 3.4 ad 8.  The ornatus animae is 
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Originally  Thomas,  taking  grace  as  that  which  joins  the  soul  to  its 
greatest good, talks of the nobility of grace vis-à-vis the soul as an argument against 
its being an accident of the soul, and responds by arguing that accidents in general 
are in some way more noble than their subjects, and thus the nobility of grace is 
preserved: the final conclusion affirms the nobility of grace.53  He does not seem to 
bring up this argument again until the Summa, and there, elegantly arguing from the 
very nobility of grace as a participation in the divine nature and through the principle 
that the qualities of God that are identical with his substance are participated in us as 
accidents, he is able to conclude the response by saying that, in its mode of being, 
grace is less noble than the human soul.54 But I suspect that he was helped to make 
this reversal and so escape from the restrictions of the nobility of grace by a parallel 
case, that of miracles.
5.1.3.4 A change on the communicability of miraculous power
In  the  Scriptum Thomas  insists  that  the  power  to  change  the  law  or 
course of nature belongs solely to the one who established that nature, and so the 
power to work miracles directly belongs solely to God and cannot be communicated 
to any creature  -  creatures, of course, could bring about miracles by intercession and 
merit, but that is a different matter.  Thus not even the soul of Christ had the power to 
work miracles effectively, and those that he does work without any intercession are 
to be seen as signs of his divinity.55
mentioned only in the Scriptum.
53 Scriptum 2.26.1 2 obj 3 and ad 3; this argument about grace is repeated and strengthened when 
discussing whether beatitude is an accident, 4.49.1.2.1 ad 5.
54 ST I-II.110.2 ad 2.
55 Scriptum 3.16.1.3 cor. De Veritate 24.4 cor states that Christ's humanity was an organ of his 
divinity, and thus somehow shared in the divine operation instrumentally, both at the bodily level 
(miracles) and the spiritual (justification).  In ad 3 he argues that the sacraments are merely 
disposing instruments, thus there is no clear ground for presuming that Christ's humanity works 
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But in De Potentia he does something quite different.56  In the first of two 
connected articles, he argues that creatures cannot perform miracles by any natural 
power, that is, they cannot impress a form upon matter: anything that angels do, they 
achieve by causing local motion on natural agents, and so the result is a work of 
technical skill (ars) rather than a miracle.  In the next article he asks whether “good 
angels and people can perform miracles by a gift of grace?”  Here he starts by saying 
that it seems that they can do so by grace, and then gives nine arguments, including a 
striking  one  which  is  based  on  Augustine's  maxim:  “Every  thing  which  is  not 
diminished in the giving, as long as it is possessed and not given is not yet possessed 
in the way it should be possessed.”57  These are followed by the sed contra “Who 
alone does great miracles” (Ps 71:18) accompanied by the same argument he used in 
the  Scriptum, now identified as coming from Bernard.  Everything prepares us to 
expect the same answer as in the Scriptum.
However, here Thomas prefers to follow the definite position of Gregory 
the Great over the hesitations of Augustine, and holds that by the gift of God saints, 
even while living in  the flesh,  can perform miracles  not only by prayer  but  also 
potestative, although the power is not a habitus but is given as God sees fit.58  He is 
won over both by the examples Gregory gives,  and his argument:  “if  people are 
given the power (potestas) to become children of God, is it any wonder if they have 
the  power  (ex  potestate  possunt)  to  work  wonders.”   What  happens,  Thomas 
miracles as an effective instrument.
56 De Potentia 6.3 - 6.4.
57 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 2.1, cited at  De Potentia 6.4 obj 9.  The Marietti text has a 
different text for this quote, but Thomas responds to it as though it were the version above, which 
he cites correctly at Contra Impugnanates 2.3.19.
58 De Potentia 6.4 cor; cf ST II-II.178.1 ad 1.  Cajetan, referring to these texts in his comments on 
the power of Christ's soul at ST III.13.2, holds that possibly Thomas, “having grown wiser 
(doctior seipso)” has corrected himself.  Commentaria, ad locum. Cf M.-Benoît Lavaud, “Saint 
Thomas et la causalité physique instrumentale de la sainte humanité et des sacrements à propos 
d'un livre récent,” Revue Thomiste 32 (1927): 298.
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explains, is that the rational agents are the mediators of the divine imperium to the 
nature in which the miracle takes place.  This imperium is present not as a habitual 
virtue, but “in the manner of those imperfect forms that are called intentiones, which 
do not remain except throught the presence of the principal agent, like light in the air 
and movement in an instrument.”  He adds that this is the way that prophecy works, 
and also the way God “uses a bodily creature for the justification of spirits, as is 
clearly the case in the sacraments.”  He then responds to all the “objections” at once 
by  saying  that  it  is  true  (verum  est)  that  only  God  performs  miracles  per  
auctoritatem, but also verum est that he communicates this power to creatures, who 
operate by ministerium.
The structure gives the impression that Thomas changed his mind in the 
very process of composing the article, which, given that these disputed questions are 
the results of a seminar session with advanced students, may be Thomas' intention.59 
In terms of the content, this seems to be the earliest case of Thomas using full-blown 
effective instrumental causality, and strikingly he cites the sacraments as a precedent, 
even  though  only  three  questions  earlier  he  maintained  that  sacraments  work 
dispositively.  He has found arguments that God's power is strengthened rather than 
diminished by bestowing that power on others according to their capacity and divine 
wisdom, so that half the argument from nobility is gone, and it seems to have taken 
very little effort after that to show that the accidental status of grace overcomes the 
other half of the argument.  The paradigm has shifted: forming grace in the soul is no 
longer considered on analogy with God pouring a soul into an embryo prepared by 
human seed, but on analogy with colours on a wall, activated by the light, sending 
59 On the manner of composition of De Veritate and De Potentia, see Torrell OP, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, 1:59-67.
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incomplete forms of a “spiritual” or “intentional” nature through the air to the eyes of 
the beholder.60  In this development, of course, Thomas finds patristic justification in 
John  Damascene's  statement  that  the  humanity  (body and  soul)  of  Christ  is  the 
organon or instrument of his divinity.61  Thus, making the distinction between the 
humanity as a conjoint instrument of his divinity (like a hand) and the sacraments as 
a disjoint instrument (like a stick held by the hand), Thomas in the Summa can talk of 
sacraments  as  instrumental  efficient  causes  of  grace  (with  God  all  the  time  the 
principal cause);62 and even though sacraments are not rational beings and have no 
soul that can be graced, grace is present in the sacraments as the effect is present in 
the cause,  and thus in an incomplete way,  as the form of a bed is  present in an 
incomplete way in the axe, flowing through it from the mind of the carpenter into the 
bed.63
5.1.4 The end results: grace is like hau
The Aristotelian terms and categories are the means to an end, and when he comes to 
the  Summa Thomas  can  employ  them  to  present  an  intellectually  respectable 
explanation of grace that is as close to hau as one could wish.64  Grace is the hau of 
God the giver, which is present in the gift, bearing God to the recipient in a spiritual 
way, so that by means of the gift the giver receives a participation in God.  God 
remains unchanged, but this  participation is the transformation of the soul of the 
60 Thomas already used the analogy of light at De Veritate 27.4 ad 4 and ad 5, where he explained 
that these “spirits,” as incomplete beings, are neither corporeal nor incorporeal.  But here he is 
using it to talk of effective rather than dispositive instrumentality.
61 For the development in Thomas' use of this formula, see Dondaine, “À propos,” 450-452.
62 ST III.62.1 cor, ad 2.
63 ST III.62.3 cor, ad 3.
64 Cf Daniel A Keating, “Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas,” in 
Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating and John 
Yocum (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 153-154.
163
recipient, the transformation itself witnessing to the power and even the fecundity of 
God.  The transformed soul, under the impulse of the hau which always belongs to 
its source, seeks to honour God in an appropriate way, and the spiral of gratitude 
comes into being.  To go one stage further, as  hau in general belongs both to the 
giver and to the gift object, but primarily to the giver, so the Holy  Hau proceeds 
principally from the Father, the Giver, but also from the Son, the gift object.65
5.2 Corroboration from biblical commentaries
5.2.1 Distinction between the gift object and the spirit of the gift
We can corroborate this claim by showing that this constellation of ideas 
is  present in discussions on grace in the scriptural commentaries,  particularly the 
later ones.  We have already seen observed the link between  gratia as favour and 
gratia as gratitude.  We could also note the use of  beneficium.   Despites its rare 
occurrence  in  the  Vulgate,66 Thomas  uses  the  word  very  often  in  his  biblical 
commentaries.  It frequently occurs in the context of the thanksgiving passages at the 
beginning of  Paul's  letters,  as Thomas explains  the reasons for which Paul  gives 
thanks.  Similarly, when there is an exhortation to gratitude, Thomas will often use 
the word beneficium to describe the grounds for gratitude.  Although Seneca's name 
is  invoked  only  once  with  respect  to  gratitude,67 one  would  expect  that  the 
understanding of benefits and gratitude that found expression in  De Beneficiis, and 
which Thomas  -   along with his  contemporaries   -   so willingly embraces,  lies 
65 ST I.36.3 ad 2, in the sense that the Holy Spirit has the capacity to be given as the Spirit of the Gift 
because the Son has the capacity to be given as the gift object.
66 Beneficium is found only at Judges 9:16, 1 Para 17:26, 2 Para 32:25, Tob 11:19,12:2, Eccli 29:9, 1 
Mac 11:53, 2 Mac 6:13, 8:20, 9:26, 1 Tim 6:2, and beneficus at Luke 22:25, beneficientia at Heb 
13:16.  Benefacere occurs about 40 times.  Vulgate Concordance, 
http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/ARTFL/public/bibles/vulgate.search.html  (accessed 9th January 
2012).
67  Super I Corinthios 12.1 (M710), as cited above.
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behind these terms.
We also find the distinction between the gift object and the spirit of the 
gift very clearly in the commentary on Titus.
It should be known that grace implies mercy, because grace is about that 
which is given  gratis, and that is given mercifully which is given with 
grace. . . .  And it can be said that in the birth of Christ this grace appeared 
in a twofold way.  First and foremost, because he was given to us through 
the  very  great  grace  (per  maximam  gratiam)  of  God.   Whence  his 
conception, even though it is the work of the whole Trinity, is attributed to 
the  Holy  Spirit,  who  is  the  principium  gratiarum.   And  this  grace 
appeared to all people, especially to Christ in his humanity. (John 1: 14 
Full  of  grace  and  truth.)   From this  grace,  in  the  second  place,  the 
instruction of the human race is achieved.68
What  we have here  is  an  application  of  Thomas'  explanation  of  why 
“Gift” is a personal name of the Holy Spirit.  It is not that the Son cannot be or is not 
given, but that the love which is the Holy Spirit, in which the Son is given to us, 
makes a gift of our ability to “use and enjoy” the Son who comes from the Father.69
Beyond  this,  there  are  comments  on  two  passages  where  the  whole 
constellation of ideas can be found.  The first, based on a Hebrews text, brings the 
ideas together very clearly.  The second, based on a verse from the Johannine last 
supper discourse, is not quite as clear, but points to some issues to be raised in the 
second half of the thesis.
5.2.2 The principal conclusion of the Letter to the Hebrews
We  shall  begin  with  Thomas'  comments  on  Heb  12:26,  “Therefore, 
receiving an unshakable kingdom, we have gratiam, through which let us serve God 
pleasing [him], with fear and reverence,” which Thomas considers as the “principal 
conclusion,”  the  “conclusion  principally  intended”  of  the  whole  letter.70  The 
68 Super Titum cap. 2, lect. 3 (M68).
69 ST I.38.2.
70 Super Hebraeos, cap. 12, lect. 5 (M722-724, cf M713)
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“unshakable” kingdom refers to what is promised in the New Testament as distinct 
from the Old, and on this basis we “have gratiam.”  Thomas gives two interpretations 
of this: we give thanks (reddimus gratiarum actionem – note that this is a statement, 
not an exhortation), or (vel  -  the alternatives are not exclusive) we have the gift of 
grace (donum gratiae).  The gift of grace comes from the hope of what is promised 
but which is not yet received; the gift of grace is thus not the ultimate gift, and is not 
really the gift object, but can be taken as the “pledge” (which in Thomas refers to the  
Holy Spirit), an inchoation of glory.  Thus hope gives grace through which we arrive.
Then noting that “natural reason” (an allusion to Seneca?) dictates giving 
reverence and honour to a generous benefactor, Thomas argues that this applies  a 
fortiori to God, who has given us very great things, and who has promised infinite 
things.  We do not give thanks for the grace, but per istam gratiam, which is nobis  
datam et dandam  -  presumably this means now in the earthly liturgy and then in the 
heavenly.   Through  the  grace  we serve  God “pleasing” him,  that  is,  not  merely 
through exterior  action,  but  “through right  intention  and love.”   Thus  the  grace, 
which is not the gift object, but what we might call the “spirit” of the anticipated gift 
-   although Thomas himself explains it in terms of the fire imagery of the next verse 
-  changes us inwardly so that we can serve God in a pleasing way.
Finally, Thomas backs up the exhortation when he comments on the next 
verse, “For our God is a consuming fire.”71  Thomas considers that fire is used to 
describe God here on account of its brightness (claritas), activity, loftiness, and its 
purgative and consumptive qualities.  Allowing ourselves some connections typical 
of  Thomas,  loftiness  and  claritas suggest  glory  (clara  cum laude  notitia);  fire's 
activity reminds us of its  place in the hierarchy of circular beings,  being able to 
71 Super Hebraeos 12.5 (M725)
166
generate fire in other matter by consuming it.  This consumption is seen in positive 
terms (God purges sin, which Thomas elsewhere describes in terms of removing the 
macula peccati and thus restoring brightness, making the sinner like God72) and in 
negative terms (consuming sinners in punishment).  Once again, we have a set of 
hau-like qualities.  Not surprisingly, then, Thomas thinks of this fire as present in us, 
mainly as the promised reality of future glory, but also as present power, for Thomas' 
scriptural quote for God's activity is Is 26:12, which talks of God's works in us.
5.2.3 John's Gospel and Christ's abiding presence among us
Unlike the commentaries on the Pauline corpus, which were probably 
produced in Naples in 1272-1273, the commentary on John was written in Paris at 
roughly the same time as  Prima Secundae (1270-1272), and thus reflects Thomas' 
understanding as he was writing the tract on grace.73  The most relevant passage is on 
15:9-17, and Thomas begins his comments by saying “that we remain in Christ is 
from his gratia; and this gratia is the effect of love. . . .   From which it is clear that 
all our good works come to us from the beneficium of divine love,” for good works 
come from love,  and  we would  not  love  unless  we had  first  been  loved.74  He 
concludes by citing John Chrysostom: “The disciples could have said: Lord, why do 
you remind us so much about your love?  You're not reproaching us, are you?  But 
the Lord says:  No, but rather so as to incite you to love of neighbour.”75  As that 
which makes our good works good,  gratia here clearly refers to grace in its strict 
theological sense.  And yet, that they come  ex gratia is paralleled with coming  ex 
72 ST I-II.86, III.79.4 cor, ad 1.
73 Torrell OP, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:146-147, 250-257.
74 Super Ioannem cap. 15, lect. 2, (M1998)
75 Super Ioannem cap. 15, lect. 3 (M2029).
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beneficio, so gratia here also refers to the favour with which a benefit is bestowed. 
And the good works flow out of us as gratitude, because being mindful of the benefit 
is the foundation of gratitude.  And yet what is done out of gratitude (gratia) is also 
done out of grace (gratia), precisely because Christ is  not reproaching them, is not 
inducing them to act out of some fear of punishment (as the Old Law did), but out of 
love, according to the New Law of grace.
Indeed, Thomas says that the introductory verse for this section, 15:9: 
“Just as the Father has loved me, I also have loved you: remain in my love,” has as  
its structure a commemoration of the benefit conferred on the disciples, followed by 
an  exhortation  to  perseverance.   The  commemoration  of  the  benefit  is  by  a 
comparison, a  similitudo gratiae et  dilectionis:  we have received from the Son a 
benefit, a favour in love, similar to the one the Son receives from the Father.  Similar, 
but  not  the  same,  for  according  to  his  divinity  Christ  is  God  per  naturam,  and 
according  to  his  humanity  by  the  unity  of  person,  but  we  are  gods  per  
participationem gratiae (a phrase that we shall explain shortly), which Thomas links 
to the “great and precious promises God has given to us, to be made sharers of the 
divine nature” (2 Pet 1:4).  Again, there is a “similarity of affect:” “whoever adheres 
to  God  is  one  spirit”  (1  Cor  6:17),  and  “those  whom  he  foreknew  to  become 
conformed to the image of the Son” (Rom 8:29)  -  once again we have in all its  
aspects the hau-like spirit of the gift.76
Thomas offers two readings of the exhortation to perseverance  -  to keep 
loving Christ on account of the great benefit, or to keep being loved by Christ, not to 
fall out of his favour and fail to receive the good things he has promised, to remain  
76 These themes will recur a little later when he comments on the “spirit of truth” of John 15:27 at 
Super Ioannem cap. 15, lect. 5 (M2602).
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faithful to our vocation  -  and he prefers the second.  Thus we have here a line of  
interpretation focussed on the gift object: the Son in his divinity is the recipient of the 
gift of the divine nature, and we are given a similar gift, although at this stage only as 
promise, and we ought be grateful for it always; further, the Son shares in the Spirit 
of God (Thomas is insistent on Filioque), and we also have the Spirit in which the 
sharing in the divine nature is promised to us, and we are exhorted to remain in that  
Spirit, which is the very favour or love with which Christ loves us.
Thomas  then,  following  the  text,  goes  on  to  talk  about  keeping  the 
commandments,  which relies  upon God's  love  of  us,  i.e.,  cannot  be done except 
through grace.
Judging from the structure, then, the “participation of grace” is linked to 
the present state of promise (grace as opposed to glory), a state of a vocation to 
something greater, and is some sort of gift-object (gratia in its second sense).  What 
this gift-object is I shall leave to the second half of the thesis which, following the 
structure of the  Summa, discusses gift objects, but it may be that Thomas does not 
mention it because the Gospel text itself is silent  -  that conspicuous absence of an 
explicit reference to the Eucharist in five chapters devoted to the Last Supper.
5.3 Why is this overlooked?
If this understanding of grace is so pervasively present in Thomas, I need 
to offer some explanation as to why other commentators have not mentioned it.  In 
one sense the connection is noticed: writers on the virtue of gratitude find themselves 
waxing lyrical in terms strongly reminiscent of grace talk;77 it is speaking of grace in 
77 J-D Folghera OP, for instance, notes that it makes religion personal.  “Notes explicatives” 
Appendix I in Thomas Aquinas, Somme Théologique: Les Vertus Sociales  2a-2ae, Questions 101-
122, Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, tr. J-D Folghera OP (Paris: Desclée, 1931), 410.  Dominicus 
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terms of gratitude that is lacking.
One reason would be that Thomas does not always draw attention to the 
developments in his thought.  As a parallel case, he never explicitly states that he has 
changed his mind on the effective rather than dispositive instrumental causality of the 
sacraments  and,  as  the  early Thomists  were  part  of  the  tradition  that  used  Peter 
Lombard's  Sentences as  their  primary textbook  and so  read  Thomas  through the 
Scriptum, there was for a long time a current within Thomism that either did not 
notice or denied this change.78
I suspect that even if people were to notice the indicators, they would not 
have  known  how  to  incorporate  them into  a  theory  of  grace.   Stephen  Duffy's 
treatment of grace in Paul is an interesting parallel.  He notes that Paul repeatedly 
uses charis to mean thanksgiving, but takes this as an indicator that he “has no eye 
for  theological  consistency.”   “One  cannot  pin  down  Paul's  meaning  in  some 
philosophical  category,  whether  Aristotelian  (e.g.,  habitus)  or  existential  (event, 
action, situation),” and so to “grasp Paul's use of “grace” one must with imaginative 
sympathy reenact an experience rather than analyze a concept.”79  When he does this, 
Duffy realises that grace is not one gift-object among many, but a “ second-order 
concept” close to what we call the “spirit of the gift,” but any reference to gratitude 
has vanished.80  It is very easy for a Catholic theologian to write on grace without 
mentioning gratitude.81
Prümmer holds that gratitude is a “necessary and at the same time beautiful virtue, which fosters 
charity and unites the hearts of people.”  Manuale theologiae moralis secundum principia S.  
Thomae Aquinatis in usum scholarum, ed. 11, updated by P. Dr. Engelberto M. Münich OP 
(Friburg in Breisgau: Herder, 1953), 2:476.
78 Lavaud notes that Cajetan was the first to note this changes, and Capreolus and Sylvester of 
Ferrara stuck with the old position, basing themselves on statements in the Scriptum.  “Saint 
Thomas et la causalité physique,” 306-316.
79 Stephen Duffy, The Dynamism of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 1993), 24, 33.
80 Stephen Duffy, Dynamism, 40.
81 For example: Bernard J. F. Lonergan S.J. , Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought  
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Interestingly, the theme does occur when people look at certain other late 
mediaeval sources.  The connection between grace and gratitude has been argued in 
studies of people as different as John Calvin82 and Ignatius Loyola.83
The fact that the question is not even addressed means that one can only 
guess at the reasons, but I suspect that one of them is that the linking of gratitude to 
sanctifying  grace  would  make  the  doctrine  of  the  efficacy  of  infant  baptism 
problematic.  We can take two ideas from the  Summa to respond to this.  Thomas 
finds unsatisfactory the idea that, for infants, baptism simply confers character (the 
gift object), and argues that it confers grace and virtues, but merely as a habitus, and 
not in actu.84  Secondly, grace begins to be in the subject when the subject begins to 
be in act according to grace, (and of course gratia in actu is almost the same thing as 
thanksgiving, gratiarum actio).85  Whatever is present in the infant's soul beyond the 
gift-object (which at least includes the “debt”), it is by no means grace in the proper 
sense of the word.   One cannot  develop a theology of grace so that  the primary 
referent of the word applies to what is conferred on infants at baptism: rather, one 
must develop a theology of grace and then work out in what secondary sense infants 
can be said to receive it: Chauvet's remarks on this point are totally apposite.86
Chauvet holds this because he knows that gratitude is inseparable from 
of St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971); Neil Ormerod, Creation,  
Grace, and Redemption (Maryknoll NY: Orbis, 2007); Henri Rondet SJ, The Grace of Christ: A 
Brief History of the Theology of Grace, tr. and ed. Tad Guzie (Westminster MD: Newman Press, 
1967); Edward Yarnold SJ, The Second Gift: A Study of Grace (Slough: St Paul, 1974).  On the 
other hand, some reflection on gratitude and grace (without it becoming a major theme) can be 
found in Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, tr. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979), 46-48; 192.
82 Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 43-44, and 69-70, where Gerrish compares Calvin to Thomas on the 
meaning of gratia.  Calvin agreed with “the sounder Schoolmen” on justification, but not on merit 
(97-98), and had a strong interest in Seneca (39-40).
83 Wilkie Au, “Ignatian Service: Gratitude and Love in Action,” Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits 
40.2 (Summer 2008): 1-32.
84 ST III.69.6 cor.
85 ST I-II.110.2 ad 3.
86 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 109.
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grace,  although,  as I  shall  explain later,  I  consider  that  he fails to  carry through 
consistently  with  this  insight.   Earlier  than  Chauvet,  Bernard  Häring  made  the 
connection between grace and gratitude central to his book on the sacraments.87  Both 
these theologians respected Thomas but saw themselves as moving beyond him: had 
they been aware that Thomas had made a connection between grace and gratitude, 
they would  have  used  it  to  lend  authority  to  their  theological  forays;  I  strongly 
suspect that the interpretations of Thomas they had received discouraged them from 
even looking for it.
5.4 Grace, promise, and covenant love
5.4.1 Sharing the divine nature
I want briefly to return to the quote, “the great and precious promises 
God has given to us, to be made sharers of the divine nature.”  Thomas refers to 
being sharers of the divine nature, or sharing in the divine nature, at least 22 times in 
his works, on eighteen occasions citing 2 Peter as his source, and normally quoting 
part or all of the text.  Compared with a single, unacknowledged use in the Scriptum, 
twelve of these uses are in the Summa, with three in the tract on grace.88  Further, on 
eight occasions the cited text included the phrases “great and precious promises,” and 
on one other occasion the phrase was not given but  pretium was referred to.  Our 
sharing in the divine nature, so important for Thomas, is not something given but 
something promised.  At one level this does not matter: the spirit of a promise is 
essentially the spirit of the gift, and, as noted earlier, can similarly evoke gratitude. 
In fact, as we saw earlier, it is on the basis of the as yet imperfect sharing in the 
87 Häring, Sacraments, 97-98 et passim.
88 Cf Keating, “Justification,” 153-154.
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divine nature, potential rather than actual, that we are able to love God with charity. 
For  any  love  is  based  upon  a  likeness,  upon  something  shared,  and  this  is  the 
criterion for  the difference between purely natural  love for  God (based upon the 
likeness of God present in us as our origin and goal) and charity (based upon shared 
beatitude).  Also the things promised are magna et pretiosa:  charity is love of things 
magni pretii (of great price or value).89
But at another level it is significant.  It means that any gift object we 
receive in this present life is essentially a sign, because it brings to mind a reality that 
is not present.  We are led back to Caillé's insistence that gift objects are essentially 
symbols, that what matters is not so much the gift exchanged, but the bonds created.
Now the nature of these gifts as promises and signs leads us to the issue 
of the trustworthiness of the promises, the truth of the signs.  In particular, we are led 
to  a  reality  referred  to  by Thomas  using   three  words,  more  or  less  equivalent: 
foedus, pactum, and  testamentum.90  The words are all used frequently by Thomas, 
often in a secular sense, or else in scriptural or other quotations.91  Thomas notices 
that testamentum is linked to testis.92  Testamentum refers to testata veritas, or more 
specifically the manifestation and “certification” of the divine mind  -  what God 
wills  -  and testimonium is anything taken from something outside for the purpose of 
establishing faith..93  Testamentum  -  and thus also  foedus and  pactum  -  have an 
essentially public character, one mediated by signs, or, to use Caillé's terminology, 
89 ST I-II.26.3 cor.
90 Super Galatas 4.8 (M256).
91 According to the Index Thomisticus, in the genuine works of Thomas foedus occurs 160 times 
(although this also includes a few cases of the unrelated adjective foedus, -a, -um), pactum 256 
times, and testamentum 1463 times, very often with regard to the Old or New Testament.
92 In Psalmos 24.8.
93 In Psalmos 24.8.  The text actually says “testimonium dicitur quasi testata veritas,” but one could 
argue that it should be testamentum on the grounds that: the text cited to support this usage 
contains the word testamentum; testamentum is closer to “testata veritas” than testimonium; this is 
the third of  five definitions of testamentum taken from scripture or the Fathers.  The Leonine 
Commission is yet to produce a critical text.
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symbols.
Thomas is also clear that a covenant substantially involves a promise, 
and in such a way that different promises make for different covenants.94  He also 
notes that the breaking of a covenant can be ingratitude.95  Charity will thus be based 
on a covenant, and although the term did not exist in Thomas' time, it would be fair 
to say that for him caritas could be described as “covenant love.”
5.4.2 The truth of grace
Our question, then, is how we know that the covenant is true.  This is the 
point where we can no longer postpone serious investigation of gift-objects, and in 
particular  the  gift-object  that  is  the  incarnate  Word  and  its  extension  into  the 
sacraments.  But before we do we should conclude this first half of the thesis by 
returning to the beginning and looking once more at truth.
Truth,  we saw, was in  the divine mind,  in the human mind and, in  a 
transferred  sense,  in  things,  insofar  as  they  reflect  the  divine  mind  (which  they 
always do) or as they lead to truth in the human mind.  These three sorts of truth are 
opposed, respectively, to participation, error, and the figure.  We also saw that they 
are linked with the three forms of the grace of Christ: the grace of union, by which 
Christ is truly divine; the habitual grace of Christ, by which he possesses all virtues; 
and the capital grace of Christ, by which he communicates grace to others.
Having explored at length the threefold meaning of the word gratia, we 
could include the grace we experience in  this  threefold schema.   The favour  we 
experience from God must be true  -  it must be a desire for God to communicate  
94  Super Galatas 4.8 (M256).
95 Super Hebraeos 10.3 (M52-531).
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himself  in  his  essence,  not  simply  some  created  thing  that  participates  in  his 
goodness.  The gratitude we feel and through which we recompense and glorify God 
must also be true, free from error: grace must fill our souls with true virtues.  And the 
gift object must be true, enabling the change to take place from a false economy, 
directed to material goods and based on fear, to a true economy based on spiritual 
reward and love.  And this, of course, could be connected to the threefold liberation 
that truth brings; from corruption, from error, and from slavery to the sin and to the 
law.  This triple liberation gives the structure to consider God's gift to us in Christ  
and his sacraments.
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CHAPTER SIX
CHRIST AS SOURCE AND MODEL OF GRACE
The first in any genus is the cause of the others in that genus, and the grace 
of Christ is the cause of grace in us.1  Thus Thomas, after considering the hypostatic 
union itself, considers the grace of Christ among the “coassumpta” of the union (that 
is, the perfections and defects), his merit among the consequences of the union, and 
then  the  mysteries  of  the  life  of  Christ,  and  only  then  goes  on  to  consider  the 
sacraments, by which we share in Christ's grace.  In this chapter we shall start with 
the grace of Christ.  An investigation of merit will require looking at its placement 
among  the  consequences  of  the  union,  for  this  placement  is  an  innovation  for 
Thomas;2 significantly, in discussing the consequences, Thomas is also looking at 
what we might term the “subjectivity” of Jesus, which, we shall see, is intrinsically 
constituted by his relations to God and to us.  This will involve looking also at his 
priesthood and the extension of the visible mission into things such as his clothes. 
As I  shall  argue,  Thomas'  favourite  proof  text  for  being incorporated into Christ 
(Galatians 3:27) uses the image of clothing, and so, considering clothing within the 
mysteries of Christ, I shall investigate how we become members of Christ's body 
through baptism; this will then be compared with what Thomas says directly about 
baptismal character.
Baptism is ordered towards the Eucharist,  which will be topic of chapter 
seven, and there we shall  see in greater depth the saving significance of Christ's 
passion.  Chapter eight can then give a general theory of sacramental efficacy, and, 
1 This principle of causality is found most explicitly at De Veritate 5.9 sed contra 3.
2 Lafont, Structures, 391.
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after  discussing  the  cases  where  sacraments  and  grace  are  separated,  will  then 
consider  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  Chauvet's  appraisal  of  the  sacramental 
theology of Thomas.
6.1 The grace of Christ
6.1.1 Christ grace in its threefold fulness: favour, gift and thanksgiving
As we saw in chapter two, Thomas uses the standard terms grace of union, 
habitual grace and capital grace to talk of the grace of Christ.  We can use texts from 
Thomas to relate these to the favour, the gift object and gratitude.  A good place to 
start is this distinction:
In this way therefore it should be said that if grace is taken as the actual will of  
God doing something gratis, or holding someone gratum or accepted, the union 
of the incarnation came about through grace just as the union of the saints to  
God through knowledge and love.  If, however, grace is meant as the gratuitous 
gift of God itself, then that very thing which is that the human nature is united 
to the divine Person can be called a certain grace, in that this took place without 
any preceding merits.3
The gift object, therefore, is the fact of the hypostatic union.  Through it 
God expresses his undeserved favour towards the human nature of Christ;4 nor is it 
received as a gift without some quality in Christ's soul which is the result of God's fa-
vour and renders the soul capable of delighting in the gift object and acting in accord 
with the favour expressed by it.  This quality arises from God's giving and the human 
nature's reception at the level of being, and in no way enables, merits or mediates that 
reception.  This is the habitual grace of Christ.5
3
 ST III.2.10 cor., cf. ST III.6.6 cor. Thomas also discusses the predestination of Christ, ST III.24.
4 Cf Colman O'Neill, “Appendix 5: The Priesthood of Christ: 3a. 22,” in Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, vol. 50 The One Mediator 3a. 16-26, ed. Colman O'Neill (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1965), 248.
5 ST III.2.10 cor, 7.1, cf De Veritate 29.1-2.  At 29.2 cor Thomas says the habitual grace “is more 
finis of the assumption than a disposition towards the assumption [of the human nature].”
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As with the rest of humanity, this habitual grace is an invisible mission of 
the Holy Spirit: indeed, as the procession of the Son is naturally (but not temporally)  
prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, so the grace of union (which corresponds 
to the mission of the Son) is naturally (but not temporally) prior to the habitual grace 
of Christ (the mission of the Holy Spirit).6  Thus Thomas’ remark that, like light in 
the air from the presence of the sun, grace in human beings is caused by the presence 
of divinity, applies first and foremost to Christ.7  In his case the presence is the union 
of the human nature to the divine person—and, in the order of nature but not tempor-
ally, the soul is united to the Word and then, through the soul, to the body.8  Because 
the human nature of Christ does not exist before being united to the Word this is not 
an invisible but a visible mission of the Word: visible for the sake of fallen humans 
who go from knowledge of visible things to knowledge of invisible things.9
6.1.2 The connections between these three modes
Now, Christ also has capital grace, in other words, his grace overflows into 
others.  It is precisely in this overflow that we have the third sense of grace, grace as 
thanksgiving, for thanksgiving must acknowledge not only the gift object, but the 
gratutity with which it is given.    The connection will become clearer when we con-
sider the merit of Christ, but first we need to look at the unity of these three referents 
of the word “grace.”
There seems to be no difference in essence between habitual grace and cap-
ital grace, and indeed, if everything that Christ did and suffered in the flesh is for our 
6 ST III.7.13 cor, cf. ST I.27.3 ad 3.
7  ST III.7.13 cor.
8  ST III.6.1 cor.
9 ST I.43.7 cor.
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salvation, then every action that results from the habitual grace in some way over-
flows to others.10  This identity is supported when we consider the lists of reasons for 
positing habitual grace in Christ and for the qualities of that grace that make it appro-
priate to call Christ “head:”
 it was conveniens for one so close to the source of grace to be graced, and 
Christ is head according to closeness to God because his grace is higher and 
prior (not temporally), and all others receive grace with respect to him, (just 
as a natural head is at the top);
 the human soul of Christ needs to be elevated to know and love God as 
closely as possible, and Christ is head according to perfection, because he 
has the fulness of all graces (all the senses are found in the natural head);
 in  his  humanity he  is  mediator  between God and humanity,  “and so  he 
should have grace redounding to others,” and Christ is head according to 
power, because he has the power of producing an influx of grace (influendi  
gratiam) into all members of the Church (the power, movement and govern-
ment of all the other members have their origin in the head).11
On the other hand, Thomas distinguishes the habitual grace from the grace 
of union, even saying that they are not of the same genus, because the grace of union, 
like the divine person himself, is beyond any genus.12  Moreover, towards the end of 
the discussion of the grace of Christ, one of the objections is based on the difference 
between the “singular grace of Christ” and “the grace of union.”13  An explanation is 
given in the response to this objection, where he remarks that Christ's capital grace 
10 For the salvific value of “omnes actiones et passiones Christi” see ST III.48.6 cor.
11 ST III.7.1 cor, III.8.1 cor.
12  ST III.7.13 ad 3.
13  ST III.8.5 obj. 3.
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and his personal grace are ordered towards acts, and so they “conveniunt in essentia 
habitus”,  which  is  not  the  case  with  the  grace  of  union.  Having  distinguished, 
Thomas can now show the connection:
However, the personal grace could in a certain way be called 
the grace of union, insofar as it produces a certain congruity 
to the union. And in this regard the grace of union and the 
capital grace and the grace of the singular person are one 
through essence, but differ sola ratione.14
Or as  he said earlier,  “one and the same grace” is  the habitual  grace of 
Christ, which can be considered as grace “of union, in that it is congruous to nature 
united to the divinity; of the head, in that through it there is an overflow to others for 
salvation; and of the singular person, in that it perfected [him to perform] meritorious 
works.”15  The point is that no other gift needs to be given to Christ so that he can 
carry out all that is necessary for our salvation.  The word gratia expresses the pro-
found unity between the divine favour elevating the humanity, the gift object, and the 
thanksgiving; moreover, it is by the same grace that both Christ himself is graced and 
he graces us.
6.1.3 The excess of Christ's grace
The grace of Christ overflows from the head into the members, but Thomas 
is quite clear that this is a metaphor, a description after the fact rather than an explan-
ation of how it happens.16  We would expect that grace would flow into us by means 
some gift, something connected with the “graces” that Christ has in abundance, or 
something that can produce a divine mission in us.  Our entry into these questions, as 
we hinted earlier, is through that issue of merit.
14  ST III.8.5 ad 3.
15  De Veritate 29.5 cor.
16 Catão considers this distinction “très important.”  Salut et rédemption , 101.
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As we have seen, the excess that is shown in gratitude is recognised by God, 
who, in his own good time, pours more grace into the soul in a potentially infinite 
spiral which, pace Aristotle, is not vicious because it is founded on charity.  Now, the 
potentially infinite spiral ends at death; after death people move from grace to glory, 
for grace is merely the preparation for glory, and in patria each participates in glory 
according to  the measure of charity  in via,  and charity of course comes only by 
grace.   Because  glory arises  from a  complete  possession  of  God (totus  sed  non 
totaliter), and each person sees the beatific vision according to the maximum of his 
or her capacity, there is no growth in glory, nor any possibility of merit: nor is there 
any time in which growth could take place.17
But Christ's grace stops growing as soon as it  starts, for even as pilgrim 
(viator) in his earthly life he is already comprehensor and enjoys the beatific vision. 
Although grace can perform greater works in Christ as he increases in age (thereby 
explaining Luke 2:52), Thomas insists that grace in Christ can increase neither in 
terms of its subject nor in terms of its form:18 in terms of its form, because “the end 
of grace is the union of rational creature to God,” and no union greater than the one 
taking place in the divine Person is possible; in terms of its subject, because Christ is 
always already comprehensor, and so has already achieved the goal of grace at the 
first moment of his conception.19  Similarly in Christ there is no growth in charity.20 
What happens, then, when the personal grace of Christ, which is a habitus, is raised 
from potency to an act of charity?  How is this supremely eminent act acknowledged 
by God?
17  ST I.12.7 obj 3, I-II.65.5 cor, II-II.24.7.
18 ST III.7.12 cor, ad 3.
19 ST III.7.12 cor.  In the previous two articles Thomas has explained how Christ enjoys the fulness 
of grace.
20 ST III.48.1 obj 3 and ad 3.
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The question is equivalent to the one of whether Christ can merit, one which 
Thomas treats explicitly.21  But his answers need to be considered in the context in 
which he places them.
6.2 Christ's human subjectivity and his mystical body
There is no question in the Summa on the merit of Christ; rather, there are 
two articles on merit at the conclusion of a question on the operation of Christ.  This 
question comes in a tract which Thomas titles the consequences of the [hypostatic] 
union, and which he divides into: first, those pertaining to Christ himself; secondly, 
those pertaining to him vis-à-vis the Father (further subdivided into his way of being 
towards the Father and the Father's towards him); thirdly, those pertaining to Christ 
vis-à-vis us.  A number of scholars have found this tract puzzling, because it contains, 
in the section on Christ with regard to the Father, a question on Christ's priesthood 
(an innovation in scholastic theology) and, in the section on Christ and us, a question 
on  his  mediatorship,  and  yet  Thomas  sees  priesthood  precisely  in  terms  of 
mediatorship.22  Moreover, as mediatorship is the more general category, it is against 
Thomas' normal method that it should come later.
The first question of the tract on the consequences of the union is about its 
“grammar,” how to speak truthfully of the one person and the two natures, and this 
concern runs right through the tract, as Thomas seeks to delineate a “space” for each 
of them.23  The focus of our investigation will be the ways in which this “space” 
21 ST III.19.3-4.
22 Gérard Remy, “Sacerdoce et médiation chez saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste 99.1 (1999):104; 
Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Le sacerdoce du Christ dans la Somme de théologie,” Revue Thomiste 99.1 
(1999): 76-78
23 L.-B. Gillon OP holds that “consequi” here means to follow logically, rather than by some sort of 
fittingness, as with the “coassumpta” of qq. 7-15, “La notion de conséquence de l'union 
hypostatique dans le cadre de IIIa, qq. 2-16,” Angelicum 15 (1938): 32-34. This view is accepted by 
Colman O'Neill,“Introduction,” in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 50 The One 
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overflows the natural body of Christ.  Thomas has terms for this overflow, such as 
persona mystica and  corpus mysticum,  and in one case where he has no name I 
would  suggest  that  it  might  best  be  described  as  an  “extension  of  the  visible 
mission.”  What is also significant is that the three questions about Christ  vis-à-vis 
the Father  -   his  subjection,  prayer and priesthood  -   are about  how the Word 
incarnate practises  the  acts  of  religion.24  We considered  earlier  Maxime Allard's 
analysis of these acts and their role in developing subjectivity, which he takes as not 
automatically present, but rather in need of being constructed.  Subjectivity in this 
sense provides a useful way of considering the  persona mystica, and the corporeal 
nature of the extensions of the visible mission helps to place it all in a wider context.
As  was  the  case  with  “head”  and  “members”  above,  persona  here  is 
metaphorical: François Daguet has argued on the basis of a close examination of the 
texts that the definition of person Thomas takes from Boethius (“individual substance 
of a rational nature”) cannot apply to the  persona  always qualified as  mystica or 
quasi (una).25
Thus this tract gives an account of the construction of this subjectivity, this 
persona mystica.26  Wherever here, or elsewhere, an appeal is made to the mystical 
body  or  person,  we  should  look  also  to  see  how  Thomas  is  accounting  for  its 
Mediator 3a. 16-26 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965), xxv-xxvii, and Torrell, “Le sacerdoce 
du Christ,” 77-78.
24 Lafont sees these three questions as a replication of II-II.82-85.  See Structures, 391-392, cf 353-
354.  Colman O'Neill notes this explictly with regard to Christ's priesthood, and then links it back 
to his subjection to the Father.  “Appendix 5: The Priesthood of Christ: 3a. 22,” in Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 50 The One Mediator 3a. 16-26 (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1965), 245-246, 248.
25 ST I.29.1; Daguet, Théologie du dessein, 410-415.  However, Daguet then says that, as the body of 
Christ has one soul through the Holy Spirit, who is the same in all, its unity and its quasi-
personality is not the merely juridical unity of a multitude with a common goal.  Martin Morard 
also insists that the “quasi-personal unity of Christ and the Church is not the unity of a supposit.” 
“Les expressions 'corpus mysticum' et 'persona mystica' dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin,” 
Revue Thomiste 95 (1995): 662.
26 Pace Lafont, who can see no theologically important reason as to why Thomas has moved merit 
from its place within the grace of Christ, where his predecessors considered it.   Structures, 391.
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construction, particularly where the term persona mystica first makes its appearance, 
in  the  articles  on merit,  which  we shall  now examine in  detail,  followed by the 
questions on priesthood and adoration.
6.2.1 Christ's merit
6.2.1.1 For whom does Christ merit?
The first four questions  -  the “grammar” of the union, Christ's one esse, his 
dual will and his dual operation  -  create the space for and culminate in his merit,  
and with it  the  persona mystica.   Once it  has been established that  Christ  has  a 
genuinely human operation, the first of the two articles on the merit of Christ asks 
whether he can merit for himself.  Taking his cue from Phil 2:8 which he uses in the 
sed contra, Thomas holds that, although the glory of his body was due to Christ on 
account of his dignity as Son of God, it was something whose absence during his 
earthly life  was more  than compensated for  by his  having it  in  his  risen life  by 
merit.27  Having argued that at least one thing could be merited, he then deals with 
the objection that the manifestation of the excellence of Christ  is  not a good for 
Christ himself, but for those who know him.  True, it benefits them more than Christ 
himself,  but  it  does  benefit  Christ  (“according  to  the  esse which  he  has  in  the 
knowledge  of  others,”  presumably  drawing  upon  the  idea  that  the  known exists 
somehow in the knower).  Besides, Thomas says that even if the benefit is chiefly for 
“the  good  of  those  who  know  him  according  to  the  esse which  they  have  in 
themselves,”  this  good  “is  referred  (refertur)  to  Christ  insofar  as  they  are  his 
members.”28
27 ST III.19.3 cor.
28 ST III.19.3 ad 4.
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The presumption here is that Christ all through his life enjoys the beatific 
vision in his interior life, and that the only purpose that exists in his exterior life is to 
benefit others by letting his glory be known to them.29  The only reward Christ has is 
for others to grow closer to God.  I doubt that those who coined the description of 
Jesus as the “man for others” meant it  anywhere as near  as radically as Thomas 
would have understood the phrase.  The human subject Christ merits, but only when 
we understand the boundaries of this “subject.”30
The  corpus  of  the  next  article  (“Whether  Christ  can  merit  for  others”) 
effectively says that, because of the whole arrangement called “the body of Christ”, it 
really is merit that produces these effects in us: there is no substantial advance over 
the previous article.  The real point of the article lies in the objections, where, to 
reconcile  merit  and  grace,  Thomas  teases  out  how  the  body  is  constructed 
(constitutum).
6.2.1.2 The gift of membership of the body as a grace in itself
The first objection cites Ezekiel's claim that each soul is punished for its 
own sin, and by equal reasoning, a soul can only merit for itself.  Thomas responds to 
this  with a  counter-example: because Adam has been established (constitutus)  by 
God as principium totius naturae, his sin is passed on to others through propagation, 
and similarly Christ is  constitutus head of all people with regard to grace, and thus 
29 For, as we have seen, it is the possibility of merit that gives purpose to these actions.  3.1.2.1.
30 Colman O'Neill elaborates what it means that Christ's human nature only exists in the act of 
existence of the Person of the Word, arguing that it “gives a new dimension, a new qualification, to 
the person's unique substantial existence.”  “Appendix 2: Unity of existence in Christ: 3a. 17.2,” in 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 50 The One Mediator 3a. 16-26 (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1965), 226.  It would seem that Christ's human subjectivity is a further dimension of 
the divine person.  However, O'Neill does not consider this; nor even, when examining Christ's 
human consciousness in appendix 3 (229-237) does he ask how Christ is conscious of this 
connection with the rest of humanity.
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his merit extends to all.  The main point is that the flow of merit is according to an 
order established by God, as Thomas maintained in the question on merit.31
The second objection reminds us that other human beings share in the grace 
of Christ, but in a particular way, not in his grace as source of grace  -  in other 
words, as God has established his ordo, Christ’s headship is something singular and 
unshared.
The third objection is  two-fold: first,  if  salvation is merited,  it  comes as 
owed in justice and not given in grace; secondly, therefore, as Christ died for all, God 
is unjust if he does not extend salvation to all.  The first part of the objection would 
hold  if  the  “body  of  Christ”  were  a  naturally  given  entity,  like  a  human  body, 
comprising the whole human race.  But Thomas responds to the second part of the 
objection first, picking up the Adam parallel: original sin is passed on through carnal 
generation and Christ’s  merit  through spiritual regeneration; spiritual regeneration 
requires something extra, baptism, and so we can conclude that salvation is not owed 
to all.32  Thomas then moves to the first part of the objection and argues that our very 
regeneration in Christ  is granted (conceditur),  and so it,  and thus salvation,  is  of 
grace.
Thus this  persona mystica which is the subject of Christ's outward human 
actions and the recipient of the reward for those actions is not a persona in the strict 
sense, and definitely not an “individual substance of a rational nature.”  Just as the 
idea of merit was extended in the first article, here the idea of  persona is given a 
31 But this order is not something merely extrinsic to the actors involved.  Daguet, Théologie du 
dessein, 412.
32 For the parallel between Christ and Adam, see Daguet, Théologie du dessein, 271-279.  While it is 
true that Adam transmits (or fails to transmit) grace by handing on the nature, it should not be 
overlooked that the transmission of human nature happens voluntarily, and it is the voluntary 
nature of that transmission that allows it to be affected by sin (at least in habitu) and thus to fail to 
hand on grace.  ST I-II.81.3 ad 2; I-II.82.4 ad 3, cf De malo, 4.6 ad 16.  Adam's headship of the 
human race is still constructed.
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“mystical”  but  proportionate  extension,  so  that  an  analogy  exists  between  the 
standard use and the extended use.33  Just as Allard notes that in Roman law the 
relation tends to go from the act to the agent, so too Thomas extends merit and then 
extends persona.34  The extension of merit constructs this  persona mystica, but this 
happens by the divine ordering, by Christ's human will,  by our responses  -  and 
through  the  sacrament  of  baptism.   As  baptismal  character  is  a  sharing  in  the 
priesthood of Christ, that priesthood now claims our attention.
6.2.2 The priesthood of Christ
6.2.2.1 Priesthood as mediatory
Thomas sees the priest above all as a mediator between God and the people 
(populus), and as a populus is by definition ordered, priesthood implies some place in 
an order.35  This mediatorship works in both directions: the priest hands on divine 
things  to the people,  and “offers the prayers  of the people to  God,  and in some 
fashion (aliqualiter) satisfies for their sins to God.”36   Thomas finds most of this 
understanding of priesthood in Heb 5:1, which talks of offering gifts and sacrifices 
for sin;37 this verse also grounds the generally held insistence that the priest must be 
33 According to the analysis of the types of analogy Thomas refers to, this would be a proper analogy, 
not of proportion, but of proportionality.  Angela Monachese, “Identità e classificazioni 
dell'analogia: analisi strutturale dei testi di Tommaso d'Aquino,” Salesianum 72 (2010): 232.
34 Morard notes that persona tends to be used in dynamic contexts to express the unity of an action, 
and it seems that Thomas, initially suspicious of the phrase when composing the Scriptum, became 
more comfortable in De Veritate, and used it most happily after the Summa in his expositions of 
the Psalms.  By contrast, the expression corpus mysticum tends to express something more static, 
the body as formed by the flow of grace from the head to the members. “Les expressions,” 663.
35 Cf Serge-Thomas Bonino OP, “Le sacerdoce comme institution naturelle selon saint Thomas 
d'Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 99.1 (1999): 56.
36 ST III.22.1 cor.  Bonino, “Le sacerdoce,” 48-52; Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Le sacerdoce du Christ,” 79-
81.
37 And yet it seems that Thomas finished III.1-25 in Paris and gave courses on Paul only in Naples. 
Torrell OP, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:250-257.  If this chronology is right, then the question on the 
priesthood cannot be the result of his Hebrews commentary, but rather, the Hebrews commentary 
relies upon the theology found here, much in the same way as Charles Morard argues for the 
theology of priesthood at work in the commentary on the Psalms.  “Sacerdoce du Christ et 
sacerdoce des chrétiens dans le Commentaire des Psaumes de saint Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue 
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human, and thus that Christ was priest by virtue of his humanity.38  The “downward” 
aspect of the priestly office, another innovation, comes from Mal 2:7.39  The levitical 
priests referred to in this text could only hand on the Old Law, which failed to make 
people righteous, but Christ hands on the New Law, that is, the “great and precious 
promises” by which we are made “sharers of the divine nature.”40  O'Neill suggests 
that placing the “downward” aspect of the priesthood first serves to emphasize its 
truly mediatory quality compared to the merely figurative levitical priesthood.41
Thus mediatorship is  essential  to  the notion  of  priesthood:  focussing  (as 
Thomas tends to) on the upward movement, all human beings are called to pray and 
offer sacrifice, but the priest does so on behalf of others.42  Priesthood thus implies an 
inability in the others, which Thomas attributes to sin.  Fundamental to priesthood for 
Thomas, therefore, is that it deals with sin.
6.2.2.2 Priesthood and praise
One might conclude, therefore, that once we are released from sin and have 
received the promised share in the divine nature which Christ as priest brought to us, 
Christ would cease to be our priest.  However, like Melchizedek's, Christ's priesthood 
is eternal, for the sacrifice of Christ was not for the sake of mere passing goods, but 
for eternal ones (Heb 9:11), and thus the bestowal of glory is the consummation of 
that one expiatory sacrifice, and we need that this take place through Christ.43  For 
Thomiste 99.1 (1999): 141-142.
38 ST III.22.3 obj 1, 22.5 obj 3, III.50.4 obj 3.
39 Torrell, “Le sacerdoce,” 80-81.
40 ST III.22.1 cor.  For Christ as a teacher on the cross, see Charles Morard, “Sacerdoce du Christ et 
des chrétiens,” 138-140.
41 O'Neill “Appendix 5: The Priesthood of Christ,” 247-248.
42 For sacrifice, see ST II-II.85.4, especially obj 3 and ad 3.  All are obliged to pray, even for others: 
ST II-II.83.2 and 5, and ST III.22.4 ad 1.  Mediatorship is a larger category than priesthood.  The 
Summa has a question on both, but oddly the more general one comes second.  Cf Torrell, “Le 
sacerdoce du Christ,” 97-100; Remy, “Sacerdoce et médiation,” 103-104.
43 ST III.22.5
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Thomas not only shows that Christ is both priest and victim, but also shows that he is 
the victim for all three stages through which one is taken by sacrifice: forgiveness of 
sin,  preservation  in  grace,  and  union  with  God  in  glory.44  In  this  way we  can 
understand Thomas' claim that even the voluntary and votive offerings, as well as 
those  for  satisfaction,  take  place  through  the  priest,  for  they  are  part  of  the 
consummation of the original expiatory sacrifice.45  It is perhaps also in this sense 
that  the  sacrifice  of  praise,  which  Thomas  finds  Christ  the priest  offering in  the 
psalms  (where  Christ  is  sometimes  praying  in  the  persona of  the  sinner  or  the 
pentitent), is and remains part of his priestly office.46  In this vein, Matthew Levering 
has written extensively about how Thomas sees Christ as the fulfilment of the Jewish 
Temple.47
6.2.2.3 Christ not a priest for himself
In order to save the word “merit” as applied to Christ, Thomas had to show 
that Christ  in some way merited for himself.  But as mediatorship is essential to 
priesthood, Thomas shows that Christ is truly a priest because he in no way benefits 
from his priestly act considered as priestly, because he alone is without sin.48  The 
priests of the Old Law offered sacrifices for sin for themselves, but they were merely 
figures of the true priest; the priests of the New Law do not act of themselves but in  
persona Christi.  In response to the objection that Christ's priestly act also included 
prayer, Thomas rejects the line of argument claiming that, although priests should 
44 ST III.22.2 cor.  In this context Thomas notes (citing Augustine, De Civitate Dei 10.6) that a 
visible sacrifice has what we have seen to be the nature of the gift, being the sacrament (sign) of 
the invisible sacrifice by which the human spiritus is lifted up to God.
45 Super Hebraeos 5.1 (M244).  
46 Charles Morard, “Sacerdoce du Christ et des chrétiens,” 132-135.
47 Matthew Levering, Christ's Fulfilment of Temple and Torah: Salvation according to Thomas  
Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 108-125.
48 ST III.22.4 cor, ad 1, ad 2.
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pray,  that it is not proper to their office, for Hebrews 5:6 contradicts this.  Rather, he 
points out that the priestly prayer of Christ mentioned in this this verse is that he 
should be saved from death: as Christ is subject to death due to taking on the likeness 
of  sin,  this  prayer  is  priestly,  not  absolutely,  but  secundum quid.   Similarly,  the 
sacrifice as sacrifice was offered for satisfaction, and thus had no effect on Christ; 
the  love  and  devotion  with  which  the  sacrifice  was  made  were  what  made  it 
meritorious so that we can speak of Christ meriting through his passion.  After all, 
Thomas insists that Christ's charity is the same in all his actions  -  indeed, any action 
of Christ was of sufficient merit to satisfy or us  -  but the passion did actually satisfy 
because Christ  deputed it  for that  reason, as it  was the most  conveniens for that 
purpose, the act most apt for overcoming the obstacles.49
If we consider the three questions about Christ's stance towards the Father, 
therefore,  we see  that,  in  his  human nature,  Christ  is  subject  to  the  Father,  and 
honours him through acts of prayer (petition), sacrifice and praise.  Yet precisely in 
these acts of religion, which are so constitutive of human subjectivity, Christ is not 
acting for himself, but for others, and indeed for sinful others, and the others are 
acting through him.  Moreover, the action of these others is the praise of God, which 
will  find its  consummation in  the “glory of  divine fruition.”50  Thus through his 
priesthood Christ is the head of the  corpus mysticum which is the Church (leaving 
aside the question of how the angels are included).  How we actually participate in 
the priesthood of Christ shall be discussed later.
49  2.1.2
50 ST III.8.4 cor.
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6.2.3 The extensions of Christ's adorable humanity
Christ, taken as the subject of worship, extends beyond the human body and 
soul, and this is also the case, in a different way, for Christ as the object of worship. 
According to Thomas, there are three sorts of material objects which we can honour 
with latria: the sacred humanity of Christ (because its supposit is the divine Word); 
images of Christ (because homage paid to an image as image is homage paid to the 
one the image represents); and certain objects that have had physical contact with 
Christ.51  The first case is a direct consequence of the incarnation; the second has 
been the object of fierce controversy and much study; the third has been neglected, 
but will prove useful for our research.
The adoration of things that have touched Christ (and we shall consider in 
particular his clothes) is a consequence of the adoration of the sacred humanity itself. 
Thomas  notes  that  we  can  honour  the  humanity  of  Christ  as  the  perfection  of 
humanity with the adoration of dulia, but we can also honour it with the adoration of 
latria as the humanity of the divine Word whose humanity it is, just as to adore the 
robes of the king is nothing other than adoring the king robed.52  Indeed, by using this 
argument Thomas is presuming the possibility of the adoration of Christ's clothes in 
order to argue for the adoration of his sacred humanity.  The same comparison with 
the adoration of the king's robes is made when discussing the adoration of the cross 
of Christ, which can be adored with latria as an image of Christ, or because of its 
contact with this body, and for this second reason, citing John Damascene, even the 
“nails,  clothes, lance and his sacred tabernacle” can be adored with  latria.53  For 
51 ST III.25.2-4.
52    ST III.25.2 cor.  “Adoration” means honouring with bodily gestures; the adoration of a king is 
dulia, not latria.
53    ST III.25.4 cor and ad 3.  People associated with Christ should be honoured with dulia (or, in the 
case of his blessed Mother, hyperdulia), but not latria, to avoid confusion about the reason for the 
honour (III.25.5); relics of saints, either their bodies or their clothes, etc., can also be honoured, but 
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Thomas the natural body of Christ is a well-defined entity;54 however,  he has no 
name for this extension of its adorability: we could call it the extension of the subject 
to be worshipped, but given its very corporeal and inanimate nature, I would prefer 
to call it an extension of the visible mission.  And what is visible is also, as we shall 
see, more easily giveable.
6.2.4 Our identity in Christ
Of  the  remaining  questions  in  this  tract,  those  on  adoption  and 
predestination still tease out the grammar of the hypostatic union, but, as far as they 
concern us, they are less about extensions of Christ's subjectivity or objectivity, and 
more about our finding subjectivity or identity through Christ.  Christ himself is not 
adopted,  but  through  his  natural  sonship  we come to  adoptive  sonship.55  God's 
individual, unchangeable and entirely unmerited choice of each of the elect involves 
their coming to glory through Christ56.  The image of the Book of Life that Thomas 
discusses with predestination in Prima Pars opens a number of possibilities: Christ's 
story  and  our  story  being  intertwined,  or  God's  writing  us  in  the  Book  of  Life 
justifying the  spiritual  readings  whereby we find ourselves  in  the Scriptures,  but 
there is no indication that these images operated that way for Thomas.57
When it comes to mediation, it is worth bearing in mind the observation of 
Emmanuel Perrier that, for Thomas, there is no “concept médiateur” through which 
we understand our relation with God, “for Christ alone is the mediator in his own 
person.”58  Mediation  has  been  left  to  last  to  include  all  that  went  before,  with 
Thomas does not clearly state at what level.
54 ST III.50.2 cor and ad 2.
55 ST III.23.3-4.
56 ST III.24.3-4.
57 ST I.24.
58 Emmanuel Perrier OP, “L'enjeu christologique de la satisfaction (II),” Revue Thomiste 103:2 
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priesthood treated separately so as to form a short section on religion.59  Thus we are 
reminded that in Christ alone we find our way to God, and in him alone we find our 
true identity, for the first in any genus is the cause of all the others in that genus.
This tract establishes the possibility of benefiting from Christ's merit and his 
priestly sacrifice by being part of his mystical body, but as for its construction or how 
we become members, there is but one brief reference to baptism, for that will be 
treated at its proper place.  But before we go to the sacraments and the passion from 
which they gain their  efficacy,  Thomas takes  us  through the mysteries of Christ. 
Now, Thomas' favourite proof text for our incorporation into Christ through baptism 
is Galatians 3:27, which uses the image of clothing.60  We have already seen clothing 
as an extension of the visible mission; I shall now trace some of the meanings it 
acquires during the life of Christ so that we can finally see what he does on the Cross 
that enables us to “put on Christ” through baptism.
6.3 Being clothed in Christ
Thomas reads the gospel texts which mentions Christ's clothes both literally, 
showing that healing power comes through the clothes themselves, and mystically, as 
representing other extensions of the visible mission through which healing power can 
(April-June 2003): 214.
59 Given the overall framing of the question in terms of Christ's relation to the Father, the Father's 
relation to Christ, and Christ's relation to us, this means that the priesthood concentrates on the 
“upward” aspect (not, for instance, on teaching), and mediation on the way Christ brings God to us 
(and not, for instance, his intercession).  Lafont, Structures, 392.
60    ST III.19.4 ad 3 (which we saw when discussing merit), III.62.1 cor, 68.1 cor, 68.4 cor, 69.9 obj 
1, Quodlibet 6.3.1 cor., Super I Corinthios, 12.3 (M734), Super II Corinthios 12.1 (M445), Super 
Romanos 8.1 (M596).  He has other proof texts: Augustine Ad Bonifacium (Scriptum 4.4.2.2.5 sed 
contra 1); Romans 6: 3 or 6:8, when he wants to emphasize sharing in the passion and death of 
Christ (ST III.68.5 cor, III.69.2 cor); and Augustine De Baptismo Parvulorum, “ad hoc Baptismus 
valet, ut baptizati Christo incorporentur ut membra eius,” (ST III.68.5 ad 1, 68.8 obj 3, 69.4 cor, 
69.5 sed contra): this text seems to be used where Thomas wants an explicit mention of 
incorporation.  He uses Ephesians 3:17 as a proof text for incorporation, but as it takes place 
through faith, not through baptism (ST 68.1 ad 1, 68.8 obj 3, 69.5 obj 1).  He does not seem to use 
1 Cor 12:13 (“we were all baptized into one body”).
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flow when Christ's natural body is not present.  In fact, such a mystical reading is an 
integral part of Christ's preparation of the disciples for his passion.
Thomas  sometimes  mystically  interprets  Christ's  clothes  as  his  corpus 
mysticum, for instance, the seamless robe represents the Church spread throughout 
the world but still united.61  The story of the woman who touched the hem of Christ's 
garment, however, is worthy of close attention, because we get both a literal and a 
mystical reading.
6.3.1 The hem of Christ's robe
In his comments on the Matthaean version of the woman who is healed by 
touching the hem of Christ's robe, Thomas cites Hilary, “Great is the power (virtus) 
of Christ, because it is not only in the soul, but redounds from the soul into the body 
and from the  body into  the  clothes,”  and then concludes  that  we should  honour 
anything that has touched the body of Christ.62  This redounding is not an automatic 
process, for remarks in the Catena indicate that Jesus allowed power to flow out of 
him.63  But Thomas is not content with the literal sense of the text.  He also reads the 
text spiritually, taking the woman to represent the Gentiles who come to Christ in 
faith after his death (which of course has a literal scriptural base, Romans 9-11).  And 
so he can give a mystical interpretation of the details: she approaches in faith, but  
from behind, because the Gentiles do not come to Christ while he is alive.  “She 
touched the clothing, that is, the humanity, and only the fringe, because through the 
61 Super Ioannem 19.4 (M2429).
62   Super Matthaeum cap. 9, lect. 4. (M783)  In other places Thomas accounts for healing through 
touch by saying that the humanity is an instrument organ of the divinity; as he also makes use of 
the distinction between a conjoint instrument or organ (the hand) and a separate instrument (a stick 
held in the hand), Christ's robe here obviously falls into the category of the separate instrument.
63 Catena in Marcum, 5.2 (citing Chrysostom).
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apostles only.”64  He provides a very similar explanation of the woman's remark that 
she need only touch the fringe to be saved, relying on an allegorical explanation of 
Psalm 132, about the ointment on Aaron's head, beard and robes, which would seem 
to  give  scriptural  support  to  this  argument,  but  is  immediately  interpreted 
allegorically: the descent into the beard is the descent of the divinity into the flesh; 
into the edge of the robe is into the apostles.65  Thomas sees in the clothes of Christ 
the type of  a  tangible  presence  of  Christ  that  continues  after  his  ascension,  thus 
making  Christ's  bodily  presence  available  to  the  whole  world.   Of  course,  that 
presence avails only to those who have faith,  the woman's faith being a constant 
theme  of  Thomas'  comments  on  that  passage,  even  if  he  does  not  pick  up  the 
distinction made by various fathers cited in the Catena between the crowds that press 
on Jesus (comprimere) and the woman who touches (tangit) in faith.66
6.3.2 The transfiguration
The  event  where  the  clothes  have  the  most  important  role  is  the 
transfiguration.   Thomas  holds  that  Christ  was transfigured  so  that  the  disciples, 
seeing the glory that he would reach through his passion, would themselves be better 
prepared to follow him in his passion.67  This means that the transfiguration, or at 
least one part of it, must be interpreted anagogically.  That part of the event is the 
shining of  his  clothes.   Thomas first  of all  considers it  literally,  noting that  it  is  
64 Super Matthaeum 9.4 (M782)
65  We also get the literal sense of this text at ST I-II.102.5 ad 8 and 9 (explaining the anointing of a 
high priest), an anagogical explanation at Super Psalmos 26.1 (our sharing in Christ's priesthood is 
a figure of our sharing in the kingdom to come), and a tropological explanation at Super Ioannem 
17.4 (M2231), where it is used to explain “consecrate them in the truth” as a deputation to 
worship.
66 Catena in Lucam 8, citing the Moralia of Gregory, Bede, and Ambrose.
67 ST III.45 cor.  As Torrell comments, modern exegetes tend to agree with this.  Le Christ en ses  
mystères, 1:258.
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strange,  because,  whereas  the  glorified  body  naturally  receives  the  glory  that 
redounds  from  the  soul,  clothes  are  not  part  of  the  body,  they  do  not  have  a 
connection  with  the  soul,  and  should  not  naturally  share  its  glory.   Thus  the 
manifestation  of  glory  in  the  transfiguration,  while  truly  showing  the  glory  that 
Christ will have, happens miraculously.68  Not surprisingly, the shining of the clothes 
becomes  a  focus  for  interpretations,  and  Thomas  gives  us  two:  the  clothes  can 
represent the saints by whom Christ  in  glory will  be surrounded,  or the letter  of 
sacred scripture.69
This  second  interpretation  is  found  in  both  Origen  and  Ambrose,  and 
Thomas gives their explanations at greater length in the  Catena.  In effect, Origen 
compares  the  transfiguration,  which  is  a  special  manifestation  of  glory  to  the 
disciples (and not to everybody) with the spiritual reading, by which those who have 
the capacity move from knowing Christ according to the flesh to knowing him as 
God the Word.  Such knowledge is only possible for those who climb the mountain 
and leave worldly ways behind.  The clothes, as mentioned, represent the “words and 
letters of the Gospels, with which Jesus is clothed, according to those things which 
are said about him by the apostles.”70  A similar interpretation from Ambrose is given 
in the Catena in Lucam.71
Given the purpose Thomas attributes to the transfiguration, it is natural that 
the first interpretation has priority, particularly when Thomas is trying to place it in 
68 Despite this, Cajetan simply says that the glory of Christ was so great as to cause (efficiat) the 
clothes to shine and the cloud to glow “through the emission of its rays”  -  in other words, it is not 
an independent miracle, and there is no sense of Christ choosing to share his glory with his 
disciples.  Commentaria, ad locum.  The basics of Cajetan's interpretation are not disputed either 
by P Synave, “Notes explicatives” Appendix I in Thomas Aquinas, La somme théologique : Vie de  
Jésus ed. P Synave OP, Tome Deuxième 3a, Questions 35-45, (2nd edition) (Paris: Desclée, 1947), 
392 or by Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, 1:289.
69 Super Matthaeum 17.1 (M1427); cf. ST III.45.2 ad 3.
70   Catena in Matthaeum, 17.1.
71   Catena in Lucam, 9.6.
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the  life  of  Christ.72  But  the  second  interpretation  supports  the  first.   Precisely 
because the transfiguration is  a miracle,  not a natural redounding, it  is  willed by 
Christ  and  thus  a  gift/sign  to  the  chosen  disciples  (as  Origen  says)  requiring 
interpretation.
6.3.3 Putting on Christ
In these examples, the clothes become a symbol for various ways in which 
the visible mission is extended.  Thus the extension of the visible mission into the 
apostles and their successors is but one extension among several.  Indeed, it is almost 
an expected result  of  a  presence  of  God in the world,  for  something in  act  acts 
outside itself.73  But the clothes also become a symbol for the very manifestation of 
the Word, both in the scriptural text and in the humanity of Christ.  Thus, despite his 
very strong reservations about a possible super-Nestorianism that says that the Word 
puts on humanity as a human being puts on clothes (for clothes are only accidentally 
united to a human being, and do not form one person with him), Thomas realises that 
the image is helpful, because the Word is seen through the human nature, as people 
are through their clothes; moreover, when one puts on clothes, they adopt the shape 
(figura) of the one wearing them.74
There is one place, however, where Thomas embraces this ambiguity, and if 
we consider what is happening there, this sheds a light on a very different use of the 
clothing metaphor to explain baptism.
Commenting  on  “Wash  me,  I  shall  be  whiter  than  snow” in  Psalm 50, 
Thomas picks up the image of the clothes of Christ becoming whiter than snow at the 
72  It is the only explanation found in the Summa.
73 Cf the remarks of Chrysostom referred to above in the Catena in Marcum, 5.2.
74 ST III.2.6 cor and ad 1.
197
transfiguration, drawing upon the familiar interpretation of the clothes as the souls of 
the just, quoting Isaiah, “with all these you shall be clothed as with a garment.” 75  He 
then links this with the baptismal washing by citing Galatians 3:27, “All you who 
have been baptized have put  on Christ.”   He has suddenly switched from Christ 
putting on us to us putting on Christ.  If we look at some of the other usages he has  
made of the metaphor of clothing ourselves with Christ, we can make some sense of 
this paradox.
When Christ puts on humanity, he changes it for the better, as we have seen. 
When  we  put  on  Christ,  we  put  on  the  “new  humanity”  (novum  hominem)  as 
reformed by Christ.  This above all means putting on his virtues (which belong to 
him in his humanity), which are not simply good habits, but sources of power, and 
Thomas uses the image of wood “putting on” fire and participating in the power of 
the fire.76  But also putting on clothes involves protection, covering, and the way we 
look (our “colour”).  In the one who has put on Christ, nothing appears accept what 
is  of  Christ.77  All  this  will  be  important  later  when  we  talk  about  sacraments 
configuring  us  to  Christ  (the  clothes  adopt  the  “figure”  of  the  one wears  them), 
particularly being configured to his sufferings in preparation for configuration to his 
glory.  But at this point what matters is the flexibility of the metaphor of clothing, 
which Christ can put on, change (“reconfigure”?) and then hand on to us for us to 
wear and be reconfigured thereby.  Thomas sees the baptismal water as working this 
way: Christ having put on the “likeness of the flesh of sin,” enters the baptismal 
water, not to be cleansed by it but to cleanse it through his sinless flesh, and then 
75 Super Psalmos 50.4.
76 Super Galatos 3.9.
77 There is no trace here of the argument that we remain sinners, but God looks at us and sees only 
Christ and so does not punish.  For Thomas, outward signs are not for God, who seeks only 
charity, but for humans, who, having put on Christ, learn to interpret their lives according to the 
life of Christ, as we shall see in greater detail in chapter seven.
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leaves the water, allowing us in our carnal nature to enter the water and be sanctified 
by it.78
6.3.4 Configuration and conformity
We should note that for Thomas to be configured is quite different from 
being conformed.  Figura denotes something merely external, such as the shape, and 
forma denotes a foundational inner principle.79  Thus he says that in baptism “all 
clothe themselves in Christ through the configuration of character, but not through 
the conformity of grace.”80  Configuration should lead to conformity, and without 
conformity configuration is of no avail.81  But also,  figura is that which enables an 
allegorical reading.  To say that we are configured to the death of Christ in baptism, 
and that the sufferings we endure after baptism are configured to his sufferings, is to 
say that, through the action of Christ we can read our story as his story: through the 
exchange  of  figura in  baptism,  we  have  somehow  become  sharers  in  Christ's 
78 ST III.29.1 cor.  Thomas is careful to argue that the power that flows from Christ into the water is 
based “not on being connected in space, but on the likeness of appearance (non propter  
continuitatem loci, sed propter similitudinem speciei).” ST III.66.3 ad 4.  He also notes that the 
Jordan symbolized entry into the Promised Land, whereas the Red Sea symbolized merely release 
from sin.  ST III.29.4 cor, ad 1.
79 Cf the way Thomas connects the meaning of transfigurare with figura.  ST III.45.1.  (Jerome, cited 
in ad 1, is not so technical in his use of forma.)
As a result of this basic meaning of figura, the word can sometimes mean “any 
sign, which is set up to signify something, by means of assimilation to another thing.”  Scriptum 
3.16.2.1 ad 1.  The two cases in the authentic works of Thomas that talks of a of “configuration” 
with respect to grace (Scriptum 4.4.1.2.2 obj 3, ST III.63.3 ad 1) fall into this category.  Thomas 
does talk of being configured in glory, (e.g. ST III.25.6 cor, III.45.1 ad 1) but in those cases he is 
talking of the glory that redounds to the body, and is influenced by Philippians 3:21 “configuratum 
corpori claritatis suae.”
Thus I disagree with Bernhard Blankenhorn's claim that “the two terms seem to be 
synonymous for Thomas.”  “The Place of Romans 6 in Aquinas's Doctrine of Sacramental 
Causality: A Balance of History and Metaphysics,” in Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred 
Doctrine,the Sacraments, and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Romanus Cessario O.P., ed. 
Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering, (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
2010), 143.
80 ST III.69.9 ad 1.
81 ST III.70.4 ad 1.  Hence, commenting on the parable of the wedding feast, Thomas shows that it is 
not sufficient merely to have put on Christ “through the sacrament” without putting him on 
through charity, the remembrance of his death, and “conformity of works.” Super Matthaeum 22.1 
(M1770).
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narrative subjectivity, and particulary in the narrative of his priestly action.82  We can 
recall Mailhiot's claim that the spiritual readings are based on our incorporation into 
Christ.83
6.4 The passion as the moment of giving
The  argument  so  far  has  been  based  on  the  mysteries  of  Christ's  life 
(baptism,  miracles,  transfiguration)  which  are  preparatory  to  his  passion.84  The 
passion,  as  well  as  being  Christ's  great  priestly act,  is  also  the  act  by which  he 
enables us to “passively share” in his priesthood by receiving its benefits, because 
priestly sacrifice is by definition sacrifice for others.85
The passive  power  to  receive  the  fruits  of  Christ's  priesthood cannot  be 
given to us without a visible and voluntary act of giving.  Thomas sees this taking 
place through the symbolic gift to us of the water and blood that flows from Christ 
side, the only aspect of the passion according to John that  he calls the “cause of 
salvation.”86
82 ST III.45.1 cor, 49.3 ad 2, ad 3; III.63.3 cor, ad 2; III.66.2 cor, III.69.3 cor.
83 Mailhiot OP, “La pensée,” 615n 2, 640-641.
84 This provides a way of talking about the presence of the mysteries of Christ in the sacraments, 
which theologians have been seeking ever since the provocative but unrealistic theory of 
Mysteriengegenwart.  Odo Casel, “The Mystery of Christian Worship” in The Mystery of Christian 
Worship and Other Writings, (London: Darton, Longmans and Todd, 1962), 27-38  See, for 
instance, Leeming Sacramental Theology, 288, 305-313;  O'Neill, Sacramental Realism, 121. 
Schillebeeckx suggests that the historic mysteries are present in the sacraments through the 
“salvific sacrificial will” “interior to the salvific human act itself” because the beatific vision gives 
all Christ's acts a “weight of eternity.”  L'économie, 135-147 (Casel referred to 140, 144; quotes 
from 146).  However, this cannot even begin to say how the effect of, say, the baptism present in 
the sacrament is different from the effect of the transfiguration, for, as we have seen, Thomas 
regards the charity interior to these acts as being exactly the same.  We shall deal with the working 
of memory in the sacraments in chapter seven.
85 ST III.63.2 cor.  Cf Colman O'Neill “Appendix 5: The Priesthood of Christ: 3a. 22,” in Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 50 The One Mediator 3a. 16-26 (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1965), 248.
86 Super Ioannem 19.5 (M2458)
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6.4.1 The flow of blood and water
The voluntary nature of this event is a part of the voluntary nature of Christ's 
sacrificial death: “none of us has the power to sleep when he would like to as Christ 
had to die when he wanted to.”87  Even though the flow of blood and water happens 
when Christ is already dead, Thomas sees it as intended by Christ (presumably as an 
integral part of his dying), and with a literal meaning: “so that Christ might show 
what he was, namely truly human.”  Nor is it an accident that there is uncongealed 
blood and the purest of water flowing from a dead body:  like the shining of the 
clothes at the transfiguration, it  is a miracle.88  Beyond the literal  meaning it  has 
mystical meanings.  It is a fulfilment of figures (the opening in the side of the ark, 
Eve coming forth from the side of Adam); it shows that we are washed from sins and 
stains of sin through the passion; and it  points to the sacraments of baptism and 
Eucharist, or perhaps the Eucharist alone.
6.4.2 Reception in faith
It  is  by receiving these sacraments  that  the effect  of  Christ's  sacrifice is 
mediated to us, and so his sacrifice is truly priestly.  As Thomas says repeatedly, the 
sacrifice of the cross is applied to us through faith and the sacraments of the faith.89 
The first virtue that a law teaches is that of obedience to the law.90  Similarly, to 
accept a sacrament is an act of worship honouring the giver of the sacrament, and, as 
such, is a protestation of faith in the power of that sacrament.91  Thus it is through 
87 Super Ioannem 19.5 (M2432), citing Augustine.  Cf ST III.22.2 ad 1.
88 It is “valde miraculosum.” Super Ioannem 19.5 (M2458)
89 ST III.48.6 ad 2, III.49.3 ad 1, III.49.5 cor.  Häring comments on the close links between these two 
in Sacraments, 128.
90 ST I-II.92.1 cor, ad 4.
91 ST II-II.89 prologus, ST III.61.4 cor. Cf Chauvet, “The 'first efficacy of rite' is to 'cause people to 
believe in the rite itself '.” 347-348, citing F.A. Isambert, 'Réforme liturgique et analyses 
sociologiques,' Le Maison Dieu 128 (1976), 84.  One could view this in the light of Mauss' remark, 
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faith in Christ the priest that we become part of the worshipping human subject of 
Christ, members of his mystical body, the Church, and equally that faith is the gift of 
God,  in  a  certain  sense given through the sacrament.   But  faith  is  merely a  gift 
(object), not the spirit of the gift.  Someone who has faith and not love is receiving “a 
grace” from Christ, who is the source of all “graces,” and is thus connected to the 
head and part of the body.  But because they are not receiving from Christ the head 
grace in its fullest sense, gratia gratum faciens, they are part of the body secundum 
quid, like a paralyzed limb that the body drags around with it.92
6.4.3 The relation between baptism and Eucharist
We should make a distinction here between the two sacraments.  The blood 
that flows from Christ's side is the same blood that is given to us in the Eucharist; the 
water with which we are washed in baptism is merely the same element as that which 
flowed from Christ's side or in which he was baptized by John  -  the connection 
between  them  is  through  likeness  or  symbolism.93  Thomas  holds  that  efficient 
causality between corporeal things can only take place through physical contact: the 
passion of Christ is corporeal, as are our own bodies, that are the means through 
which God touches our souls, taking into account our fallen state.94  Thus it is the 
Eucharist  which is  the  chief  of  the  sacraments,  the one through which the  other 
sacraments have their effect.  Thomas quite explicitly says that baptism only works 
through  an  (at  least  implicit)  desire  for  the  Eucharist.   To  use  Maussian  terms, 
quoted earlier, that “ the illusion of the real . . . is already of the real.”  See 4.3.2.
This does not apply if one approaches in a spirit of superstition or some other sort of fiction.  This 
will be discussed in chapter nine.
92 ST III.8.3 cor, ad 2.  The situation where at least one of the trio sacrament, faith and love is not 
present will be examined in more detail in chapter nine.
93 ST III.66.3 ad 4.
94 Cf ST III.62.6 cor.
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baptism involves the giving of a don d'institution; the Eucharist, on the other hand, is 
the gift given within the existing relationship, but insofar as the Maussian gift is the 
gift  of  oneself,  this  is  supremely  realised  in  the  Eucharist.   The  gift  given  and 
received puts the recipient in the power of the giver, for the recipient is in debt to the 
giver, and thus in the Eucharist (and through the Eucharist in baptism) the recipient is 
bound to the giver.95
As  a  don  d'institution,  baptism  enables  the  gracious  and  meritorious 
exchange that is symbolized in the Eucharist.  This does not mean that there was no 
prior exchange between God and humans, merely that the prior exchange was not 
gracious or meritorious: our reflections on Mauss have shown that enemies keep up a 
very lively (and deadly) exchange, but the exchange between enemies, even when it 
consists of “gifts,” is motivated by fear and self-interest.  We are enemies with God, 
not because God hates us, but because we are incapable of gracious exchange:96 As 
we have seen,  Thomas holds that we need a priest  because sin prevents us from 
offering  sacrifice  to  God.97  The  need  for  the  incarnation  and  the  sacraments  is 
predicated  upon  our  sinfulness  and  turning  towards  temporal  goods;98 and  if  we 
reckon things  according to  temporal  goods,  then we must  look upon God as the 
provider of material rewards and punishments, climaxing in the punishment of death. 
A gracious exchange is only possible through learning to view death (and all the 
other poenalitates of sin) in a different light, and we have seen that baptism does this 
by configuring us to Christ by imitating his death and resurrection.  Hence Thomas 
insists that the sacraments have their power through the passion of Christ.99  Hence 
95 Mauss, The Gift, 51, 61.
96 Cf ST III.49.4.  Thomas still talks of God's hate for us (in that he wants to punish our sins), but he 
has already told us how to interpret such an expression (ST I.19.11 cor, I.20.2 ad 4).
97 6.2.2.
98 ST III.1.3 cor, ad 1; III.61.1-2.
99 ST III.62.5.  For the relation between passion and resurrection in our justification and in the 
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also the role Thomas ascribes to faith, the faith implicit in receiving the sacrament. 
Moreover, the character given in baptism works by being a sign, and yet it is only a 
sign in relation to the outward ritual.100  We do not enter into this gracious exchange 
except through a ritual that symbolizes the washing away of the stain of sin and the 
coolness  that  is  the  quenching  of  the  fires  of  punishment.101  Indeed,  we  can 
corroborate all that we have said about baptism by considering Thomas' theology of 
baptismal character, and character in general.
6.5 Baptismal character as a sharing in Christ's priesthood
The enrolment of a soldier is marked in two ways, and Thomas uses both of 
them to illustrate our following of Christ.  Predestination is likened to writing the 
enlisted in a book,102 and Thomas, innovating in the Summa, goes back to the primary 
meaning of “character” as a mark or brand on a soldier's body in order to understand 
the Christian reality that bears the same name.103  Character is first and foremost 
some sort of sign.  The definition of sign by Augustine universally accepted by the 
scholastics held that it was something detected by the senses;104 Thomas admits that 
character is a sign in a derivative way, as being caused by an outward rite that is a 
sign.  As a sign, it distinguishes those who bear it from those who do not.105
sacraments, see III.62.5 ad 3.
100 ST III.63.1 ad 2.
101 ST III.69.2 ad 2.
102 ST I.24.1 cor.
103 Schillebeeckx, L'économie, 409-410, comparing ST III.64.1 with Scriptum 4.4.1.1 cor.
104 De Doctrina Christiana 2.1, cited at ST III.63.1 ad 2.  For its universal acceptance by the 
scholastics, see Irène Rosier Cattach, La Parole efficace: signe, rituel, sacré (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 
481-482.
105 ST III.63.1 ad 2.
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6.5.1 Potestas or potentia?
Thomas  also  argues  that  character  is  a  spiritual  power  (potestas)  and  a 
participation in Christ's priesthood.106  Potestas often denotes authority, for instance, 
marriage gives each spouse a potestas over the body of the other spouse, but this is 
not a new ability, but rather a consequence of their belonging to each other, to the 
intertwining  of  their  subjectivities.107  Similarly,  Thomas  refutes  the  idea  that 
character is a radically new ability, a new potentia of the soul, for if it were, it would 
be located in  the essence  of  the soul.108  If  Thomas does  refer  to  character  as  a 
potentia, this is picking up the terminology of Aristotle who holds that only three 
sorts of things can exist in the soul, potentia, habitus or passio, or that potentia is the 
second species of quality.109  But by making character reside in one of the existing 
powers (potentiae), Thomas is ensuring that it is a potentia only as a modification or 
perfection of a  potentia that already exists.  Indeed, the intellectual power already 
can perform those protestations of faith that are acts of worship, what is added to 
them by character is that Christ uses them as part of his worship.110  Those who take 
106 ST III.63.2, 63.3 cor.  Thomas' contemporaries had linked only the character of ordination to 
Christ's priesthood; Thomas saw the character of baptism (and confirmation) as linked to Christ's 
priesthood as well.  B. Fraigneau-Julien, L'Église et le caractère sacramental selon M.-J.  
Scheeben (Paris (?): Desclée de Brouwer, 1958), 226,
107 Super I Corinthios 7.1 (M314-325).  It would be an interesting digression to explore the parallel 
between the formation of the mystical body through the Eucharist and Thomas' teaching about the 
formation of one body in marriage through the creation of a mutual debt which is paid through the 
gift of one's body.  (See also Scriptum 4.27.1.3; 4.32.)  But I shall not do so because, although 
Thomas often states that marriage is an image of the union between Christ and the Church, I can 
find no evidence of any influence in this regard in either direction.  Thomas does sometimes make 
use of the parallel, for instance, arguing that sacramental marriage is indissoluble because it is an 
image of the bond between Christ and the Church (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.78.4-5), but not at 
the level of how the bond is constructed or maintained.
108 ST III.63.4 ad 2.  Admittedly the distinction between potentia and potestas is by no means 
absolute, but potentia is very definitely a principle of operation that enables one to act on an other 
object (ST I.8.3 ad 3, I.25.1 obj 3, I.41.4 cor), and it would not be used for an authority to act in 
the way that potestas is used.  As an indication, the Index Thomisticus gives 19 places in Thomas' 
works where potestas is used with Papa, but none for potentia.
109 ST III.63.2 sed contra, cor.  Similarly, discussing the character of confirmation, Thomas uses 
potentia when making an Aristotelian distinction, but then potestas when showing how this 
“power” is used.  ST III.72.5 obj 2, ad 2.
110 ST III.63.4 ad 3.
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part in Christian worship are ministers of Christ, and thus instrumental causes.111  As 
part of Christ's worship, the acts of the Christian give glory to God in a way they 
could  not  otherwise  achieve.   They do  not  thereby merit  anything  more  for  the 
worshipper,  because  merit  comes  from  charity  which  comes  from  grace,  and 
character and grace, even if related, are clearly distinct; indeed, character is directed 
primarily towards worship and only secondarily towards grace.112  Christ's worship is 
priestly, that is, it offers something to God on behalf of others, and therefore requires 
for its completion others who receive its effects.  Baptism designates some people as 
chosen by Christ to receive the effects of his priestly act, for Thomas insists both that 
receiving a sacraments is an act of worship, and that baptism only has its effects 
because it is ordered towards the Eucharist.113
Against this seemingly reductionist reading one could cite those passages 
where Thomas refers to character as a “spiritual sign” and a “spiritual power.”114  It is 
important here to see the primary referent of “spiritual.”  It is the cult that involves 
the sacraments of the New Law which is spiritual, because it has a spiritual effect: 
these sacraments contain and cause grace in a way that those of the Old Law do 
not.115  Whatever change circumcision makes on a person's subjectivity, it does not 
connect it with the subjectivity of Christ or make it part of any narrative involving 
spiritual rewards.  There is no need for a spiritual sign, so a purely corporeal sign 
suffices.
This position is worth comparing with that of Schillebeeckx, who claims 
that such deputation to worship is is purely juridical  -  even among the Jews  -  but 
111 ST III.63.2 cor, 63.5 ad 1.
112 O’Neill, Meeting Christ, 93, with reference to ST III.63.4 ad 1.
113 ST II-II.89 prologus, ST III.73.3 cor.
114 ST III.63.1 cor, ad 3; III.63.2. III.63.5 cor, III.72.5 cor, ad2.
115 ST III.63.1 ad 3.
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in the Church it is a “potentia physica.”116  The very fact that he needs to introduce a 
term foreign to Thomas points to a misreading; if it were a new  potentia physica, 
then it would reside in the essence of the soul.  Not that we could call character 
“juridical”  -  it is about subjectivity, identity, and what in some cultures is called 
“face.”  It is very much a “personalist” term.
The second difference is the emphasis on the community.  For Thomas, it is 
not so much initiation into the Church that brings about this spiritual power,  but 
belonging to Christ.   Baptism first  of all  links a person to Christ,  makes them a 
member  of  Christ,  and  because  there  are  many  members  organized  towards 
perfecting each other in worship, this multitude is a body with Christ as head.  There 
is a tendency in some recent theologies to start at the anthropological level and hold 
that the Church, as a community, can initiate members into itself, and then to argue 
up from that to the ability to take part in the priestly act of Christ.117  For Thomas the 
sacrament always has Christ as its principal agent, and the minister is at the level of 
an  instrumental  cause.   Character  is  the  character  of  Christ  that  distinguishes 
members of the Church, and not the character of the Church.118  It is Christ who acts 
to authorise a person to share his subjectivity.  Authorisation, of its nature, comes as 
a gift; it cannot be presumed, and so its bestowal must be displayed in signs.
6.5.2 From character to grace
Thus far I have been speaking of baptismal character, the gift object, rather 
116 Schillebeeckx, L'économie, 416.
117 For example, see the critique by Michael Dauphinais of the approach of Joseph Martos, “Christ 
and the Metaphysics of Baptism in the Summa Theologiae and the Commentary on John,” in 
Rediscovering Aquinas and the Sacraments: Studies in Sacramental Theology , ed. Matthew 
Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2009), 15-16, with reference to 
Joseph Martos, Doors to the Sacred: A Historical Introduction to Sacraments in the Catholic  
Church (Chicago: Triumph Books, 1991), 164-165, 176.
118 ST III.63.3.
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than  the  grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  spirit  of  the  gift.   But  Thomas  follows 
Augustine  in  holding  that  “each  human   being  becomes  a  Christian  from  the 
beginning  of  her  own  faith  by  the  same  grace  as  that  human  being  from  the 
beginning became Christ.”119  Accordingly, not when discussing the grace of Christ, 
but when considering the mysteries of his life, Thomas talks of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the conception of Christ, showing how it parallels the Spirit's work in our 
becoming adoptive sons.120
The Spirit was operative in Christ  first of all because God's plan for the 
incarnation was conceived out of love.  Thomas here does not argue, as he could, that 
Christ's predestination to glory was the model and cause of ours, because in one 
single act God intended that our glory should come through the glory of Christ, and 
therefore our predestination is  equally the work of the Holy Spirit.121  Rather,  he 
reminds us that it was love of us sinners that prompted the love of that human nature: 
“God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son.”
Secondly, Christ's birth from (de) the Holy Spirit (presumably meaning the 
miraculous formation of his human nature in the Virgin's womb) was indicative of 
the fact that the assumption of a human nature into the unity of the person of the Son 
was without preceding merits (as, we have argued, is the assumption of our human 
nature into the persona mystica formed from the “subjectivity” of the Son).
Thirdly, the purpose of the union is that a human being should be the natural 
Son of God  -  and this is the Holy Spirit's work, just as it is the Holy Spirit who 
makes us adoptive sons, crying “Abba, Father!” (and thus acknowledging the source) 
119 ST III.2.10 sed contra, III.7.13 obj 1, III.23.4 obj 2, citing Augustine, De Praedestinatione 
Sanctorum 10.
120 Cf ST III.32.1 cor, which is the source of the next three paragraphs.
121 Cf ST III.24.3 cor, 4 cor, ad 3.
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-  and holy, for the Spirit is also the Spirit of sanctification.122
Christ is the first in the genus of graced people, and so is the source and 
model of all those who have grace.  This grace is given to us through baptism.  At the 
level of the sacramentum tantum, it is an extension of the visible mission of the Son; 
at the level of the  res et sacramentum,  a share in Christ's “subjectivity” (e.g.  his 
priesthood), one gift object of the many which he has in all their fulness.123  And 
through these visible means we receive the gift objects, given gratuitously, and so we 
are graced with the overflow of Christ's grace.
But  the efficacy of  baptism depends upon a  desire  for  the  Eucharist,  an 
examination of which in chapter seven will explain more fully many of the points 
made here, particularly the saving significance of the passion.
122 This sheds further light on how baptismal character, unlike the deputation to worship through 
circumcision under the Old Law, is a “spiritual character” (ST III.63.1 ad 3) and the work of the 
Holy Spirit, without denying that it is potestas rather than potentia.
123 Cf the description of the capital grace of Christ at ST III.8.1 cor.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EUCHARIST AS “GOOD GRATIA”
7 The Eucharist as gracious gift object
Of all the sacraments, the Eucharist  can most easily be considered as an 
extension of the visible mission of the Word, for here we have the body and blood of 
Christ  available  to  our  senses.  In  order  for  this  “visible  mission” to  become an 
invisible  mission  (and thus  be accompanied by an  invisible  mission of  the  Holy 
Spirit, that is, grace), it needs to reach through to our intellect, in other words, it must 
be read, or considered as a sign, and not only as a sign of the body of Christ (the 
literal sense of the sign), but a sign of the body as graciously given so as to excite 
gratitude, and, more specifically, as sufficiently precious  -  either in itself or in what 
it means for us  -  so that the gratitude is grace, the presence of the Holy Spirit.
Thomas  succinctly  describes  the  Eucharist  as  such  a  gift  object  in  his 
Magnificat antiphon for the Office of Corpus Christi.
O sacrum convivium, in quo Christus sumitur, O sacred banquet in which Christ is  
received,
recolitur memoria passionis eius, the memory of his passion is renewed,
mens impletur gratia the mind is filled with grace
et futurae gloriae nobis pignus datur. and a pledge of future glory is given 
to us.
The  structure  of  the  antiphon  reflects  the  structure  of  the  sacrament  as 
examined in chapter two.  There is the sacramentum tantum, the convivium (shared 
meal) which signifies and makes really present the res et sacramentum, the body of 
Christ.  The  body  (and  blood)  of  Christ  as  signified  in  turn  indicate  the  res 
sacramenti through a threefold sign: rememorative of the passion, the efficient cause 
of our sanctification; demonstrative of the formal cause of our sanctification, grace; 
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and foretelling the final cause of our sanctification, future glory.1
But  there  is  another  approach to  the  causality of  the  sacrament,  for  our 
sanctification is equivalent to the presence of the Holy Spirit by which charity is 
poured into our hearts.  The Holy Spirit, of course, is uncaused, but love has causes - 
goodness,  knowledge and likeness  -   and charity is love whose object is  magni 
pretii.  If the Holy Spirit is present in our hearts through love, then these three causes 
must be operating.  The threefold nature of this cause does not reflect an Aristotelian 
division: they describe not only the efficient cause, but (at least) also the final cause, 
for the lover seeks the good of the beloved, wants to know the beloved and be united 
to the beloved.  But this threefold division does in some way correspond to faith, 
hope and love.   Faith  lets  us  know that  beyond this  bodily world  there  exists  a 
spiritual world of great value, which God wants to share with us; this then gives us a 
potential likeness, a likeness in hope; and the gratuity with which this hope is offered 
makes us respond in love.
There is an intricate network of causality here that defies being reduced to a 
single logical thread.  The presentation of the Eucharist in the  Summa has quite a 
different logic to that used in the commentary on John 6, and neither of them really 
follows the plan proposed to us by the Magnificat antiphon.  What I want to do is as 
follows.
First, I shall consider Thomas' commentary on John 6.  Being based upon a 
narrative, it is more concerned with development and transition than are Thomas' 
other accounts of the Eucharist.  In particular I want to consider it as the move from a 
carnal economy to a spiritual one that comes about through faith.
Going from faith to hope, I shall  then consider what Thomas says about 
1  ST 60.3 cor.
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covenant and pledge, which are the basis of our hope.  Starting from his comments 
on the words over the chalice, I shall consider how God uses material things to give 
hope to people collapsi ad corpora, and therefore how our potential spiritual likeness 
must somehow be based upon a bodily likeness.  The bodily likeness is, of course, 
the first gift object which enables a second one, the spiritual gift.  But we shall also  
need to consider how our hope is not only for union with God but also for union with 
the Church.
When faith discloses to us the object of our hope, we also can realise that 
something of great price has been freely and graciously given to us, and thus respond 
in love.  This will entail a reading of the passion as an act of love, great in itself and 
even greater when considered as made in the face of suffering and sin.  The way that 
this promotes love in us will then help to explain why Christ's death (represented in 
the Eucharist) can be considered as satisfying for us, and the role of the explanation 
that he can satisfy for us because we are one body with him.
And  after  that,  there  will  still  be  facets  of  Thomas'  presentation  of  the 
Eucharist in the  Summa that offer further insights or which need to be reconciled 
with this overall picture.
7.1 The Eucharist and faith
7.1.1 Thomas on John's Gospel as a whole
Ceslaus  Spicq  notes  that  early scholastic  commentators  used  to  give  the 
auctor, modus et materia of the book under discussion, and later ones used Aristotle's 
four  causes;  moreover,  we  can  see  this  transition  at  work  in  Thomas'  own 
commentaries.2  The prologue to his commentary on John (a later work) takes the 
2 Ceslaus Spicq, Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge (Paris: Vrin, 1944), 212-
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Aristotelian approach, although instead of formal cause Thomas holds that the “ordo” 
of John's  Gospel  is  the movement from contemplation of God's  essence,  through 
contemplation of his  virtus, to being united to God.3  This  ordo is not the macro-
structure  (which  is  termed  a  divisio  textus or  a  distinctio4),  but  something  that 
permeates  the  whole  Gospel,  a  structuring  principle  that  is  found  recursively  at 
different  levels,  which  can  be  verified  if  one  takes  the  trouble  to  collate  the 
indications of the divisio textus found strategically placed through the commentary.
In a similar vein, commenting on chapter 5, which contains a miracle and a 
discourse, Thomas notes that it is customary in this Gospel that “to the teaching of 
Christ there is always joined a visible deed pertinent to the subject of the teaching, so 
that in this way invisible things can be made known from visible things.”5  The deed 
itself, even if miraculous, does not immediately lead to perfect faith, that is, faith that 
takes Christ as its end.  Thomas notes that Nicodemus (who has seen many miracles), 
has  imperfect  faith,  or  rather  opinion,  about  Jesus,  and so needs teaching.6  The 
teaching is often about the sacraments, the means by which we join ourselves to 
Christ.
Thus,  when  Thomas  comes  across  sacraments  in  John's  Gospel,  he  is 
expecting them to be part of a larger unit that involves movement from defective 
knowledge of God, through a call to faith based upon a miracle, to union with Christ 
through the sacrament.
The  defective  knowledge  is  an  integral  part  of  the  process,  and  so,  for 
instance, the Samaritans do not know God because they also worship idols (Thomas 
218.
3   Super Ioannem, Prologus (M10).
4 Super Romanos Prologus (M11).
5  In Johannem c. 5, lect. 1 (M699), cf  In Johannem c. 6, lect. 1 (M844).
6  Super Ioannem, 3.1 (M431),  cf 7.5 (M1114)
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cites “You worship what you do not know, we worship what we do know”), and yet 
this error is an integral part of the woman's journey to true faith, for it gives her the 
desire to ask Christ about true worship.7  This movement from error to knowledge is 
typical of John's style.8  It is Chauvet's reluctance to see this error as an integral part 
of the working of the sacraments, which leads him to discount the more material 
qualities of the sacramental elements in favour of their more symbolic ones.9
This accounts for both the advantages and disadvantages of using the text of 
the  Lectura to  understand the  sacraments.   Thomas  comments  on  the  Gospel  as 
structured around the change that is taking place in the recipient of the sacraments, 
and comments on it as such, whereas in the  Summa we tend to find scriptural or 
traditional assertions that the change takes place, and theological justifications of the 
possibility of such a change, given the causes that are operating.  The disadvantage is 
that the cause of these changes is the object of John's contemplation, the unity of the 
divine  essence,  but  we want  to  break  down what  John saw  totum simul into  its 
metaphysical (essence), physical (virtus) and ethical (union) aspects (or into similar 
divisions).10  We shall see how hard it is to isolate one from the other two.
7.1.2 Chapter Six as an example of the move from the carnal to the spiritual
7.1.2.1 The miracle story as an introduction to the discourse
Chapter six begins with the crowds following Jesus, according to Thomas 
either because of his teaching, or because of the visible signs he has performed, or 
7 4.2 (M603).   Cf John Milbank, “Truth and Vision”, in John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, 
Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), 39.
8 Among the “notable characteristics” of John's style, Raymond Brown includes, “twofold or double 
meaning,” “misunderstanding” and “irony.”  The Gospel according to John (Garden City NY: 
Doubleday, 1966), 1.cxxxv-cxxxvi.
9 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 397.
10   Super Ioannem proœmium, (M9).
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because they have been healed by him.11  So this chapter begins, with some sort of 
quest for God or for Jesus already in place, but based upon a knowledge that is, as we 
shall soon see, defective, as is their union with God.
Thomas  divides  chapter  six  into  two  sections,  a  visible  miracle  and  its 
effects on the people (6:1-25) and teaching by Jesus (6:26-72), which correspond to 
the Word's virtus over nature and the way we are sanctified by the Word and adhere 
to it through the sacraments that the ordo suggests should be there.
Thomas gives spiritual interpretations of the narrative.12  These do not add 
any extra information to what is contained in the discourse, but enable us to receive 
that teaching in a way that is life-giving. If the feeding of the multitude is a gift that 
is meant to bring us into friendship and covenant union with Jesus, and if it is a 
prelude to  greater,  spiritual  gifts,  then  this  should be indicated in  the manner  of 
giving   -   either  through  the  deliberate  choice  of  Jesus  or  the  providential 
arrangement of God  -   and thus the inspired evangelist  selects those events and 
details  that  best  serve  the  overall  purpose  of  the  Gospel.13  Thomas  makes  his 
spiritual interpretations on these grounds, and on also identifications made elsewhere 
in scripture, such as “Your justice is like the mountains of God” or “All flesh is 
grass.”14
I shall not consider each one individually, but the overall effect of all these 
allegories is to prepare us to trample down the carnal ways and thoughts beneath us 
11 6.1 (M843).  (In this section, references to the Lectura Super Ioannem will be merely by chapter 
and lecture number, followed by the paragraph number from the Marietti edition.)
12 But not of the discourse, in keeping with his principles.  Michel Corbin, “Le pain de la vie: La 
lecture de Jean VI par S. Thomas d'Aquin,” Recherches de science religieuse 65.1 (1977): 112-
113.  See also 2.1.1.2.
13 Thus the Evangelist chooses to record only some miracles (6.1 (M844)), and  mention the qualitas 
temporis (nature of the time) with regard to certain persons in order to convey their state of mind 
or the quality of their actions (3.1 (M427)).
14  6.1 (M845, M857).
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and  rise  up  to  a  spiritual  understanding,  and  the  allegory  of  the  two  crossings 
prepares  us  for  the  two reactions  to  Christ's  teaching.   When we move into  the 
discourse, these ideas will be presented to us in the literal sense of the text; in fact, 
Thomas considers the first part of the discourse to consist in Jesus calling the crowds 
to move from a carnal to a spiritual understanding, that is, to the truth.  Thomas is  
showing that the visible miracle, in its very materiality and in the singular details that 
are part of it, becomes part of the way we move from the carnal to the spiritual.
One of these interpretations needs a more detailed treatment: that of Philip 
and  Andrew  representing  philosophy  and  the  Law.   Thomas  explains  that  the 
“testing” way in which Christ asked Philip was meant to elicit a response through 
which others could be led into utterly certain knowledge of the sign that was to take 
place.15  Now Philip, commenting that not even 200 denarii could buy enough bread, 
is proclaiming the insufficiency of all knowledge obtained by acquisition (either by 
experience or by contemplation) to bring people to the fulness of wisdom: not only is 
philosophy incapable of calling people back from error, it actually leads them into 
it.16  Andrew, on the other hand, does not want to buy bread (wisdom), but looks to 
what is already there, the crude barley loaves of a mere boy symbolizing the Mosaic 
law that cannot bring anyone to perfection; besides, the Jews could not understand its 
true meaning as they were still veiled; nor can something as localised as the Law 
(“God is made known in Judah”) lead the human race as a whole to the truth.  Truth 
here is opposed to error and figure.    Thus Thomas places the discourse on the bread 
of life in the context of the human search for God, utterly beyond any merely human 
15 6.1 (M850).
16 6.1 (M854).
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economy, and begun but frustrated until the coming of Christ.
7.1.2.2 The discourse itself
This is the structure of the bread of life discourse, according to Thomas.
Christ puts forward He puts forward he shows the spiritual he rebuts their per-
the truth of the the truth food verse cupidity 26
spiritual food
he exhorts them to
truth   27
manifests who it is 28-29
he insinuates its origin the question of the Jews
(they seek a sign) 30-31
the response of Christ 32-33
he teaches the manner the request for this food 34
of getting this spiritual
food exposition what the bread is
(the way to get it) 35-36
how to get it
37-40
He excludes with respect to the the murmur about the
contradiction murmuring crowds origin of the spiritual food41-52
the quarrel about the 53-60
eating of the spiritual food
with respect to the 61-72
doubting disciples
This division reflects the ordo.  There is the invitation to contemplate lofty 
things  (moving from bodily to  spiritual  food);  seeing the power of the object  of 
contemplation (its origin, which arises from a request for a  sign); and the way of 
attaining the object, which, as we shall see, is through faith and love.  The last two 
are repeated, as Christ proposes the truth and then deals with objections.17
Thomas realises that in the beginning “bread of life” refers to Wisdom, and 
later to the Eucharist, but he presents a structure that shows the unity of the theme of 
spiritual food.  Whereas, Raymond Brown start with two discourses, one on Wisdom 
17 Michel Corbin finds the division reminiscent of a scholastic disputatio. “Le pain de la vie: La 
lecture de Jean VI par S. Thomas d'Aquin,” Recherches de science religieuse 65/1 (1977), 110-111. 
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and the second on the Eucharist, but, as Michael Dauphinais remarks, “What he has 
distinguished,  Brown  has  no  ability  to  unite.”18  For  Thomas,  within  the  one 
discourse, the Eucharist remains instrumental; it is only raised as a response to an 
objection, or the answer to a contingent need.
7.1.2.3 Distinguishing the carnal and the spiritual
Thomas considers the Bread of Life discourse to begin at 6:26, where Christ 
rebuts the “perverse cupidity” of the crowds and tries to lead them to the truth.19  As 
our examination of Thomas' text will gradually make clear, this is also a move from a 
“carnal” economy to a “spiritual” one.  But this move is equivalent to coming to 
faith, and it requires faith because of the intrinsic difficulty involved.  Thomas refers 
to  this  difficulty  in  pointing  out  that  the  move will  be  achieved  by one who is 
designated not as Son of God but as Son of Man: it is the humanity of Christ that can 
reach us in our carnal ignorance and desires.20  Of course,  as Thomas repeatedly 
observes, the humanity of Christ does this only by virtue of being conjoined to the 
divinity.  It is in this context that we can understand the instrumental role that the 
Eucharist plays.
We need to begin with two distinctions operative in the thought of Thomas: 
between bodily and spiritual food, and between a carnal and a spiritual mind.  With 
the help of these distinctions, we can develop the ideas of a carnal and a spiritual 
economy.
18 Brown, The Gospel of John, 1.272-275, 284-291.  Michael Dauphinais, “'And They Shall All Be 
Taught by God': Wisdom and the Eucharist in John 6” in Michael Dauphinais and Matthew 
Levering, edd., Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative  
Theology (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 312-317, esp. 312-313.
19   6.3 (M892)
20   6.3 (M897).
218
Thomas begins his comments on the Bread of Life discourse by noting that 
the crowds seek Christ for the sake of bread, not because they have seen the signs  -  
that is, for carnal rather than spiritual motives  -  and following Augustine he makes 
the point that such people still exist in his own age among Christians.21  So Christ 
must lead them back to the truth.  He does so by proposing to them spiritual  -  as 
opposed to bodily  -  food, first its virtus, then its auctoritas.
It is clear from this discussion that spiritual realities (in this case, spiritual 
“food”) have ontological priority over material realities, which are like them and in a 
manner  imitate  them because  they  are  caused  by  them and  derived  from them. 
Nonetheless, the very indefinite way Thomas talks of spiritual food (“whatever it 
may be”) reminds us that, from our point of view, it is bodily food, as that which 
sustains the body, that we know first.  But bodily food sustains the body by being 
corrupted  -  and therefore it cannot endure to eternal life  -  whereas spiritual food 
changes the one who receives it (quoting Augustine's Confessions here) and does not 
perish, and so can endure to eternal life.  This is the food we should “work”: that is,  
seek by working or merit by working; this is the food that should be at the heart of 
our economy.22
Thomas then tells us, based on three scriptural quotes, what the bread of life 
is:
 God himself, as the truth to be contemplated and the goodness to be loved;
 obedience to the divine commandments; 
 Christ.
We notice here that  the interpretations  begin with the most  spiritual  and 
gradually become more corporeal, but always with the spiritual in control, for when 
21   6.3  (M893-894)
22  6.3 (M895)
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Thomas finally gets to citing “My flesh is real food and my blood is real drink,” he 
qualifies this as “only insofar as it is conjoined to the Word of God, who is the food 
by which the angels live.” At this stage Thomas is respecting both the sense of the 
text  and his  own theology and is  much more interested in  the Word as  spiritual 
food.23
Thomas notes that Christ put forward a similar distinction between spiritual 
and bodily drink in chapter 4, to which we now turn.
Here Thomas is reconciling the apparent contradiction between Jesus' claim 
that those who drink the water he gives will not thirst  in aeternum and Wisdom's 
claim (Sir 24:29) “Those who drink me will still thirst.”  The second explanation he 
gives involves a comparison between the thirst for temporal and spiritual things, and 
is worth quoting at length.
[A] temporal thing, when possessed, causes thirst not for itself, but for some other 
thing; a spiritual thing takes away thirst for an other thing, and causes thirst for itself.  
The  reason  for  this  is  that,  before  it  is  possessed  a  temporal  thing  is  reckoned 
(aestimatur)  to  be  of  great  value  (magni  pretii)  and  sufficient;  but  after  it  is 
possessed, because it is found to be not so great nor sufficient to quiet the desire, it  
not only does not satisfy the desire but rather the desire is moved to having some 
other thing.  But the spiritual thing is not known unless it is possessed (Rev 2:17 
“No one knows, except the one who receives”).  And so when it is not possessed it  
does not move the desire; but when it is possessed and known, then it delights the  
affect and moves the desire, not indeed to having something else, but, because it is  
imperfectly  grasped  [percipitur  can  mean  both  “seized”  and  “understood”]  on 
account of the imperfection of the receiver, it moves [the desire] that it might be 
possessed perfectly.24
Thomas goes on to note that in glory we shall possess perfectly and so we 
shall not thirst in aeternum.
23 I  6.3 (M895).  While angels desire to feast on the Word of God, they do not desire to receive the 
Eucharist, which would be impossible for them.  ST III.80.2.
24 Super Ioannem 4.2 (M586)
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In  this  beautiful  contrast  between  restlesss  temporal  and restful  spiritual 
desire, a particularly important phrase is magni pretii, indicating not only that we are 
concerned with an economy, but also one in which the operative desire is charity.25 
The inordinate love of temporal goods, based on a false estimation of their worth, is a 
misleading  subsitute  for  charity.26  It  would  be  easy  to  see  how  such  a  false 
estimation would lead to an entirely false economy.27
Of course, until food and the stomach are eschatologically destroyed, the 
bodily economy does not disappear.  Thomas approvingly cites Augustine's reproach 
of monks who cited John 6:27 as justification for not performing manual labour.  We 
must keep working bodily to keep the body alive, but all this activity is “accessory”to 
the spiritual economy.28
A question arises: given that the true value of a spiritual thing cannot be 
known until it is possessed, what value can motivate a decision to enter the new (and 
true) economy?  Thomas comments on chapter 6 will show us.
Given the threefold spiritual nature of the bread of life, we might expect it to 
be given by the Son of God, but Thomas pointedly notes that the text says, “the Son 
of  Man.”  It needs to be so, for our human nature, weakened by sin, disdains the 
spiritual and is unable to take it.   Thus the Son of God took flesh to refresh (or 
remake) us through it  -  with authority granted to him by the Father.29
25 “Magni pretii” occurs only here and at ST I-II.26.3 cor.  Thomas often uses the ablative magno 
pretio (indicating the cost at which something is purchased), especially when citing 1 Cor 6:20.
26 While Thomas, commenting on Eph 5:5, shows that, although there is a similarity between avarice 
and idolatry, there is also a significant difference, he nonetheless argues that avarice is a spiritual 
sin, because it is grounded not in sensual desire but in the apprehensions of the soul.  ST II-
II.118.5 ad 4 and 118.6 cor.
27 A little further on in his comment on ch. 4,  the connection is implied but not stated between thirst 
and toil (labor), the two reasons the woman offers for seeking the water Jesus offers.  An economy 
based upon a thirst that cannot be satisfied will therefore lead to much pointless toil.  See 4.2 
(M589)
28  6.3 (M896), cf 6.5 (M639-640).
29   6.3 (M897-898)
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The  Jews  know  enough  to  realise  that  something  material  cannot  give 
eternal life, so they ask about the works of God.30  But Thomas has prepared us for 
the answer; although bodily (to meet our needs), the Son of Man has auctoritas, and 
so what we must do, the “works of God,” is faith in the one he has sent.31  The role of 
faith will be explained at length later, but Thomas does make it clear that this faith is 
faith informed by love, that is, “faith in” which makes its object its final end and the 
principle of its actions.  Only God is worthy of such faith.32  In one sense we have 
here the basic Thomistic teaching on merit, but it is articulated in different terms for 
a different problematic.
Auctoritas is a significant factor in Thomas' sacramental theology.  When 
Thomas, following the text, finally takes up a proper discussion of the Eucharist, he 
immediately presents it under four aspects: its species, the auctoritas of the one who 
instituted it, its truth and its usefulness.  These aspects are linked to the text of the 
verse,  but  it  is  clear  that  they  represent  Thomas'  own  theology,  a  variation  on 
Aristotle's  four-fold  causality:  the  institutor  is  the  efficient  cause,  its  usefulness 
corresponds to the final cause, the species to the material cause, and we are left with 
truth taking the place of the formal cause.33  And, from here on, rather than try to 
develop the theology in an order dictated entirely by the text, I shall take each of 
these causes separately, starting with auctoritas, because it is the main topic before 
we come to the discussion of the Eucharist as such.
30   6.3 (M900).
31   6.3 (M898).
32   6.3 (M901-902).
33  6.6 (M960).
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7.1.3 The efficient cause of the Eucharist: the auctoritas of Christ
For Thomas, the question of  auctoritas, with its associations of authority, 
origin, institution, empowerment, pervades the whole Gospel.  Repeatedly Thomas 
comments that a given passage contradicts the claims of Arius, because in it Christ is 
seen to have an authority or power that can only belong to God.34  Thomas explores it 
here in terms of the metaphor given in the text, to come from heaven.35  Much of 
what  Thomas  says  applies  to  Christ  himself  rather  than  the  sacraments.   What 
concerns us here is that to come and learn from God is to come to the Word, which 
Thomas expressly reminds us is the Verbum spirans Amorem: the authority of Christ 
is linked not only to his coming from the Father, but also his ability to give the Spirit.
Corbin has claimed that Thomas presents Jesus' discourse as though it were 
the lecture of a master in Paris, but Thomas does so to help us follow the thread of  
the argument in  the Gospel text.   And so when, at  the end of this  dispute about 
authority, Thomas analyses Christ's words in logical terms, this gives an important 
insight into what Thomas thinks is going on.  There is:
1. a minor premise, “I am the bread of life;”
2. a major premise, “That bread descends from heaven which gives life 
to the world;”
3. a conclusion, “I am the bread which came down from heaven.”36
The positing of both the minor and the major is broken down into two steps: 
the manifestation of the propositum, and then leading from it to the intentum, what he 
wants to say.
34 1.1 (M61-62); 1.5 (M162-127); 1.14 (M262); 3.3 (M477); 5.4 (M765-769); 6.5 (M935); 6.7 
(M978); 9.4 (M1355); 10.5 (M1450-1451); 13.3 (M1794); 14.2 (M1879); 14.3 (M1888); 14.3 
(M1895); 17.1 (M2181-2183); 17.5 (M2248).
35 The spiritual realm, and not just the upper air whence came the manna. 6.4 (M909)
36 6.6 (M949).
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For the minor, the propositum is the conclusion of the argument so far about 
authority; “the one who believes in me has eternal life.”  But, explains Thomas, to 
believe in someone (which involves both intellect and will) is to take (sumere) him 
into oneself, which could be considered as eating him.  And so Christ can speak of 
himself as the bread of life, which he does.37
For the major, the  propositum is manifested from its contrary.  Those who 
ate the “bread from heaven” that Moses gave have died, and so, says Thomas, this 
cannot be bread from heaven, for bread from heaven would have the property that 
anyone who eats it would not die (pace the Gloss, which has the Lord pointing to 
himself as he says “This is the bread coming down from heaven”).38
Now Christ can come to his logical conclusion: speaking in general, he is 
the living bread which has come down from heaven (for he is not merely human) and 
thus gives eternal life through “spiritual” eating.39  More specifically, his body is an 
organ of his divinity, and it also can  -  in the power of the Word  -  give life.  Christ 
gives  his  flesh  for  the  life  of  the  world,  and  this  through  the  sacrament  of  the 
Eucharist.40
The structure of this  syllogism indicates the place of the Eucharist.   The 
major premise, the question it seeks to answer, is about the bread from heaven.  It is  
about human desire, twisted after the fall (perversa cupiditas) and focused on earthly 
things (represented by bread).  Christ takes that desire and gets to its heart, a desire 
for eternal life.  Then he puts forward himself as the one who brings eternal life, 
which Thomas makes the minor premise.  The conclusion, that Christ is the goal of 
37  6.6 (M950).
38  6.6 (M953-955)
39  6.6 (M956-958).  
40  6.6 (M959).
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this desire is immediately followed by an invitation to eat Christ in a bodily way  - 
but if we are surprised at this, Thomas has dealt with this surprise already: the true 
bread will be given by the Son of Man, because our desires are focussed on earthly 
things.  It is the Eucharist that enables a realignment of our desire, and a restructuring 
of our economy.  The spiritual economy does not run parallel to the bodily economy, 
but  the  bodily  economy  is  subsumed  into  the  spiritual  economy  and  becomes 
“accessory”  to  it.   Thus  the  sacrament  of  the  Eucharist  will  radically  revise  our 
virtues.
7.1.4 The material cause of the Eucharist: the species of food and drink
With regard to the Eucharist  as “bread” and “food”, we can see all  four 
steps: the initial, carnal desires; the logic of perfection that these indicate something 
spiritual; the transformation of the desire; and the new order of values this brings. 
Then we shall mention two other matters associated with the presence of the body of 
Christ under the species of bread.
7.1.4.1 The starting point: our attachment to food
As for the initial state, when the people ask for a sign, Thomas uses the 
authority of Chrysostom and Augustine to show that it can be taken in two ways. 
Chrysostom presumes that the crowds are stuck at the carnal level, and want simply 
to move from one carnal economy to another.  Christ is asking for their faith, and the 
crowd see this desire of his as their opportunity.  They will trade their allegiance  - 
acknowledge his auctoritas  -  for bread.41
Augustine's  explanation  presumes  that  the  crowd  is  not  so  carnal  and 
41  6.3 (M904)
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actually wants food that endures to eternal life.  But this would be something greater 
than what Moses provided, and so they need a sign that is greater than any Moses 
performed, a sign so that they are sure of Christ's origin: “We know that God spoke 
to Moses; but we don't know where this man is from.”42  Augustine's interpretation 
does not invalidate Chrysostom's, but shows that the “bread” of the Eucharist can 
still work for those who have left the carnal economy behind  -  we do not reach a 
stage where the sacraments are useless.
7.1.4.2 The logic of perfection and the superiority of the spiritual food
As we saw, when Thomas first talks of spiritual food, he lets us know that it 
is  the  primary  referent  of  “food,”  but  nonetheless  known  to  us  by  a  logic  of 
perfection from the bodily food we eat.  This same logic recurs when Thomas tells us 
what  spiritual  food  is,  for  the  three  meanings  cited   -   God,  obedience  to  the 
commandments, and Christ  -  correspond, roughly, to the three parts of the Summa, 
and Thomas (or someone else) can prove that these are necessary for spiritual life 
without using the term “food.”  And later, when Christ first calls himself the bread of 
life, Thomas considers the properties of earthly bread (in this mortal life, it staves off 
death), and then points out that in the life to come, where there is no death, such 
bread will not be needed, but nonetheless we shall still need a source of life, the 
fount of life and wisdom; and for that reason the Word of God is principally the 
bread of life; his flesh (or the Eucharist) is the bread of life in a derivative sense, 
drawing its power from the Word to which it is joined.43
We also see this logic when Thomas comments that we can make our own 
42  6.3 (M905)
43   6.4 (M914)
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the carnal request of the Jews, “Give us this bread always,” for we say exactly the 
same words and mean it in a spiritual sense, as we do each day when we pray, “Give 
us this day our daily bread.”44  That Thomas should then add: “because we cannot 
live without this bread” would seem to be to justify the use of the term “bread”,  
rather than to prove the vital necessity of what is sought.
7.1.4.3 To be drawn by delight
He explicitly parallels this request to that of the Samaritan woman for the 
living  water.   We  have  already  noted  that  in  reference  to  this  passage  Thomas 
comments that we cannot desire spiritual gifts until we have tasted them.  But a little 
earlier he has said that we must ask for spiritual gifts: with reference to adults he 
says, “for grace is not given to anyone without petition and desire.  Whence we say 
that in the justification of the wicked free will is needed for the detestation of sin and 
the desire for grace,” a position given in more detail in the Summa.45  Thomas does 
not even draw our attention to the apparent contradiction, but goes on to present the 
woman asking for the water, asking in a carnal way although it had been offered to 
her spiritually.  And if we follow Augustine's interpretation, the misunderstanding 
continues.46  The real husband is the intellect, the five previous husbands are the five 
senses which, along with her currrent adulterous man, the misled reason, lead her to a 
carnal understanding.  This spiritual reading, of course, invites us in our carnality to 
44 6.4 (M912) Thomas, of course, allows that “bread” could also be material bread, or material 
necessities in general.    However, the way that the Lord's prayer teaches us to pray for bread, so 
that it serves our spiritual life rather than being an end in itself, is a spiritual and not a carnal way 
of prayer.  In Orationem Dominicam 4; Super Matthaeum 6.3 (M586); Catena in Matthaeum 6.7, 
ST II-II.83.9 
45 4.2 (M578), cf ST I-II.113.
46 4.2 (M5909).  Thomas represents Augustine as holding that the Lord's intent in referring to the 
woman's husband was figurative (just as the water had been).  Thomas follows Augustine's line, 
but as he is also following Chrysostom's more literal interpretation, it is not clear whether he is 
giving us two literal readings of the text or, more likely, a literal reading and an allegorical reading.
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identify  with  the  woman.   Thus  Thomas  indicates  that  through  these 
misunderstandings  and  misplaced  desires  the  woman  is  coming  to  a  deeper 
recognition of who Jesus is and is being taught how to pray.
A little later Thomas introduces the term “prevenient grace” to explain what 
is happening.  The Lord says to the disciples offering him food that he has food of 
which the disciples know nothing, and Thomas explicitly draws our attention to the 
identity of the referent of this food and the drink mentioned earlier.47  Just as the Lord 
created an occasion to talk of spiritual things under the similitude of water by asking 
the woman for a drink, so also here he creates an occasion to talk of spiritual things 
under the similitude of food when the disciples offer him food.  Then, to account for 
the lack of parallelism (as to who asks first), Thomas notes that we cannot offer God 
food (ask for salvation) unless a prevenient grace precedes: “He himself first seeks 
who makes us seek through prevenient grace.”  Our carnal requests, and our carnal 
responses to God's requests, are prevenient grace.  The prevenient grace leads us to 
ask for something that we do not understand, and to look to Christ as to someone 
who will be useful to us.  Unwittingly, it would seem, we turn away from sin and 
turn to God, and so are open to grace which is not given except to those who are 
open to it.  The response of the disciples has been prefigured by the woman who, 
transformed by grace, leaves behind her earthy desires (symbolized by the water jug) 
to preach the Gospel.48
Thomas has prepared us for this earlier in his comments on “No-one can 
come to me unless the Father draw him,” citing Augustine that one's own delight 
47 4.4 (M644) “quia idem intelligitur per cibum et potum.”  This identification is worth noting, 
because previously the living water has been identified as the grace of the Holy Spirit, and the 
food as doing the Father's will: these two would be inseparable for Thomas, just as in commenting 
on the food that endures to eternal life Thomas says that this could be either God himself or (with 
reference to this very passage) obedience to the divine commandments. 
48  4.3 (M625)
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draws each one.49  Thomas carefully distinguishes this drawing from a violent and 
coercive dragging, but allows that the non-violent drawing has several modes.  Some 
are drawn by rational persuasion, some by the Father's majesty or some through their 
delight in  the truth.  But they are also drawn through God's interior instinct that 
brings them to believe.  Indeed, so much is this from God that we must ascribe to the 
divine  decision  that  one  is  attracted  and  another  is  not.50  These  rather  abstract 
remarks need to be fleshed out by considering the woman at the well, or the crowds 
who have seen the miracles and are now hungering for bread, and the way Jesus 
works with their desires.  Indeed, later on Thomas, following Augustine, allows that 
Christ might rightly be called a seducer, ironically re-interpreting an accusation made 
against him, for he seduces people away from falsehood into the path of truth.51 
7.1.4.4 The new economy
As a last illustration, when comparing the need for bodily and for spiritual 
food, he supports his claim that we cannot live bodily life without food with two 
scripture quotes, the first being Lam 1:11:  “They gave whatever valuables (pretiosa) 
they had for food.”52  Thomas did not have to use this quote to express the mere 
biological fact  -  the second quote, “Bread to strengthen the human heart” (Ps 103:5) 
would have sufficed.  The citation therefore is asking us to consider the necessity of 
food in a way that goes beyond biology, namely, that when it comes to the crunch, as  
in a city under siege, a thing has value (pretium) if it can be exchanged for food. 
Possibly it is an inclusio recalling Philip's mention of 200 denarii, which prompted 
49  6.5 M935.
50  6.5 (M935-937)
51  7.2 (M1030-1032).
52  6.7 (M968)
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Thomas to  say that  Philip  was slow and stupid.   “And therefore he suggests the 
manner by which all people could feed (pascere) them, namely, by money.”53  Christ, 
Thomas notes, is so poor that he does not have even 200 denarii, and the implication 
is that Christ, being spiritually-minded, does not concern himself with his standing in 
the economy that the witless Philip is immersed in.  Returning to the text at hand, to 
support the need for spiritual food, Thomas quotes Dt 8:3, “The human being does 
not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth of God.”  The 
implication waiting to be drawn is that for the person who is aware of the spiritual 
realm, things will be of ultimate value if they enable us to be nourished by God's 
word.  The existence of spiritual food, once it is understood as food, creates a new 
scale of values  -  as we have seen, what was reckoned to be magni pretii turns out 
not to be so  -  and so a new economy.  In this economy, charity, love of things magni 
pretii, becomes possible.
7.1.4.5 Another aspect of bread  -  unity
Here we should mention two other points that Thomas, going beyond the 
text at hand, raises here which he will use in later discussion.
The first concerns the species, which is bread.  We have already investigated 
at length the use of “bread” as a way of meeting us in our carnality, but here Thomas 
gives another meaning: bread is made from many grains, so through the Eucharist we 
become one in the body of Christ which is the Church (cf Rom 12:5), and thus the 
use of bread is conveniens for this sacrament.54
The second concerns its truth.  Christ does not say “signifies my flesh” but 
53  6.1 (M852)
54  6.6 (M960).
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“is my flesh.”  The flesh is really there.  And Thomas notes the that use of “flesh” 
rather than “body” for Christ's passion and death was a result of his weakness, and 
this sacrament is “rememorative of the Lord's passion.”55
This then provides a useful link to the consideration of the usefulness of the 
sacrament,  because,  as  really  containing  Christus  passus (not,  we  could  note, 
Christus patiens  -  it is a reminder, not a re-enactment), it contains all the effects of 
his passion, which include both, on the one hand, the destruction of death and the 
restoration of life (the eternal life so often mentioned in John 6) and, on the other 
hand, propitiation for our sins, which John 6 does not mention.56
7.1.5 The final cause of the Eucharist: eternal life in community
7.1.5.1 The necessity of this sacrament for life: sacramental and spiritual 
eating
The discussion about the material cause (“food”), leads into a discussion of 
the necessity of this sacrament, and here we get a set of distinctions.  Spiritual eating 
of this sacrament is necessary for all; sacramental eating is not necessary for infants, 
but it is necessary for adults, at least  in voto; and reception of both the body and 
blood  under  their  separate  sacramental  forms  is  not  necessary,  for  the  one  who 
receives  the  living  body  of  Christ  receives  also  the  blood  by  concomitance.57 
Reception of the sacrament in voto will be covered in a chapter eight; spiritual eating 
is  given much closer  treatment  in  the  next  sub-section,  on  the  usefulness  of  the 
sacrament.
The  sacrament  is  useful  because  it  brings  eternal  life.   This  is  obvious, 
55  6.6 (M962).
56  6.6 (M963).
57  6.7 (M969-970).
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because  “the one who eats this bread has in himself Christ, who is  true God and 
eternal life.”58  This includes eternal life for the body as well as the soul, and there is 
a real congruity here between the sacrament and its results, for, citing Augustine: 
“The word resuscitates souls, but the Word made flesh gives life to bodies,” and this 
sacrament contains the Word according to its divinity and according to the truth of its 
flesh.59
But  Thomas  will  not  let  us  gain  eternal  life  from a  mere  bodily action. 
Spiritual  reception  is  necessary  for  eternal  life:  it  is  not  sufficient  to  receive 
sacramentally, to take the  ipsum sacramentum; one must reach right through to the 
res sacramenti, which, in this case, is twofold: the res contenta et signata and the res  
signata  et  non contenta.60  Care  needs  to  be  taken  here.   Although Thomas  has 
distinguished  three  objects,  we  shall  see  that  they  do  not  correspond  to  the 
sacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum and res sacramenti;  moreover, he is taking 
sacramental  and  spiritual  reception  as  terms  widely  used  in  the  schools.61  The 
sacramentum ipsum here corresponds to the body and blood of Christ present ex vi  
conversionis, (in other contexts referred to as the  res et sacramentum): this is the 
object of sacramental reception, and it is received by those who have sufficient faith 
to intend to receive it and somehow make us of it.62  The res sacramenti is the effect 
of receiving the sacramentum ipsum.  Here it is twofold: as contained, it is the whole 
Christ (integer Christus);63 as not contained, it is the corpus Christi mysticum.64
58   6.7 (M972), citing 1 John 5:20.
59  6.7 (M973)
60   6.7 (M972)
61 ST III.80.1 cor, 80.4 cor , cf Scriptum 4.9.1.1.3 cor, In I Corinthios 11.7 (M698).
62 ST III.80.3 ad 2 and ad 3.
63 The “whole Christ” was mentioned when explaining how those who receive only one species 
nonetheless fulfil the command to “eat my flesh and drink my blood:” the other reality is there 
through “concomitance.” 6.7 (M972).
64 The same division of the res sacramenti is given at ST III.80.4 cor.
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7.1.5.2 Moving from a visible mission to an invisible one
We can analyse what is happening here in terms of visible and invisible 
missions, or of gift object and the spirit of the gift.
The  Eucharistic  presence  is  an  extension  of  the  visible  mission,  for  the 
divinity of the Word is present along with the visible body.  The one who receives the 
sacrament in faith, who eats sacramentally, receives the body of Christ, for that is 
what is given to him (albeit as a means of reaching through to the divinity), and so at 
this level it is still the visible mission.  For it to become an invisible mission, the 
believer must be joined (conjungere) to the Word, which can only happen through 
faith and charity;65 anything less does not have God as such as the object, but rather 
God as known through natural reason, and so ultimately only the effects of God. 66 
This  act  of  being  joined  to  Christ  transforms  the  believer  into  Christ;67 and  she 
becomes a member of Christ, is divinised, and is intoxicated with divinity  -  this is 
what  is  contained  in  the  idea  of  spiritual  food  and  drink.   To  use  terms  from 
elsewhere,  the  visible  mission  becomes  an  invisible  mission,  and  configuration 
through  sacramental  eating  becomes  conformation  through  spiritual  eating. 
However, even though this approach mentions our incorporation into Christ , it does 
not talk of the relations between those who are incorporated into Christ, that make 
the assembly of members a body.  Thomas introduces this aspect simply by moving 
from the  res signified and contained to the  res signified but not contained, which 
with the tradition he states to be the mystical body.  The unity of the mystical body 
comes from charity, which comes from the Holy Spirit,  who is the pledge of our 
65 6.7 (M972), cf ST I-II.62.3 cor, where charity is the union to God as known through faith and 
desired through hope.
66 Cf ST I-II.62.1 cor, ad 3, I-II.62.2.
67 The transformative power of charity is also mentioned at ST I-II.62.3 cor.
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eternal heritage.68  Thus, if we persevere, also in this way the Eucharist brings us 
eternal life.
This does not seem satisfying.  But we are helped by a later treatment of 
spiritual  and  sacramental  eating,  where  membership  of  the  mystical  body  takes 
priority.69  For spiritual eating goes beyond the real body to what it symbolizes, the 
mystical body.  One is joined to the mystical body in faith and charity, charity causes 
divine indwelling, and so on.  On the other hand, sacramental eating also brings this 
about, but only if it is accompanied by spiritual eating (not impeded by fiction) .
The jump from the real body of Christ  to his mystical body presents no 
difficulty for Thomas, because that is the true spiritual sense of the sacrament.  He 
has constantly warned us that we must take things spiritually, which involves reading 
them mystically, and will do so again regarding the disciples who find this a hard 
saying,  because  they  take  flesh  literally  and  not  spiritually.   He  has  given  this 
spiritual reading to us: bread achieves its unity from many grains, which symbolizes 
the  formation  of  the  body of  Christ,  the  Church  (whose  unity  is  stated  literally 
elsewhere  -  he cites Romans 12:5).   He has also pointed out that the Jews are 
arguing because they have not yet received the “food of concord,” which shows that 
they are still carnal.70
7.1.5.2.1 Corpus mysticum and corpus verum
A close study by Henri de Lubac has shown that by the 12th century there 
had been a change from the usage of the patristic period, so that corpus verum now 
referred to the Eucharistic body of Christ and corpus mysticum to the Church, and 
68 See later at 7.2.4.
69   6.7 (M976)
70   6.7 (M966)
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not the other way around.71  Chauvet complains that this disconnects the Church from 
the sacrament, so that its production is left to the juridical sphere.  Whatever the 
rightness of this claim (which we shall take up again in chapter nine), we should first 
of all note that, for Thomas, “the glory of our heavenly homeland is the  res non 
contenta  et  significata in  all  the  sacraments,”  and   -   as  we  have  seen   -   an 
eschatological reference is an integral part of any sacrament.72  Therefore the unity of 
the Church symbolized in the Eucharist is its eschatological unity, the perfection of 
charity.  For Thomas, while the perfection of charity, unity and glory is still awaited, 
the sacrament so re-orders our desires that even now an imperfect charity is achieved 
as  the  res  sacramenti.73  The order  in  which  Thomas  considers  the  Eucharist  to 
operate reflects the order of charity, by which we love God first, and others as loved 
by God.74
The unity of the Church is not mentioned in John 6, but Thomas considers it 
an integral part  of eternal  life  and so introduces it;  the Aristotelian categories of 
substance and accident, however, are not mentioned at all in his comments on this 
chapter.75
7.1.5.3 The Eucharist as gift: moving from food to convivium
We can appreciate this better if we consider the body of Christ as the gift 
object.  In a state of gift exchange, the gift object is always less important than what 
71 Henri de Lubac, Corpus mysticum: the Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages: historical  
survey, 2nd ed., tr. Gemma Simmonds with Richard Price and Christopher Stephens, (London: 
SCM, 2006)
72 Scriptum 4.8.1.1.3 obj 2, cf ST III.60.2 cor.   This does not rule out the possibility of another res  
significata et non contenta, such as the burial of Christ in baptism  -  as this is not primarily 
intended, but removal of original sin is, baptism takes place in water, not in earth.  Scriptum 
4.3.1.3.1 ad 4, cf 4.3.1.4.2 cor, 3 cor.
73 The corpus of all eight articles of ST III.79.
74 ST II-II.25.12 cor, II-II.26.1-2.
75 In the commentary on ch.6 we get substantia twice: once in a quote from Hebrews (6.3 (M898)), 
and once with reference to Arius (6.5 (M935)); accidens does not occur at all.
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it symbolizes, and thus a gift object cannot simply be taken “literally,” it must always 
be read.  Commenting on the “hard saying,” Thomas makes it clear that he is not 
denying the real presence of the flesh of Christ in the sacrament of the altar, but as 
“the Lord says that he will  give himself to them as spiritual food,” the appropriate 
sense of his words here is spiritual, not carnal.76  Although in one sense one moves 
from the bodily to the spiritual in understanding the body of Christ as the instrument 
through which his divinity is also given to us, this reading on its own still sticks too 
closely to the literal; the logical connection between the two is too automatic.  The 
Spirit needs freedom to blow.
We can also recall that the body of Christ here is not given to us “under its 
proper  species,”77 but rather as bread and food, precisely in order to relativise the 
place these things have in our carnal economy and enable a spiritual economy (and 
we can consider an economy as a body).  As I made clear earlier, it is not the mere 
body of Christ that acts as a symbol or instrument in this sacrament, but the body of 
Christ precisely as symbolized under the form of bread: it cannot be taken simply as 
his body as organ of the divinity, but the body as bread as the organ of divinity  -  a 
further  reading  is  demanded.   “Food,”  “bread”  and  “eating”  are  not  absolutely 
necessary for our encounter with the Word.
It might also be said that here, and also in the  Summa, Thomas reads the 
Eucharist as a sign of Church unity almost entirely from the imagery of the many 
grains  of  wheat  making one loaf,  which  does  not  have a  strong appeal  to  most 
76 6.8 (M992)  My emphasis.
77 Cf ST III.79.2 obj 3 and ad 3..  Thomas objects that the body under an alien species is a lesser 
reality than the body in its proper species, and so the reception of the former cannot cause the 
enjoyment of the latter, and thus future glory cannot be an effect of the Eucharist.  His response, of 
course, is that the alien species belongs to the sacrament precisely as sacrament, which as an 
instrumental cause can act beyond its own species.  But it should also remind us that the alien 
species is for the sake of us, collapsi ad corpora.
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western Christians these days.   An image that could appeal to us more is that of 
becoming one through sharing one bread.  There is potential for this in Thomas' use 
of the word convivium to describe the Eucharist, both in the Magnificat antiphon and 
in his comments on the last chapter of John.78  Now, a  convivium is a shared meal, 
and Thomas always uses the word in that sense.  In particular, in De Regno he notes 
that to increase their power tyrants sometimes ban weddings and convivia, which are 
things  that  may foster  familiarity among the  people;79 in  his  commentary on the 
Politics he notes that both the Cretans and the Spartans had the practice of public 
convivia to foster a sense of community: the Cretans provided it all from community 
funds, but the Spartan custom, whereby each person had to bring some food, ended 
up destroying the poor (like a potlatch).80  Again, he notices with approval that Job's 
sons include their sisters in their convivia.81  Christ shows his peace for Judas by both 
kiss and  convivium.82  A convivium, therefore, is a sort of beneficium (even if it is 
mutual), because something material is given (food), but what is really given is the 
relationship  between  those  present.   It  is  a  Maussian  symbol  that  produces  or 
strengthens alliance.
Thomas notes that the meal on the shore of the lake was a  convivium, and 
even a familiare convivium, as if to emphasise the sort of bonds it is trying to foster.83 
Everyone is expected to bring food, but (unlike the Spartan banquet) this does not 
embarrass us, because God gives us what we can bring to the banquet.   Thomas 
interprets  the  convivium in  two  ways:  ecclesially,  in  which  what  is  brought  are 
people, brought in by evangelization; and morally, where we bring in the good works 
78 21.2 (M2597-2602)
79   De Regno 1.4.
80   Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, 2.14.9.
81   Super Iob, cap. 1. 
82 In Psalmos 3.1.
83  21.2 (M2597)
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that are the fruit of the grace given to us.84  Thomas leaves it to us to realise that 
either interpretation can apply to the Eucharist, but the hints are strongly there.  In 
the ecclesial banquet, the fish represents Christ offered for us on the cross; in the 
moral banquet, it is required “that we use well the gratia granted to us,” and, as all 
the mendicant theologians agreed, “eucharistia” meant “bona gratia.”85
7.1.6 The formal cause of the Eucharist: truth
The usefulness of the sacrament corresponds to its final cause; prompted by 
“My flesh truly is food . . . ,” Thomas then goes on to consider that which takes the 
place of its formal cause, namely, its truth.  The discussion is brief, picking up the 
meaning of  truth  he  gave  earlier  (that  Christ's  body is  not  figuratively but  truly 
present), and then giving explanations from Chrysostom and Augustine.  Chrysostom 
holds that, since the human being is principally the soul and secondarily the body, 
food for the soul is true food.  Augustine explains that true food and drink truly 
satisfy  -  and the body and blood of Christ lead us to glory, where there is neither  
hunger nor thirst.86
7.1.6.1 The threefold truthfulness of the Eucharist
We should look at these explanations in terms of the meanings of truth we 
have had earlier.  Considering the characterisation with regard to “true light,” the first 
explanation matches truth as opposed to the figure; the third, truth as opposed to 
participation, for only union to the divinity gives us glory.  We could identify the 
84  21.2 (M2599-M2601 and M2602)
85  P.-M. Gy, “La documentation sacramentale de Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue des sciences  
philosophiques et théologiques 80.3 (1996):427.
86  6.7 (M974)
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second with truth as opposed to error, for the soul is fed on truth, but the parallel is 
not close enough.  A better fit is found if we say that true food for human beings 
picks up the truth about human beings, that the soul has priority over the body (not in 
a grossly dualist way, but in that the soul gives life to the body and makes it a body 
in the true sense of the word), and the Eucharist, in leading us into a true economy 
which is spiritual and not carnal is working at that level of truth which is in the soul 
and which is opposed to error and vice.
We  can  also  match  these  three  ways  with  the  three  aspects  of  Christ 
mentioned in the exposition of “full of grace and truth”: the first way corresponds to 
the body and blood, the second to the soul, and the third to the divinity.  We could 
also link them with the past, present and future aspects of the Eucharist as recalled in 
the Magnificat antiphon of Corpus Christi: through the flesh we are reminded of his 
passion; through his soul our soul is filled with grace; through his divinity we are 
given the pledge of future glory (which, as we shall see, is the Holy Spirit).
7.1.6.2 Truth and origin: the need for faith
Thomas continually characterises the disputed points of the Bread of Life 
discourse  in  terms  of  two  concepts:  the  virtus of  spiritual  food  and  its  origin 
(sometimes expressed as the  auctoritas of the one who institutes it).  Thus as the 
more strictly theological part of the discourse comes to a close, it is not surprising 
that these two issues arise, as part of a syllogism:
1. the major: the one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood is joined 
(conjungere) to me;
2. the minor: the one who is joined to me has eternal life;
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3. the conclusion: the one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has 
eternal life.87
The major Thomas expounds in terms of spiritual and sacramental eating, in 
a passage we have already discussed.
The minor takes up “Just as the living Father sent me . . . ,” and interprets it 
according to Christ's divine nature and his human nature.88  Eating implies some sort 
of participation, and we can participate (to a limited extent, of course) in the divine 
nature by participating in (eating) the Son.  We can also participate in his human 
nature, that is, as graced, although once again the parallel is not exact.  Interestingly, 
because of the text (“misit”), Thomas reminds us that Christ's union comes about as 
the result of a mission, which is the incarnation.
Now, says Thomas, Christ comes to his conclusions.  As regards his origin, 
he is  “the bread that  comes down from heaven,” both in his  divinity,  and in his 
humanity (formed by the Holy Spirit), and so superior to the manna, which could not 
give life.89  And as regards his virtus, “the one who eats this bread will live for ever,” 
which is the principally intended conclusion.90
We  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  there  were  three  things 
necessary to  inspire  charity:  knowledge,  likeness  and goodness.   Our  reading of 
Thomas' comments on John 6 have focussed mainly on the acquisition of knowledge 
through faith.  To enter into the spiritual economy of the gift we must know that it 
exists and that it exerts a claim more powerful than the claim of the goods of a carnal 
87  6.7 (M975).
88  6.7 (M977).
89  6.7 (M980).
90  6.7 (M979, M981)
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economy.   Hence three important  themes of Thomas'  exposition:  the authority of 
Christ (because faith is only possible in one who has authority), the unknowability of 
the spiritual world, and Christ's use of the material to bring us to the spiritual, an 
assistance towards faith for those collapsi ad corpora.  We now need to see both that 
there is a likeness between us and this spiritual world, a likeness given in hope, and 
that this spiritual world is exceedingly good and thus worthy of love, in other words 
that it comes from a God who loves us both gratuitously and at a great price.  And 
thus we move to consider the Eucharist as the pledge of future glory, and as the site  
of the renewal of the memory of the passion.
7.2 The Eucharist and hope
7.2.1 The words over the chalice
When dealing with the formula of consecration, Thomas devotes one article 
to the words over the bread, and one to the words over the cup.  Although the former 
deals with certain technicalities common to both, nonetheless it is only half as long 
as the latter.91  One of the reasons is that the formula for the consecration of the 
chalice is longer, and this itself is the second objection: if the bread is consecrated 
with a simple Hoc enim est corpus meum, why do the properties of the blood need to 
be included before the words of consecration take effect?  In his response, Thomas 
claims that the body is the subject of the passion (and implicitly is passive in the 
passion), and is thus less appropriately linked with the effects of the passion than the 
blood.  The blood, consecrated by itself, expressly symbolizes the separation of the 
blood from the body in the passion, and thus mention of the effect of the passion is 
91 736 words and five objections in ST III.78.2 as opposed to 1406 words and nine objections in ST 
III.78.3.
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better  (potius)  included  in  the  consecration  of  the  blood.92  Thomas  is  not  quite 
saying that the blood is the active element in the passion, but as sacraments work by 
signifying, it would seem that the blood has some sort of priority in the way the 
Eucharist operates.
Thomas justifies the mention of these properties as part of the formula of 
consecration, first of all by appealing to the rite itself and the Lucan version of the 
words,  then by showing their  convenientia,  that  is,  that  the properties  mentioned 
designate “the power (virtus) of blood poured out in the passion, which is at work in 
this sacrament.”  Novi et aeterni testamenti indicates that through the blood we enter 
into our eternal inheritance; mysterium fidei that the blood justifies us through faith; 
qui  pro vobis  et  pro multis  effundetur  in  remissionem peccatorum that  the blood 
removes  the  impediments  to  the  previous  two  effects.93  These  three  effects 
correspond  to  the  familiar  future  glory,  present  grace  and  past  passion.   In  the 
following section we shall consider the remission of sins; here I want to consider the 
new and eternal testamentum that gives us hope of a likeness to God.
7.2.2 
stamentum
7.2.2.1 The specific difference of testamentum:  heritage and death
We  saw  in  chapter  five  that  there  are  three  words  expressing  alliance: 
foedus, pactum and testamentum.  Thomas is most specific about what testamentum 
entails in his commentary on the words over the chalice in 1 Corinthians.94  He notes 
that  testamentum is used in a general sense for any  pactum that is  confirmed by 
92 ST III.78.3 ad 2, cf ad 7.
93 ST III.78.3 cor.  All three effects are backed up with scriptural quotes that explicitly mention 
blood.  The Leonine edition reads the lectio difficilior and has “pro multis aliis”.
94 In I Ad Corinthios, 11.6 (M678-679); cf Super Matthaeum 26.4 (M2200-2203);  ST III.78.3 ad 3.
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witnesses;  but  there  is  also  a  specific  sense  which  has  these  two properties:  the 
disposition of an inheritance to be received; and that this inheritance is not confirmed 
except through death (Heb 9:17).
Inheritance is linked to sonship, for it  is precisely by being promised an 
inheritance that we are adopted as sons of God.95  Thomas, talking of adoption, holds 
that hereditas is a very suitable term for describing the way we receive beatitude, for 
the  hereditas someone bestows is that out of which that person is rich, and we, as 
rational creatures, made in God's image, are able to enjoy God through knowledge 
and love, as God does.96  Although adoption, being a work ad extra, is a work of the 
whole Trinity,  as our adopted filiation is a likeness of the natural filiation of the 
eternal  Son,  it  is  appropriate  that  it  is  achieved  through  the  incarnate  Son  as 
exemplar, the eldest of many brothers.97  In the commentary on Romans, Thomas 
sees adoption as conformity to the image of his Son, firstly in the right of sharing the 
inheritance, and secondly in the participation of his splendour.98  We have already 
seen that the ability to conform us to his image is part of the way that Christ's grace 
is the source of our grace.
Any alliance, says  Mauss, is made in the face of death, but Thomas holds 
that death is, to use Maussian terms, the symbol that mediates and makes effective a 
testamentum, and the new  testamentum is mediated, or confirmed, by the death of 
Christ.  In his commentary on Hebrews Thomas explains this confirmation by noting 
that the death of the testator is necessary in two ways.  Firstly, because death makes 
it “expressive of the last will” which can no longer be changed.  Secondly, because 
95 Super Romanos 8.6 (M704) 
96 ST III.23.1 cor.
97  ST III.23.2 cor and ad 3.
98   Super Romanos 8.6 (M704).
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through death a  testamentum “is valid and has efficacy”  -  no one is able to seek 
anything left to them in a will until the testator is dead.99  Yet in the Summa Thomas 
notes that because the goods at stake are spiritual goods they can be possessed by 
many at the same time, and so there is no detriment to the Father if we receive our 
inheritance while he is still living.100  We are left to draw the conclusion that if God 
chooses to enact the testamentum through a death, this is because the symbolism of 
death speaks to us, rather than from any necessity on God's part.
Thus God chooses the death of his incarnate Son as the most  conveniens 
way of enacting the testamentum by which we are promised an inheritance of eternal 
beatitude as adopted sons in the likeness of the natural Son.  This argument seems in 
no  way to  depend  upon payment  of  price,  removal  of  punishments,  satisfaction, 
redemption, or merit.
7.2.2.2 Blood as a sign of death
Perhaps we have skipped a step here.  For any covenant or testament to be 
effective, something must be handed from one party to the other in a public way.  If  
death makes the testamentum effective, this is only so because it is symbolized (both 
represented  and  turned  into  a  covenant-making  symbol)  by blood.   This  idea  is 
fundamental to Thomas, for in a mere 24 lines of his commentary on 1 Corinthians 
he  says  three  times  that  the  new  testamentum is  mediated  or  confirmed 
(confirmatum) by the death of Christ which is symbolized by his blood.  It is the 
exhibitio of this blood that effects the testamentum.101
99 Super Hebraeos 9.4 (M451).  Here Thomas uses confirmare just for the first sort of necessity, but 
given the way Thomas uses words, it is not unreasonable to take his use of confirmare elsewhere 
in this regard to cover both sorts of necessity.  Like the Corinthians commentary, this text also 
refers to the use of blood in the establishing of the covenant under Moses (M453-455).
100   ST III.23.1 ad 3.
101   Super I Corinthios 11.6 (M678-679).
244
It is on this basis that Thomas tackles two of the seeming oppositions in the 
formula, between newness and eternity, and between the fundamental interiority of 
the New Testament, and exteriority of the gesture that enacts it.  He begins with the 
basic  meaning of  testamentum,  namely,  the  disposition  of  an  inheritance.   God's 
disposition  (which  we perhaps  could  connect  with  his  ordo iustitiae)  is  that  the 
heavenly inheritance is to be given to people “through the power of the blood of 
Jesus Christ,” because death is necessary to give effect to a  testamentum, and the 
blood here, presumably, is the sign of the death.102  Certainly the blood needs not 
merely to be shed, but also produced in public (exhibitus), as befits a testamentum as 
a public reality.  Indeed, the  exhibitio of the blood is such an essential part of the 
testamentum that the new  exhibitio, done not  in figura but  in rei veritate, is what 
constitutes the difference between the two  testamenta:  even if the  testamentum is 
eternal according to God's preordination, it is new by reason of the exhibitio of the 
blood.103  Interestingly, he does not use the figure/truth distinction to explain how the 
new testamentum is about internal inspiration (the context in which he introduced it) 
rather than external rewards and punishments; he does that merely by saying that the 
internal inspiration comes from the blood, even if it is an external reality, because we 
are justified by the passion.  That leads to the role of faith, but we shall come to that 
shortly.  But first we shall consider one more example of the power of this blood.
7.2.2.3 Entering the underworld in the power of the blood
The need for a public enactment is always there, even in the descent into 
Hades.  The patriarchs have personally merited the beatific vision, but the “gates of 
102   ST III.78.3 ad 3.
103 ST III.78.3 ad 3 and ad 4.
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heaven” are closed to them because of the reatus of the whole human race, and are 
not opened until this is paid by the “price of Christ's blood.”104  But once again this 
must be somehow applied to them, not by sacraments (as the patriarchs' souls are no 
longer in their bodies), but by Christ's descent  -  in his soul  -  to the underworld. 105 
Thomas favourite scriptural text to support this is Zechariah 9:11: “he drew out those 
who had  been  bound in  the  pit  by the  blood  of  his  testamentum.”106  So  God's 
disposition still holds: in order to preserve the order of justice, no-one is given the 
heavenly inheritance except  through the blood of  Christ.   And,  as  we have seen 
earlier, the order of justice is a public thing: it is for the sake of this order and its 
effect on the whole human race that the patriarchs are “punished” by being shut out 
of paradise until the shedding of the blood that symbolizes the death of the Son  -  it 
is not surprising, therefore, that it is made publicly, for even the damned are aware of 
it, as we shall see.
The  more  we  focus  on  beatitude  as  adopted  sonship  enabled  by  a 
testamentum,  the more  we see the  appropriateness  of  the closure  of  the gates  of 
heaven until the  testamentum has been enacted in the Son's death.  This also is a 
fitting way to deal with original sin, which is a punishment to bring into order the 
disorder caused by bad fatherhood  -  and Thomas is clear that this is not the malice 
associated  with  any  particular  act  of  begetting,  but  the  whole  habitus of 
concupiscence that  affects  the process of  reproduction.107  This  can explain it  all 
104 ST III.49.5 ad 1.
105 We could make a further distinction, that exhibitio refers to the giving, applicatio to the receiving, 
so that in the same act of exhibitio various people will receive differently, and the applicatio will 
not be the same.  ST III.52.8 ad 2.
106   According to the Index Thomisticus, it is cited 17 times for this purpose.
107 ST I-II.81.5, De Malo 4.2 ad 7.  Of course,  as M. Leblanc comments, original sin is known 
through not through reason but revelation. “Aspects du péché originel dans la pensée de saint 
Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 93.4 (1993): 569-570, 573, cf ST I-II.81.1 cor.  The revelation, 
moreover, is strictly a revelation of its overcoming: in finding our true father, we realise that 
fatherhood as given to us by Adam is defective.  However, it is more likely that it was through his 
theology of the virginal conception of Jesus that Thomas came to insist on the role of the father in 
246
without the need to mention “price,” and as we shall see shortly, Thomas himself 
admits that the paying of a price is a manner of speaking about something which 
already has salvific value in its own right.
Of course, Christ descends into Hades not in his body but in his soul, and so 
he does not take the blood with him, but enters through the power of the blood. 
Thomas cites Hebrews 9:11: “Christ . . . through his own blood entered once into the 
holy place.”108  What Christ brings is the fruit of his passion, “suae passionis fructum 
exhibuit sanctis in inferno detentis.”109  What mode of exhibitio takes place between 
the soul of Christ  and the souls and demons in  the underworld is  not  explained, 
although the metaphor of light is used in several places.110  Whatever the mode by 
which it takes place, Christ's visit has an effect through the whole of the underworld, 
bringing salvation to some and confutation and confusion to others.111
7.2.3 The mystery of faith
The souls of the just in the underworld see Christ directly (with the vision of 
the soul), and go straight into heaven: they need neither faith to give them knowledge 
nor hope to establish a likeness with God.  This is not the case for us still in via who 
walk by faith.
There are two objections to the inclusion of the words mysterium fidei in the 
formula of consecration.112  The first, focusing on mysterium, is that these words have 
suggested to some that Christ's body and blood are present only “mystice” (which 
handing on original sin.  ST I.119.2 ad 4, III.31.4 ad 3, III.32.4 cor.
108 ST III.49.5 cor.
109 ST III.52.5 ad 3.
110 ST III.52.2 cor, ad 1; III.52.4 ad 1.  However, the “light of glory” is only given to the fully purged; 
those in purgatory benefit from Christ's descent, but do not at this stage receive this light, merely 
hope, ST III.52.2  cor.
111 ST III. 52.2 cor, III.52.6 ad 1.
112   ST III.78.3 obj 5 and 6.
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could mean only allegorically) in this sacrament.  The second, focusing on fidei, is 
that baptism is the sacrament of faith, the Eucharist the sacrament of charity.  In both 
cases Thomas gives a twofold response to the objection.
Mysterium does  not  exclude  the  “truth  of  the  thing”,  but  shows  its 
hiddenness: the blood of Christ is hidden in this sacrament, Christ was hidden under 
the figures of the old testamentum.  It is the mystery “of faith,” not as a protestation 
of faith, but as being the object of faith: faith that the blood is truly there, and faith 
through which the passion of Christ justifies us.113  The responses are linked because 
the hiddenness of the blood is the reason it can only be known to be truly there by 
faith.   (The  question  remains  whether  they  are  also  linked  through  the  second 
example:  is  the  faith  that  justifies  the  same  as  the  faith  that  sees  Christ  as  the 
fulfilment  of  the  figures  of  the  old  testamentum?)   We  should  note  that  this 
sacrament, which is the mystery of faith, symbolizes and causes charity (“caritatis 
quasi figurativum et effectivum”).  Of course, the journey from faith to charity goes 
by way of hope, hope of sharing God's beatitude.
In the Eucharist, as we have seen, by faith we first know that what is offered 
to us is truly the blood of Christ, which is of exceeding price and infinite dignity, by 
virtue of its union to the person of the Word.  It is also blood offered to establish a 
covenant, and so it promises a new and extraordinary level of likeness; Thomas takes 
the word “eternal” in  the formula to  refer  to  our eternal  heritage,  which we can 
understand to be the beatific vision.114
113   ST III.78.3 ad 5 and ad 6.
114   ST III.78.3 ad 4.
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7.2.4 The pledge of future glory
Now, the gift object (effectus) is not as important as the spirit of the gift 
(affectus).  Therefore, the ultimate effect of the Eucharist, union to God in Christ, is 
something greater than the precious blood itself.  Just as baptismal character has its 
value in that it  enables us to enjoy the Eucharist,  so also the Eucharist  itself,  no 
matter what great delight it gives us, is not our final goal.  Interestingly, Thomas 
poses this as a paradox working in the other direction: how can something lesser (to 
take Christ's body and blood under another  species) produce something greater (to 
enjoy (frui)  him in  his  proper  species as  we shall  do in  glory),  for  nothing acts 
beyond its own species?  He then resolves it by reminding us that it is of the nature 
of sacraments to use instrumental causes, which produce an effect beyond the power 
that resides within them.115  This instrumentality applies not just to the bread and 
wine  (sacramentum  tantum),  but  also  to  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  (res  et  
sacramentum).  To put it another way, granted that a covenant is made in the blood of 
Christ, it can only be a covenant which enables nothing less than a sharing of the 
Holy Spirit.
So it is faith that enables us to recognise the reality of the blood of Christ, 
which inspires hope in the new testamentum, hope of much greater likeness to Christ, 
and on the strength of  that  likeness-of-great-price,  charity arises.   And charity is 
precisely the working of the Holy Spirit, the spirit in which the gift is given, which 
flows through it.
So, is the blood itself the pledge of future glory?  In one way we could say 
yes: the blood is the gift which establishes the new and eternal testamentum, which 
115 ST III.79.2 obj 3 and ad 3.
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ultimately promises the beatific vision.  And that would be true if we take pignus in 
its narrow sense, for strictly speaking a  pignus is of a different nature to what is 
promised, and is returned when the promise is fulfilled.  If something is given that is 
of the same kind as what is ultimately expected, but lesser in quantity, then the strict 
term, says Thomas, is arra (a sort of down payment)116  But Thomas, following the 
usage of scripture, applies both terms only to the Holy Spirit: arra strictly speaking 
and pignus in a looser sense, because as well manifesting itself through charity which 
endures and is perfected, the Holy Spirit also gives lesser gifts (faith and hope) which 
do not endure.117 
One final remark on the pledge.  What is pledged is not there  -  and, as we 
shall soon see, the same applies to what is remembered.  The future glory is not 
present,  but  only signified,  because,  as Thomas says,  it  is  the final  cause of our 
sanctification.   The final  cause is  not  the  motive  of  God's  action,  for  nothing is 
caused in God; nor does God know through signs.  Rather, the pledge is given to us, 
and acts  as a  final  cause for  us.  Thus we are not  to  be viewed as  objects  to  be 
sanctified, but are active agents of our sanctification with a view to eternal glory; we 
are acting in hope. This is not to say that God is not acting, but rather that God is 
acting by giving himself (the active Spirit) in the modality of a final cause, as well as 
a formal cause and an efficient cause.  The efficient cause is the passion, and we 
would expect it also to act upon us by making us agents, not to  motivate us with an 
end in view (for that would make it a final cause).  It is to this cause that we must 
now turn.
116   Super Ephesianos 1.5 (M43)
117  A slightly different interpretation of pignus is given at Super II Corinthios 5.2 (M161).
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7.3 The memory of his passion is renewed: the Eucharist and charity
We have established that in the Eucharist we are given a ground of charity 
through knowledge, for we are led beyond this world to the world above, so that we 
know that there is something worth seeking.  We have also been given a ground 
through hope, because the beatific vision is promised to us as our inheritance.  We 
also  need  to  be  prompted  into  charity  through  goodness,  and  this  in  two ways; 
through an act of undeserved love that excites our love in response, and through a 
removal of sin and the punishment due to sin, because as sinners we could come to 
believe that our present state of bondage is where God wants us to be, or fail to love 
ourselves.  This double motivation is particularly evident in the ten reasons Thomas 
gives for the incarnation.118  And so we need to consider the way that the passion is 
present in the Eucharist, particularly as a motive for love.
7.3.1 Memory, or making the efficient cause effective
Like  our  future  glory,  the  passion  is  not  truly  present  in  the  Eucharist. 
Thomas talks of a presence of Christus passus, not Christus patiens.119  The Eucharist 
is a sacrifice because it commemorates Christ's passion.120  The passion is present as 
a memory, and there is nothing in Thomas to suggest the sort of memory that Odo 
Casel talks about, the mysteriengegenwart, the remembering that makes the past act 
present again.121  Let us look at how Thomas understands memory.
118   ST III.1.2 cor.
119  Scriptum, 4.8.1.2. cor and ad 6, 4.8.1.2.2 cor; ST III.49.4 cor (possibly), III.66.9 ad 5, III.73.3 ad 
3, 73.5 ad 2, 73.6 cor,  75.1 cor; Super Ioannem 6.6 (M963), 21.2 (M2599).  In baptism there is a 
configuration to the death of Christ, and in penance configuration and conformation to Christus 
patiens, Scriptum 3.19.1 .3.2 cor,  ST III.49.3 ad 2.  The contrast between baptism and Eucharist is 
clearly made in ST III.66.9 ad 5.
120  ST III.73.4 cor and ad 3, 79.7 cor and ad 2, cf ST III.83.1 cor, ad 2.
121 Cf 6.4.
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7.3.1.1 Memory and gratitude
Seneca recommends the would-be benefactor that he should give something 
that  will  last  and  that  the  beneficiary  will  see  often,  to  be  reminded  of  the 
benefactor's  favour  and  to  increase  the  prospect  of  an  act  of  gratitude  without 
needing to ask for one directly.122  Taking his cue from Seneca, Thomas connects 
memory and gratitude, taking the third and most serious stage of ingratitude to be a 
complete  lack  of  awareness  of  the  benefit,  as  a  result  of,  among  other  things, 
forgetfulness.123  Thomas is referring not to forgetfulness that happens involuntarily 
from a natural weakness, but to that which arises from negligence, culpable because 
true gratitude (which, as we recall, is the natural response to a benefit) constantly 
remembers the benefit and seeks to repay: as Seneca cited by Thomas says: “It is 
clear  that  forgetfulness  creeps  up  on  the  one  who  has  not  often  thought  about 
repaying.”124  To refresh the memory of the passion, therefore, is the virtuous act of 
one who is  gratus, and in this case it is already a work of  gratia performed in the 
power of the Holy Spirit  -  unless of course it is a dead work that brings no benefit, 
but obviously Thomas is not talking about that here.  Just as with grace and pledge, 
when the Magnificat antiphon talks of memory, it is referring to the work of the Holy 
Spirit.
The  purpose  in  remembering  the  passion  is  to  excite  gratitude/grace. 
Thomas reminds us that it is the spirit of the gift that is more important than the gift 
object.  In the Eucharist the gift object is present  -  the body and blood of Christ  -  
122 “Ipsa res evanescentem memoriam excitet.”  Seneca De Beneficiis 1.12.1.
123 ST II-II.106.2 obj 3 and cor, with reference to  Seneca De Beneficiis 3.1.
124 ST II-II.106.1 ad 2, citing Seneca De Beneficiis 3.2.1.  Seneca's describes how a desire for new 
things leads to a forgetfulness of past beneficia and is thus incompatible with thanksgiving, noting 
that once they are obtained things tend to be considered “cheap (vile)” and “negligible (leve),” and 
even the one who bestows them (auctor) is not “in pretio.” De Beneficiis 3.3.  Similarly, when 
Thomas describes how material desires are never satisfied, he notes that before it is obtained the 
temporal thing “is reckoned to be of great price (magni pretii);” Super Ioannem 4. 2 (M586)).
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but in order for us to receive it graciously, we must understand the spirit in which it  
is given.  As we are not mind-readers, we cannot know this directly, but can read it, 
so to speak, from the signs, especially those that are part of the manner of giving.125 
We thus remember the passion so that we can see in it the signs of the spirit in which 
the gift was given.
7.3.1.2 What we should remember from the passion
So far we have considered the “spirit of the gift” in fairly general terms: 
love, freedom, or the utterly undefinable Holy Spirit.   We can also adopt a more 
focussed approach, considering: the specific virtues with which the gift is given; the 
personal cost to the giver; and the extent to which the recipient deserves the gift at 
the time of the giving.
The  first  one  is  fairly  straightforward.   Christ's  passion,  says  Thomas, 
provides an example of all the virtues, and so encourages us to imitate them.126  The 
passion  is  not  just  one  example  to  imitate  among  many,  but,  because  it  is  the 
occasion of this great gift to us, it impinges upon as exactly when we are most moved 
to imitate.127  This aspect of memory affects the way we love in return rather than the 
extent of that love.
Secondly,  Thomas,  following  Seneca,  notes  that  we  should  consider  the 
personal  cost  to  the giver.128  Christ's  suffering  and death,  then,  work with  great 
effectiveness in this sacrament not because they are part of the gift object (either to 
God  or  to  us),  but  because  they  indicate  the  spirit  of  the  gift.   Here  Thomas 
125 ST II-II.106.5 ad 3.
126  ST III.46.3 cor, cf 46.4 cor.
127  ST III.73.5 cor, 
128   ST II-II.106.3 ad 5; 106.5 sed contra and ad 1, citing Seneca De Beneficiis 1.7.1 and 1.6.1.
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emphasises  that  Christ's  suffering  was greater  than  any other  human suffering.129 
And as the spirit of the gift so profoundly affects the gift response, Christ's extreme 
suffering enables a response from us in the face of any suffering that might confront 
us.130
But Christ inspires suffering in us in another way.  As the sufferings not of 
an  unconnected  other,  but  of  one  who is  giving  to  us  (and in  fact  entering  into 
covenant with us through that gift), they are the sufferings of one who is already a 
friend.  And when a friend suffers, especially when a friend suffers for us, then we 
ourselves  suffer.131  Thomas  notes  that  to  receive  cheerfully  is  already  to  give 
thanks;132 we can add that to suffer with one who suffers in giving is an integral part 
of gracious reception, a gracious reception enabled by the grace of the giver.
Thirdly, we must consider that Christ died for us while still sinners.  This 
adds enormously to the gratuity of the gift.  And when we consider that our sins are 
the cause of the suffering, then the suffering we feel as we see Christ suffer increases.
7.3.1.3 Satisfaction  as  a  way  of  considering  the  establishment  of  the 
covenant
And we are now in a position to consider satisfaction again.  As we recall, 
satisfaction  is  that  hybrid  action   -   in  some respect  voluntary,  in  some respect 
involuntary  -  that disrupts a cycle of exchange or an economy that is based on 
punishment, and replaces it with one that is based on gift.  The gift must be great 
enough to overwhelm all the demand for punishment, voluntary enough to start a 
129   ST III.46.6.
130  ST III.46.4 cor.
131  Summa Contra Gentiles 3.158.7.
132   ST II-II.106.3 ad 5, citing Seneca, De Beneficiis 2.22.
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cycle of gift exchange, and yet involuntary enough to replace the punishment.  For an 
offence is that which should not have been and which disrupts the order; it can be 
healed only by acknowledging that disruption of the order, through an action that 
itself would not have been if the original offence had not taken place  - and this sense 
(that  it  otherwise  would not  have been)  is  conveyed by its  involuntary aspect.133 
Hence the sufferings of Christ are presented to us as things that he naturally resiled 
from, but which he accepted only in accordance with his Father's will, the will to 
reconcile humanity in the face of sin, and the gift that he gives, his precious blood, is 
of infinite  value,  and starts  a new economy of the gift.134  Obviously,  to  present 
Christ's  suffering  as  satsifactory  unites  two  things  that  affect  the  extent  of  our 
reponse in love: the cost to the giver and our unworthiness as sinners (and hence the 
love of the giver).   A similar advantage holds when we present Christ's death as 
redemptive or sacrificial.
7.3.2 How can one person satisfy for another?
7.3.2.1 Congruous satisfaction and the extended subject
The problem arises when we try to reconcile all  this  with the mediaeval 
notion that the one who has offended must pay satisfaction: one person cannot satisfy 
for another one.  Thomas resolves this problem in two ways.
The first is that, as pointed out earlier, when Christ suffers, we suffer with 
him, so that his suffering are also in some sense our sufferings.135  This goes some of 
the way, but our sufferings never reach the magnitude or the merit of his; they might 
satisfy congruously, but a congruous satisfaction can only work if it is based upon a 
133  ST I-II.87.6 cor.
134   ST III.47.2 ad 2; cf ST III.18.5.
135   Summa Contra Gentiles 5.158.7.
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condign satisfaction, and the condign satisfaction is that of Christ, so we are back 
where we started.136  (We might add that, if it is really our suffering that has achieved 
the result, there is less motivation to be thankful to Christ for his sufferings.)
The other way is to argue that we are all one body, and therefore Christ's  
sufferings  (or  the  merits  of  the  sufferings)  belong  to  us,  which  Thomas  does  in 
several places.137  But, as we have seen, the body is only a metaphor.  We are quasi  
una mystica persona, but we are not one real person.  But we have also seen  -  in the 
case of merit   -   that  body metaphor works in  a different  way.   Christ  performs 
meritorious actions that have an effect in us as though they were our meritorious 
actions, and so we have an extended sense of merit, producing an extended subject: 
neither  makes  sense  on  its  own,  but  taken  together  there  is  a  real  analogy  of 
proportionality  to  merit  normally  considered;  moreover,  the  very  the  way  that 
Christ's  actions  affect  us  provides  the  means  of  becoming  part  of  the  extended 
subject.  Does Thomas deal with satisfaction in the same way?
7.3.2.2 The apparent duplication in the questions on the effects  of  the 
passion
We should expect the same logic to be operating, for there is the one saving 
action of Christ, effective on account of his divinity, operating by the mode of merit 
when  we  consider  his  soul,  and  by  the  modes  of  satisfaction,  redemption  and 
sacrifice when we consider his body.138  And indeed this logic is behind the division 
into two questions of the treatment of the effects of the passion divided: the first 
about the modus efficiendi, the second about the effects, as we can see.
136   ST III.1.2 ad 2.
137   Scriptum 3.19.1.1.1 ad 4,  ST III.48.2 ad 1, III.49.1 cor, 49.3 ad 3.
138 ST III.48.6 ad 3.
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III.48 III.49
1. merit 6. Christ merits his own exaltation
2. satisfaction 3. liberation from punishment for sin
5. opening the gates of heaven
3. sacrifice 4. reconciliation with God
4 & 5. redemption 1. liberation from slavery to sin. . .
2. . . . and to the Devil
6. efficiency (includes all other modes)
This is not otiose repetition.  In question 48 we have the extension of the 
action: Thomas is showing how the passion, as an action of Christ undertaken for us, 
can truthfully be spoken of in the traditional language of merit, satisfaction, sacrifice 
and redemption, with a final article looking at efficiency that also neatly summarises 
the distinctions between the terms.  In question 49 he shows the effects the passion 
has on us, and thus, implicitly, an extension of the subject.
7.3.2.3 The modes in which the passion operates
The  first  article  addresses  merit,  and  having  refered  us  back  to  earlier 
discussions about Christ's capital grace and merit, it then argues that the passion is 
worthy of meriting salvation.139  The responses to the objections then argue that the 
merit  (in God's  eyes)  comes from charity,  which was the same as in  all  Christ's 
actions, but the external aspects, which removed the impediments to our reception of 
the rewards of this merit, made the passion the most appropriate action of Christ to 
merit our salvation.140  The last article makes clear that merit takes place through the 
soul of Christ, and the other modes (satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption) through 
the body, for Christ took on a body precisely to remove the impediments we impose 
by being turned to bodily things.141  Thus what pleases God, charity, is in the highest 
139 ST III.48.1 cor.
140 ST III.48.1 ad 1, 2 and 3, cf Quodlibet 2.1.2.
141 ST III.48.6 ad 3, cf. III.1.3 ad 1.
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part of the soul which did not suffer; and the suffering, greater than any other human 
suffering, did not please God but was for the sake of its effect upon us.142
Thomas then looks at these other modes, and first satisfaction.  The body of 
the  article  shows  that  the  passion  offered  something  greater  than  the  offence 
committed;  to  the  objection  that  only the  one who has  committed  the  fault  can 
satisfy, Thomas promises that he will explain (presumably in the next question) how 
when two become one in charity, one can satisfy for another, but as a hint he points  
out  that,  unlike confession and contrition which can only be done by the person 
concerned, for satisfaction one can use an “instrument,” which, as Aristotle points 
out, might be a friend.143
Then Thomas defines sacrifice as “something done for the sake of giving 
God the honour owed to him to bring peace with him (ad eum placandum)”, and as 
Christ honoured God with an act of great love, this was a sacrifice.144
Similarly,  redemption  is  defined  as  setting  people  free  from slavery  by 
paying a price, so Thomas shows that human beings were under a twofold slavery 
from which  they  were  set  free  by  Christ's  satisfying  passion:  if  this  passion  is 
considered as some sort of price (quasi quoddam pretium), then they can be spoken 
of as redeemed.145
Before we began this question we already knew that Christ could merit for 
us.  Now we know that Christ's passion is the appropriate action by which to do so, 
for in its bodily aspects it overcomes the impediments, provided that we can justify 
142 ST III.46.5-8.  Or, as Torrell puts it, it was the passion and not any other meritorious act because of 
our weakness.  Le Christ en ses mystères. 2:390.
143 ST III.48.2 cor, ad 1.
144 ST III.48.3 cor.  Torrell translates this tricky phrase as “pour assurer sa bienveillance.” Le Christ  
en ses mystères, 2:409.
145 ST III.48.4 cor.  Hence my remarks at 7.2.2.2 that we can explain our salvation without reference 
to “price,” but  mention of “price” is usefully added afterwards.
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not only sharing in Christ's merit, but also in his satisfaction.  To show this is the task 
of question 49.
7.3.2.4. How the passion makes us one body with Christ
While the question works as a whole, I shall focus on the third article, how 
the passion frees us from liability to punishment, and draw upon the other articles as 
necessary.  The corpus of this article gives nothing new: Christ has freed us both 
directly,  by paying our  satisfaction  (in  a  manner  yet  to  be  fully  explained),  and 
indirectly, in that the passion causes forgiveness of sins (presumably by provoking 
charity, as in the first article), and sin is the source of punishment.146
7.3.2.4.1 Clothing ourselves in the passion of Christ
The first  response points out  that  Christ's  passion must  be applied to  us 
through faith, charity and the sacraments of the faith (and thus it has no effects on the 
souls in  Hell).147  The idea of application carries through into the remaining two 
responses,  but  using the terminology of configuration and conformity.148  We are 
configured to the passion, death and burial of Christ seen as poena (naturally enough, 
as satisfaction is about liability to  poena), but we are conformed to Christ in grace 
and glory.
Thomas  does  not  employ clothing  imagery  here,  but  I  shall  use  it  as  a 
preliminary to a more rigorous explanation.  Let us recall that clothing adopts the 
figura of the one who wears it.  149 The humanity that Christ takes on is humanity 
146   ST III.49.3 cor.
147 ST III.49.3 ad 1.
148 See the discussion at 6.3.4.
149 See 6.3.3.
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liable to the poena of death and bodily suffering, not because he himself is liable to 
punishment,  but  because  this  is  our  humanity,  and  he  is  taking  it  on  for  our 
salvation;150 in doing so it is changed as it adapts to his figure, that is, the outward 
manifestation of his inner reality  -  for it is through the clothes that a person is seen.  
When we look at Christ in faith, believing him to be innocent, the sufferings are re-
configured, for they cannot be punishment for his sins.  Hence Thomas retains the 
idea  that  in  engineering  the  death  of  Christ,  the  Devil  overreached  himself  and 
exposed his injustice.151  This is part of the shift from the Old Law to the New Law, 
for, as Thomas makes quite clear, under the Old Law temporal goods and ills were 
seen as rewards and punishments in themselves, but under the New it is eternal life 
that is seen as the only real reward (and its loss as the only real punishment), and all 
temporal goods and ills can only be evaluated in the light of the eternal.152  Before we 
have been configured to Christ we are under the Old Law, and see the pains of this 
life as punishment.  When we put on Christ, our humanity is configured to his, and in 
particular our sufferings are configured to his sufferings or covered by them;153 when 
we look at our sufferings, we see his, and therefore we do not see punishment, but 
something that helps us on the road to glory, signs of God's love for us.  If anything, 
the sufferings are medicinal, as were Christ's (although in his case, as he needed no 
healing, they are medicinal for others).154
With this in mind, we can now look at those last two responses in the article 
under discussion.
150  ST III.14.1 cor, ad 3; 14.2 cor, 14.3 cor, ad 2.
151 ST III.49.2 cor.  This “fishhook” theory is also found at Super Romanos 8.1 (M609), Super 
Hebraeos 2.4 (M142) and, complete with fishhook, at Super Iob, 40.
152   ST I-II.114.10.
153  Besides this article, see ST III.52.1 ad 2, 66.2 cor, 66.11 cor, 80.10 ad 1.
154 ST I-II.114.10 cor, ad 3 and ad 4.  Thomas compares Christ's sufferings to a medicine for us at ST 
III.49.1 ad 3, and other places, III.31.7 ad 3, 46.10 obj 3, 69.1 ad 3. 
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7.3.2.4.2 Configuration to the passion
The  ad secundum does not mention conformity,  only configuration.   The 
objection is that, if Christ has satisfied for us, satisfaction should not be imposed as 
part of the sacrament of penance.  Thomas replies that in order to gain the effect of 
Christ's passion, we need to be configured to it.155  (There is a step missing here.  The 
easiest way to fill the gap is to say that as every effect resembles its cause, if we bear 
the effect of the passion, we must somehow resemble it.  The passion is a bodily 
thing which will affect us in our bodies  -  the reason for the incarnation was that  
Christ's body could have an effect on our bodies  -  hence we are concerned with the 
outward manifestation or figura.)  Thomas then points out that we are configured to 
Christ's passion sacramentally, and in baptism that configuration is to his death (cf 
Rom  6:4),  and  so  no  further  satisfaction  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of 
configuration  to  gain  its  effect.   But,  as  Christ  died  only once,  we can  only be 
configured to his death through baptism once.  Thus after baptism the configuration 
to the suffering Christ is through “aliquid poenalitatis vel passionis” which penitents 
take on themselves.  This suffices “through the co-operation of the satisfaction of 
Christ.”  This response is about what is appropriate at the level of figura.
7.3.2.4.3 Conformity to the passion
The third objection was that, as death is the punishment for sin, if we still 
die then Christ has not satisfied for us.  Thomas begins his response by saying that 
“the satisfaction of Christ has an effect in us insofar as we are incorporated to him as 
members to the head, as was said above.”156  He is talking here of formal causality, 
155 ST III.49.3 ad 2.
156 ST III.49.3 ad 3.
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whereas the last article was talking of efficient instrumental causality.   Moreover, 
Thomas is clear that the head-members relationship is about the flow of grace.  In 
fact, he could have just mentioned grace, but he has explained that we can talk of 
“satisfaction” because of the head-member relationship, and so he takes that as his 
starting point.  But now when he says “but members need to be in conformity with 
the head,” he makes it clear that this is likeness at an inner level.  Then he goes on to  
explain the likeness, with the parallel “just as Christ” “so also we.”  The likeness is 
about grace and glory: “Just as Christ first had grace in his soul with passibility of 
the body, and through the passion arrived at the glory of immortality.”  The parallel 
follows  -  “So also we, who are his members”  -  and then he deals with the two 
consequences of “membership.”  First of all,  satisfaction: we “are indeed set free 
through the passion from liability to any punishment whatsoever.”  Then conformity: 
“but in such a way that first in our soul we receive the spirit of adoption as sons, by 
which  we are  numbered among those  entitled  to  the  inheritance  of  the  glory of 
immortality, while still having a passible and mortal body; but afterwards, having 
been configured to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are led into eternal glory,” 
which he supports by citing Romans 8:17.
The  role  inheritance  plays  in  the  argument  enables  us  to  examine  the 
reciprocal relation between covenant and satisfaction.  The blood, as instituting the 
covenant, manifests publicly that we are entitled to eternal glory.  The gift is of such 
value (in terms of both gift object and the spirit of the gift) that the covenant promise 
of union with God is believable.  Moreover, for Thomas, only spiritual punishments 
are real punishement, so for those destined for eternal glory, there is no punishment 
(except the self-inflicted loss of glory).  Thus the blood of Christ has removed all 
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punishment.  Further, this process of removing all punishment can be considered as 
satisfaction  because  it  is  achieved  by  offering  something  to  God  whose  value 
outweighs the offence caused by all our sins, and thus the gravity of sin and the order 
of  justice  are  not  upset  in  this  process.   Remember  that,  even  in  human  terms, 
satisfaction is about restoring the status of the offended one in the eyes of others. 
Thomas,  by  taking  satisfaction  as  something  Christ  does  in  his  body,  makes  it 
something that removes an impediment in us rather than something to which God 
responds (as he does to Christ's meritorious charity).  Finally, it can be counted as 
satisfaction because, filled with grace from Christ as our head, we are one body with 
him, we love him, and we see his sufferings as our own, even suffering with him.
7.3.2.4.4 Becoming one body in Christ
Hence Thomas' insistence that God can forgive without satisfaction, but in 
his  mercy  satisfies  for  the  sins  he  forgives;157 for  indeed  he  does  not  require 
satisfaction in order to forgive, but forgives in a way that enables us to look at the 
process of forgiveness as satisfaction, so as to impress upon us the extent of his love 
and the seriousness of sin. It would seem to be in order to emphasise the seriousness 
of sin that the holy souls are not admitted into heaven until Christ descends to the 
underworld.158  And in the same way it is the passion, as conferring forgiveness, that 
constructs the satisfying subject in which we are included.
Once this extended subject, this  persona mystica, has been established, we 
can use it to talk of Christ's offering as the “price” that frees us from sin and so 
redeems us; or as the sacrifice that restores us to friendship, realising always that the 
157 ST III.46.2 ad 3, cf III.46.1 ad 3.
158 ST III.49.5 cor, ad 1.  Cf 7.2.3.
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obstacles to friendship were on our side, and that “placated” needs to be read in that 
light.159
As a final reminder that we are dealing with an “extended subject,” the last 
article looks at Christ meriting exaltation for himself in his passion, which, we recall,  
was what Christ merits in the strict sense of the word, and yet for our benefit.160 
Christ's  resurrection  is  the  cause  of  our  resurrection.161  Christ  merits  ascension, 
through  which  “in  a  way  (quasi)  he  led  us  into  possession  of  the  heavenly 
kingdom.”162  Thirdly, Christ merits to sit at God's right hand and have his divinity 
manifested so that he can be revered as God by all;163 but we are inseparable from 
him in his glory, and indeed we manifest it, like the shining robe that surrounds him 
at his transfiguration, through which his glorious humanity is seen.  Finally, Christ 
merits power of judgement, and this power not only brings justice (presumably to the 
benefit  of the just),  but  his  judgement is  also the occasion of the overcoming of 
death.  Thus Christ's passion is the cause of our salvation through the mode of merit.
Thus  question  49,  taken  as  a  whole,  shows  how  the  passion  brings  us 
salvation, provided that it is applied to us through faith and the sacraments of the 
faith, for it is through these means that we become one with Christ.
7.3.2.5 Bearing the passion of Christ in our bodies
Two corollaries of this should be considered here.
159 We should keep in mind that words related to buying and selling originally referred to the 
redemption of captives, and were only later transferred to commercial trade in objects. 
Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, 105-112.
160 ST III.49.6.  There is both a reference back to III.19.3-4 and, as Torrell notes, an inclusio with 
III.48.1, emphasised by using the same sed contra.  Le Christ en ses mystères, 2:446.
161 ST III.56.1.  In the prologue to Tertia Pars, Thomas notes that it will be divided into three parts, 
the third of which will be “about the end of eternal life, which we reach through him by rising.” 
Thus, if the Summa had been finished, this issue would have been explored in much greater depth.
162 ST III.49.5 ad 4, cf III.57.6.
163 ST III.49.6 cor, cf III.58.2-4.
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The  first  concerns  the  passibility  of  our  bodies  that  remains  until  the 
judgement.  Thomas has pointed out that merit, which has its root in the soul, is more 
fundamental  as  a  mode  of  causing  salvation  than  satisfaction,  redemption  and 
sacrifice, which are based in bodily actions.  And yet it is through the passible and 
mortal body that Christ performs the actions that merit our salvation.  The first in any 
genus is the cause of all the others, and so Christ's journey from grace to glory is the 
cause of ours, and so our journey (the effect) will resemble his.  If Christ's passion 
had removed all the poenalitates, we could still have performed meritorious actions 
-  and indeed ones caused by Christ's passion  -  but they would have only been pale 
reflections of his original meritorious actions, and we would have been deprived of 
the opportunity to show the gratitude that we wanted to show him by reflecting his 
glory as fully as possible.164  Such an answer, of course, can only be understood by 
one who is motivated by the truest gratitude, who is “full of grace,” such as was the 
motivation of countless martyrs.
Secondly, we can now return to an unanswered question: if the pledge of 
future glory responds to the anagogical reading, and the filling of the mind with 
grace to the tropological reading, why does the memory of the passion respond to the 
allegorical reading?  We have seen that one of the key ways the passion works is that  
it enables us see that our true reward is eternal life, and that any good or evil we 
receive in this world can be evaluated as reward or punishment only in this light. 
Thomas uses this insight to argue that although any material reward or punishment 
spoken of in the Old Testament was an actual historical event, it can only be truly 
understood as reward or punishment when taken as an allegory of eternal rewards 
and punishments.  If we fail to grasp this allegorical reading, we shall neither escape 
164   Cf ST III.69.3 cor.
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from a logic and ethic of carnal rewards and punishments, nor will we realise that our 
temporal woes are not punishments from God  -  in fact, we shall still think that God 
is punishing us either directly or through the Devil, and so we shall fail to appreciate 
that we are children of the covenant.  The memory of the passion thus enables the 
allegorical reading which is indispensable for our salvation.
7.3.2.6 The dependence of baptism on the Eucharist
Thus the relation between baptism and the Eucharist is seen more clearly. 
Baptism provides the  habitus of grace and virtues, and the Eucharist,  involving a 
recollection of this gratia, elicits an act from the habitus an act of gratia, or perhaps 
one could say actio gratiarum (thanksgiving).165  Thomas thus holds  -  against the 
custom among the Greeks  -  that there is no point in giving the Eucharist to those 
who cannot understand it, such as infants.166
Thus this approach gives us a way of thinking of baptismal character as a 
passive sharing in Christ's priesthood, for without the configuration of our body to 
the body of Christ, a fruitful reception of the Eucharist is not possible.  We also see 
how being joined to his mystical body corporaliter can enable the reception of grace, 
and thus spiritual membership of the mystical body.
But, if the Eucharist depends upon baptism, so also baptism depends on the 
Eucharist.  Thomas declares that baptism only has an effect because it contains a 
votum for  the  Eucharist,  albeit  sometimes  only  an  implicit  one  (particularly  for 
infants, where the votum is the votum of the Church, just as they are baptized into the 
faith of the Church), something that will be explained at greater length in chapter 
165  ST III.69.6 cor, III.79.1 ad 2, 79.8 ad 2.
166   ST III.80.9 cor and ad 3; Super Ioannem 6.7 (M969).
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eight.167  And  this  makes  sense:  the  habitus exists  for  the  sake  of  the  act;  the 
figurative reception of Christ for the sake of the real reception.
We could put it in Maussian terms: sacraments are offered to us as part of a 
sacramental system, a system of signs that are meaningful as a system.  Baptism 
enables  the  entry  into  that  system,  it  is  the  gift  that  institutes  the  alliance;  the 
Eucharist, recalling the alliance as instituted, is the sacrament wherein the exchanges 
that express and strengthen that alliance take place.
7.3.3 The signification of the sacramental system as a whole
There  are  two  other  points  to  be  made  about  the  signification  of  the 
sacramental system as a whole.
The gift, as gift, does not need to be given.  In particular, what makes an 
object into a gift object is ultimately not anything in the object itself, but the will of 
the giver who, precisely as giver, is not compelled to act.168  In this sense the choice 
of the gift object is arbitrary, in a similar way as the choice of the linguistic signifier.  
This, of course, applies especially for gifts that institute  alliance; once an  alliance 
has been established there is a shared world of meaning that renders some objects 
suitable, expected or even obligatory for certain purposes.  Thomas notes that there 
were sacrifices and sacraments even before the giving of the Old Law, and these 
were chosen in congruity with the time, but with a certain arbitrariness (secundum 
humanum placitum) parallel to that of linguistic signification.  After the giving of the 
Law, things were more determined.169  And although Thomas holds that, in contrast 
to the Old Law, “the decrees of the New Law, which chiefly consist in faith and the 
167   ST III.73.3 cor.
168   Cf ST I.38.
169 ST I-II.102.1 and 2, ST II-II.85.1, II-II.85.4.
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love of God, are reasonable out of the very nature of the act,” it would seem that this  
would  not  have  to  apply  absolutely  to  the  New  Law  as  regards  sacraments; 
particularly as there are things in any law, says Thomas, which do not make sense in 
themselves singly,  but only as part of a larger whole.170  And Thomas, of course, 
believed that the sacramental system as we have it, albeit with some non-essential 
changes, has come down to us as a whole from Christ who instituted it through the 
Apostles, handed on under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.171  Thus in some places he 
draws the meaning of these signs from the way the various parts of the sacramental 
system work.172  In any system of signification, the difference between the signs is 
part of the way they signify, and we find this in the sacramental system too, as we 
shall see in the next sub-section.
7.3.3.1 How Thomas treats the effects of the Eucharist
These two points are important as we come to conclude this chapter on the 
working of the Eucharist.  For, although this explanation of how the Eucharist works 
is based directly on Thomas' explicit statements, it is not the approach that we get in 
the Summa when he deals specifically with the effects of the Eucharist.  The reason 
for this is that our explanation was starting with the Eucharist to try to understand the 
working of  the  sacramental  system as  a  whole,  and was  seeing  baptism and the 
Eucharist as working together.  In the Summa Thomas is considering the Eucharist as 
a  specific  sacrament,  and indeed often contrasts  the effects of the Eucharist  with 
those of baptism.
170 ST I-II.102.1 ad 1, 102.2 ad 3; cf ST III.64.2 ad 2.
171  ST III.64.2 cor, ad 1 and ad 3; cf III.78.3 sed contra and ad 9, and the sed contra to III.83.2, 3, 4, 
and 5. Liam G. Walsh, “Liturgy in the Theology of St. Thomas,” The Thomist 38 (1974): 560-561.
172   E.g. ST III.79.3 ad 2, 79.5 ad 1.
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Thus,  although  we  have  argued  that  what  we  are  presented  with  in  the 
Eucharist is a whole, in the Summa question Thomas seems at the beginning to break 
apart this unity, for he regularly appeals to four aspects of the sacrament to argue for 
its  effects,  dividing  them as  follows.   There  are  those  things  out  of  which  the 
sacrament has an effect,  namely,  (i) that which is  contained (Christ)  and (ii)  that 
which is represented (the passion), and those things through which the sacrament has 
an effect, namely (iii) the use of the sacrament (as food and drink) and (iv) its species 
(bread and wine, which symbolize unity).173
However,  the  division  is  only apparent.   When  he  gets  to  asking if  the 
Eucharist  removes  mortal  sin,  after  a  sed  contra about  eating  and  drinking 
condemnation on oneself, he begins by saying that Christ's passion (the source of the 
sacrament's efficacy) in itself has the power to overcome original sin, with the rider 
that  there  should  be  no  impediment  in  the  recipient.   Then  he  argues  from the 
symbolism of the sacrament to what that impediment would be: as the sacrament is 
given under the form of spiritual food, it  can only be meaningfully taken by the 
spiritually living; as it is about union with Christ, it can only be meaningfully taken 
by one who is not in mortal sin.174  Baptism, on the other hand, is spiritual birth, and 
is given in the manner of cleansing, and so is properly received by those who are not 
yet spiritually alive, and who need to be cleansed of sin.175  It is the system as a 
whole  that  gives  meaning  to  the  various  elements,  and determines  which  of  the 
possible meanings are taken into account.  (For instance, could not the sharing of 
food symbolize reconciliation, rather than eating and drinking symbolizing that one 
173 ST III.79.2 cor, cf 79.1 cor.
174 ST III.79.3 cor.  Here we definitely have the use of the sacrament and the content; the mention of 
being united may be an allusion to the unity symbolized by the bread and wine.
175 ST III.79.3 ad 1.
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is already alive?  Or do bread and wine have to symbolize unity?)
It is only with this approach that we can return to the first article, which 
seems to divide these four aspects and to make some unjustifiable claims in doing so. 
For instance, when asking whether the Eucharist confers grace, Thomas holds that 
since the sacrament is transmitted under the form of food and drink, “every effect 
that  material  food  and  drink  produce  with  regard  to  bodily  life,  namely,  that  it  
sustains, causes growth, repairs, and delights, this sacrament does totally with respect 
to spiritual life.”176  Thomas is clear that a metaphor is alike is some respects and 
different in others, so, even if we hold that sacraments cause what they signify, this  
argument seems weak, if not invalid.  But, as we have seen, spiritual food is the 
primary referent, and material food is food only by analogy, and the Eucharist is the 
bread  of  life  only  because  the  body  of  Christ,  which  it  really  contains,  is 
hypostatically united to the Word; further, this analogous quality of “food” enables it 
to replace material “food” in our economy, and lift it from being carnal to spiritual. 
So the argument should be expanded something like this.  This sacrament contains 
Christ, who brings the life of grace to the world.  But it contains Christ under the 
form of bodily food, so that we, who are focussed on bodies, can perceive and desire 
Christ as spiritual food.  Now, when one considers spiritual food, one can think of it 
as life-giving along the lines of bodily food, not because bodily food is the primary 
referent of “food,” but because we know bodily food better.  Thus, by thinking of 
food, all these life-giving possibilities are open to us: sustenance, growth, repair and 
delight.  And these are the sort of changes (among many) that grace brings about in 
us.  Thus, because we are open to Christ as food, we are open to the grace Christ 
brings in those ways.  This argument is not a separate one from the first point in the 
176  ST III.79.1 cor.
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corpus, that the sacrament contains Christ.   Rather,  it  is  a specification of it:  the 
sacrament contains Christ, who confers grace, and precisely because of the manner 
of use of the sacrament, when we receive it properly, we receive grace.
Now, in the eight articles devoted to the effects of the Eucharist, Thomas 
never simply relies on the fact that it contains Christ and reminds us of his passion. 
In all the articles the attributes of food and drink and of the unity of charity implied 
by the bread and wine play a part, except the seventh, which is about the effects of 
the  Eucharist,  not  as  sacrament,  but  as  sacrifice.   The  earlier  discussion  about 
convenant and satisfaction, which gain their efficacy from the passion, is true, and 
their results are referred to in this question.177  But this question is primarily about the 
application of these things to us, an application that comes about through a union 
with Christus passus, a union of the will (through charity) and through knowledge, 
for it is through signs.  Thomas does not dwell on knowledge explicitly here, but we 
have seen his  opposition  to  the  practice  of  communicating infants;  moreover,  he 
holds that a person who unknowingly consumes a consecrated host (or indeed, an 
animal that does so) does not receive even sacramentally, let alone spiritually.178
177  ST III.79.2 cor; III.79.5.
178   ST III.80.3 ad 3.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A GENERAL THEORY OF SACRAMENTAL EFFICACY
8.0 Reconciling the inductive and the general approaches
The preceding chapter gave an account of the workings of the Eucharist as a 
key to understanding sacramental efficacy in general,  but relied very little on the 
treatise on the sacraments in general found in the Summa, and only referred briefly to 
its  tract  on  the  Eucharist.   Our  approach  so  far  has  been  inductive,  going  from 
specific cases; in the  Summa Thomas starts with the most general and then works 
down to the particular.  It is important to reconcile the results of the two approaches.
This  chapter,  therefore,  will  begin  with  the  key  question,  whether 
sacraments cause grace,  where we shall  see that Thomas is talking about the gift 
object and the spirit of the gift.   Then we shall  consider the cases where the gift 
object of the sacrament and grace are given separately:  fiction and “revival,” the 
votum  sacramenti,  and  the  sacraments  of  the  Old  Law.   As  a  supplement  to 
understanding the sacraments of the Old Law, we shall consider Jacques Derrida's 
approach to the gift,  which will also provide the occasion for bringing together a 
number of other themes, including the very possibility of the gift itself.  The chapter 
and  the  thesis  will  then  conclude  by  returning  to  Chauvet,  arguing  that  he  and 
Thomas actually have a common project, and when that project is kept in mind, the 
comparatively small differences, which Chauvet proclaims so loudly, actually help us 
to see what is lost when we stop speaking of sacraments on causes.
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8.1 The conferral of grace in a unified sacrament
8.1.1 The unity of the sacrament as a sign
Reversing what he said in the Scriptum, in the first article on the nature of 
the sacraments in the  Summa, Thomas places sacraments in the genus of sign, and 
then in the second adds causality, but as signified: “the sign of a sacred thing insofar 
as it is sanctifying human beings.”1  This definition excludes things like sprinkling 
with holy water, but includes the sacraments of the Old Law.2  This implies that it is 
not in their ritual nature that the sacraments of the New Law are to be distinguished 
from the sacraments of the Old, but in their relation to Christ, as we shall see later in 
this  chapter.3  Moreover,  it  presumes  the  connection  with  worship  found  in  a 
definition in Prima Secundae. 4 For sacraments are ordered towards dealing with sin 
and  Christian  worship,  although  sometimes  more  directly  towards  one  than  the 
other.5
Having  established  this,  Thomas  makes  great  efforts  to  show  that 
sacraments are one (despite divisions into word and sensible things; past, present and 
future signfications), and that they should never be regarded as mere things rather 
1  ST III.60.1 cor, III.60.2 cor, cf Scriptum 4.1.1.1.1 cor, 4.1.1.1.3 cor.  This change is discussed by 
Hyacinthe-François Dondaine, “La définition des sacrements dans la Somme Théologique,” Revue 
des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 31 (1947): 219-226.  At 223n 1 he comments that 
some outside the Thomist tradition (Bartmann, Gautier, Pesch) have thought that this is 
introducing efficacy in the definition as the specific difference.  Pierre-Marie Gy OP considers that 
the shift in focus is from the effect of the sacrament (grace) to the cause (Christ).  “Divergences de 
théologie sacramentaire autour de S.Thomas,” in Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris: Image et message de  
saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récents études historiques, herméneutiques, et doctrinales:  
homage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP à l'occasion de son 65e anniversaire, ed. Carlos-
Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira OP (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1993), 427n 9.
2 ST III.60.2 ad 2.  See also Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole OP, “The Importance of the 
Definition of Sacraments as Signs,” in Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments  
and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Romanus Cessario OP, Reinhard Hütter and Matthew 
Levering (Washington: Catholic Univerity of America Press, 2010), 128-130, and Schillebeeckx, 
L'économie, 114-115.
3 Cf Schillebeeckx, L'économie, 142-143.  Chauvet, without reference to Thomas, insists upon the 
same.  286-289.
4 ST I-II.102.5 cor, Schillebeeckx, L'économie, 117.
5 Penance, for instance, directly towards sin, indirectly towards worship, but vice versa with 
baptism. ST III.63.4 ad 1, III.63.6 cor.
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than signs (so it is the meaning of the words, rather than the  voces, that matters).6 
Then there is a question on the necessity of grace, which appeals to our bodies and 
our fallenness  -  this will be important when dealing later with Abraham.7
8.1.2 The unity of the giving of the gift object and of grace
The third question is on the principal effect of the sacraments: grace.  The 
first article asks whether the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, and what we 
learn about how they do is incidental.  We would expect a statement that sacraments 
are an extension of the visible mission that give rise to an invisible mission, or that 
through them a gift object is given graciously that graces us.  In fact, we get the 
latter, but we have to look closely.
Thomas' argument relies on Christic incorporation through baptism (and by 
the same logic through the other sacraments).
One must say that  the sacraments of the New Law cause grace in some way.   For it  is  
obvious that through the sacraments of the New Law a human being is incorporated into 
Christ, just as the Apostle says about baptism (2 Gal 3) “All of you who were baptized in 
Christ have clothed yourselves in Christ.”  But a human being is not made a member of 
Christ except through grace.8
We can take the last  sentence as expressing the same idea as an earlier 
statement: “And this itself is of grace: that it is granted to a human being to be reborn 
in Christ.”9  Sacraments are actualisations of God's grace towards the recipients, and 
thus “cause grace in some [as yet unspecified] way.”
Thomas  opposes  this  result  that  is  achieved  by  the  sacrament  doing 
something (operando) to the mere signifying of a conventional sign (like the lead 
penny), after whose application God produces (operatur) grace in the soul.  We are 
6 ST III.60.6 ad 2l III.60.3; III.60.7-8.
7 ST III.61, especially 61.1 cor, 2 cor..
8 ST III.62.1 cor.
9 ST III.19.4 ad 3.
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then told that  sacraments are instrumental  causes,  and that  the effect therefore is 
assimilated to the principal cause: if God's grace (or God acting graciously) is the 
principal cause, the recipient of the sacrament will end up graced.
This is reflected in the response to the first objection, which deals with how, 
as effects are signs of causes, a cause can be a sign.  An instrumental cause is both a 
cause and, insofar as it is moved by the principal agent, an effect: and as effect it is a 
sign of the principal agent.  We must now apply this to a sacrament like baptism, and 
the application is complicated because the instrumental cause in this case is a sign.10 
We  shall  need  to  distinguish  clearly  between  signs  that  are  arbitrarily  chosen 
(“conventional signs”) and signs that are effects (“effect signs”).
The washing, in bestowing character, is God's instrumental cause, and it is 
an  instrumental  cause  precisely  as  the  conventional  sign  used  by God.   This  is 
exactly the way that the lead penny causes the giving of the hundred pounds, and the 
book the investiture as canon.11  Thomas admits  that  this  is  part  of the way that 
sacraments work, but taken by itself, it is not the way that sacraments cause grace, 
“as is clear from many authorities of the saints.”12
The bestowal of character is not just any sort of effect that God produces, 
but a configuration to Christ for the salvation of the individual concerned (as distinct 
10 Thomas will later explain that words (voces) are instrumental causes that allow spiritual realities to 
be formed in those who receive them.  ST III.62.4 ad 1. The argument obviously extends to other 
signs as well; after all, the very definition of a sign includes causing something in the mind (cf ST 
III.63.1 obj 2). 
11 Although Chauvet goes to great lengths to explain this sort of symbolic conferral of social status, 
Thomas takes it for granted.  Pace William J Courtenay, Thomas does not reject Bernard's analogy 
because he does not appreciate how a power can reside (or at least flow through) an arbitrarily 
chosen object: he rejects it because grace is given in a different way.  “Sacrament, Symbol and 
Causality in Bernard of Clairvaux” in Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought: Studies in  
Theology, Philosophy and Economic Practice, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 111-122.
12 ST III.62.1 cor.  As William J Courtenay points out, Thomas has cited this text from Bernard twice 
before, Scriptum 4.1.1.4.1 obj 1 and ad 1; De Veritate 27.4 obj 1 and ad 1.  As these citations are 
objections, we get a fuller reply, saying that this is true for sacraments as signs, but there is more at 
stake.  Courtenay holds that Thomas becomes less accepting of this text over time. “Sacrament, 
Symbol and Causality,” 118-120.
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even from a gratia gratis data) and so is an effect of God's grace, and thus an “effect 
sign” of God's grace.  We should recall that in the question on  gratia (gratitude), 
effectus was the gift object; this was paired with the more important affectus or spirit 
of the gift.13
God's  grace,  as  we  have  seen,  posits  something  in  the  soul.14  For  the 
moment I shall refer to what is posited in the soul simply as “debt,” because referring 
to its other attributes may cause confusion.  Debt is caused by a gift, and the special 
sort of debt we call grace is caused by a gift that chooses us for salvation, in this 
case,  character.   Thus grace is caused by the sacrament actually doing something 
(operando), that is, by producing character.  Grace is produced by something that is 
an “effect sign” of grace, and so sacraments cause what they signify (efficiunt quod 
figurant).
Thomas has proved what he needs, and stops here.  But grace as debt is 
merely grace as habitus.  For it to become act (and the actus gratiae is thanksgiving) 
the recipient must be aware of the affectus of the donor, and while that nature of the 
effectus will be important, one must also look for some sign in the act of giving.15 
Thus being an “effect sign” is not superfluous to the working of the sacrament, but 
the eschatological aspect of the sacramental sign helps us see what the effectus is for 
and thus appreciate its value, and the way the sacrament recalls the passion reminds 
us  of  the  love  with  which  the  sacrament  is  given  to  us   -   Thomas  insists  that 
sacraments have efficacy from Christ's passion.16  We have seen how important it is 
for the different working of the sacraments that baptism is given by washing, and the 
13 ST II-II.106.5.
14 ST I-II.110.1 cor.
15 ST II-II.106.5 ad 3.
16 ST III.62.5
276
Eucharist  under  the form of  bread and wine.   But the working of  the sacrament 
cannot be reduced to this: sacraments are not merely signs.
The use  of  different  words  to  describe  the  same situation  confirms  this 
reading that places God's desire to give at the heart of the issue, even if it seems to be 
behind the claim of some theologians that character confers a “title” to grace.17
A subject is attributed to an accident bearing in mind that to which it proximately disposes,  
not that to which it disposes remotely or indirectly.  But character directly and proximately 
disposes the soul to carry out those things which are of divine worship; and because these are  
not suitably done without the help of grace (for, as it is said in John 4, “those who adore God 
ought (oportet) to adore in spirit and truth”), as a consequence the divine generosity bestows 
(largitas . . . largitur) grace upon those receiving character, through which they may worthily 
carry out those things to which they are being deputed.  And thus it is better to attribute a 
subject to character bearing in mind the actions pertaining to the divine cult than to do so 
bearing in mind grace.18
Thomas  is  not  here  primarily  explaining  the  causal  connection  between 
grace and character, but investigating the subject of character.19  We first note that the 
bestowal of character and grace are simultaneous, as is shown by the use of present 
verbs and participles (recipientibus, largitur, deputantur).  Grace is bestowed in the 
same act as the bestowal of character and for the same purpose (worship).20  This one 
act  has  one cause,  the  divine  generosity,  emphasized  by repetition (largitas  .  .  .  
largitur).  Something as noble as participation in divine worship cannot but be given 
graciously and thus with grace.21  This is  quite  the opposite  of the idea that  the 
17 John M. Donahue, “Sacramental Character,” 464, and Toshiyuki Miyakawa, “The Ecclesial 
Meaning,” 440.  Schillebeeckx notes that the scholastics may have spoken of a “disposition” to 
grace, but never a “right” or “title.”  Christ the Sacrament, 172n 20.
18 ST III.63. 4 ad 1.
19 Thus he shows that that the essence of character does not lie in its relation to grace, but in its 
marking out someone for worship.  After all, it is res et sacramentum: as res it is a signing, a 
deputation to worship; as sacramentum it is in the genus of sign, and causality should not enter its 
definition.
20 Later Thomas points out the grace follows character as the effect of a form follows its generation. 
ST III.69.10 cor.
21 But, pace A B Boulanger OP, this simultaneity does not mean that character and grace cause each 
other (even if in different ways).  Character is produced graciously, but grace (as something in the 
soul) does not cause character, but perfects it.  “Notes Explicatives” in Thomas Aquinas, La 
somme théologique, Le Baptême et la confirmation: 3a QQ66-72, tr. A B Boulanger OP , Revue 
des Jeunes (Paris: Desclée, 1929), 336-337.
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recipient is in any way “owed” grace or has a title to it.
As for the choice of words here, remember that Thomas does not have our 
terms “spirit of the gift” and “gift object;” affectus is too vague to use here; and in 
this context gratia would pre-empt the answer.  Largitas, which has the advantage of 
having the cognate verb largitur, works well.  However, in both cases we can only 
follow the argument if we already understand his teaching on grace and gift well 
enough to know what to expect.
If we want to compare this to earlier theories, it has elements of both  the 
“intentional dispositive causality” described by Leeming, and “dispositive physical 
causality.”  In the former, “the sacraments express the divine intention to sanctify, 
and by expressing it produce the sanctity expressed;”22 in the latter, “the sacraments, 
by placing the symbolic reality in the recipient of the sacraments, cause a real change 
or 'disposition' which, in virtue of God's ordinary supernatural providence, carries 
grace with it unless there be an impediment of ill-will.”23  The “symbolic reality” is, 
of  course,  the  res  et  sacramentum which  Leeming,  in  a  move  that  anticipates 
Chauvet, would prefer to call a particular “union with the Church.”24  However, the 
very fact that two theories are needed to express what we have covered in one shows 
that, not understanding the unity of the gift, these pre-conciliar theologians were not 
getting to the heart of the matter.  There was still somehow a separation of the giving 
of the gift-object and the giving of the spirit of the gift, revealed in statements such 
as sacraments cause “an infallible designation” that grace should be given.25
22 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 289-290.
23 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 289.
24 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 355.
25 Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 290.  Another attempt at dispositive intentional causality, 
combined this time with a sort of perfective physical causality, holds that in order for the divine 
imperium to heal, etc., in Christ, there must be something visible presented to the one to be healed. 
Hence the human soul of Christ must also imperate, and must do so by positing some external 
sign.  Because the ordained in the Church possess sacramental character, they are habitual 
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There is one more complication to this article.  In response to the second 
objection, that material things cannot affect a spiritual reality like the mind, Thomas 
replies  that  instrumental  causes  have  two  actions,  their  own  proper  one  and  an 
instrumental one in virtue of the principal agent, but that the the instrumental action 
is achieved through the proper one, as a saw makes a bed by cutting.   When it comes 
to baptismal water, as the human being is a unity composed of body and soul, the 
action that touches the body can also affect the soul, and so Thomas can now justify 
the saying of Augustine found in the  sed contra: the water “touches the body and 
washes the heart.”  26 But, especially against the proponents of perfective physical 
causality,  we  must  keep  in  mind  that  this  is  not  an  explanation  of  sacramental 
causality,  even  less  a  suggestion  that  the  water  is  elevated  to  perform  another 
operation.27  Rather, as the citation at the end shows, it  is a reconciliation of the 
Aristotelian category of instrumental cause with the text from Augustine used in the 
sed  contra:  Thomas  often  has  to  reverentially  expound  the  rhetorical  devices 
Augustine uses when talking about effects upon the body and the soul.28
This is one of the more important articles in the Summa, but also one of the 
more obscure ones.  As Lafont laments, “We believe that we find here for the first 
time  since  the  beginning of  our  study a  real  deficit  in  the  construction  of  Saint 
Thomas.”29
instruments of Christ, taken up by Christ as instruments.  Thus when they exercise imperium to 
effect an external sacramental sign (as designated by Christ through the Church) and intend to do 
what the Church does, their signifying action is taken up, elevated by the principal cause (Christ) 
and so has power to act on the human soul.  John F Gallagher CM, Significando Causant: A Study 
of Sacramental Efficiency (Fribourg: The University Press, 1965), 190-220.  That he should talk of 
imperium whereas we talk of gift is the first of many differences.
26 ST III.62.1 sed contra , ad 2.
27 Rudi te Velde makes it perfectly clear that Thomas does not understand instrumental causality in a 
way that gives an additional power and operation to the instrument.  Participation and 
Substantiality, 172-173.
28 For example, ST III.8.4 ad 3; III.62.5 ad 1; Super Ioannem 5.5 (M791), 6.7 (M973)
29 Lafont, Structures, 450.
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8.1.2 Ensuring the unity of the giver
The remaining five articles in this question clarify the first.
Firstly, Thomas makes clear that sacramental grace is different from “grace, 
virtues and gifts”, but only as a specific form of the general genus of sanctifying 
grace, by being directed to specifically Christian goals: dealing with worship and the 
liability to punishment  -  both these activities are symbolic.30  Here  -  and again in 
the last question on the number of the sacraments, where Thomas elaborates a system 
whose apex is the Eucharist31  -  we get a sense of the way the different symbols used 
in the sacraments excite grace in different ways  -  which of course is far more fully 
developed as he treats each sacrament individually.32  For sacraments bestow upon us 
the fulness not only of grace but also of truth.
In  the  next  two  articles,  Thomas  preserves  others  traditional  statements 
about sacraments, but mainly through reverential exposition: they “contain” grace;33 
and  they  have  a  power  to  cause  grace.34  But  this  “power  to  cause  grace”  is 
“spiritual,” that is, at the level of meaning, the way that something proceding from a 
mind can, by something in the sensory realm, a word (voce sensibili), affect the mind 
of another.35  Thomas illustrates this by considering the power the water gained when 
Christ was baptized in it,  and we have already seen that this power works at the 
symbolic  level:  all  water  can  now  symbolize  something  more  because  of  the 
“blessing” it  received at the baptism of Christ.36  These examples would seem to 
30 ST III.62.2.
31 ST III.65.
32 Lafont complains that the theologically richer treatment of the individual sacraments should have 
had a stronger influence on the general question on the causation of grace.  Structures, 450-453.
33 ST III.62.3.
34 ST III.62.4.
35 ST III.62.4 cor.
36 ST III.62.4 ad 3, cf 6.3.3.
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contradict Courtenay's claim that Thomas cannot see that merely conventional signs 
have  power  and  that  this  power  can  cause  things.37  When  Thomas  dismisses 
Bernard's example as being merely about signs, he is not saying that the book given 
to the canon does not cause something, nor that this sort of causality is not happening 
in the sacraments; rather, he is saying that the causality responsible for the grace 
given by the sacrament is of a different kind.38
As far as the remaining questions are concerned, the significant parts of the 
question on character we have already covered, and the question on the cause of the 
sacraments  makes  it  clear  that  God  is  always  the  cause,  as  befits  gifts  given 
graciously,  so  only  Christ  in  his  divinity  can  institute  the  sacraments  as  author, 
although  he  does  so  in  his  humanity  instrumentally.39  By  making  sacraments 
principally actions of God, the lack of grace, or even of faith  -  but not of intention  -  
in the minister does not impede the effect of the sacrament.
8.2 The breakdown of sacramental unity
Thomas emphasizes the unity of the sacrament;  but we need to examine 
those  cases  when  the  bestowal  of  grace  and  of  character  (or  its  equivalent)  are 
somehow separated.  There are three cases in particular of this separation.
 The administration of the sacrament does not immediately bring grace, 
but grace may follow from the sacrament at a later date.  The failure to receive grace 
is often ascribed to “fiction;”  the later reception of grace, when the fiction recedes, is 
often misleadingly referred to as the “revival” of the sacrament.40
37 Courtenay, “Sacrament, Symbol and Causality,” 111-122.
38 As he makes clear at De Veritate 27.4 ad 1.
39 ST III.64.1-2; III.64.3-4; III.64.5, III.64.9; III.64.8.
40 Schillebeeckx in particular objects to this term.  Christ the Sacrament, 147.
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 The votum sacramenti, (a phrase that contains an element of will not 
found in the standard English counterpart “desire for the sacrament”) whereby the 
grace of the sacrament precedes the actual administration of the sacrament which, 
due to, say, intervening death, may never happen.  The question of salvation outside 
the visible Church is a closely related issue.
 The  efficacy  of  the  sacraments  of  the  Old  Law,  particularly 
circumcision, which Thomas considers closely.
8.2.1 The splitting of character and grace by fiction
8.2.1.1 Grace comes with the removal of the impediment
As  mentioned  earlier,  Thomas  talks  of  the  unity  of  the  sacrament  by 
comparing character to a form (like the form of a heavy object) and grace to the 
effect  of  a  form (like  the  falling  of  the  heavy  object).   But  the  comparison  is 
introduced to explain disunity, when this single gift of grace and character is split 
into two through fiction.41  The fiction is  likened to an impediment to the heavy 
object: as soon as the impediment is removed, the object begins to fall, and as soon 
as fiction is removed by repentance, baptism brings grace as its effect.42
Thomas holds that fiction can arise because God does not force his gifts on 
us.  An adult baptized without wanting to receive the sacrament is not baptized at all,  
and should be rebaptized; someone who has a will against the effect of the sacrament 
will  not  receive the effect.43  At this  level the explanation of how the sacrament 
brings about its effect once the fiction stops is easy, as we have just seen.  Although it 
41 Ganoczy has the useful image of the “disturbance” of the communication that should take place in 
the sacrament, An Introduction to Catholic Sacramental Theology, 164.
42   ST III.69.10 cor.
43   ST III.68.7 ad 2, 69.9 cor.
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is still common to talk of the “revival” of the sacrament in such a case, on analogy 
with the “revival” of good works after repentance, Thomas insists that baptism, as 
God's work, was never dead.44
Also from the point of view of gift, someone who receives the sacrament but 
with a will contrary to its spiritual and gracious nature (as distinct from the infant 
who does not receive it with any will) cannot accept it as a gracious gift and cannot 
receive the Holy Spirit as the spirit of the gift.   A person, of course, may accept 
baptism as a gift of a lower sort (for instance, in the hope of physical healing), and 
while that could generate gratitude, it would be “carnal” rather than “spiritual.”45
8.2.1.2 God's will towards the recipient is always gratuitous
But  there  is  something  more  subtle  at  work  here.   Thomas  recalls  that 
“character”  orginally  referred  to  the  brand  on  the  soldier  identifying  him  as 
belonging to one army and not the other, with the brand remaining after the fight is 
over, as a sign of glory to the victors and marking the defeated for punishment; and 
on analogy he argues that character, which deputes us to the cult of God in this life, 
remains after the goal of that cult has been obtained, in the blessed to their glory, and 
in the damned to their ignominy.46  Again, Thomas, following 1 Corinthians, holds 
that reception of the Eucharist has vastly different outcomes for the just and for the 
sinner.47  Just as in the one who is justified, it is a sign of God's favour, so also in the 
one who poses an obstacle, it is a sign of God's will to punish, of God's disfavour.  It  
is  the  same thing,  the  same power,  but  with  two different  meanings.   Thus  this 
44 ST III.69.10 ad 1, cf. III.89.4-6.  Schillebeeckx too insists that this work was never dead. Christ  
the Sacrament, 147.
45   Cf ST III.68.8 ad 3, 69.6 obj 4 and ad 4.
46 ST III.63.5 ad 3.
47 “Sumunt boni, sumunt mali,/sorte tamen inaequali,/vitae vel interitus;/mors est malis, vita bonis;/ 
vide, paris sumptionis/quam dispar sit exitus.”  Lauda Sion, the sequence for Corpus Christi.
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spiritual good can be considered analogous to the temporal goods (and ills), through 
which the good are led to beatitude, and the evil are not.  It has a different meaning in 
a different economy.
Further, Thomas does not talk of God's grace being simply frustrated by the 
one  who imposes  an  impediment,  but  he  talks  of  God  actually  withdrawing  his 
favour;  similarly,  God does not  merely will  to  give a  reward that  is  refused,  but 
actively wills to punish.48  God's gift of character to that person is still gratuitous, in 
the sense of being inscrutable, but given to the person who refuses the effect to which 
it is primarily ordered, it has another effect, per accidens and yet part of God's order, 
and this effect is willed by God for as long as the perverse will of recipient endures. 
There is a “poison in the gift,” and yet the very poison may also be medicinal, as  
God's punishments for those in still on pilgrimage often are.
In the anthropological literature, the “poison in the gift” is debt.  God's gift 
always leaves a debt, but, as Seneca and Thomas note, friends are happy to be in debt 
to each other.49  Reception of a sacrament implies the intention to receive what the 
Church  is  offering,  a  submission  to  the  Church  to  some  extent.   Even  if  it  is 
defective, there must be some “faith” that leads one to ask for the sacrament from the 
Church, although such faith will necessarily be unformed.50  Thus each sacrament 
brings its debt, a set of obligations, but without charity the debt will be a burden.51 
These obligations are incurred even in the case of the baptism of infants, and so the 
children  of  Jews  and  non-believers  should  not  be  baptized  against  their  parents 
wishes, because of the likelihood that they would “return to infidelity,” which would 
48   ST II-II.24.10 cor.
49  ST II-II.106.4 cor, citing Seneca De Beneficiis 4.40.5, 106.6 ad 2 .
50   ST III.68.8 ad 2 and ad 3; Cf Chauvet.
51   Those in the New Law who lack charity will need to be motivated by fear of punishment and 
temporal promises: ST I-II.107.1 ad 2.  Cf 4.4.1, n101.
284
be dangerous for them.52  This danger only makes sense due to the obligation to 
believe imposed by baptism.
As Thomas compares the one who has faith without charity to the ones for 
whom the Old Law was given, the obligations of the Christian life would, for such a 
baptized person, be experienced as the same sort of burden as the Old Law was for 
the carnal Jews, and thus be a means of leading them to formed faith.53
Alternatively, we can consider fiction as a form of hypocrisy, which Thomas 
defines as adopting a persona different from what one is.54  Thus it is an appropriate 
way of looking at falsehood in baptism, when when one should put on Christ.  In 
fact, this hypocrisy means that there are two subjects or personae in baptism, instead 
of one, and I want to suggest that this breaks the unity of the sacrament.  It is also 
worth noting that character arose in theology to explain fiction, rather than to explain 
true baptism.  It is in fictitious baptism that we have one subject giving a gift object  
to another subject, which is the sort of gift that Derrida declares to be impossible, as 
we shall see at 8.3.
An example of the medicinal, almost purgative, quality of a sacrament can 
be seen in the closely related example of someone who receives the Eucharist while 
in mortal sin, but unaware of it,  by, for instance, being imperfectly contrite.  The 
devout and reverent reception of the Eucharist could bring about a grace of charity, 
which  would  perfect  the  contrition  (a  painful  process,  we might  add)  and  cause 
forgiveness.55
52   ST III.71.1 ad 3, 68.10 cor.  Cf the strong obligation on godparents, III.67.8 cor.
53 ST I-II.107.1 ad 2.
54 ST II-II.111.2 cor.
55   ST III.79.3 cor.
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8.2.2 The votum sacramenti
8.2.2.1 The explicit votum
Thomas does not consider receiving grace through the votum sacramenti to 
be  an  exceptional  or  abnormal  thing,  as  we  see  in  his  commentary  on  John. 
Augustine has offered two mystical interpretations of the Lazarus story, in the second 
of which the coming forth of Lazarus is by the act of confessing.  Lazarus comes 
forward, brought to life in the grace of God, but still bound, that is, still reus (liable 
to punishment),  and he is  sent to the disciples (the ministry of the priests) to be 
unbound (by absolution).  However, Thomas notes that some people (quidam) have 
followed through this interpretation to conclude that God forgives sin and absolves 
from eternal punishment through the interior working of grace, and that “priests by 
the  power  of  the  keys  do  nothing  more  than  absolve  from part  of  the  temporal 
punishment.”56
Thomas  rejects  this  position  as  seriously  undervaluing  the  keys  of  the 
Church.  As a sacrament of the New Law, penance must confer grace.  He draws a 
comparison with baptism, where the priest washes and says the words, and Christ 
interiorly baptizes.  He then calls this comparison into doubt, because in most cases 
(plerumque)  it  is  children  who  are  baptized,  but  it  is  adults  who  come  seeking 
absolution, who, “in most cases have obtained remission of their  sins beforehand 
through contrition.”57  But, says Thomas, if we diligently consider things, and take 
the case of adults for both sacraments, there is a parallel at every stage.  For one who 
is perfectly disposed to the forgiveness of sins, the  votum obtains this forgiveness, 
and when they receive the sacrament, although the sacrament, considered by itself, 
56 Super Ioannem 11.6 (M1560-1561)
57 Chauvet has pointed out how a misunderstanding of this leads to a theology of the sacraments that 
makes them more efficacious for people who are “less converted.” Symbol and Sacrament, 436.
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forgives sins, this does not take place here, but rather there is an increase of grace. 
But the one who is not perfectly disposed obtains forgiveness in the act of receiving 
the sacrament through its power (virtus), unless fiction poses an obstacle to the Holy 
Spirit.   And, adds Thomas, things happen “similarly in the Eucharist,  in extreme 
unction, and in aliis sacramentis.”58
Are, then, sacraments only for the imperfectly disposed?  We can return to 
the Eucharist, where things happen “similarly.”  We are familiar with the distinction 
between spiritual and sacramental eating.  Thomas notes that only a human being can 
spiritually receive the Eucharist; although angels desire to be fed on the Word of 
God, they cannot desire the Eucharist or spiritually receive it, because the Eucharist 
is a sacrament, something corporeal.59  Thus implicit in the votum for the Eucharist is 
the desire for spiritual food under the form of material food, and we have seen how 
important  for  Thomas  this  redirection  of  desire  is.   Similarly,  the  votum for  the 
sacrament of penance is not a mere desire for forgiveness, but a resolution to place 
oneself under the keys of the Church so that one's satisfaction would be united with 
the satisfaction of Christ, without which there is no true contrition.60
But if it were simply a matter of redirecting desire, this would not explain 
the way the  votum brings grace.  Grace comes gratuitously; the  votum can only be 
effective if there is a sense of the graciousness of God's gift.  Let us recall that for 
Thomas gratitude can arise for something that is not yet given, merely promised  - 
although of course an even greater gratitude arises when the promised gift is actually 
received.61  The  votum is the response to a sacrament, not yet received, but really 
58 Super Ioannem 11.6 (M1561-1562)
59   ST III.80.2 cor.
60   ST III.69.1 ad 1, 84.7 ad 2, 90.3 obj 2.
61    ST II-II.88.5 ad 2.
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promised and offered,  and so truly given.  And precisely because the  votum is  a 
response, not just  to the gift of the grace of the sacrament,  but to the gift  of the 
sacrament  itself,  it  is  a  votum that  seeks  to  fulfil  itself  when  the  appropriate 
opportunity arises.  There may be reasons for postponing a sacrament: baptism may 
be postponed so that it is celebrated at a fitting time in the liturgical year, and it  
should be postponed to avoid the sin of simony (even if  it  means dying without 
actually  receiving  the  sacrament);62 similarly,  one  may  postpone  sacramental 
reception of the Eucharist so as to be better prepared, but to decide never to receive 
sacramentally undermines the whole concept of spiritual reception, and not to receive 
out of contempt of the sacrament is not the saving  votum at all, but rather a sin.63 
Thus there is no problem with the sacrament re-ordering desire and eliciting gratitude 
before  its  actual  reception,  but  in  both  cases  this  is  only  possible  through  the 
institution and the offering of the sacrament.64
8.2.2.2 The implicit votum
Of course,  so far  I  have spoken of an explicit  votum made by one who 
knows of the sacrament and believes in its virtus.  Thomas also allows for an implicit 
votum.  For Thomas, the minimum content required for faith is that God exists and 
has providence concerning human salvation (basing himself on Heb 11:6).65  From 
what has been said it is clear that this would be less effective in changing desire or 
eliciting gratitude, but its possibility can easily be admitted.  This category obviously 
62   ST III.68.3 cor, II-II.100.2 ad 1.
63  ST III.80.10 cor, ad 3, 80.11 cor.
64 Leeming, despite coming close to our position on sacraments, holds that catechumens receive 
grace because they learn to say the act of contrition.  Sacramental Theology, 357-358.  This sort of 
example shows how, without grasping the working of the gift, one misses the real meaning of 
Thomas' theology of the sacraments.
65   ST II-II.1.7 cor.
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applies to people who have no real knowledge of the Gospel;66 it would also seem to 
cover the people of the Old Law, but at least in one case Thomas admits them as a 
third category, neither  in re nor  in voto, but  in figura.  This will be dealt with at 
length in a later section.
8.2.2.3 For which sacraments can there be an effective votum?
We have seen that reception of grace before the sacrament takes place in 
baptism, penance, “Eucharist, extreme unction and in aliis sacramentis.”67  Thomas 
does not say whether he means “the other sacraments” (all of them), or only some. 
Schillebeeckx holds that it is impossible to receive the effect of orders or marriage 
without  receiving the sacrament itself,  because  one cannot  carry out  the  specific 
functions of a priest or a spouse without having been empowered or authorised by 
the  sacrament.68  However,  not  only  would  that  leave  only  confirmation  as  the 
possible  referent  of  “other  sacraments,”  but,  more  importantly,  it  seems  that 
Schillebeeckx here has not distinguished between the effects of receiving the res et  
sacramentum and  the effects  of  receiving the  res  sacramenti.   The one who has 
received baptism of desire may not carry out the functions of the baptised (such as 
receiving the Eucharist) without first receiving the sacrament of baptism itself, as 
Thomas insists would be the case even if someone were sanctified in their mother's 
womb.69  Nonetheless, they have sanctifying grace and the associated ease in meeting 
66 Thomas is vague as to who would fall into this category apart from the most obvious cases, De 
Veritate 14.11 ad 1, cf I-II.76.2 .  However, Stephen Bullivant argues that later developments by 
Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomeo de las Casas were in keeping with this thought, and prepared 
the way for the declaration on the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church in Lumen 
Gentium 16.  “Sine culpa? Vatican II and Inculpable Ignorance,” Theological Studies 72 (March 
2011): 70-86.
67  Super Ioannem 11.6 (M1562)
68 Schillebeeck,  Christ the Sacrament, 143.  A similar position is held by Leeming, Sacramental  
Theology, 118.
69   ST III.68.1 ad 3.
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the demands of Christian morality  -  they have the res sacramenti without the res et  
sacramentum, character.  Similarly, it makes perfect sense for someone to have the 
res sacramenti of marriage or orders, that is, the grace to carry out the duties of the 
sacrament,  without  having the  res  et  sacramentum,  the  character  of  order  or  the 
participation in the marriage bond.70  We see this time and time again in the person 
who remains chaste until marriage out of recognition of the dignity of marriage as a 
Christian sacrament, or the seminarian who joyfully accepts his duties out of love of 
the sharing in Christ's priesthood that he hopes to receive as a gift.  Of course, such a 
person  may  never  marry,  or  never  get  ordained,  and,  as  these  sacraments  are 
necessary for the life of the Church as a whole, but not for every individual, there is 
also the further possibility that one could be very grateful for the offer of the gift, but  
choose not to receive it.  And this may in fact explain why there is no sacrament of 
religious consecration, for the religious remains faithful to the vow of chastity by the 
grace given to the Church through the sacrament of marriage in a way almost the 
same as the single person before marriage.   By a similar extension, the grace of 
orders extends to the whole Church, enabling its members to experience the ordering 
of the Church as a gracious gift rather than as a burden (and, as a more specific 
example, allowing parents to graciously accept that God has called their son to holy 
orders), even if only a small portion of believers actually receive the sacrament.  And 
this is the richer meaning of the statement that contempt for any sacrament impedes 
salvation even if  its  reception is  not  necessary for the salvation of  all  individual 
believers.71
70   Scriptum 4.26.2.1 ad 5.
71 ST III.65.4 obj 3 and ad 3.
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8.2.3 The sacraments of the Old Law
In explicit contrast with the position he put forward in the  Scriptum, in 
the  Summa Thomas  argues  that  circumcision  not  only,  as  was  commonly 
acknowledged, removed original sin, but also bestowed sufficient grace to overcome 
the effects of sin and to live in accordance with the Law, his argument being that 
even the  smallest  amount  of  grace  is  enough for  this.72  So we can  say that  for 
Thomas there is an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit at circumcision, and thus 
there must also be an invisible mission of the Son.  However, Thomas does not use 
these terms: we need to find these missions by analysing what he does say.
Thomas holds that circumcision works as a protestation of faith.73  If we 
work from Thomas' analysis of both faith and its confession, two questions arise. 
What was the content of that faith? And why did God require circumcision as its 
most  appropriate  form  of  profession?   The  answers  will  shed  light  on  the 
circumstances under which circumcision conferred grace,  and how it  could be an 
occasion of a double invisible mission.
8.2.3.1 Faith and the profession of faith
Circumcision was first  given to  Abraham as  a  sign of his  faith.   The 
content of this faith was that he would be (fore)father of the future Messiah,  the 
source of blessing of all the nations of the earth.74  This faith contains implicitly the 
Trinity (the title Christ implies not only the anointed, but also the anointer and the 
anointing75), the incarnation, and salvation, and so is salvific  -  Thomas specifically 
72   ST III.70.4 cor.
73   ST III.70.4 cor.
74 ST III.70.2 cor and ad 4.
75 ST III.66.6 arg 2, and Super I Corinthianos 1.2 (M34)  citing Ambrose, and with reference to Ps 
44.8.  Thomas often says that the anointing is the Holy Spirit (e.g. ST III.72.2 cor, Super Psalmos 
26.1), and is clear that the Father is the one who anoints (Super Isaiam 61, cf Catena in Lucam, 9.4 
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notes that in the Old Testament not all the people would have had explicit knowledge 
of this content of the faith, but it was sufficient that they believed in the faith that 
their leaders had (who, like Abraham, would have known more through the gift of 
prophecy given to them).76  And Thomas does explicitly note that circumcision was 
the sign of accepting such a faith.77
Profession is the outward act of faith.  It is not absolutely essential, for 
one is joined to God sufficiently by the interior act.  However, it is commanded by 
God, and, as is the case with affirmative commands, the act is necessary only under 
certain circumstances, even though the command to act (under those circumstances) 
is  always  valid.78  Circumcision  is  God's  response  to  the  need  to  separate  the 
believers from those who do not believe, for it is by the time of Abraham that the 
knowledge of God handed on from Adam has become so darkened by sin.79  When 
Abraham's descendants become numerous enough to form a people, then they can be 
given the Law with all its other observances (for a law can only be given to a people) 
and thus experience both the wisdom of the law and also its inability to sanctify, so 
as to prepare for the coming Saviour.80  These are the literal reasons for circumcision, 
to which can be added various others justifying its particular form, such as why it  
takes place in the “member of generation.”81  But there are also figurative reasons. 
While the rite itself of baptism was prefigured by the historical events of the crossing 
of the Red Sea and the pillar of cloud, they had no profession of faith and were not 
sacraments; circumcision prefigured and prepared for baptism as a profession of faith 
(citing Cyril)).  See also his comments on Ps 44 ad locum.
76  ST II-II.2.7 cor, 2.8 cor.
77 ST III.70.4 cor.
78   ST II-II.3.2 cor.
79 ST III.70.2 ad 1.
80 ST III.70.2 ad 2, cf. ST III.1.5 cor.
81 ST III.70.1 cor, 70.2 ad 3 and ad 4, 70.3 obj 1 and ad 1.
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and the rite of aggregation to the congregation of believers.82
Those who are circumcised are thus joined to Christ in faith, but only if 
their faith was in circumcision and the other observances of the Old Law as shadows 
and figures, rather than in the rite itself.83  Indeed, they can be spoken of as part of 
the body of Christ, in that very metaphorical sense of the term we described earlier. 
Since an invisible mission of the Son has the effect of some sort of illumination, it 
makes sense to talk of the act of acceptance of this faith in terms of an invisible 
mission of the Son.  And if the faith truly reaches through to this Word, who is the 
Verbum spirans Amorem, then grace, the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit, surely 
follows.
The fact that Christ was yet to come is not a problem, because faith is in 
the soul, which, through the processes of apprehension and desire, can operate by 
final causes that are still in the future.84
Of course,  those circumcised  were normally only eight  days  old,  and 
incapable of making a personal profession of faith; Thomas holds that some other 
person makes the profession of taking on the Abrahamic faith for them, along the 
lines  of  Christian  baptism.85  Thus  we  must  presume  in  them  some  habitus of 
gratitude, not for a share in Christ's priesthood, but for this profession of faith made 
on their behalf.  The connection with the gift of Christ is getting more and more 
tenuous, and we can see why Thomas, twice in the one article on circumcision and 
justification, speaks of a “more abundant grace” given in baptism.86
82 ST III.70.1 cor, ad 2.
83 ST III.8.3 
84 ST III.62.6 cor.
85   ST III.70.3 ad 3, 70.4 ad 2,.
86 ST III.70.4 cor and ad 5.
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8.2.3.2 Problems with causality
According to Thomas, circumcision and all the other sacraments of the 
Old Law are deficient and weak (egena et infirma) in that they neither contain nor 
cause grace.87  There is a metaphysical reason for this: an efficient cause cannot have 
a retroactive effect: something “that does not yet exist in the nature of things cannot 
have an effect in the order of the use of exterior things.”88  The power of Christ's 
passion cannot flow into a rite taking place before his passion, says Thomas, and the 
same would apply for  his  incarnation.   Thomas therefore insists  that  no grace is 
conferred by the act  of  circumcision as  such,  but  that  it  comes by means of the 
profession  of  faith:  it  is  from  the  faith  signified,  not  from  the  circumcision 
signifying.89  He then points out two other differences arising from the same cause: 
unlike  baptism,  circumcision  does  not  imprint  character  which  incorporates 
somebody to Christ (and so they are incorporated only mentally by faith, but not in a 
bodily way),  and baptism confers more abundant  grace,  as “the effect of a thing 
already present is greater than the effect of hope.”90
Part of the problem with this presentation of circumcision is that Thomas 
so reads the Old Testament in the light of the New that the reader ends up projecting 
Christian faith in the Messiah back upon the people of the Old Covenant, and it is 
hard to see how much more grace is given in baptism than in circumcision.  A similar 
thing happens in the case of the manna and the Eucharist: all who eat the manna and 
all who eat the Eucharist die bodily; all who eat the manna spiritually and all who eat 
the Eucharist spiritually gain spiritual life, so what is the difference?  And Thomas' 
87  ST I-II.103.2 cor, III.61.4 ad 2, cf Gal 4:9, cited frequently by Thomas in this regard.
88 ST III.62.6 cor.
89 ST III.70.4 cor.
90 ST III.70.4 cor.
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answer is that more abundant grace is given from the reality of the gift rather than 
from the figure.91
Sometimes Thomas makes it seem so easy for those under the Old Law 
to acquire grace.  We shall better understand the difficulty (and therefore the “more 
abundant grace” of the New Testament) if we consider from the insider's point of 
view  the  grace  of  one  who  knows  that  he  lives  in  a  world  of  figures  (or 
“counterfeits”), and who has faith in the faith of Abraham, but no explicit faith in the 
incarnation:  and probably no-one has examined this  experience so searchingly as 
Jacques Derrida.
8.3 But can a gift be received?
8.3.1 The incompatibility of the gift and the Cartesian subject
It is widely held these days that  Given Time I presents a critique of the 
gift that renders it impossible.92  One of the few dissenting voices is Jacques Derrida, 
who  protests  that  he  did  not  say  that  the  gift  was  impossible,  but  that  it  was 
“impossible for the gift to appear as such.”93  Closer attention to the text makes it 
clear that the gift cannot possibly appear in our world  -  or appears in our world as 
impossible   -   a world that  consists  of (Cartesian)  subjects and objects.   For the 
subject can only relate to others by dominating (like a king, particularly the Sun-
91   Super Ioannem 6.6 (M954)
92 Most notably, Jean-Luc Marion wrestles with the consequences of this in Being Given: Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness, tr. Jeffrey L Kosky (Stanford: Stanford Universtiy Press, 2002). 
Robyn Horner tries to re-order theology around this premise.  Rethinking God as Gift: Marion,  
Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology (New York: Fordahm University Press, 2001).  John 
Milbank is aware of the subtleties in Given Time I, while finding fault with the critique itself, but 
nonetheless takes this to be its intention, and tries to circumvent it by redefining the gift.  “Can a 
gift be given?” 129-131.
93 Jaques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, “On the Gift: a Discussion between Jacques Derrida and 
Jean-Luc Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John 
D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1999), 59.
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King);94 and its decisions are based upon a calculation of the return it will get.  One 
could only have a gift if there were no giving subject seeking a reward from the act  
of giving (not even the self-congratulation of having given anonymously), and no 
recipient subject who would then be under an obligation to acknowledge the gift, nor 
even a gift object, whose presence is a constant reminder of the gift to the recipient.95 
“A subject will never give an object to another subject.”96  But it is not as though the 
subject  and the  gift  were unrelated,  for  Derrida continues  immediately:  “But the 
subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift.”
In a similar way there is no theory of the gift, no essence or logic of it.  
Mauss had to write about everything but the gift, and it was when he was writing of  
the irrational (especially potlatch) that he was his most illuminating.97  There is about 
the gift always a sense of the irrational, the excessive.
8.3.2 The gift and the subject in Thomas
Such an approach is by no means incompatible with that of Thomas.  For 
a start, Thomas understands the gratuitous as that which exceeds reason.98
Perhaps more importantly, in his writings the subject does not precede the 
gift, but is constituted by it.99  Our true subjectivity is a sharing in the subjectivity of 
94 Derrida says: “The Sun and the King, the Sun-King will be the subjects [sujets] of these lectures.” 
Given Time I: Counterfeit Money, tr. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
1-2; Donner le temps I: la fausse monnaie (Paris: Galilée, 1991), 11-12.  As Derrida stops talking 
of the Sun-King after only a few pages, we should interpret this as meaning that the “subjects” 
who are spoken of in these conferences are subjects who behave like the Sun-King, whose life was 
contemporary with René Descartes and the appearance of the “Cartesian” subject. 
95 Derrida, Given Time, 23-24.
96 Derrida, Given Time, 24.
97 Derrida, Given Time, 38-39, 45-48.
98 See 4.4.2.
99 Of course, our understanding of subjectivity in Thomas is heavily indebted to Allard, whose study 
of the virtue of religion was undertaken in the light of the contemporary critique of the subject 
propounded by Derrida and others.  Allard has eleven citations of Derrida in his introduction. Que 
rendrai-je, 5-29.
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Christ.   In Christ  the gift,  the fact of the union, does not come to a pre-existing 
human subject, but establishes that subject;100 and the return gift which that subject 
makes is an offering of the humanity in which the humanity is itself dissolved, and 
Christ, as we have seen, can seek nothing for himself in his giving, but rather his 
subjectivity is constituted by giving totally for the sake of others, and his gift is a 
giving  of  his  very subjectivity.101  As we noted  earlier,  the  sacrament  splits  into 
giving subject, receiving subject and gift object (the “arrests of the gift”) only when 
it is a failed sacrament, one that does not give grace, one that is not a true gift.
Moreover,  all  this  giving  is  somehow modelled  on  the  giving  in  the 
Trinity.102  There the Father gives the Son all that the Father is (the divine essence). 
But, given that the persons are subsistent relations, there is no subject “Father” or 
“Son” that  can be thought of independently of or logically prior to  the giving.103 
Derrida asks if “give” and its cognates would have a different meaning if what is 
given is  that which one  is rather than what one  has.104  Thomas makes a similar 
distinction, that unlike material goods, spiritual goods can be possessed by many at 
once, so that the giver does not need to relinquish the gift, and many can receive 
simultaneously  -  and this applies in a special way to our spiritual inheritance, which 
is  called an inheritance because it  is  that by which God is  rich.105  Furthermore, 
although the material gift is received in an act of domination (paradigmatically food, 
which  must  be  corrupted  and  become  part  of  the  recipient),  spiritual  gifts  are 
incorruptible, and we receive them by being changed into them.106  To that extent 
100 ST III.4.2-3.
101 See 6.2.
102 See 2.2.1, 4.2.3.
103 ST I.40.3 cor.
104 Derrida, Given Time, 48.
105 ST III.23.1 cor, ad 3.
106 Super Ioannem 6.3 (M895), which refers to 4.2 (M586).
297
they are gifts of identity.
On the other  hand,  for  Thomas all  human action  is  motivated  by the 
desire for a reward: his morality is an economics.  And yet we have seen that this  
economy is an economy of the gift.  We shall see a little later that this does make a 
difference.
8.3.3 The gift and the counterfeit
Forsaking  the  rational,  Derrida  seeks  the  gift  in  fiction  and  in  the 
sacrifice of Abraham, which is for him the paradigmatically unjustifiable act.
As regards fiction, the story Derrida looks at is Baudelaire's  La fausse  
monnaie,  which  Derrida  sees  as  being  about  the  naturalisation  of  literary fiction 
itself.107  Condensing his argument considerably, he notes four points in the story that 
are true of literary fiction as such.
The first is the tobacco shop, the starting point of the story.108  Tobacco, 
as that whose purpose is to be consumed by fire and reduced to ashes, is a symbol of 
excess.  Stories are traditionally told while smoking after dinner, or in similar times 
of excess.109
Secondly,  he  plays  with  the  title  itself,  “La  fausse  monnaie,”  and its 
possible referents and meanings, to remind us that the counterfeit only works when it  
is not identified as such, but when it is unidentified, it works as well as that which it 
imitates would work.110
Thirdly, he notes that the structure both of this story and of literary fiction 
107 Derrida, Given Time, 169-170.
108 Derrida, Given Time, 102.
109 Derrida, Given Time, 107, 109, 111-115.
110 Derrida, Given Time, 124-125, 127-128.
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as such is to somehow provoke the events that it describes.111
Fourthly, he notes, reflecting on the interplay between the characters, that 
fiction invites and obtains trust or credit: it lends wings to the spirit.  But, as we fly, 
we should remember Icarus, whose wings failed him because he flew too close to the 
Sun (the sovereign subject).112
We can start by suggesting that, when it comes to stories, the equivalent 
of excess in Thomas is inspiration, the gift (or spirit) of prophecy that enables the 
speaker to know what cannot be reached by rational inquiry.113  Thus what Derrida 
applies to literary fiction in general, Thomas applies to the Bible.  For Thomas one 
can find allegorical meanings in non-biblical literature, but these are either meant by 
the author, and thus are the literal sense, or else they are not intended by the author, 
and are merely “adaptations” that the reader makes without any real basis in the 
text.114 For Scripture,  the author not only narrates what  happened, but the events 
themselves are arranged by God to convey a message:  “Dum narrat gestum, prodit 
mysterium.”115  The narrative  condition  of  scripture  itself  seems to call  forth  the 
action.116
Now, while a real event can also allegorically represent something else 
(as the manna, a real “food from the sky,” represented Christ, the bread of life) there 
are also events in the Old Testament that are “counterfeit:” the carnal rewards and 
punishments that allegorically represent spiritual rewards and punishments, and yet 
lead to a belief that God is giving a gift, and elicit a response: to use Derrida's phrase, 
111 Derrida, Given Time, 151-154.
112 Derrida, Given Time, 169-171.
113 ST II-II.171.1 cor, II-II.171.5 cor.
114 Super Matthaeum 1.5, cf Super Ioannem 12.7 (M1705).
115 ST I.1 10 sed contra, citing Gregory.
116 ST I-II.114.10 ad 1.
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it may seduce into an alliance (covenant).117  Moreover, the counterfeit differs from 
the real reward and defers the real reward, thus giving time.  And Derrida insists that 
“What there is to give, uniquely, would be called time.”118  Time is necessary so that 
the Chosen People are ready for the coming of Christ, for the Law needs time to 
teach them both what needs to be done and that, on their own, they are incapable of 
doing it.119
8.3.4 The sacrifice of Abraham
For both Derrida and Thomas, the paradigmatic one who enters into the 
world of the gift is Abraham.120
8.3.4.1 Abraham's sacrifice as unspeakable
For Derrida Abraham exemplifies that the way to the gift lies through the 
irrational.  Influenced by Søren Kierkegaard's reading of the sacrifice of Isaac, he 
emphasises the sheer unknowing with which Abraham acts.121  This is an act beyond 
all calculation or justification.  Such an act is only possible for one who believes in a 
personal God as ultimate reference.  The motives for actions for Platonists, for whom 
the ultimate is the Good, an impersonal idea, will always be in terms of ideas, and 
117 Derrida, Given Time, 112, Donner le temps, 144.  For Derrida, the seduction is connected with “the 
desire as desire for tobacco and a certain work of mourning linked to the incineration of the 
remainder.”
118 Derrida, Given Time, 29, emphases removed.  Further, Mauss confirms that what is given in the 
gift is time. 37-41.
119 ST I-II..6 cor, ad 1, I-II.106.3 cor.
120 Here we start relying on The Gift of Death, tr. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995).  In a “Prière d'insérer” at the front of the French edition (Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 
1999)), Derrida insists that this is not the second volume of which Giving Time I: the False Coin, 
was clearly the first.  However, Derrida of all people should know that an author's work is beyond 
the author's control.
121 Søren Kierkegaard, “Fear and Trembling,” in Fear and Trembling; Repetition, tr. Howard V Hong 
and Edna H Hong (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
300
therefore could be justified before others who grasped these ideas.122  But Abraham is 
called by a personal God; he finds himself in a totally asymmetric relationship.123 
Within this personal call, no reason need be given.  Abraham is silent about what he 
will do, not because he could speak and chooses not to, but because what he will do 
is  unspeakable;  no word can express it,  even to  Abraham.124  As a  consequence, 
Abraham can expect nothing from his action, not even the satisfaction of knowing 
that he has done the right thing, because he does not know this, and at the level of 
knowledge, of reason, what he is doing is unethical, even “monstrous.”125  The gift 
object is not given, but rather is to be destroyed in the giving.  And the recipient is 
utterly unknown, unable to be objectified; indeed, even to consider God as a subject 
would be idolatry.126  If subject A giving object B to subject C is the action which 
cannot  possibly  be  a  gift,  then  Abraham's  sacrifice  falls  out  of  the  zone  of 
impossibility on all three counts.127  If then Abraham does receive something  -  the 
return of his son  -  then this is not exchange within the old economy, but something 
quite other taking place in completely different register.128  This new economy even 
restores the subject that was eclipsed in the act of giving, for in this economy God, as 
the condition of possibility of the interior secret that makes such giving possible, “is 
the  absolute  “me”  or  “self”  [est  «moi»  absolu],  he  is  that  structure  of  invisible 
interiority that is called, in Kierkegaard's sense, subjectivity.”129
122 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 60-63, cf 24-28.
123 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 72-73.
124 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 74.
125 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 85,
126 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 108.
127 Derrida, Given Time, 11.
128 Derrida, The Gfit of Death, 71-72, 94-95, 107.
129 Derrida, The Gift of Death, 109, Donner la mort, 147.
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8.3.4.2 The seduction of Abraham
There is something quite noble in this reading, where Abraham risks all 
for nothing, but its very nobility is its problem.  It seems to place the initiative in 
generosity with Abraham, and it has lost sight of the role of the counterfeit.  Thomas'  
reading places the initiative with God, because the call to sacrifice is in the context of 
the promise to  Abraham that  he would be the (fore)father  of the Messiah.130  As 
Abraham's line was to continue through Isaac, the call to sacrifice was irrational, but 
obedience to it meant an implicit faith in resurrection.131  Similarly, it was a call to do 
the unethical except that God is in charge of life and death, and all human lives are 
forfeited to him on account of original sin, so that it is possible that another human 
being might be asked to carry out the sentence.132  It is through these counterfeits that 
Abraham is given wings, and yet (if we can mix our metaphors) in mid-flight an 
angel stays his hand, and it is at this point, insists Thomas, that he realises that both 
the  call  to  sacrifice Isaac and his  being saved from death are figurative.  133 The 
command  not  to  sacrifice  enables  a  spiritual  reading  both  of  the  command  to 
sacrifice and of the saving of his  son that the command not to  sacrifice literally 
brings.  Derrida has argued that the gift is the impossible, that we cannot decide to 
step outside the circle of the economy, but then holds that Abraham did so; this may 
explain his  insistence that  The Gift  of  Death is  not  the sequel  to  Giving Time I. 
Thomas is equally adamant about the impossibility of such a purposeful decision, but 
there is no paradox: Abraham was seduced.134  Thomas insists that there is a real 
130 ST I-II.102.5 ad 1.
131 Super Hebraeos 11.4 (M605).
132 Super Hebraeos 11.4 (M604); cf ST II-II.64.6 ad 1.
133 Super Hebraeos 11.4 (M606).
134 Of course, Thomas does not say this directly, but he does present the impossibility of choosing 
spiritual goods because, turned to material goods, we do not know them, and he does speak of 
Christ as a “seducer” precisely in regard to this turning of desire.  Super Ioannem 4.3 (M586), 7.2 
(M1030-1032), with reference to Jer 20:7 “You have seduced me.”
302
humiliation in accepting salvation through material things:135 Derrida, by preferring 
to imagine that  Abraham did the impossible rather than suffer the humiliation of 
seduction, has shown how potent the fear of that humiliation still is.  Even Thomas 
seems to have struggled with it; otherwise, we might have had a clearer statement 
that the reasoning justifying a request from “God” to kill another in sacrifice ceases 
to  be  possible  through  the  very  movement  from the  carnal  to  the  spiritual  that 
Abraham underwent on Mount Moriah.
8.3.4.3 More abundant grace
This respect that Thomas has for Abraham and the other patriarchs and 
prophets, this insistence that their faith is the same as our faith, makes it hard to 
imagine the real difference between the sacraments of the Old Law and those of the 
New.  Thomas' understanding of the power of grace pushes him to acknowledge full 
justification through circumcision, even though it threatens the necessity of the New 
Law which he wants to uphold.136  We can see this also when he compares manna and 
the Eucharist: all who eat the manna and all who eat the Eucharist die bodily; all who 
eat the manna spiritually and all who eat the Eucharist spiritually gain spiritual life, 
so what is the difference?137  Derrida, by highlighting the difficulty Abraham would 
have had in communicating his experience (even if he is a little excessive), and the 
difficulty of getting a counterfeit to work while at the same time recognising it as 
135 ST III.61.1 cor.  Thomas here gives three reasons for the necessity of sacraments: to learn through 
our senses (as is natural), to be humiliated (cf the humiliation of the fires of purgatory Summa 
Contra Gentiles 4.90.4), and to be given good bodily exercises to keep us from bad ones, such as 
the cult of demons  (Cf ST I-II.101.3.cor).  We can consider Abraham's sacrifice as a similitude of 
a demonic cult, and thus humiliating as a reminder either of where he would be without grace, or 
of how before grace he was able to be seduced into this act and, in realising it was only figurative, 
to find grace.  As this is a constitutive part of sacraments, we can now see why corporeal 
sacraments would have been inappropriate before the Fall, even though it is natural to learn 
through the senses. (ST III.61.2 cor) 
136 ST III.62.6 ad 3, III.70.4 cor, where Thomas gives the reason for his change of position.
137   Super Ioannem 6.6 (M954)
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counterfeit, shows how hard it would have been for the average Jew to have fulfilled 
the conditions that would make circumcision a profession of saving faith.  And this 
helps us to understand what Thomas meant by saying that when the figure is replaced 
by the reality in Christ, there is “more abundant grace.”138
For Derrida, because Abraham's experience is intrinsically irrational and 
incommunicable, there is no content to his faith; following Kierkegaard, faith needs 
to begin anew in every generation, not only in its act, but also in its content.139  There 
can be no definitive revelation.   Thus while Derrida has great admiration for the 
Sermon on the Mount as a “cardiotopology” (a teaching on where to place the heart), 
Jesus can no more bring us into the world of the gift than can Abraham; for if the 
word of the New Testament becomes law, we are still in an economy.140  Derrida 
remains an Old Testament prophet (one of the most illuminating of the 20 th century), 
urging us not to place our hearts in the counterfeits of outward things, and pointing to 
a world beyond.  This is understandable in a Jew, but there are also traces of it in 
Chauvet.
8.4 Conclusion: Chauvet and Thomas
8.4.1 Economy or non-value?
In chapter two we laid foundations for the rest of our study of Thomas. 
By seeing the threefold nature of truth, we were prepared to understand later both 
that sacraments effect a threefold liberation, and also that Thomas is aware that the 
literal sense is not sufficient, that symbolism in the religious field is not a superfluous 
embellishment, but a true human need.  The investigation of the exitus-reditus pattern 
138 ST III.74.4 cor.
139 Derrida, The Gift of Death, 80.
140 Derrida, The Gift of Death, 98, 109.
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gave us a way of looking at reality that was not “productionist,” and in which grace 
and gratitude would be an integral part of being a rational creature.  In both cases we 
showed that there was substantial room for agreement between Thomas and Chauvet.
This  was not  the case in chapter  three.   I  chose the term “economy” 
precisely to express the role that price and merit have in Thomas' account of human 
action.  Therefore, when we investigated the gift in chapter four, and grace in chapter 
five, these were seen as refining our idea of the economy of human action and human 
interaction with God, not as alternatives to this economy.  For Thomas, there can 
only be charity when there are things of great price; for Chauvet, symbolic exchange 
takes place in a realm that knows no price, and grace is not only a non-thing (with 
which Thomas would heartily agree), but also a non-value.  Both of them see grace 
as gratuity that is not complete without a counter-gift,  and yet the counter-gift is 
freely given;  both of  them see our  human subjectivity constructed through ritual 
means; and yet these insights are received in two quite different ways.
In fact, Chauvet's approach to the gift and symbolic exchange does not 
come from Mauss, but despite of him.  For Chauvet sets up an opposition between 
commercial  exchange,  where the value of the things  exchanged matters,  and gift 
exchange, as typified by the kula, which “is of a completely different order from that 
of the market place or of value.”141  It is not easy to square this with Mauss' remarks 
about the vaygu'a exchanged by the Trobriand islanders as  “valuable and coveted,” 
of  a  “superior  and  sacred  nature.   To  possess  one  is  'exhilarating,  comforting, 
soothing  in  itself'.   Their  owners  handle  them and  gaze  on  them  for  hours.”142 
Chauvet admits that he has been influenced by Jean Baudrillard.143  In his theory 
141 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  100.
142 Mauss, The Gift, 22.
143 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  103-104
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there are four “logics of value,” but between the first three (usage value, exchange 
value and value/sign) and the fourth (symbolic exchange)
there is no articulation, but radical separation and transgression, or eventual 
deconstruction  of  the  forms  which  are  the  codes  of  value.   Properly 
speaking, there is no symbolic “value,” only symbolic “exchange,” which is 
defined precisely as something else, and beyond value and code.  All form 
of  value  (object,  merchandise  or  sign)  must  be  negated  to  inaugurate 
symbolic exchange.  Here is the radical cut in the field of value.144
Admittedly,  there  is  a  marked  difference  between  gift  exchange  and 
commercial exchange, but not one so radical. There also seems to be the implication 
that, unlike the other three, symbolic exchange is intrinsically virtuous in itself, but 
this contradicts the established phenomenon of “agonistic” exchange.  Nor can gift 
exchnage be justified on the grounds that the obligation to return is “usually to a third 
party,  who will  in  turn offer  the  return-gift  to  a  fourth,  and so on.   Thus riches 
circulate endlessly from top to bottom, reaching all levels and all domains.”145  This 
alleged return to a third party is not found in Mauss;146 although the original gift may 
be  handed  on  to  a  third  party  (as  in  Ranapiri's  example,  and  as  in  the  kula), 
nonetheless, the original giver does not consider himself repaid thereby, but expects 
to receive his own counter-gift, as is the whole point of Ranapiri's discourse on the 
hau.147  Chauvet is trying to give a justification for gift-exchange  -  reminiscent of 
the modern “trickle-down” arguments to justify capitalism  -  and it is significant that 
only here,  in  an  excursus  into  utilitarianism,  the  objects  exchanged  are  valuable 
(“riches”).
Chauvet  seems  to  be  projecting  an  idealised  antithetical  opposite  of 
144 Jean Baudrillard, Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 144, 
147.
145 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  102.
146 Except, in a later development, as alms to the poor as a way of repaying a god.  Mauss, The Gift, 
15-16.
147 Mauss, The Gift, 8-10.
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capitalist commercial exchange onto archaic gift exchange, without acknowledging 
that both are in need of transformation, which Thomas, with the whole tradition, does 
by  using  words  such  as  “price”  and  “merit”  in  a  way  that  subverts  them. 
Interestingly, Chauvet himself recognises that the outright rejection of a traditional 
term  that  is  highly  susceptible  to  dangerous  interpretations  may  create  further 
problems in its wake.  Although appreciating Girard's powerful insights (who would 
not?)  he  thinks  that  in  eliminating  (sacrificing?)  sacrifice,  Girard  has  deprived 
theology of a useful concept, of Christ's sacrifice as “quite a singular sacrifice” that 
can  serve  as  an  anti-sacrifice  that  both  teaches  generosity  and  yet  counters  the 
dangerous notions.148  Yet, despite the Gospel parable, he insists, “there is no treasure 
in the field.”149  Instead,  there is only work, and it  seems that grace cannot even 
sweeten or lighten it, because grace is the work itself.150
Chauvet's  denial  of  value  could  and  probably  should  be  read  as  the 
moment of  negation before an affirmation by way of pre-eminence:  value in the 
spiritual economy is totally different from value in the carnal economy.  But Chauvet 
does not explicitly make this step; rather, he is very wary of any presence of God in a 
graspable way that could be construed as giving us some object from the spiritual 
realm that would have value.
8.4.2 Penance or reconciliation?
This difference has an effect when we deal with the subject matter of 
chapter  six.   We  could  put  the  difference  very  simplistically  by  saying  that  for 
Thomas sacraments are means by which we share in the subjectivity of Christ, for 
148 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  302-308.
149 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 442.
150 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  440.
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Chauvet we find receive our subjectivity in the Church, the body of Christ.   The 
difference is subtle, and indeed as far as baptism goes, Chauvet could probably take 
any statement from Thomas and explain it in terms of his system.  We do find a  
difference, however, when we come to the sacrament of penance.
Chauvet holds that the res et sacramentum here is reconciliation with the 
Church. 151 Admittedly, many others before him have said the same, but it particularly 
suits his sacramental theology, for it becomes an example of a symbolic exchange 
affecting our relation with the Church also bringing about a new relation with God, 
without anything being “caused.”  There are many reasons for holding this, not least 
that  sin is  an offence against  the Church as well  as  against  God,  But there are 
problems, not mentioned by Chauvet, but at least referred to by other writers who 
adopt this position.  Karl Rahner, for instance, notes that the res et sacramentum here 
is precisely the lifting of an excommunication;152 and yet does not ask why it is also 
possible to have a re-admission to Holy Communion that is non-sacramental.  For 
there are two such cases: the lifting of a formally imposed excommunication, and the 
reception of a baptized non-Catholic into full communion; in both cases, although 
sacramental confession is a preliminary to the action, the admission to communion is 
a  non-sacramental  rite.   On the other  hand, there is  no non-sacramental  rite  that 
confers the  res et sacramentum of the other sacraments, incorporating one into the 
Church,  for  instance,  or  conferring  holy  orders,  or  establishing  an  indissoluble 
marriage bond.153
Secondly, just as in the three cases mentioned above, although one can 
151 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 432.
152 Rahner, “Penance,” 133-134, 136.
153 One can have a non-sacramental marriage, say, between a Catholic and one non-baptized, but 
precisely as non-sacramental, this marriage does not create an indissoluble bond.
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receive the res sacramenti through a votum, this does not entitle action that presumes 
the res et sacramentum  -   specifically, the unbaptized cannot be admitted to Holy 
Communion  -  so the theologian should justify the Church's position that in certain 
extreme  circumstances  a  penitent  sinner  who  cannot  go  to  confession  may 
nonetheless receive Holy Communion.154
Thirdly,  for Chauvet it  is the community that operates throughout the 
sacrament: the community welcomes the penitents, prays for them, and “the minister, 
acting as the servant of the Church's action, as the bearer of the assembly's 'symbolic 
capital,'  pronounces  the  word  of  forgiveness,”  and  does  so  performatively.155 
Admittedly, he does so under the authority of the absent God, but what he does in 
Chauvet's description is a juridical act which becomes sacramental because it is an 
act of the Church.
For Thomas, sin is an offence against God and God's honour because it 
violates God's order, and part of its pardon is for the order to be restored through an 
act of satisfaction.  (If, as Chauvet insists, everything is symbolic, so also is sin, or 
rather, sin, as a failure to be, is a failure to symbolize, and so it needs to be addressed 
symbolically.)  The role of the priest is to accept the contrition and confession of the 
penitent and, by the words of absolution, configure the satisfaction of the penitent to 
the  satisfaction  Christ  offered  on  the  cross.   It  is  this  that  makes  the  action 
sacramental, for in every sacrament there is some configuration and conformation to 
Christ's passion.156  Christ thereby reconciles us to God  -  and to the Church157 (but 
154 Leeming refers to the exception, and justifies it not theologically but by an appeal to canon law. 
Sacramental Theology, 363.  Rahner mentions the prohibition, but not the exceptions.  “Penance,” 
131.
155 Chauvet, 435.
156   Cf Scriptum 4.26.2.1 obj 3 and ad 3.  Although this is found in some writers who hold 
reconciliation with the Church to be the res et sacramentum (Leeming, Sacramental Theology, 
363-364), the idea does not occur in Chauvet.
157 As has been argued by Emery, “Reconciliation,” 173-192.
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not juridically: the lifting of a juridical excommunication requires a distinct juridical 
act).  For Thomas the prohibition on receiving Holy Communion comes from mortal 
sin, not from an alienation from the Church as such.  The sin can be forgiven before 
the sacrament (but not apart from the sacrament), which is why he allows reception 
of the Eucharist  -  in very restricted circumstances  -  with only the intention to go to 
confession.158
Of course, Christ is mentioned in Chauvet's account, but as absent; in 
Thomas' version he is present and active, and thus spirans Amorem.  It is Chauvet's 
description of the sacrament that is more strongly institutional.
8.4.3 Spirit and institution
Chauvet ends up being more institutional because he tries to escape the 
juridical by seeking refuge in the symbolic, even though he has noted that symbols 
are  both  instituted  and  instituting.   Just  as  gift-exchange  can  be  agonistic  and 
destructive, symbols can be oppressive, and one of the reasons for the development 
of the law and commercial exchange was to set people free from the burdens of a 
purely symbolic society.  Chauvet is also right in holding that true freedom comes 
from the Holy Spirit,159 but Thomas is right in insisting on the inseparability of the 
missions.  Chauvet tries to make room for the Spirit by avoiding giving too much 
attention to Christ,160 and this, combined with his anti-metaphysical bias, is why he 
says Christ is present in the sacraments in the mode of absence.  But that leaves 
Christ present as authorising, and “merely” symbolically, and thus only through the 
institution as an institution.  If a role for the Holy Spirit is then sought, it will either  
158 Scriptum 4.17.3.1.4 cor.
159 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 513.
160 Chauvet, 468-470.
310
be to validate the acts of the institution (which Chauvet opposes) or to act against the 
institution,  an  interpretation  to  which  Chauvet's  statements  about  the  Holy Spirit 
leave themselves open.
8.4.4 True bread
In chapter seven we explored the workings of the Eucharist in the light of 
Thomas' threefold understanding of truth.  It was a study of Thomas on the Eucharist 
without referring to substance and accidents, except to note that, in his exposition of 
John 6, Thomas does not use the terms either.  Rather than focussing on metaphysics, 
we looked at the symbols, and through them at  economics.  We saw how Thomas 
used the terms like “true bread” to redirect our desires and, through the Eucharist, to 
establish  a  spiritual  economy to  which  the  economy of  bodily  things  would  be 
merely accessory.  We considered being enriched by an inheritance that is pledged to 
us.  And we learnt how to recall Christ's passion, in which his blood was the price for 
our  redemption  and satisfied  for  us  sinners.   Such an  exploration,  understanding 
Thomas on his own terms, also puts us in a position to dialogue with Chauvet, who 
quite deliberately rejects the metaphysical approach in order to develop a symbolic 
one.  We can begin by comparing how each of them reads the symbolism of bread.
Thomas, following the Gospel, starts at the most material level: hunger, 
toil, the desire for bread as desire for bodily life rather than bodily death, and uses 
analogy to talk of an as yet unidentified spiritual food offering eternal life, of which 
bodily food is only an pale imitation.  The two work in a different way (“unlike 
ordinary food, you will  be changed into me”).  He thereby converts our desire to 
something  that  he  identifies  as  the  Word  of  God,  doing  God's  will,  and,  in  a 
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derivative way and surprising way, the Eucharist, given by the Son of Man.  He then 
shows that  this  does not  exclude being busy about  bodily bread,  but  puts it  into 
perspective.  He also mentions another aspect that is not found in the text at that 
point, the unity of the Church.  That the “true bread” is so different to bread made 
from wheat is essential to the working of this sacrament.
Chauvet  mentions  bodily  hunger  and  desire  for  bodily  life  not  to 
transform them or to seduce through them, but to leave them behind.161  He presumes 
already a level of conversion in which it is the more symbolic aspects of bread that 
attract  us,  and  then  points  out  that  these  symbolic  aspects  are  most  fulfilled  in 
symbolic exchange that includes God.162  The sacrament no longer testifies to our 
conversion  from bodily things  to  spiritual  things.   There  is  no transformation of 
desire taking place here, no conversion, no surprise, no humiliation, because there is 
no  new  object,  no  new  way  of  working,  even  at  a  symbolic  level,  only  an 
intensification of what was present.  While Chauvet is strongly eschatological, his 
vision is one of the kingdom, not one of divinisation and seeing God “as he really 
is,” whereas the promise of the beatific vision is an ever-present theme of Thomas 
theology.163
Chauvet  has  Catholic  faith,  and he  realises  that  his  theology,  like  all 
theology,  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  msytery.   He  himself  admits  “This  symbolic 
approach is obviously insufficient for expressing the significance of the Eucharistic 
presence. . . . We will never be able to pass from the offering of bread as a gesture of 
161 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 396-397.
162 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament,  397-398.
163 Labbé notes the absence of divinisation as a theme in Chauvet.  “Réceptions théologiques,” 412-
413, 423-424.  AN Williams holds that divinisation is a major theme for Thomas. “Deification in 
the Summa Theologiae: A Structural Interpretation of the Prima Pars,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 
219-255, and The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
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God's  gracious  gift  to  God's  Eucharistic  offering  as  the  mediation  of  Christ 
himself.”164  Chauvet is right in saying that his symbolic approach should be judged 
on  its  own  terms,  rather  than  be  condemned  because  it  does  not  say  what  the 
metaphysical approach says;165 but we can be critical when his use of the symbolic 
approach fails to do what Thomas does with a symbolic approach.  If we start with 
Thomas' comments on John, we can then read the metaphysical approach we find in 
the  Summa as  explaining  that  a  gift  is  really  given.   And if,  like  the  Trobriand 
Islander, we want to gaze on our gift-object for hours, then, as Thomas specifically 
argues, transubstantiation guarantees that the Eucharist is worthy of true latria.166
8.4.5 Full of grace and truth  -  the value of causality
Walsh claims that Chauvet's attack on Thomas is something of a literary 
device, and I must admit that I am using Chauvet himself in a similar way.167  This 
thesis is not about Chauvet, but about Thomas; Chauvet serves to place what I say 
about  Thomas  in  the  context  of  contemporary  Catholic  theology,  to  sharpen  the 
questions and to establish common ground for dialogue.  Chauvet acknowledges that 
words like quasi in Thomas indicate that the mystery he is trying to explain exceeds 
the categories of Aristotelian or any other metaphysics, and so provide a warning to 
any interpreter who thinks that the thought of Thomas can be neatly systematized; we 
also  need  to  give  full  weight  to  Chauvet's  protestations  that  his  approach  is 
“obviously insufficient,” that “baptismal grace cannot be reduced theologically to the 
symbolic efficacy of a language act,” that his proposal “is in no way a reduction of 
164 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 398.  Emphasis in the original.
165 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament 398-401.
166 ST III.75.2 cor.
167 Walsh, “The Divine and the Human ,” 362n 15.
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grace  to  the  socio-linguistic  mechanism of  symbolic  efficacy.”168  Like  Thomas, 
Chauvet's work requires careful exposition, but that would require another doctoral 
thesis.
But  to  make  use  of  this  “literary  device”  one  last  time,  what  does 
Thomas gain (or lose) by appealing to the causality that Chauvet rejects?  Putting the 
question another way, Thomas' motive is fidelity to the tradition: even if causality is 
an  element  of  the  tradition  liable  to  misinterpretation,  what  is  the  danger  of 
suppressing it?
Summarising what has been explained at greater length already, we can 
say that both would agree that the res et sacramentum takes place through a symbolic 
action  that  is  somehow  both  an  action  of  Christ  (both  recognise  the  need  for 
institution  by Christ)  and an action  of  the  Church.   (Although this  is  weaker  in 
Thomas, there still must be the intention to do what the Church does.)  Furthermore, 
the formation of the res et sacramentum cannot be reduced to symbolic exchange at 
the anthropological level: both insist upon the role of the Holy Spirit.  Chauvet is 
clear on this with regard to baptism and Eucharist; the case is not so clear with regard 
to  reconciliation,  but  this  is  probably  the  point  of  the  emphasis  he  makes  on 
communal  prayer:  the  reconciliation  is  not  simply the  work  of  the  priest  or  the 
community acting  in  their  own capacity.    However,  it  is  clear  that,  to  make  a 
generalisation, Chauvet prefers to consider the res et sacramentum in terms of one's 
place in the Church which is the body of Christ, whereas Thomas would consider it  
as a sharing in the priesthood of Christ that has some effect on one's place in the 
Church.  In both cases it has a radical effect on our subjectivity.  Both of them would 
also hold that what is taking place here can be described better in terms of signs or 
168 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 398, 439, 443.  Emphasis in original.
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symbols rather than causes, and that what is produced is some sort of status or sign, 
or (a term both use) a consecration.
Both  would  also  agree  that  this  consecration  is  a  gift,  gracious  and 
gratuitous,  and  that  this  gratuity  and  graciousness  would  be  frustrated   -   more 
specifically,  we would be frustrated  -  if  there were not some grateful response: 
indeed,  so great  is  the  gift  that  the  response  must  be  one of  our  whole  lives,  a 
response will continue throughout our whole lives.  Neither of them shrinks back 
from  insisting  that  this  response  will  be  difficult  because  of  the  effects  of  sin 
remaining  within  us  and  in  the  world  outside;  nonetheless  this  difficulty  finds 
meaning in the paschal mystery.  This is where both would find grace, and neither of 
them would dare call  grace a “thing.”  But Thomas says  grace has been caused, 
whereas Chauvet recoils from using the word: what difference does this make?
We can examine the difference according to the threefold understanding 
of truth and liberation.
Truth sets us free from the figure and from slavery.  If sacraments do not 
cause grace, Thomas says, then we have a situation like that under the Old Law, or 
like the one described by Derrida, and indeed Chauvet's continued talk of the absent 
Christ or the absent God is reminiscent of Derrida.  The Old Law sacraments were 
described as weak, and to deny causality is to deny that from the sacraments there 
comes a power (potentia and not merely  potestas)  which can assist  us to live as 
Christians.  It is not surprising that Chauvet equates sacramental grace with work. 
And, despite his citation of Heidegger that before the God of ontotheology “humans 
can neither fall to their knees in fear, nor play instruments, sing or dance,”169 joy is 
very rarely mentioned in Symbol and Sacrament.
169 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 62, citing Martin Heidegger, Identité, Q. 1, 306.
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Truth sets us free from error and vice.  This is perhaps best displayed by 
the two approaches to the Eucharist; only Thomas' approach seriously tackles the 
error of materialism.  To deny causality would be to deny that God, working with 
material elements, transcends them, and so the sacraments would fail to teach us to 
set our heart on that transcendent end, whereas they should lead us from hunger for 
bread to hunger for the Word of God.
And truth sets us free from corruption and decay.  Grace is a sharing in 
the divine nature, a pledge of the future glory of eternal life.  It is not simply spiritual 
rather than corporeal goods that we set our hearts upon, but union with God.  In this 
context we should note that, as a correlative to cause, Thomas also talks of the effects 
of the sacraments, and he divides them into primary (grace) and secondary (character 
or, presumably, any other res et sacramentum).  In other words, there are priorities in 
the  way we think  about  and celebrate  the  sacraments,  and Thomas  pushes  these 
strongly.   These  priorities  strongly  relativise  the  res  et  sacramentum,  be  it 
membership of the Church, holy orders, the marriage bond, or even the Eucharistic 
body and blood of Christ.   This is  utterly consistent  with his  whole approach to 
human action, which is based upon the quest for divine beatitude, or that charity is 
above all love for God, and that we love ourselves and others in charity because God 
loves us and them.  Chauvet has to stress that the Eucharistic esse is always an ad-
esse, and in doing so would seem to downplay the presence it contains, its value, its 
adorability.  Indeed, in a world where value is denied, the appearance of any value, 
the presence of any good, would be a danger.  Chauvet locates the incarnation safely 
in the past, and believes that for the present God would not lead us into temptation or 
seduce us.  In contrast, the economy Thomas presents to us is highly ordered, so that 
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anything of value comes from God, honours God and leads us back to God.
And there are in this world things of great price.  For Christ has come, 
full of grace and truth, indeed overflowing with it.  Sacramental causality claims that 
this overflow continues.  Thomas insists on it  -  et  avec quelle force!
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